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ABSTRACT
This work is concerned with the coverage of Le Monde during a
troubled historical phase: the Algerian war under the Fourth
Republic. The Algerian war, Le Monde and the French Fourth
Republic are all keypoints of reference in French political
life and culture. Based on a corpus representing the entire
output of Le Monde, this thesis sets out to examine Le blonde's
claims that it was at the forefront of the decolonisation
struggle. The methodology used is that provided by Laswell's
investigative programme, Who says what, to whom and with what
effect, updated and adapted for this purpose. The thesis unco-
vers the newspaper's bias in the portrayal and discussion of
the protagonists: the army, the FLN and the civilian popula-
tions on both sides of the Mediterranean. An important dimen-
sion of the analysis relates to the coverage of civil liberties
and the paper's position on the use of wide-scale repression
and torture; and discusses the implications for press freedom.
The analysis shows that in many respects these were undefended
and their champions sacrificed on the altar of national inter-
ests and Raison d'Etat. The conclusions reached challenge the
view that le Monde's coverage was critical of government and
authority over Algeria, particularly Guy Mollet's administra-
tion. The analysis shows how progressive and challenging views
propounded by some intellectuals were rejected, or minimised in
favour of a more traditional and reforming discourse which did
not seriously undermine French prestige. The overall conclusion
reached, contrary to conventional wisdom, is that Le Monde did
not construct a view of the Algerian war under the Fourth
Republic that was fundamentally different from that propounded
and circulated by official sources notably by the military.
This analysis challenges an on-going myth, that le Monde's
position was both radical and pro independence. This work,
written primarily with the British social scientist in mind,
combines insights from the historian, the political scientist
and the media analyst. It gives priority to the political and
historical -rather than the linguistic- aspects. It is the only
work to span the whole of the Fourth Republic, and the only
contribution in English to comprehensively address the politi-
cal and historical context of Le Monde.
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SECTION ONE: THE CONTEXT





Modern societies are crucially underpinned by mass-media and
communications, which impinge on every aspect of our lives,
economic, social and political. Media research seeks to under-
stand and account for the nature of mass-media processes, their
role and impact on societies. Within this framework, the aim of
the present study is to consider a particular coverage of print
media -Le Monde- during a particular colonial conflict, and to
analyse its reporting of matters relating to the Algerian war
during the French Fourth Republic.
This introductory chapter consists of three parts: the first
subsection provides a brief overview of the literature relating
to both Le Monde and Algeria, together with a succinct review
of the literature on mass communications and methodologies. The
approach, presuppositions and methodology chosen for this study
are outlined in the second subsection. The third subsection
sets out the corpus, structure and presentation of the study,
and its rationale.
1.2 .Historiography
1.2.1.Literature on Le Monde 
There was a renewed interest in Le Monde at particular
moments of its history. Articles were published about its
financial and organisational difficulties, its move to the Rue
Falguiére and Ivry from the Rue des Italiens, and its moderni-
sation)- In adddition, a number of books and articles have been
1
devoted to this newspaper. However, this number is small given
the importance of the paper. 2 There have been serious, compre-
hensive studies of the paper, reinforcing the academic value of
the topic. 3 A comparative study has also been made by Padio-
leau. 4
A thirty-year-old study and crucial book by Abel Chatelain5
provides invaluable insight into how Le Monde functioned under
the Fourth Republic.
Books by journalists include Michel Legris, 6 whose impar-
tiality is slightly suspect, Edouard Sablier, 7 and Jacques
Dolleans. 8
The literature on Le Monde and Algeria consists of two
dissertations and two books. A Master's dissertation covered
1945 to 1954 9 and a doctoral thesis looked at Le Monde and the
whole of North Africa. 10 As for the two books, both written by
journalists, one, by Alain Jacob, covered the period 1958 to
the immediate post-independence era, 11 and the other, pub-
lished in 1989, consists of a collection of articles from Le
Monde and testimonies about the Algerian war, gathered by P.
Eveno and J.Planchais. This latter book is rather thin on
articles covering the earlier period and offers a rather selec-
tive coverage of the Algerian war. 12 This could also be said of
the 147th issue of Le Monde - Dossers & Documents -which con-
stitutes a post-war assessment rather than a contemporaneous
account. 13 Planchais, an already well-known historian of the
French Army, wrote another book upon his retirement from the
paper. 14 Much earlier, another journalist, J.Lacouture, who was
in charge of the North African desk from 1957, explained his
reservations in a book that retraced his long and distinguished
career. 15
2
A few books were devoted to the founder and director of the
paper, amongst which was a biography by Laurent Greilsamer
(1990 ), 16 a study by Bruno Remond17 and a published series of
discussions. 18 Finally, there is a book on H.Beuve-Mery and de
Gaulle by Beuve-Mery himself and another by Sainderichin on Le
Monde and de Gaulle(1990).19
1.2.2.  Sources on Algeria 
As Maynadies reminds us, 2° Alfred Halpern has pointed out
that "certainly more books have been written on what was once
French North Africa than on most regions of the continent" .21
More have been written since. Indeed, a plethora of books and
articles exist on the subject.22
This literature on Algeria is to a certain extent proble-
matic since a great deal of it stems from a particular perspec-
tive - that of the dominant ideology.
With the exception of one or two major contributors, Alger-
ian history in general, and particularly the Algerian struggle
for independence, has been covered mostly by French authors
with a bias evident in any literature written predominantly
from a colonial outlook or background.
This is not to say that no outstanding work has been done by
French historians, such as the late Charles-Andre Julien,
Charles Robert Ageron, and, more recently, Benjamin Stora.
Charles Andre Julien's contribution spans more than fifty
years, and sets the scene for later work. It is much too
voluminous to be listed here. 23 His most acclaimed Afrique du
Nord en marche (1952) has for a long time constituted a stan-
dard reference work on Algeria. This study was complemented by
another French scholar, Charles-Robert Ageron, whose recent
work, Histoire de l'AlOrie contemporaine, is now available in
3
English. 24 More recently, Benjamin Stora has devoted his un-
doubted historical skills to treating the various aspects of
nationalism. Yves Courri6re and Jules Roy have also made major,
though more journalistic, contributions. Others, like Andra
Nouschi, enriched the early debate on Algerian nationalism.25
More recently, he seems to insist more, (wrongly, in my view),
on the idea of a "mythical" Muslim life and nation prior to
colonisation. 26 Many more works deserve mention, and these are
listed in the bibliography.
In addition, it must be said that there have been important
contributions to the Franco-Algerian debate from outside France
and Algeria. In this respect, Swiss, 27 German, 28 American and
British scholars'contributions should be mentioned.29
A debate over the last twenty years has encouraged the study
of Algerian history from a different perspective. Efforts have
been made to fund research institutes, to organise conferences
and colloquia, debates in the press, finance research projects,
and to encourage Algerians themselves to engage in research.
The aim was to encourage Algerians to write their own history,
rather than to have it written for them by Europeans. The
process is not so much to Algerianise Algerian history as to
decolonise it.
More and more Algerians are taking up the challenge. Some
remain caught up in the colonial framework." Others go too far
in their anti-colonial discourse. Many Algerian authors have
begun to make a significant contribution in this field. 31 Now,
there are more varied sources available; and it is possible to
tackle the subject in a more serious and dispassionate way.
This has been facilitated by the healing impact of time and the
benefit of hindsight.
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Outstanding amongst the general bibliographical works is
that provided by Richard Lawless(1976, 1980 and 1991). 32 Simi-
larly, Maynadies made a major contribution in establishing his
"bibliography of bibliographies" (l989). 	 have been a
number of earlier historiographies, which make a useful contri-
bution to the study of the nationalist and colonial phase of
Algerian history. 34 A British scholar gave an exhaustive as-
sessment of the work on Algeria in the English language. 35 Of
particular interest to this study is the work done on the
actual discourse of the Algerian war by Denise Maldidier in
terms of a diachronic and synchronic analysis of the language
and concepts used.38
In the present study, the analysis of the views and images
portrayed in Le Monde is also compared with others appearing in
contemporaneous publications, books, journals, periodicals, as
well as newspapers and radio broadcasts. 37 A number of these
are sometimes echoed in Le Monde itself. The use of more
recent publications relating to the topic, as illustrated below
(and in the bibliography), stems from the desire to include
serious publications in the analysis which relate to the period
examined and which are relevant to the topic.
In terms of archival sources, those made available have been
published by writers such as Harbi(1985), Mandouze (1977),38
but some archives were destroyed during the conflict (for
instance, the fire in the Algiers Library in 1962), while other
archives still remain closed.
Discussions and interviews with many authors, including
Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Andre Nouschi, Benjamin Stora, Jean Lacou-
ture, Jean Planchais and Andre Mandouze, have helped to com-
plete the picture.
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1.2.3 Mass communication research 
Although the broad contours of this multi-dimensional
field39 can be easily defined, a thorough investigation calls
for a multidisciplinary analysis involving linguistics, psycho-
logy, sociology, social psychology, politics, history and many
more disciplines.
Laswell's work, subsequently refined, made a major contribu-
tion. Information Sciences have taken enormous steps forward
since he defined a programme of investigative questions:
<< Who says what, to whom, in what channel, and with what
effect?>>. 40
Many pioneering works have paved the way for research in the
field during the last forty years.41
Investigating the sender of the message (Who) has opened up
a series of questions. 42 Is it a single individual, a group of
people, an organisation? What is the structure of the organisa-
tion? What are its financial and political links, its ideology?
Who are the proprietors of the medium, the organisers, the
journalists, those who transmit the message via the medium (the
air waves for radio and television or the printed media)? What
influences, backgrounds or ideologies have shaped their lives?
A vast array of answers has been proposed to these questions.
However, apart from a few cases, like that of Macluhan,43
who refocussed attention on the "who" component, this aspect
has not retained the attention of scholars. 44 The trend in
research communication has tended to concentrate on the second
component of Laswell's question: the "what," 45 and on the
language of the newsmedia.46
Once the "Who" has been defined, attention must turn to the
content of the message, its characteristics, its physical
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aspect, its symbolic nature, its environment, its synthetic
effect, its tone, its credibility, and the potential for iden-
tification that it holds.47
Content analysis (CA) was soon to be spurred on by the
increasing ease of access to the mass-media and the increasing-
ly pervasive nature of the phenomenon.
CA can be investigated along two lines: quantitative analy-
sis measures the surface devoted to articles, to texts and
titles, illustrations and publicity, while qualitative analysis
endeavours to obtain value judgments and introduces the notions
of intensity and significative value, surveying the vocabulary,
style and presentation of facts and arguments. It also makes
comparisons with other models, verifications by tests in order
to reconstitute intentional and implicit content, the connota-
tions of the message and the way it is understood.48
However, while CA can give a reasonable account of the
differential behaviour of a group of press organs, 48 it has
serious shortcomings, and a number of problems have been high-
lighted.
There is no entirely satisfactory method for CA. Each medium
(in this case, each newspaper) is different in its shape,
physiognomy and individual character. Each period has its own
style of journalism, and the current affairs field presents
each event and problem in an entirely original context."
Consequently, very few studies using CA alone have led to
significant findings for the elucidation of any general theory
of mass communication. 51 However, the researcher can still
formulate and conduct analyses in such a way as to be able to
draw conclusions of statistical and sociological significance.
It has been pointed out, nevertheless, that the most fruitful
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analyses are not always the most rigorous, nor those made by
people who are the most concerned with the technical, quantita-
tive and statistical aspects of their empirical work or by
those who are afraid of taking liberties with some of its
aspects 52
Another major finding in the field is that researchers,
primarily trained in the literary field, have felt the need to
acquire new techniques and disciplines more adapted to their
work.
Francois Mariet commented on the poor findings of limited
monodisciplinary training that:
Le resultat c'est une littêrature pedagogique
aseptisêe ou ne reste que le piment d'une qónoncia-
tion souvent ethnocentriste des contenus.5'
The communication channel becomes the subsequent focus of
the research. Radio, television, and the press (newspapers) are
the main ones, and each of them has particular ways of communi-
cating its message, its own method, with different advantages
and disadvantages. Radio, for instance, has the advantage of
speed, print is relatively permanent, while television is
perhaps more easily digestible an can perhaps achieve the
greatest impact.54
In some studies, researching the audiences is of primary
importance. Apart from studies of audiences under fascist and
totalitarian systems, which preoccupied some scholars in the
thirties and the forties, more recent studies constitute a
literature in themselves. Researchers, both academic and
commercial, often stimulated by commercial pressures, have
multiplied work in the field in an attempt to account more
accurately for, and understand, the readership of newspapers
and magazines, and audiences of particular television or radio
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channels. Determining social categories, age group and sex,
political persuasion, purchasing power, and many other charac-
teristics has become a legitimate and substantial field of
enquiry.55
The final question to be asked, which overlaps somewhat with
the last one and is, to a certain extent, contingent on it,
relates to the impact of the message.
The study of the mass-media impact has from the start been
linked to understanding the means and processes of social
control. 56 Many sociological studies looked at the complete
process of communication. This calls for an informed awareness
of the structures and processes inside and outside the world of
communication, and not just the public's reactions to the
media.57
In this field, so much depends on the methodology selected
and the theory or model that underwrites it. For instance, some
would opt for a cultural rather than an institutional orienta-
tion.58
Other analysts followed a behaviourist approach, especially
during the 1960s, when they looked at the impact of the message
being transmitted to the audience, because they considered it
to be a "stimulus" and viewed the message receiver as an isola-
ted being subjected to a "magnetic field of ideas, slogans and
symbols". This is now universally considered to be flawed.
Others gave the receiver of the message a more determining role
in the content of the medium, and followed a more functionalist
approach.59
An increased emphasis has progressively been given to the
message being transmitted, and to the context in which this
takes place. Efforts have been made to widen the analysis to
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encompass what the public does with the content/message, what
it expects of it and what it thinks of it."
In terms of effects, both media 61 and proprietors are linked
generally to the world of business for which the maintaining of
the status quo, of order and stability, is seen as essential.
Such features tend to be considered, perhaps wrongly, as exclu-
sive features of democracy. The need to maintain the status quo
is even more crucial in societies where communication is under
the control of a single party. Controversy, reformist, and
revolutionary trends are reflected in media content at times of
upheavals and major tensions, as in wars and revolutions.62
Another factor highlighted by research is the fact that
sensitivity and permeability to the media are highly selective
processes - since the ultimate media censorship is operated by
the audience/readership itself. People tend to read, watch and
listen to material which largely corroborates their beliefs,
values and interests. 63 When media messages contradict their
beliefs, they tend to ignore them, shut them away, pretend
ignorance of them, or interpret "badly" such alien messages
which may be a source of discomfort or hostility. 64
People usually tend to choose their newspaper and, to a
certain extent, contribute to its continued existence, success
or downfall, which tends to produce a "boomerang effect". In
practice, however, the reader has no control over the newspa-
per, short of discontinuing purchase or subscription, writing
to the editors, or putting a bomb in the hallway.65
1.3. Research Problems and methodological choices (aims and
methods)
1.3.1. The problem of objectivity
A major hurdle in an investigation of this kind is the
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notion of objectivity or bias. The literature on this subject
alone is vast.
It could be said that objectivity in journalism does not
exist. Many, like Doris Lessing, have a very poor view of
journalists; they are alleged not to be concerned about the
truth and spend much time reading each other, and merely
repeat what others have said."
Other researchers have insisted on the fictional nature of
objectivity in journalism and on the fact that the media could
not really be objective, as journalism is not a science but an
art, c'est A dire un mélange de techniques et de bricolage.67
It has also been argued that journalists cannot be independent
of the subject they are reporting. 68
Indeed, Hubert Beuve-Mry himself, the founding-father of Le
Monde, the paper forming the basis of the present study, is
reported to have said that objectivity did not exist, but that
honesty was an essential tool for a journalist to do his job."
If a bias is taken for granted from the start, then the next
task consists in investigating the nature of the bias, of its
rationale, its aims and objectives. This would constitute a
legitimate approach.
However, many still consider Le Monde to be a newspaper
offering the most objective coverage.
L'important est de voir pourquoi "Le Monde"
(titre qu'on ne sêpare jamais en France et ailleurs
des adjectifs <prestigieux> et <respectable›)...
pourquoi ce quotidien est attaque... en raison de
l'austêrite prude de sa presqptation, ainsi que de
l'objectivite de son langage."
It is very much the "sacred cow" of French journalism, whose
coverage very few dare question, and which constitutes much of
the compulsory daily reading diet of the most significant or
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educated members of French society.71
Conversely, it is possible to argue that, on the one hand,
journalists are not "value-free", since they are the product of
their own historical circumstances and, as with writers, the
words they use can explicitly or implicitly construct or
reflect to a great extent their values and beliefs. 72 One would
expect to find images or mirror images of such constructs in
the reports they write, the opinions they express, and in the
overall content of the newspaper for which they write.
On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect a newspaper of
the standing of Le Monde's, which enjoys considerable financial
and political independence, to reflect fairly the variety of
views expressed and to be more able than many other media to
state opinions and produce factual reports in which the subjec-
tive element has been minimised.
Even in 1991, some outspoken critics of the media maintained
that Le Monde was more "serious," had more of an objective
stance than any other newspaper. 73 If this is still the case,
and this is debatable, was it always so, especially over Alger-
ia?
If one is to look for it in the paper, objectivity should be
understood as distinct from "neutrality." It is not simply the
presenting of a variety of views, or an array of opinions out
of which each reader will find "their part of the truth," or
would dismiss them all for an "obvious interpretation infused
in the presentation of the document".74
It is understood that the differences outlined for the
readers must include contradictions; 75 and that objectivity, in
the sense of fairness of information, implies that the infor-
mation provided must not only be correct and reflect all opi-
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nions, but it must also reflect them in equitable
proportions.76
Much of the media, attached to the erroneous and traditional
conception of objectivity as neutrality, attempt to hide the
inadequacy of their reports by presenting it as the natural
form of information. 77 But it is clear that objectivity in
journalism appears as much more than a strategy of caution, a
refusal to commit oneself, under the pretext of a "very strin-
gent morality" or "faultless intellectual honesty". The rejec-
tion of this type of objectivity in no way implies a complacent
attitude towards bias and supposes a falsification of verifi-
able facts. 78
Neither does objectivity mean, either, that the journalists
should merely report factually. To separate information from
commentary is viewed as a "total aberration", since informing
means to give meaning, signification, and to throw light on a
particular topic.79
However, this raises a whole series of problems: which
elements are to be highlighted?" The choice of subject, the
selecting of information, the adoption of a moral tone, the
series of explanations used to make the information "under-
standable" -all constitute areas in which subjective elements
can take over and objectivity recede.81
1.3.2. Problems of disinformation and misinformation
The reading of newspapers is not "innocent" ,82 but the
journalist shares responsibility for what the reader concretely
makes of the message transmitted by the information incorpora-
ted in the newspaper. Often the journalist has a determinant
role. 83
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There are ways of deliberately misleading the readers or of
disinforming them, ranging from printing outright lies, to
making far-fetched parallels or comparisons, from insinuating
to printing what the reader wants to read, from excessive
resorting to the use of the conditional mood of the verb to the
immoderate use of ambiguous or vague and even misleading con-
cepts.84
There are many others. 85 Indeed, a major problem, as far as
journalists are concerned, is that in informing their audience,
they run the risk of misinforming them. Journalists work under
pressure and have very little time for checking details."
On the other hand, it is also true to say87 that journalists
do not simply repeat information they receive without sub-
jecting it to their critical judgment. Because of the lack of
time for analysis, they may fall back on "a series of old
certainties," not to say prejudices and misconceptions.88
Sometimes, because of the perceived readers's need for clarity,
they may forego very necessary nuances in their reports.89
Audiences can be misinformed, irrespective of the state of
media technology. This was illustrated by the Gulf war (Jan-
uary-February 1991), when information was under strict military
control, as it soon became clear even in the most serious
press. This feature has always been present and can be ex-
plained by various factors."
Misinformation may be explained partly by the fact that
newspapers represent both a commodity that has to be sold and
information that has to be delivered. This concern has been
denied by Claude Julien, who stated that "Le Monde was not a
capitalist firm, in the business of giving dividends to share-
holders 11 . 91 It is clear, however, that the paper could not
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survive, short of borrowing and jeopardising its independence,
if it were not financially viable.
Some of the "errors" made by journalists are due to the
confusion which sometimes occurs between projected and real
events being put on the same level or on a level where it
becomes difficult for the reader, consciously or subconscious-
ly, to distinguish between them.92
Problems of verification, a "crucial procedure" for the
journalists and the "guarantee of the quality of information"93
and the lack of accuracy, can lead to misinformation. Even if a
piece of information can be cross-checked by reference to
several sources, it can still have originated from a single
source or interview. Furthermore, using several press releases
(panachage de plusieurs dOpêches) is not a guarantee that the
various sources have not taken the same inaccurate or false
information. 94 Government statements do not necessarily provide
the truest or the most reliable sources of information 95 and
well-informed sources, more or less genuinely well-intentioned,
may well turn out to be a single person.
Misinformation can also be caused by a lack of information
relevant to the context. 96 It can also be caused by a surfeit
of information which may end up confusing the readers, giving
them too many elements to make sense out of them. There are, of
course, other elements situated outside the informational
field. These may include factors of misinformation and may
shape or influence the judgement of journalists.97
1.3.3. Objectives and methodological choices 
This research is concerned with the content of the newspa-
per, Le Monde. Some essential quantitative aspects of CA of the
topic under consideration here have already been addressed.98
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The limitations of a purely positivist approach can, never-
theless, be easily demonstrated 99 as very often this method is
not cost effective l " and lacks explanatory power. Furthermore,
it has rightly been pointed out that systems of random sampling
may distort the analysis. The pitfalls of statistical work and
random selections have already been highlighted by other scho-
lars' pseudo-scientific use of figures.101
An initial attempt to use these frameworks 102 through a
random selection of reports, editorials, pages, confirmed that
their usefulness was limited in the context examined. 1" In
order to uncover the reality of the paper, its ideology, its
trends, themes had to be followed, step by step, to see if
there was any evolution in the way news was perceived by its
analysis of events. It has to be said that the safety of fig-
ures is of little comfort when one is trying to comprehend what
is beneath the surface of a text, with its connotations and
implications)-04
Therefore, this work consists essentially of a qualitative
analysis which looks at the written discourse, at both the
objective and the subjective elements, at the use of words and
concepts in a synchronic and a diachronic movement, and at the
ideological frameworks in which they operate.1°5
Taking to heart Voyenne's advice to the Press researcher, 106
the task was to adopt a coherent plan and to follow it metho-
dically through its various stages.
On the whole, the approach did not seek to select a sample
of reports and editorials. Instead, it analyses the whole of
the newspaper output at the time, 1 " with a view to revealing
what the paper was trying to tell its readers, to determine
what the paper said, and what it did not say. The author's per-
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spective on the whole is an objective attempt to analyse and
dissect coded as well as explicit messages, covering the most
significant themes in the paper -those most frequently used, as
well as those played down and neglected. The research tries to
assess to what extent the attitude adopted by the newspaper
during the War of Independence through the series of themes
identified was, or was not, a colonial attitude. It tries to
dissect the message conveyed to the readers informing them,
helping them to inform themselves, assessing the situation for
them, but also making judgments on their behalf. An attempt to
draw conclusions and provide a tentative assessment of the
possible impact, or lack of it, on the readership has also
been made in the light of some comparisons with other contem-
poraneous publications and media. The intention is to reveal
what kind of discourse was used, what sort of images, views and
opinions were being presented by Le Monde on a wide range of
related subjects.
The analysis and the findings relating to various topics or
themes l" are presented under the various chapters and headings
in this dissertation (with the necessary cross references).
These provide for a comprehensive, if not exhaustive, account
of the subject studied.
The analysis and insights will help draw much firmer conclu-
sions concerning the ideology and attitudes, explicit or impli-
cit, as they were produced and reflected by and in Le Monde.
1.4. Research corpus, structure, presentation and rationale
1.4.1. The corpus, structure and presentation 
1.4.1.1.	 The corpus
This research examines Le Monde's coverage of Algerian
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issues during the War of Independence, until the end of the
Fourth Republic (May 1958). In the light of the methodologies
and problems outlined above, the work will cover Le Monde (who-
Chapter 2), its reporting of Algeria (what Chapters 4-14) to
its readers (to whom-Chapter 2), and will try to draw some
conclusions on the possible impact or lack of it. It must be
emphasized that, like Lebrazi's, this work seeks to avoid
falling into the Laswellien paradigm of limiting research to
studying and evaluating the influence and impact of techniques
on the public. It is considered more fruitful here to examine
the mass-media phenomenon in its context, as the discourse
produced is the product of particular conditions likely to
determine a text, or at least have an impact on it:
(..) pas seulement le locuteur dans sa persona-
lite psychologique, mais la situation dans laquelle
le texte est emis, depuis la relation psychosociale
entre emetteur et rócepteur, ou situation re-
streinte, jusqu'A la situation generale,0,gavoir le
contexte social ideologique et politique."'
The channel of communication (in what) is, of course, the
newspaper itself, with all its articles, editorials, letters to
the editor, reportages, etc..
It is claimed that Le Monde played a very significant role
in the fight against colonialism and journalists, and editors
alike, take great pride in the stances taken by the paper
during the Algerian conflict. This is done through inflated
claims made by the paper's journalists. Andre Fontaine, for
instance, was quite adamant about Le Monde's successful role in
the decolonisation struggle when he declared in 1977
(...) et s'il y a un point sur lequel me sem-
ble-t-11 Le Monde y a reussi c'est sur le theme dp
la decolonisation. Losque Le Monde a pris les posi-
tions qu'il a prises il y a vingt ans sur les
guerres coloniales, aussi bien l'Indochine que
l'Algerie, a ce moment 16 il prenait a rebrousse-
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poil une grande partie de l'opinion frangaise et il
me semble qu'il a contribuê ,1'pinion frangaise a
l'idêe de la decolinisation.ilu
Claude Julien has also been known to have stated that the
problems the paper had with a minister (Alain Peyrefitte) in
the 1980s paled into insignificance compared with Le Monde's
denunciation of torture in 1955. He wrote:
(-..) Les choses 6taient fort bien ainsi et,
apres tout une polêmique avec M. Alain Peyrefitte
paraissait en 1980 assez anodine a cötê des denon-
ciations, yingt-cinq ans plus tOt, de la torture en
Algerie.111
Le Monde and its staff, as well as historians 112 , all claim
that the paper played a central role in the Algerian war.113
However, as our study will show, this was not the case.
It is asserted openly by historians that Le Monde is well
known for its anti-colonial views and that very early on in the
Algerian War of Independence it adopted liberal views support-
ing the struggle of Algerians and even backing their emancipa-
tion , self determination and independence. This claim was even
made as recently as March 1992 by Patrik Eveno at the Colloqui-
um on Memory and Teaching of the Algerian war. 114
Although not claiming that Le Monde supported the idea of
independence immediately, another historian and former journal-
ist and editor of the newspaper, Jean Planchais, nevertheless
stated in a letter to the author (see Appendix D) that the
paper was a "proponent of the most liberal policies in Algeria"
and "a great defender of human rights" in that country, causing
it to be seized on many occasions.
There are more indirect and insidious ways of making the
same point. This was exemplified in a publication of Le Monde
commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Algerian war. [Le
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Monde: Dossiers et Documents, No 146, July-August 1987, for
instance, pages 1 to 9 were devoted to the period of the Fourth
Republic which is being covered here. Only a third of a single
page ( 4 articles) was given as a sample of articles written at
the time. The date chosen for that sample (29 January 1959)
could be very questionable. This was the day when the paper
reported that the Algerians were on strike in Algiers and when
bombs destroyed the Otomatik, Cafeteria and Coq Hardi brasser-
ies in Algiers, killing and injuring a number of Europeans in
some of busiest cafés of the capital.
Curiously, apart from the five official statements, public
declarations or documents, in the public domain at the time,
only four of the 23 articles covering the period were written
contemporaneously by Minay (1955), Penchenier (1955), Herreman
(1957) and Sirius (1957). All of the others have been written
since that time.
More seriously, in my view, are claims made in academic
books which propound the same view. This selective view of
history is particularly evident in the book published by J.
Planchais and P. Eveno on the Algerian war.
Although the title does not associate Le Monde with the
Algerian War explicitly, the superimposition of the title of
the book, La Guerre d'AlOrie, on a background showing an
enlarged front page of Le Monde (with the name of the paper in
large characters), leaves no doubt in the mind of a reader as
to the linkage this implies.
Furthermore, although the title of the book is said to
consist of a dossier and testimonies gathered and presented by
the authors, the latter do, indeed, situate the book at a
"meeting point between memory and history ( confluent de la
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mêmoire et de l'histoire).
Additionally, although they concede that at times (parfois)
articles are written with a degree of hindsight (un peu de
recul), they emphasise that their articles are, indeed, written
often in the heat of the action (souvent A chaud, au coeur de
l'êvênement).
But they go further. They claim that the Eveno and Planchais
book may be read not only as a history of the Algerian war, but
also as a chronicle of Le Monde's memory throughout events, in
which it was itself one of the actors.
However, a close examination of the book reveals that very
few articles indeed were written at the time. Most of them in
fact have been written since independence, with a lot of hind-
sight.
More precisely, there was a total of 400 pages of main text
written or 136 articles. Documents, official statements and
other publications that were in the public domain at that point
(17) cover 47 pages, while testimonies (27), mostly interviews
recorded in 1988, cover 63 pages. Documents and testimonies
about the war cover about 25% of Planchais and Eveno's book.115
If sequels of the war may be accepted as a useful part of a
book dealing with the Algerian war (19 pages), the 10 pages of
the power struggles after the war seem less appropriate; and
the section devoted to the 1988 riots (23 pages) seems really
out of place in view of the fact that fewer than 25 pages were
actually devoted to the paper' writings on the four years (1954
to 1958) covered by this study.
The danger with this kind of publication is that, if taken
at face value, it is likely to convince many, including acade-
mics, that Le Monde did, indeed, express progressive views, and
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that it was at the forefront of opposition to government colo-
nial policy during the Algerian War. 116 This received wisdom is
still largely unchallenged today. In the last Colloquium on the
Memory and the Teaching of the Algerian War (March 1992),
Patrick Eveno, acknowledged historian of Le Monde, explicitly
repeated this claim with renewed vigour.- 1- 7 Even Algerian
writers subscribed to this view)-]8 After all, had Le Monde
not been denounced by J. Soustelle as one of the quatre grands
de la contre-propagande francaise? 119 One might, therefore,
think that the paper did indeed play a major role in the fight
for Algerian independence. But nothing is more misleading.
A more rigorous look at the portrayal of the protagonists,
governments and policies, as well as an examination of civil
liberties and their advocates, provides us with a sharper focus
for testing this hypothesis. This in turn will provide a firmer
assessment of the role of the paper.
Some hypotheses may be set up for the purpose of verifying
this claim through an examination of the newspaper's content.
Was the position claimed by the paper clearly demonstrated
in its portrayal of protagonists and policies that sought to
change or resist the transformation of the colonial order? What
was the paper's attitude towards the means used to implement
the various policies, and towards their advocates and oppo-
nents? To what extent were Le Monde's reports objective or
biased in any way? These constitute the central themes explored
in the study which follows. These questions invariably raise
other linked subsidiary questions and these are also addres-
sed.
1.4.1.2.	 Structure and presentation
The work is now presented in four sections. Section one
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provides a discussion of the context. The origins and develop-
ment of Le Monde, the problems encountered by this newspaper
throughout the period studied are explored in Chapter 2. This
also examines the paper's audience and related aspects.
A review of the history of the country and its nationalist
struggle against foreign invaders are outlined in Chapter 3,
which sets out the background to the analysis.
Chapter 4 deals with Le Monde's coverage of the colony up to
the November 1954 uprising. This has been done through a criti-
cal examination of Le Monde's articles (1944-1954) and with
reference to T. Firchon's dissertation covering Le Monde and
Algeria over the same period.
The main focus of the dissertation thereafter is devoted to
a critical discussion of the content (what). Section two deals
with the coverage of the protagonists: the French Army (Chapter
5), the Algerian FLN (Chapter 6), and the civilian population
of both Algerian and European communities in Algeria and in
France itself (Chapter 7). This section examines aspects that
have been overlooked or addressed rather superficially by other
researchers.
The third section of the study deals specifically with the
coverage of the solutions proposed and discussed in relation to
Algeria. Chapter 8 discusses the various governments in France
and governor-generals in Algeria, and tries to assess to what
degree the paper supported or rejected official views. Chapter
9 explores the nature of the discourse present in the paper in
relation to Algeria, as well as the views propounded by jour-
nalists and contributors to the paper, to see whether these
were consistent with claims of anti-colonial leanings. Chapter
10 looks at how Le Monde treated and discussed the views put
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forward by the most enlightened members of society, and which
the intellectuals expressed in various books and periodicals.
The final section deals with two major issues: civil liber-
ties and the freedom of information. Chapters 11 and 12 look at
the coverage of the repressive measures taken to deal with the
nationalist uprising, concentrating on those taken within and
outside the legal and institutional frameworks respectively.
Chapter 13 assesses the length to which the paper went to
encourage freedom of enquiry, debate and expression to inform
public opinion. It reveals a very ambivalent attitude to these
freedoms as well as a very equivocal support of those prevented
from, or persecuted for, doing just that -informing public
opinion. The final Chapter (14) attempts to bring all the
strands of the discussion (of the various chapters) together
and presents a critical synthesis of the findings. This study,
although comprehensive, does not claim to be exhaustive. The
final Chapter also suggests ways in which this study could be
pursued and developed.
1.4.2.Rationale of the study
1.4.2.1.	 Why Le Monde?
Le Monde was chosen on account of its independence and the
seriousness of its reports. 120 It is also, of course, extremely
well known. Of all the French newspapers at the time, it is the
one that one would expect to be most complete in its coverage,
the most enlightened, and the less likely to exhibit bias.
Le Monde is largely known as the "newspaper of record". 121
It is widely used and quoted. It has provided scholars with
useful information and comments about most aspects of French
society, and especially of French political life. It is judged
by many, including its critics, as a serious newspaper which,
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since its inception in 1944, has kept its finger on the politi-
cal pulse of France. Pierre Albert gives an idea of the esteem
in which it is held in France:
Le Monde est le journal frangais de reférence
par excellence. Le sêrieux et la variête de ses
informations, la qualite de ses enquétes et de ses
articles de commentaires, la valeur surtout de
l'êquipe de ses redacteurs (...) en font de tout
point de vue ;RN exception dans la presse
frangaise....-"`
Although this research is in the general field of the mass-
media, it has to be understood that Le Monde is a particular
medium with a specific public. Its message and content are in
many ways unique.
All newspapers, including Le Monde, have their history. In
the case of Le Monde, it also helps to make history, 123 and is
therefore of great interest to the historian. Le Monde is said
42to have a central position in French democracy. 1 Albert du
Roy gave the paper a historic responsibility when he wrote
that:
Le Monde a êtê le filtre unique a travers
lequel s'ilte une On6ration a vu l'histoire vivante
1.4.2.2.	 Why the Algerian war?
The importance of Algeria as a French colony does not need
to be established as a subject of interest for the French. As
the war progressed, interest in the question increased. With
the heightened interest of public opinion about Algeria , 126 Le
Monde devoted a number of articles (including front page and
leading articles) to the question; and the importance of the
country for the paper became increasingly apparent.
A phenomenon like a colonial war, leading to a prolonged
period of armed struggle, tension and conflict in the political
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and social spheres, is likely to reveal the political stand of
a newspaper. The merciless struggle which engulfed communities
on both sides of the Mediterranean, which Le Monde witnessed,
is likely, more than any other event, to make it abandon its
reserve. It is, therefore, an ideal event or phenomenon for
investigating its ideology, the underpinnings of its thinking,
and the views of the paper and journalists alike.
Another reason for studying Le Monde and the Algerian war of
independence is that, in general, the French have been slow in
finding out the truth about Algeria and the Algerian war.127
The same was true of France's collaborationist record. It took
years before FR3 showed the Channel Four series on the Algerian
war in the mid-1980's and, despite the number of books and
articles published on the subject, it still remains a contro-
versial and emotive subject. Some have explored the processes
by which national consciousness chooses to postpone the moment
when it had to face up to a different reality.128
A further reason for the choice of subject is that it is not
very well known in the English-speaking world, although a
considerable number of works are now available.-29
1.4.2.3.	 Periodicity, or why the Fourth Republic?
Because the Algerian war as a whole (1954-1962) is a huge
topic, the study has been limited to the Fourth Republic.
Limiting the coverage to the end of the Fourth Republic l " has
its own academic logic. The Fourth Republic constitutes a
watershed in French history in the sense that its experience
helped the French resolve the fundamental questions of the
distribution of political power and the nature of their politi-
cal system. The Fourth Republic was characterised by a long
period of immobilisme, political squabbles, indecision, a lack
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of focus of power, and over-concentration of decision-making.
The complexities of this era of French history have been ex-
plored in detail by the work of Philip Williams, which in many
respects has remained unsurpassed. 131 The character of French
politics suddenly changed with the Fifth Republic, when lea-
dership and initiative in the Algerian question came from
General de Gaulle himself. After 1958, it was in relation to




2.A UNIQUE NEWSPAPER: THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF LE MONDE
2.1. Introduction
For many, Le Monde is generally recognised as the "newspaper
of record". The paper is widely used and quoted and has thus
provided many scholars with information and comments about most
aspects of French society and political life. For a number of
observers this "serious newspaper" has kept its finger on the
political pulse of France since its launch in 1944.1
It is always of interest to find out why particular papers
are launched. Le Monde is a case in point. The history of the
paper has been well documented 2 and this section will be limi-
ted to some of the most relevant facts.
The chapter examines the appearance on the scene of Le Monde
and its history up to 1958. It also looks at the launch of the
paper and introduces its founder (and director until 1969). It
examines its difficult beginnings, the bravery of some of its
outspoken positions and also attempts to undermine it. A final
part will be devoted to a brief look at the readership and
philosophy of the paper.
2.2. An unusual paper for an unusual director
2.2.1.  The paper's launch 
During the Occupation, which preceded the setting up of the
newspaper, there was no freedom of the press and most of the
papers in circulation at the time were thought to have colla-
borated with the Germans. 3 This was the case of Le Temps. 4
A Provisional government decree (30 September 1944) banned
all newspapers published during the Occupation and allowed the
State to seize all their assets.5
This situation left France in need of a respectable newspa-
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per of high standing which could fill the gap left by Le Temps
at a time when the State was in possession of confiscated
buildings, presses and assets which were not being put to
productive use.
J.Dupraz, a member of the Ministry of Information under
P.H.Teitgen, was given the task of trying to create a successor
to Le Temps, independent of powerful financial interests.
Hubert Beuve-Mery (HBM), a former diplomatic correspondent of
Le Temps, was then approached towards the end of October 1944
and formally asked by the Minister for Information and former
journalists of Le Temps to head a new paper.
The first copy of Le Monde was sold on 18 December 1944
carrying the next day's date. 6 It was printed on a sheet double
its present size. 7 Though it was accused of stealing Le Temps'
clothes, 8 Le Monde had a radically different philosophy.8
Despite the post-war enthusiasm for the nationalisation of
all major services, the new paper was created with government
help but as a private company. The new company, S.A.R.L. Le
Monde, was set up on 11 December 1944 with a capital of 200.000
francs divided into 200 shares worth 1000 fr each. The major
shareholders were HEM, Rene Courtin and Christian Charles
Funck-Brentano, and there were a few minor ones.1°
If there were means put at the disposal of Le Monde which
no doubt helped the launch of the paper, these did not ensure
its survival. This was achieved through the paper's own organi-
sation, efforts and performance.11
Though the appointed Editor-in-Chief was Andre Chenebenoit,
former general secretary of Le Temps, from the start Le Monde
had to work under the troika of Courtin, Funck-Brentano and
HEM, who made up a board of directors headed by the latter.
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During the period covered by this study, he was the single
most important person to determine the newspaper's stance and
outlook.
2.2.2.  Hubert Beuve-Mery, Managing Director of Le Monde 
HBM, who came from very humble origins and was plagued by
ill health, made tremendous efforts to complete his
education)- 2 He managed to start a professional career and gain
a position of influence)-3
Very early on in his career, he showed evidence of integr-
ity, honesty and commitment to honest journalism. 14 He saw his
role as being that of a teacher and educator of the people of
France and of its elite)-5
He was not ignorant of matters dealing with colonialism16
and experienced the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Germans.
On that occasion, he also showed bravery and a willingness to
stick to his role and his duty as a journalist against all
odds, even putting his job on the line when required.17
HBM was to remain as managing director of Le Monde for
twenty-five years. Through his style and directorship he was to
leave an indelible mark on one of the most important French
newspapers. Le Monde has become an institution in itself and
has acquired a central role in French society and culture as we
know them today. His importance cannot be emphasised enough, as
he was put on a par with de Gaulle in terms of influence in
shaping modern France.18
Despite his role in Uriage, HBM was greatly admired by many
of "the Good and the Influential." Michel Drancourt called him
"l'Alceste et le Cassandre du journalisme francais". Francoise
Giroud, who herself ran L'Express with the help of J-J. Servan-
Schreiber, described him in the following terms:
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Le poil gris, l'oeil jamais d'accord avec la
bouche... de rude et haute allure, amoureux de
l'humanitê, mais distant de tous les hommes, cet
inamovible Breton est gracieux comme un cactus. Ii
n'oublie jamais qu'il a dêbute dans la vie en tirant
une charrette A bras pour payer ses etudes; mais
faut bien le dire, dêdaigner l'argent et les agrê-
ments qu'il procure est relativement aisê a l'homme
d'orgueil qui croit A sa mission et qui, au- dela
des plaisirs, ne poursuit qu'une seule joie: la joie
amere d'être seul, seul A étre lucide , seul
rester pur. Beuve-Mêry a pour l'argent plus que du
mepris: il le craint pour tout ce qu'il le soupconne
d'apporter de corrupteur et d'amollissant aux men-
leurs. Et c'est presque une faiblesse, une peur.J-7
When he retired in 1969, J.Fauvet, his colleague and succes-
sor at the head of the paper, used the following words to
describe him:
(...) un homme agissant et 6duquant moms par
ses prèceptes que par sa presence;"..ce myst&re 
d'influence magnetique qu'on appelle presence au 
theatre disait Madame Dussane. Un sage sans cesse
present a l'êvênement, mais sachant étre a la fois
loin et prês de l'evênement, prenant toujours la
distance ou la hauteur permettant de le decanter, de
le dominer, bref de le juger. Enfin, un liberal, non
pas comme le genêral de Gaulle le lui dit un jour-en
allemand et en public-celui gui dit toujours non,
mais celui qui veut dire non au pouvoir, A tout
pouvoir, chaque fois qu'il abuse de ses pouvoirs;
dire non chaque fois qu'il pouvait être porte at-
teinte a l'indepenlqnce du journal, et qui voulut la
garantir a jamais."
However, the paper which HEM led had a very difficult start.
An examination of its difficulties, of the images portrayed,
of the positions it proclaimed or adopted, would help us set up
further hypotheses to be tested later.
2.3. A brave paper despite difficult beginnings
2.3.1. 	 A hard start 
Experiencing a series of crises, Le Monde was riddled with
problems which, for the sake of simplification, can be placed
in three categories: personality conflicts within, internal
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conflicts of opinion leading to clashes over the line to be
taken regarding the different issues of the day, and threats or
attacks from outside. It is sometimes very difficult to separ-
ate these categories, as there is a degree of overlap between
them, or at least between two of them.
Problems hit the paper from the very first day of publica-
tion, when Beuve-Mery was thought to be taking prominence over
the other directors. 21 This conflict was to emerge just as
France was about to ration paper.22
The first conflict of opinion appeared less than a month
after the paper's launch, over the speed of implementation of
the reforms introduced after the War. 23 The troika set up to
run the paper did not last long. What remained was an equilibre
instable between Beuve-Mery and Courtin until the spring of
1949. 24
Though the paper was attacked at the very start by the
Left and by the Right 25 as well as by the print Union, 26 it was
the Cold War which was to bring out the worst in the paper in
terms of internal conflicts and external opposition.
2.3.2.  Position over the Cold War
The Communists left Ramadier's government in May 1947 and
adopted a hostile attitude towards the MRP, putting France in
the first stages of the bipolar system of alliances and of the
Cold War. France sided with the United States. 27 But Beuve-
Mery's philosophy was to refuse the leadership of the US and
to advocate a "neutralist" 28 policy for France.29
At the centre of the "neutralist" battle of Le Monde were
the articles of Etienne Gilson" which called into question the
role of the US in the defence of Europe. 31 The possibility of
a Third World War looked very real to him, especially a war
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between the two superpowers. Having come to the conclusion that
America was not ready to defend Europe, it seemed perfectly
feasible to him that Europe should be free rather than fight
for the USA.
Gilson was not the only one on the paper to think along such
lines. 32 Beuve-Mery was also advocating neutrality, which he
saw as a lesser evil than the double bluff of the Pact.33
Although not widespread, this position was not unique to Le
Monde; it was shared by Esprit. It was also similar to the
views expressed by Gilles Martinet and Claude Bourdet of
France-Observateur, who had written along the same lines in
Combat in 1948.34
This neutralist position was certain to provoke the wrath of
both sides. 35 But the ideal of European independence and of the
French identity in 1951 was said to be, with the first ideal of
performing a public service dating back to 1944, the two pil-
lars of the paper.38
However, inside the paper the neutralist quarrel was to open
old wounds. 37 Courtin was convinced that Beuve-Mery was more
afraid of the USA than he was of the USSR, and that, if he had
to choose, he would opt for the USSR as being the lesser of two
evils. 38 Courtin himself stood for a united Europe which would
be kept under the protection of the US, before one day becoming
a fully-fledged partner. He tried to counter the work of Beuve-
Mery and other journalists of the paper who did not share his
views." In July 1949, the stormy relationship culminated in
his taking a six-month holiday. 40 He nevertheless was revolted
by the articles of Duverger and Pierre Emmanuel (25 & 26 Octo-
ber 1949); and he realised that instead of adopting this escap-
ist attitude, refusing to put his signature to articles he
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disapproved of, he should adopt a more positive one and resist
the people whose views he opposed, defend his ideas, and inform
the people involved in the paper.41
Even E.Gilson's departure in September 1950 42 did not con-
vince Courtin that the neutralist campaign, which he felt was a
dangerous position and one that was harmful to the country, was
at an end.
Le Monde published a number of articles in support of
Gilson whom it defended unreservedly against an attempted
"moral assassination". 43 This was really aimed at Beuve-Mery
who then became the centre of the polemic.
Courtin tried to contact Dupraz again to see whether he, as
well as Teitgen and Bidault, believed that the departure of
Beuve-Mdry was called for and said that he had confirmation of
that on 12 January 1951.
Beuve-Mdry became increasingly exasperated, and Courtin was
more and more dissatisfied with the new system. 44 He used to
come every Thursday to inspect the copies of the paper for the
six previous days. He made a number of criticisms, as he felt
the same campaign was still continuing.
The Association of the paper met again on 12 July 1951.
Courtin's attempts failed again when his proposal was defeated
by 110 to 90 votes. He decided to call on public opinion and
bring the affair out in the open. 45 When the departure of
Courtin and Funck-Brentano seemed likely, it was Beuve-Mery
who offered his resignation" despite some journalists openly
siding with him (R.Gauthier, A. Fontaine and J Fauvet).
However, the readers 47 and the journalists themselves came
to the rescue of Beuve-Mery. 48 They drafted a letter affirming
their moral right to be involved in the paper, not to be kept
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in ignorance, and expressed their support for Beuve-M6ry.49
Beuve-Mery then convened an extraordinary meeting of the
SARL for 13 September 1951, by letter, outlining the problems
at stake.	 When the journalists met 50 they wanted their claim
to ownership of the newspaper to be set up in legal terms, and
tried to put through a motion to this end, but nothing came of
it. They met again on 14 September and deplored the fact that
they had obtained no satisfaction. They also asked the Presi-
dent of the Republic to intervene, threatening a strike.
Readers were mobilised and a movement was started throughout
France by intellectuals and academics in support of Beuve-Mery
under the auspices of Duverger.51
A commission mixte prepared a project for the modification
of the statutes arranged for 14 September. It led to the
setting up of the Society of Journalists, which requested part
of the shares. The object was to acquire 80 shares of SARL/Le
Monde which would be created for that purpose. They asked for a
reply by the end of November so as to enable the new share-
holders to take their seats in a new general assembly. 52 The
increased status of the journalists could only help Beuve-Mery
who, despite repeated efforts to oust him, remained at the helm
of the paper.
Despite a difficult start, Le Monde showed during the first
decade that it was adopting a very independent policy, especi-
ally over the Cold War. It was not afraid of taking very
courageous and even open risks, as was illustrated by the
Fechteler episode.
2.3.3.  The Fechteler report
This is a report on American policy in the Mediterranean
allegedly written by Admiral Fechteler for the National Securi-
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ty Counci1. 53 It was published in Le Monde on 10 May 1952 (page
three) and had a devastating impact. Introduced by A. Chénebe-
noit, editor-in-chief, the article seemed to have all the
guarantees of authenticity.54
The report was denied by the Admiralty and Churchill him-
self. On 14 May the Dutch paper Algemeen Handelsblad headlined
with an article (strangely resembling the one attributed to
Fechteler) by A. Besnard who stated that he had found the
original of the so-called Fechteler Report published under the
title of "Sea of Division".55
In any case, Fechteler said that he did not recall it. It
was revealed later that the report was false. Accusations were
rife about the lack of seriousness of Le Monde which was pub-
lishing false reports and taking its job too lightly. Le Monde
demanded an enquiry by the Quai d'Orsay.58
In any event, Commander Talerico's report could have provi-
ded the basis of Fechteler's recommendations. The views deve-
loped in the US by people like Senator Taft, for instance, were
quite similar. On 3 January L' Observateur published extracts
from General Richard L. Zimmerman arguing along the same lines
and developing the same views.
There were different reactions in the various political
milieux to Le Monde, whose "seriousness" and reputation were
questioned. 57 Chénebenoit, who had been previously the secre-
tary-general of the editorial team of Le Temps, and who was the
author of the gaffe58 thought of resigning, then merely stood
down from the presidency of the Sociêtê des Redacteurs.59
2.3.4.  The rise and fall of a rival: Le Temps de Paris 
After ten years of trying to undermine Le Monde from with-
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in, a final attempt was made kill it off by competition,
through the recreation of Le Temps. 60 This was to lead, in the
following year, to the creation of Le Temps de Paris.61
Money was to come from 40,000 shares of 10,000 fr each. The
Sociête de Presse d'Information et de Publicitê was constituted
and Le Temps de Paris created. 62 HEM found an informer in the
group who kept him abreast of the latest developments, especi-
ally on the financial side.63
The political complexion of this new company was made up of
people who were defeated at the Liberation with the participa-
tion of people like A. Guerin, journalist and editor-in-chief
of Le Temps de Paris."
When this paper was set up The Economist (London) hoped that
the "the independent Le Monde" would survive this financial
struggle. 65 Fortunately for le Monde, the strategy of the new
paper could not be worked out properly because of internal
differences."
However, the first copy of Le Temps de Paris was printed on
17 April 1956 (the day Prince Rainier of Monaco married the
actress Grace Kelly). The paper had enough money to last 12-18
months, then it would have to secure revenue from publicity to
balance its books in the long term. 67 It was launched with big
blue, white and red posters. The Messageries de presses/Hach-
ette were reluctant to distribute the paper and some of their
employees chose that day to strike. This meant delays in the
suburbs and the provinces, or the newspaper failed to arrive in
sufficient quantities. On 30 April Le Temps de Paris complained
to its readers that a real sabotage operation had been mounted
to prevent or hamper its distribution.
The product was seen to be of mediocre quality. Technically,
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it was badly presented and the photographs were of poor qual-
ity. 68 It was also unstable and inaccurate. 69
In the political field, it defended two lines: first, anti-
communism, second, "French Algeria", which earned it the nick-
name of the "the newspaper of Robert Lacoste in Paris"." Its
success was remarkable in North Africa where it sold 4,360
copies, compared with 5,290 copies for France-Soir, 2,300 for
Le Monde and Le Figaro, 1,100 for Paris-Presse.
This was not to last. Sales of the paper slumped. 71 Publi-
cation ceased on 3 July, when the public was informed that
paper shortage had forced the stoppage of publication. The
hybrid product managed to hijack G. Penchenier from Le
Monde. 72 However, Le Monde did not have to go to great lengths
to fight the paper: it watched others do the work for it.73
2.3.5.  Further assaults 
Le Monde had outside enemies who were trying to influence
it, to stage a coup d'ftat from within or lure away its jour-
nalists.74
A number of Le Monde's journalists at that time, especially
those who had worked for Le Temps, thought that Beuve-Mery was
leading them down a very hazardous political path. Moreover,
the need for measures of economy was making him pay low
wages . 75
Money (the sum of 50 million francs was mentioned) was also
used by Robert Bollack, the influential boss of the Agence
Economique et Financiêre, 76 to entice Beuve-Mery to cooperate
or to retire early.
2.4. The positions of the paper a source of problems?
2.4.1.  Indochina and the Cold War 
It has been suggested that the difficulties of Le Monde
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since 1949 may be explained by the analyses and positions
adopted by the paper regarding the "governing elite". 77 Indo-
china and Algeria are presented as the most obvious cases when
the paper went against many of the views prevailing at the
time. As outlined earlier, the paper itself seemed to be proud
of that record. But, in my view that remains to be demonstra-
ted.
On Indochina, for instance, Le Monde, under the influence of
Jacques Guerif, one of the more enlightened journalists, who
favoured increased autonomy for French colonies, progressively
moved towards recommending a federal solution. A federal solu-
tion is not an anti-colonial one. In fact, it seems that,
whenever colonies were about to be lost, federation was seen to
form the ultimate solution. Against that, many argue that at
the time nobody, including the Communists, was apparently in
favour of independence. But one can clearly find inside Le
Monde, on the other side of the political spectrum from Guerif,
journalists like Remy Roure, who was opposed to Communism,
hostile to Ho Chi Minh and who, in fact, argued for maintaining
the French presence in Indochina.78
It is well documented that Hubert Beuve-Mery had called the
war la sale guerre. 79 The expression was taken from a report by
William Bullit in Life. He, in turn, had borrowed it from one
of the fighters involved in the struggle. Beuve-Mery had con-
cluded his article by saying : Ii y a des generosites qui
paient et des egoismes reputes sacres qui cod tent affreusement
cher. But it is also true to say that an important contribu-
tor, Martial Bonis-Charancle, who played an important role in
the setting up of the paper, left it in December 1947, because
he could no longer cope with the position taken by the paper on
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the Indochinese question.
In any case, Indochina seemed to have become a subject of
disagreement within the paper up to 1950, with the revelations
on 12 January of the "General's affair" . 8 ° The position of the
paper is reported thereafter as becoming unambiguous.81
However, more research, which could not be undertaken here,
is needed to give a definite answer to that particular ques-
tion.
After all, it is usually argued that Le Monde was against
government policy in Algeria. How could that be when the paper
was not against (in fact it welcomed ) the Suez expedition,
designed to deal with this "supporter of Algerian terrorism".82
2.4.2.  Guy Mollet against Le Monde? 
There are also claims that governments of the Fourth Repu-
blic were against Le Monde because of the position it took on
Algeria. Many accused G.Mollet of preventing the paper from
putting up its price, of starving it of funds in order to
hamper its independence and force it to adopt a more concilia-
tory line towards the government.
Despite claims to the contrary, this was not a vast conspir-
acy against Le Monde but a mere pricing problem which arose
after the episode of le Temps de Paris.
Arguing that quality and austerity had to be paid for and
that independence had its price, the management of Le Monde
decided, at the beginning of 1956, to increase its sale price
to 20 francs, to take into account the cost and the charges
incurred since 1951. 83 In May, the Minister of Economy and
Finance, P. Ramadier, was more understanding and encouraging
towards Le Monde, but the decision was not implemented because
of the competition posed by Le Temps de Paris. So, in the
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autumn, nothing stood in the way of this increase, which was
seen as justified in view of the vast price increases during
the two previous years. 84 However, it was argued that the
increase could start up a chain reaction and send the 213 price
index up. The Mollet government was fighting inflation and had
to watch the 5% threshold. 85 Le Monde nevertheless notified
the government on 26 October of its decision to implement the
new price from 29 October."
On 5 and 6 November, the sale of Le Monde was prevented
(saisies fictives), a fine (proces verbal) was imposed on the
paper for an illicit price increase, and the government planned
to withdraw all state advertising from the paper. The bosses of
the paper could face a 10 M. franc fine and two years in
prison. These measures would have throttled the paper. On 9
November Le Monde backed down and reverted to the 18 Fr price
(the subscriptions remained at their initial price).
Le Monde started again from square one by submitting a new
request for a price increase to the Ministry of Finance and
Economic affairs. 87 By the end of 1956, several other newspa-
pers (Vie Frangaise, Figaro Agricole, Ici Paris, Juvenal and
Guerir) had all increased their prices without "offending" the
government, which had itself authorised price increases for the
SNCF.
The attitude of the government to Le Monde was seen by Le
Canard Enchaine, for instance, as a reaction to how the newspa-
per viewed government policy and an attempt to bring it into
line. It was also alleged that the government could not take
the opposition of the paper to its policies, since it was not a
paper which could systematically be classified with the Left
like France-Observateur and Temoignage Chretien.88
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Some government circles are said to have suggested a change
of name to get round the problem. 89 Others thought that Beuve-
Mery had protested before the paper was really hit." But,
depriving the newspaper of 3 to 4 Million Fr a month, it was
argued, would jeopardise the financial stability of the paper
in the middle to long term and G.Mollet was trying to undermine
its independence.
These perceived threats to Le Monde led to silence or to
very mild reactions in the press generally. However, a number
of weeklies criticised the government's decision. 91 During
November, the newspaper received 2,147 letters, 1,504 of them
with cheques offering money.92
Finally, in April 1957 Guy Mollet received Beuve-Mry at his
request and gave in to Le Monde's request, since the 20 Fr
price had allowed for a competitor, Debats de ce Temps, and was
granted to any new publication.
However, the two battles in 1956 were the last ones to
threaten the independence, if not the survival, of the paper.
The return of General de Gaulle in 1958 coincided more or less
with easier times for the paper and with a period of relative
ease and security.
2.5. Le Monde's journalists, readership, and the paper's
philosophy
2.5.1.  Readership and social distribution of the paper
Le Monde's readership at the time was important, as was the
paper's code of conduct and philosophy. We need, then, at the
end of this chapter, to explore further the who and to whom
before covering the what in the remaining chapters.
Le Monde's readership constituted an extremely influential
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group in French society. Its readers tended to be successful
professionals, businessmen and industrialists. Between 1948 and
1958 half of Le Monde's circulation (49% in 1948 and around 48%
in 1958) was in the departments of the Seine, Seine-et-Oise and
Seine-et-Marne, in other words, in the Paris region, the centre
of political power and decision-making in the highly centra-
lised French State.93
It follows that the paper's role was bound to be of great
importance in terms of giving a certain angle on stories, news
and political analyses, and providing the reader with the raw
material and finished products that were to shape that individ-
ual or group's outlook on very crucial matters of the day.
In his study of the paper, Abel Chatelain (1962) finds a
degree of continuity in the composition of the readership which
stabilised less than ten years after its launch. From a survey
commissioned in 1954, some useful, if incomplete, conclusions
may be drawn. Most of the readership belonged to two categor-
ies, the middle and well-to-do classes; and the maximum pene-
tration of the paper was among the well-to-do-class.94
45% of the readers belonged to the first three categories,
20.5% belonged to the professions and 18.2% were white collar
workers or civil servants. The analysis carried out also took
account of social status and external signs of wealth. Whereas
the proportion of 92.5% of the readers who owned a radio was
not exceptional as 80% of the French possessed one at the time,
the percentage of those owning telephones (seven out of ten in
1954) does seem high for the time.95
The 1958 survey carried was much wider and helped show that
most of Le Monde's readers were men: 64% as opposed to Le
Figaro, for instance, where the proportion of women reached
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57%. Only 26% of Le Monde's readers were over 50 years of age.
For Le Figaro, the proportion was 46%."
This 1958 survey also revealed that the readership was more
urban than rural, with the higher educational level which that
implies. Le Monde had the highest proportion of those who had
attended primary, secondary and higher education (81%), whereas
the average for the rest of the daily press (73 newspapers) was
a mere 22%. The same applies for those with primary and second-
ary education, where Le Monde still led. The respective figures
were 65% and 12%. The same conclusions are drawn for the
higher education category, where the respective figures are 39%
and 4%.
This set of data goes a long way to prove that the paper was
indeed the newspaper of the intellectual elite, and especially
the urban elite. The readers of Le Monde were to be found in
"the University, the Bench, the Administration/Civil Service
and Banking". 97 The newspaper was also read by educators and
those in the teaching profession."
It had many qualities sought by a very small but important
group of readers who had enough money to buy a few papers and
who had enough time for a prolonged and serious read.99
In addition, Le Monde was the main French newspaper read
outside France, and in 1958 its circulation in North Africa
reached 22,000. 100 Its importance worldwide, despite the low
sale figures, cannot be underestimated. It was judged to be the
sixth most important paper internationally. It was "the only
French paper read all over the world .. the best made and the
most hated ... the least so1d". 101
Indeed, with a coefficient of 2,5 (i.e every 2 copies of the
paper are read by 5 people), it was the most read French paper
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in the world even if the number of copies sold remained mod-
est. 102 The paper was describedl " as being unquestionably the
first French daily, 104 written for those who think by journal-
ists who are "most attached to intellectual rigour". 105
2.5.2. _A_particular philosophy of journalism
2.5.2.1.	 A high reputation and profile
Throughout the period of the Algerian War of Independence,
Le Monde was probably the most important French newspaper in
terms of quality and influence. Since its foundation in 1944,
despite the Fechteler episode, it had acquired the reputation
of being "the most serious Paris newspaper" because of the
rigorously intellectual approach of its contributors and be-
cause of its informed and comprehensive treatment of develop-
ments in France and around the world.
2.5.2.2.	 High calibre staff
Many of the	 staff who joined Le Monde l" were very
experienced journalists who had previously worked for Le Temps
before the war. Many of its contributors were graduates had
gained doctorates in their field ( Georges Hourdin, J. Schwoe-
bel, P. Viansson-Ponte), were Professors ( Maurice Duverger,
Etienne Gilson, Jacques Kayser, Jean Vignal) or were even
members of the Acadêmie (Pierre Emmanuel).
The backbone of the paper was constituted by the Director
HEM, who was the most important person in the paper, the Edi-
tor-in-Chief, Andre Chénebenoit, and many of the great names of
the paper, journalists and contributors, such as Robert Gauth-
ier, Andre Fontaine, Jean Shwoebel, Jacques Fauvet, Jean Plan-
chais, Jean Lacouture (not a member of the paper's staff be-
tween 1953 and 1957) and Pierre Viansson-Ponte (not a member of
staff between 1953 and 1958), who gatherered around their boss
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in the morning conference to decide what went in the paper that
day where:
On s'exprime a voix feutree, et on se range,
droits comme des i, en demi-cercle, autour du patron
vertical (...) Ile Monde est une maison oil on ne
s'assied pas. J-01
As Giroud put it: "In Le Monde if one had to die, then it
would prefereably be standing up. 108
Indeed, as a serious paper, distributed in 116 countries
which account for 20 % of its distribution (Chatelain p. 166),
a paper in which there was no horoscope, photographs, cartoons
or faits divers and where advertising only represented 40 % of
the income, Le Monde boasted many contributors and journal-
ists: e.g. Andre Ballet, Raymond Barrillon, Georges Chaff ard,
Edmond Delage, Claude Ezraty, Jean Francois, Pierre Frederix,
Pierre Froment, Etienne Gilson Jacques Grignon-Dumoulin,
Jacques Guerif, Claude Julien,Michel Legris, Julien Lemoyne,
Georges Mamy, Pierre Albin-Martel, Gilbert Mathieu, Pierre
Andre, Bertrand Poirot-Delpech Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber
(1948-1953) and Jean-Marc Theolleyre. All these signed numerous
papers in Le Monde that made compulsory reading for other
journalists, decision-makers, and the readership as a whole.
Some combined administrative and managerial duties with
journalistic talents. This is the case for instance of the
Director, who often wrote under the name of Sirius, Martial
Bonnis-Charancle, Andre Catrice, Joann'es Dupraz, Rene Courtin,
Christian-Charles Funck-Brentano, Remy Roure, Jean Vignal,
Jacques Fauvet ( who became director in 1989) and Andre Fon-
taine ( who became director in 1991).
The paper also had many journalists who were special envoys
or correspondents: Dominik Birmann, Andre Blanchet, Charles
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Favrel, Maurice Ferro, Philippe Herreman, Pierre Henri, Alain
Jacob, Jean Knecht, Andre Leveuf, Eugene Mannoni, Gilbert
Mathieu, Georges Penchenier, Charles Pignault, Jean Wetz and
Jean Planchais (who travelled occasionally with the troops).
Some were awarded the great title of grand reporter, like
Jean Couvreur, Jean Lacouture and Edouard Sablier.
All these journalists may be assumed to be speaking on
behalf of the paper.
This is also the case for others (Robert Escarpit, Yves
Florenne, Jean Taillemagre and Maurice Vaussard , for
instance), who, although they had regular columns which they
wrote, were outside contributors. They were, nevertheless,
closely associated with the paper and spoke in its name as head
of the particular sections they managed.
The category of outside contibutors includes also such
journalists as Andre Blanchet (1946-1965), Jacques Driand,
Andre Fabre-Luce, Jacques Kayser, Gaston Messud, Philippe Minay
and R. Pierron, who were closely associated with Le Monde, as
was Maurice Duverger, who wrote frequently for the paper but
did not have a column himself. As a professor of Law and a
Senior Researcher for the F.N.S.P., he was called upon to
express his views on the major problems of the day. It can
safely be assumed that his views were his own.1"
Many other contributors wrote a Libre-opinion/libre tribune,
or sent an occasional article to the paper, at the paper's
request (or without it), expressing their own point of view.
This was the case for Jean-Marie Domenach, Andre Frossard,
Andre Mandouze, Lyon-Caen, Henri Marrou and Pierre-Henri
Simon. 11° In no way could these journalists be considered to
speak on behalf of the paper.
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2.5.2.3.	 Political and financial independence
It is often argued that newspapers are not free to express
certain opinions because of the very fact that they are not
independent. 111 It is said that some financial interests make
it an express condition that their continued financing and
their sustained backing rest upon the paper adopting very clear
and unequivocal positions which should not be in any way detri-
mental to those interests.
Le Monde states categorically that it is a politically
independent paper, not linked to any political party. It does
not claim to be simply a "newspaper of information", but de-
clares itself to be "politically and materially independent,"
that it "expresses an opinion freely, presenting, however, the
maximum number of items of information and reflection before-
hand."
In fact, the independence of Le Monde is often hailed as its
greatest asset. On becoming director, a very proud J.Fauvet
wrote praising the achievements of the paper
Le scandale pour ses adversaires 	 c'est
qu'il ait rêussi en pr6servant son indêpendance A
l'ëqard de tous les pouvoirs, de tout parti, de
toute idOologie, de toute confession et, bien-sdr de
tous intêrêts.
2.5.2.4.	 Objectivity and realism
One could safely assume from what precedes, and indeed, one
is often reminded, that in Le Monde the reader should look
forward to an objective treatment of news and political and
other commentaries throughout the paper. This objectivity,
emphasised by the editors and journalists of the paper, does
not preclude choice. The reader is told that when a grave and
crucial position is called for, Le Monde is able to make a
choice. Aware of the difficulty of objectivity in reporting 112
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and the definite advantages of the historian whose best allies
are time and hindsight over the "historian of the moment" (the
journalist), J. Fauvet points out that the newspaper is well
placed to access sources, even though it may have only a few
minutes or hours to write this history of the moment:
Un journal n'est pas depourvu de moyens; il
peut et doit multiplier les sources d'information,
recouper et verifier les nouvelles, publier plu-
sieurs versions, user, bien-sdr sans trop en abuser
du conditionnel 	  et enfin, et surtout, completer
et corriger quand la lacune Cu l'erreur est trop
manifeste 	  s'il n'est pas honteux le se tromper,
il est malhonnéte de ne pas rectifier. .1.3
The reader of Le Monde has some guarantees, 114 or may have
some expectations of the newspaper, provided that there is
enough space:
Le lecteur a l'assurance, Cu l'espoir que rien
d'important cu de significatif ne lui sera dissi-
mule. L'objectivite nait d'une certaine facon, de
l'abondance des nouvelles.
2.5.2.5.	 Thoroughness and speed of reporting
The reader is also informed that the spirit and the philoso-
phy of the paper are different. And on the first day of its
publication the paper proclaimed that it wished to provide a
particular kind of service:
"Assurer au lecteur des informations claires,
vraies et iNgs toute la mesure du possible, rapides,
completes."
The newspaper also makes it clear that it refuses to wait
until an event settles down before making it known. It is not
afraid of getting its fingers burnt. Aware that in times of
crises the reader will try and find in the paper "informative
and thought-provoking items not usually available in other
media coverage", the paper sets definite standards of what it
expects of newspaper reporting:
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Le journalisme, c'est la vie, la vie mouvante,
passionnee, troublante; les apeures et les frileux
n'ont guere plus de pace ou de relle clans la vie que
clans le journalisme."°
2.5.2.6.	 Freedom and justice as a vocation
The paper sets itself a high standard when it declares that
it stands for the upholding of justice and commits itself to
speaking out:
Quand un homme ou un pays souffre d'une injus-
tice grave, l'indifference est une opinion. Et le
mensongqpar omission peut etre la pire des opi-
nions."'
Quite proud of its record, Jacques Fauvet described the
paper, which he worked for and which he headed from 1969, in
very complimentary terms, stating:
Cette passion de la justice, ce souci de la
concilier avec la liberte, peuvent definir l'ideal
de ce journal et le critere qu'il tente d'appliquer
au jugement d'une actuante qui, au Iii des ans se
transforme profondement. Les problemes, les discip-
lines, les valeurs, les evenements, les pays aux-
quels s'interesse un journal tel que celui-ci ne
sont plus les memes qu'il y a vingt ans, dix ans.
Le monde a change; 	 Monde, lui, n'a change ni
d'esprit ni de vocation."6
This proud record is claimed by Le Monde's journalists
themselves, even in respect of decolonisation and the Algerian
war. They set the paper up as a defender of justice and freedom
and like to see themselves as champions of these causes.
En soutenant l'entreprise de la decolonisation,
Le Monde defendait a la fois la justice et la lib-
erte.
Ne desesperant pas de voir garanties un jour la
justice et la libertd au sein d'une democratie
economique, Le Monde reste fidéle a sa tradition.119
2.6. Conclusion
As we have seen, the Fourth Republic for Le Monde was a time
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of struggle and hardship which did not prevent the paper and
its journalists from being very outspoken on some of the issues
on which they held strong views. In writing to, or in, the
paper, some contributors were expressing their own views which
may not have been similar to those held within the paper.
Considering the history of the paper and its most signif-
icant features, one is tempted to see this paper with its
difficult beginnings, its struggle for political and financial
independence, as a strong and resilient news medium. The
strength of character of its director, who was a man of humble
origins but of honest and forthright views and unquestionable
integrity, added to the paper's established and declared re-
cord.
The self-proclaimed code of conduct and the ideals of jour-
nalism that it puts forward, as well as the nature of its
readership, all lead one to conclude that Le Monde was indeed a
very important paper which, in many ways, was unique on the
French scene. This explains why personne ne lui conteste, ni
en France, ni a l'êtranger, le titre de premier quotidien
francais even in the 1950s when the paper was considered to be
le journal le plus sêrieux de Paris. Everything so far indi-
cates that, if this paper was not altogether faultless, it
was, indeed, committed to the noble ideals of freedom and
justice, and not afraid of taking up a cause along those lines.
The purpose of this study, as outlined in the introduction,
is to assess critically the reputation which the paper has
acquired, especially in the coverage of Algeria (which consti-
tutes an essential part of the decolonisation debate) over the
period covered by this study and to determine to what extent




De ses grands desseins de politigue coloniale,
la France n'a rêussi aucun: l'assimilation par
l'êcole, par l'armee, par l'ómigration, par le
syndicalisme, fut impuissante a êteindre l'esprit de
rêvolte de l'eternel Jughurta.
Charles Robert Ageron,
Le Nouvel Observateur,
La Guerre d'Algêrie: 30 ans aprés
Numero Special (9), March 1992, p. 20.
CHAPTER THREE
3. THE ALGERIAN SCENE OR ALGERIA UNDER COLONIAL RULE
3.1. Introduction
When Le Monde was launched in 1944, Algeria had been a
French colony since 1830. From that date the country exper-
ienced a series of uprisings against French occupation in
almost every generation. 1 In 1954, however, Le Monde considered
Algeria to be peaceful in relation to neighbouring Morocco and
Tunisia, where "terrorist" activities were reported. However,
what was to become the war of independence in Algeria broke out
on the first of November of that year, and lasted until 1962.2
As it had been up to 1954, Algerian history for the next
eight years was going to be a troubled one. Throughout its
history, the country was subjected to various foreign inva-
sions, some of which had a more lasting impact than others.3
Although it took various forms, the resistance of the indige-
nous population to outside influences and domination is a
constant factor. 4 Throughout the historical development of
Algeria, there is ample evidence that beneath the resistance to
foreign occupation, lay a deeply embedded developed sense of
identity. There could not be such a degree of resistance with-
out this sense of identity and an understanding of the concept
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of "Umma" (nation).5
3.2. Before the French Conquest
Contrary to widespread belief evident in some colonialist
literature, which tried to legitimise colonisation as a civil-
ising venture, Algeria had been in contact with other civilisa-
tions for many centuries prior to its colonisation by the
French after 1830. 6 Throughout the centuries, Algeria had
acquired traditions, customs and a cultural heritage unique to
that part of the world.7
Since its emergence in history books, with the arrival of
the Phoenicians in its eastern part in the 12th century BC
(although traces of human life go back three to four thousand
centuries), 8 North Africa experienced many invasions, relative-
ly peaceful and otherwise (Phoenician, Roman, Byzantine, Van-
dal, Arab, Portuguese, Spanish, Ottoman and French). Although
important ruins of Roman cities and of Byzantine fortresses
still remain, the most lasting influences were those of the
Carthaginian occupation (about 1,000 years's duration in the
Eastern part) and the Arabo-Islamic conquest that began in the
7th century A.D.9
The history of Algeria in particular, and that of North
Africa in general in this earlier period, has been extensively
documented, especially through the works of Charles Andre
Julien, 1 ° who was for many years the established scholar in
this field. Nevertheless, Julien contends that the country was
struck by a somewhat "congenital ineptitude" for independence,
and that it remained constantly subjected to the influences and
sometimes the destiny of outside civilisations. This position
is somewhat surprising and hardly justifiable, when in the
views of this same renowned historian, very few of these civil-
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isations left long-lasting traces; and that underneath the
"changing clothes", the "body and the soul" of the population
of North Africa remained unchanged.11
Moreover, towards the end of the Ottoman empire, Algeria was
a partially independent province, just as it had been before.
It was not under direct control, but run instead by notables of
the indigenous population with a minority of Turks. It was a
cohesive unit which was economically and culturally indepen-
dent. Politically some form of authority was acknowledged to
the Sublime Porte, but the province was run independently of
it.12
3.3. The French conquest and the colonisation of the country
3.3.1. Le Coup d'eventail and the Algiers expedition (1827-
1830)
The whole colonial venture started after a diplomatic inci-
dent involving the Dey of Algiers and the French Consul in
Algiers. 13 The French blockade of Algiers started after this
diplomatic incident (1827) but did not constitute a real dan-
ger:
La Regence edt pu longtemps subsister si des
tractations financier-es dont le dey fut victime, et
les agissements suspects du Consul Deval n'avaient
amene la fameuse scene du coup d'eventail ( 30 April
1827) dont les necessites de la politique interieure
frangaise firent, trois ans apres, sortir l'expedi-
tion qui aboutit la prise d'Alger (5 July 1830).14
In August 1829 the Dey went even further when he dismissed
the French envoy and fired upon his ship while it was retreat-
ing under the flag of truce.15
In 1830 the French government decided on military inter-
vention (which had been recommended since 1827 by the War
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Minister) and sent 37,000 troops, who landed in Sidi Ferudj on
14 June 1830. 16 By 5 July 1830 General de Bourmont had accepted
the surrender of the Dey with the guarantee that the rights and
property of the people of all classes would be respected.17
The assault on Algiers in 1830 was presented to Europe by
the French government as an attempt to put an end to the acti-
vities of the pirates, which would, in the eyes of European
nations, honour France and which earned her the benediction and
the congratulations of the Pope in the name of Christendom)-8
To the Algerians the assault was presented as an operation to
rid them of the "Turkish oppressors". 19 Indeed, it was the
Restoration, condemned to incation by the general situation in
Europe, which wanted to assert France's vitality by an action
d'eclat, by a military action outside Europe. 20 As far as
Algeria was concerned, the conquest was in many respects an
"accident" of the general policy of the Restoration Monarchy in
France. 21 Initially there was no colonial preoccupation, nor
desire for settlement 22 when France, reluctant to make war, had
proposed to the Ottoman Sultan to bring Algiers under his
control 23
3.3.2. Military rule: 1830-1870 
Although not implying that the conquest had in any way been
completed in 1830, this is how C.A. Julien characterised the
story of the fall of Algiers:
Une louche affaire menee par les tout-puissants
negociants juifs d'Alger avec la complicite des
politiciens tares de Paris; un accident provoque par
un diplomate suspect: une expedition mediocrement
conduite par un general discredite; une victoire
accueillie avec indifference ou hostilite par l'opi-
nion publique et suivie de la chute de la dynastie
qui en revendiquait le merite, tels furent les
merites sipguliers de la conquete de l'Algerie par
la France.4'*
56
The capture of Algeria did not save Charles X and the Re-
storation, replaced in late July 1830 by a new monarchy headed
by Louis Philippe. The period following July 1830 was one of
uncertainty for the French government.25
The progressive occupation and colonisation of Algeria have
been documented extensively elsewhere. 26 To start with, there
was no big colonial project and from 1837 until 1840 a policy
of "limited occupation" was adopted and treaties, preserving
their rights, were signed with the Algerian populations, espe-
cially with the Emir Abdel Kader.27
Even under Napoleon III, who took a great deal of interest
in his "Arab Empire" through his "senatus Consulta" of 1863 and
who in 1865 tried to protect the indigenous populations and
their property rights, the colonials were not deterred from
finding loopholes and continuing their expansionist policy at
the expense of the local populations, who were more and more
subjected to a policy of ref oulement and cantonnement, especi-
ally after Napoleon III's fall in 1870. Ageron found no exag-
geration in the use by the Algiers Lawyer, Emile Larcher, of
the expression "consumed art of spoliation" to describe the
way two fifths of arable land were removed from the Algerian
Muslims. 28
The process continued with the Third Republic and beyond as,
from 1871 to 1919, the Administration gave 897,000 hectares of
land to settlers either freely or for very modest prices. If at
the end of the First World War European property extended to
2,317,000 hectares, by 1954 it had reached 2,726,000
hectares 29
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3.3.3. The Third Republic and the triumph of colonisation 
The defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war and the
establishment of the Third Republic saw the triumph of coloni-
sation."
In the intellectual field, the classical economic ideas of
Adam Smith (of the Manchester school), Richard Cobden (transla-
ted in France by Frederic Bastiac), Jean Baptiste Say and
others traditionally opposed to colonisation, 31 were being
slowly overtaken by ideas in favour of colonial domination,
expressed in the following terms:
Le peuple qui colonise le plus est le premier
peuple; s'4A ne _Pest pas aujourd'hui, il le sera
demain....'
There were also appeals by the Church, for instance from
Cardinal Lavigerie to the people of Alsace and Lorraine, to
emigrate to Algeria, 33 which became officially the promised
land for France deprived of part of its territory. 34
The discontent of the colonists, opposed to the continuation
of military rule in Algeria following the fall of the Empire
(1870), was felt when Paris proposed to send a General to take
over the destiny of Algeria as opposed to instituting a civil-
ian regime.35
The Moslem population was also unhappy but for the opposite
reasons. In contrast, the discontent of the Muslims was trig-
gered off by the possibility of a civilian regime being estab-
lished in Paris and Algiers and by the French defeat in 1870,
which inspired a desire of independence for the Muslims. The
little authority that local Moslem chiefs had was undermined by
French authorities. The departure and defeat of French troops
and the fear of the new regime, as well as the hope of sending
the colonists home, led more than one third of the population
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to take up arms in a resolute way, 36 following the various
insurrections which had nevertheless preceded in different
parts of the country in 1859, 1860 and 1864.37
The cancellation of the jurisdictions and the legal guaran-
tees that had previously protected the Moslem population, the
upgrading of the indigenous population of Jewish origin to
full citizen status, the departure of the generals and officers
who were on good terms with the local populations, and the
extension of the civilian regime of the colonists, feared by
the Moslems for a long time, are among the reasons for the
Algerian uprising under Mokrani and his brother Boumezrag in
1871. 38
The Moslems suffered a great deal from deaths, casualties.39
They were also victims of confications of land and property. 40
Moreover, the Loi Warnier (26 July 1873) was to permit the
division of collective lands, increasing the disruptive process
taking place in indigenous land property. 41 Finally, the law of
22 April 1887 made transactions possible where they had not
been possible before.42
3.4.General evolution and the rise of nationalist political
movements
3.4.1.Administrative and political evolution 
The Third Republic's policy towards Algeria was that of
assimilation. As a result, different public services were
attached to different French Ministries. 43 An Algerian budget
was created, prepared by the latter and his staff, discussed
and voted by the Dêlegations Financieres and implemented only
after the consent of the French parliament.44
The Indigenes were considered to be French "subjects": those
of Jewish origin were declared "citizens" by the Decret Crè-
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mieux (24 October 1870), issued on the initiative of a Jewish
member of the Government of National Defence. Those of Moslem
origin could aspire to the same rights only upon giving up
their Islamic status. They would have had to accept French
jurisdiction in all social and religious spheres of life.45
The Algerians participated in the First World War and suf-
fered in great numbers (25,000 killed out of a total of 173,000
soldiers) . 46 The French government decided to increase their
access to citizenship, but only to a limited extent. The
decree of 6 February 1919 slightly increased their representa-
tion in local assemblies (Conseils municipaux and Conseils
01262-aux). The number of voters went up to 421,000.
with the exception of the southern territories under military
rule, was divided into three departements: Oran, Alger and
Constantine. The departements themselves were divided into two
kinds of communes: communes de plein exercice similar to the
ones in France with a high number of colons (settlers), and
communes mixtes which had a very high proportion of Moslems.
The indigenous population was ruled according to the severe
Code de l'Indigênat (1881-1927), which enabled administrators
and judges of the communes alike to repress it without any
right of appeal.
In spite of the fact that the Moslem religion does not have
a clergy, French authorities created an official one, paid and
controlled by them.48
In addition to the established French taxes, the natives
were also subjected to a certain number of Impeits arabes.48
This triumph of colonisation 50 meant further pauperisation of
the local population, whose economic, social and educational
aspirations were frustrated by the increase in their numbers,
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the loss of their lands, the decline of their standards of
living and by the relative decrease of education at all levels.
On the eve of the Second World War and after the efforts de-
ployed by the Authorities, about 110,000 children attended
school out of 1,250,000 of school age. 51 If in 1914 5% of the
children went to school, by 1954 this figure had only reached
15%.52
3.4.2. Economic and social condition of the population 
By the end of the 19th century, colonisation forces had
their way and the anti-colonialism expressed in Parliament and
in the press went unheeded. 53 The number of "civilising colon-
ists" rose steadily in the 19th century and at the beginning of
the 20th. But so also, and in even greater numbers, did that
of the local indigenous population, especially after the fa-
mines and epidemics of the mid-19th century -famines and epide-
mics were still a feature in 20th century Moslem society (1920-
21).54
The laws on land property led to dismemberment for the
benefit of speculators. 55The Algerian population lived under
dire economic conditions and when they were forced by their
hardship to sell their lands, the cost of legal fees for land
transactions ruined them.56
The forests to which certain peasants fled after having been
deprived of their land were sequestered by the Authorities and
"protected" by the "Code Forestier", prejudicial to the Moslem
peasants. 57 The Algerians were subjected to "harsh economic
and social systems". The burden was too heavy for the popula-
tion to carry; and the situation worsened as the years went
by. 58 They had less and less income, having been victims of the
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policies of repression and confiscation of land, 59 ref oulement
and cantonnement which pushed them towards the poorest lands.6°
Moslem traditional economy was being destroyed. 61 The crisis in
agriculture and the increase of mechanisation in this field
meant even less revenue than ever, even as employees, for the
Moslem peasant, who started to migrate to the cities and even
abroad as industry was not developed to a great extent.
Whereas the colonists had a more stable revenue which, if it
did not increase, stagnated, the revenues of the "fellahs"
(Algerian peasants) was constantly decreasing.
During and after the First World War cereal production went
down by between one third to a quarter of what it had been
before. 62 The gravity of the situation was never declared
openly by the French authorities in order not to frighten off
potential investors. 63 The total credit available to help
agriculture was 82,000 francs whereas one single commune needed
120,000 francs."
The world economic depression of the early 1930s hit Alger-
ia particularly hard because of the traditional structure of
the economy. There was a sharp contrast between the two commu-
nities living in Algeria. The disequilibrium was in favour of
the "colonists" minority. 65 Most Algerians lived off agricul-
ture. The Muslim economy was more affected than that of the
settlers. 66 The colonists ran no risk of dying of hunger. The
only risk was bankruptcy, but they could hope to be reflated.67
Industry, which was not an important sector anyway, was down
75%• 68 Against this background of misery, exploitation and
discontent nationalist movements started to increase their
power and influence.
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3.4.3. Resistance and Revolt 
Despite the common territory, language, history, religion,
culture, traditions and past history of the Algerian people,
numerous authors assert that it is not possible to discern
Algerian nationalist or political movements as such until the
1930s. 69 Letourneau, for instance, maintained that, in spite of
the insurrections, Algeria did not have an indigenous political
tradition or any national sentiment before the 1930s."
The resistance of the Emir (up to 1847), the uprising of
the Mokrani (1870-1871), and the revolt in the area of Batna
in 1916, were claimed to have been limited geographically to
certain regions. They were also considered to have been either
half-political or half-religious, 71 or to have crystallised
behind a particular leader the reaction, discontent and bit-
terness of a population, led or left to take up arms against
the French.
When the means of transport and communication were not
sufficiently developed for any extensive exchange of ideas or
development of political debates, and when the means of expres-
sion of the increasingly impoverished local population were so
limited, it would be wrong, in my view, to expect to find a
modern nationalist movement.72
The development of indigenous politics, and of modern style
nationalism in Algeria, were further discouraged by the beha-
viour of the French army and of the French authorities. The
massacres, atrocities, ordeals and punishments to which the
local population in Algeria were subjected by the French
stifled and repressed nearly all form of indigenous politics.
Moreover, Islam, which could have acted as a ferment and a
catalyst for resistance and uprisings, did not have this role
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because, as Le Tourneau himself pointed out, it was isolated
from outside influences and subservient to the authorities.73
It should, nevertheless, be pointed out that, in the same
way as before French colonisation, the desire for independence
had been alive since the early years of the conquest. The Bey
of Constantine reigned until 1848. The organised resistance of
Emir Abdel Kader against the French occupation and his fight
for liberty from 1832 until his surrender in 1847 won him the
praise even of his adversaries. Cavaignac, for instance, as de
Luna points out, had a great respect for the resistance of
Abdel Kader74 and saw him as a national Algerian hero.75
Altogether, the French were often concerned that if anything
happened in Europe, and France required her armies, it would be
the end of French Algeria.76
The peasants' resistance and the frequent uprisings were the
ultimate way in which the Algerians could express their pa-
triotism. 77 There were very few moments of peace between 1871
and 1915. Resistance to occupation took various forms: from
open armed conflict to refusal of conscription, from exodus to
requests and demands for better deals. 78 Even on the eve of
the First World War, the conquest of the Sahara was far from
having been completely achieved.79
The Algerians had to adapt themselves in view of the mater-
ial superiority of the French troops. The nature of the strug-
gle changed from open armed revolt (the last in 1916) to legal
opposition, demands for independence or for the improvement of
their socio-economic conditions and political rights. Differ-
ent nationalist movements in the modern sense of the word
appeared and started to organise and lead these struggles at
the beginning of the 20th century.
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3.4.4. The nationalist movements 
The revolutionary events of the turn of the century greatly
influenced the emergence of organised modern (Western-style)
nationalist activities. Algerian peasants (and sometimes
workers) migrated towards the cities (and even abroad). Be-
cause of their socio-economic and political circumstances they
became very sensitive to the influence of communist, socialist
and Islamic ideologies" the programmes of which offered ideas
and objectives that to a certain extent they shared and hoped
for.
After the success of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia,
the congress of Tours (1920) led to the establishment and
development of the Communist Party in France. In the same year
the Socialist International also condemned colonial policy. 81
For Algerian workers present in France, the mixing with French
workers, the development of proletarian consciousness, the rise
of Arab nationalism, the Turkish revolution of Mustapha Kemal,
the war of the Riff in Morocco, 82 all played an important role
in the development of a "modern" Algerian consciousness. The
role of the press, and the turbulence and agitation of these
years, could not but have an impact on the dissatisfied natio-
nalists.
The nationalist resistance consisted of three main move-
ments. Firstly, in Metropolitan France a communist political
grouping of workers in the Paris area known as L'Etoile nord-
africaine (ENA) was formed in 1926. It became radical in its
programme when headed in 1927 by Messali Hadj, a worker with
little formal education who had stayed in France after demobi-
lisation. Messali came under the influence of Chekib Arslan,
an Arab nationalist leader, who established his Bureau d'Infor-
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mation in Geneva. 83 After meeting Arslan in an anti-colonial
congress, Messali moved away from the earlier communist influ-
ence. Upon returning to France he still favoured an Algerian
independent nation, but in the framework of Islam and the Arab
nation. The ENA took a more radical and revolutionary approach
in its struggle under his leadership and adopted a more speci-
fically Algerian programme (as opposed to North African).
Dissolved by the French authorities, it was recreated in 1937
under the name of Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA). The latter
experienced the same fate (26 September 1939) and was trans-
formed into the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertes Demo-
cratiques (MTLD). In the process, Messali was imprisoned
several times, put under house-arrest at other times, and,
occasionally, exiled for his ideas and his role in the party
(or rather the parties). 84
After the reforms of 1919 there was a slight increase in the
number of elected liberal Muslims to local councils and to the
Delegations Financier-es. Dr. Bendjelelloul, one of the locally
elected councillors, created the Federation des Elus Musulmans
in the departement of Constantine in 1934, which was followed
by similar organisations in other places. A few newspapers
came to life like L'Entente, the official newspaper of the
Federation, Voix Indigene, and a few books were published by
people like R. Zenati. At that time, a young liberal, by the
name of Ferhat Abbas, emerged and was to have a primordial
importance.
Abbas characterises this second trend in the nationalist
movement, formed by an elite with a French education back-
ground, which at first and for quite some time did not question
French sovereignty in Algeria, but fought for a gradual trans-
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formation of the political status of the Algerian people,
asking for equality in the Army and the Civil Service, the
suppression of exception laws, the reform of justice and educa-
tion in favour of the Algerian population without a renuncia-
tion of their Islamic status. Abbas created the Union Popu-
laire Algêrienne (UPA) and then the Association des Amis du
Manifeste on 14 March 1944, in which members of other parties
were welcome, 85 but he had to create his own party: l'Union
democratique du Manifeste Algêrien (UDMA).
However, towards the mid 1950s he joined the radicals for an
independent Algeria. Several developments had occurred before
his disappointment led him to change his policy, from the
stance adopted when he wrote in L'Entente in February 1936:
Si j'avais d6couvert /a "nation algerienne" je
serais nationaliste.... Et cependant je ne mourrai
pas pour la "patrie algerienne" parce que cette
patrie n'existe pas. Je ne l'ai pas decouverte.
J'ai interrog6 l'histoire, j'ai interrog6 les vi-
vants et les morts; j'ai visitê les cimetiêres;
personne ne m'en a pane. Sans doute oui - je
trouve "l'empire arabe", "l'empire musulman" qui
honorent l'Islam et notre race. Mais ces empires se
sont eteints. us correspondaient a l'empire latin
et au saint empire Romain-Germanique de l'èpoque
mêdievale. us sont nes pour une époque et une
humanitê qui ne sont pas les nOtres... Nous avons
donc ecarte une fois pour toutes les nuêes et les
chiméres pour her dafinitivement notre avenir a
celui de l'oeuvre frangaise dans ce pays. Nous
l'avons 6crit. La sauvegarde desette oeuvre est he
pivot de notre action politique.°°
But if, as Barbour points out, Abbas could not find the
Algerian nation in history, it was because long years "separa-
ted him from the memory (and the patriotism) of the great peas-
ant risings". It was also because "the centres of Arabic
culture had been destroyed and his French upbringing had con-
fined his education to textbooks used in the French schools".87
Abdelhamid Benbadis, founder and leader of the third natio-
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nalist movement, replied to Abbas' declaration two months later
that, having "examined history" and discovered a Muslim Alger-
ian nation "with its culture, its traditions and its character-
istics, good or bad like every other nation of the earth... we
state that this Algerian nation is not France, cannot be France
and does not wish to be France". 88
Already in 1931 a book on the history of Algeria had on its
cover the motto of the Ulêmas. This motto was " Islam is our
religion, Algeria our motherland and Arabic our language".89
The Association of the "Ulemas" was founded in 1931 by Benba-
dis, who was influenced by the reformist ideas of Djamal Eddine
el Afghani and the Egyptian Sheikh Mohammed Abdouh. The orga-
nisation flourished under Benbadis, who wanted to improve the
political standard of the Muslims and purify their religion
which was tainted by corruption in many respects.
Several newspapers were formed, El Muntakid (The Critic), a
monthly review, El Chihab (The Meteor), El Islah (The Reform)
and several history books on Algeria were published in
Arabic." In its Statutes (Article 3) the Association des
Oulemas Reformistes d'Algerie asserted its desire not to inter-
vene in politics, but this could hardly have been the case.91
Since they had declared that "independence was a natural right
for every people on earth," their ideals were far from accept-
ing French domination. They preached their ideas in mosques
from which they were banned from 1939 and in the schools which
they managed to create (from charity funds) and which were
sometimes tolerated, sometimes closed down by the French au-
thorities, but always under persistent threat of closure.
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3.5. The last chances of peaceful settlement
3.5.1. The failure of the Blum-Violette Bill (1936) 
In spite of the euphoric celebration of the centenary of the
conquest, there was a deep-rooted feeling of malaise in the
population. 92 The rise to power of the Popular Front increased,
however, the hopes in the colony. The "Elus", the Communists
and the Uldmas prepared a Muslim Algerian Congress which took
place on 7 June 1936 and drew up a charter of demands (social,
economic, cultural and religious, in order to create a more
liberal, egalitarian and less discriminatory system for the
indigenous community). As a result these different political
groupings were only partly satisfied.93
A second congress was convened for 2 August, at which Messa-
li participated, and at which he spoke without having been
formally invited. From that moment onwards he had a greater
impact on the Moslem community in Algeria itself. This gather-
ing had little success because of the disagreement between the
different tendencies, and because of the disappointment of the
more liberal elements as a result of the failure of the Blum-
Violette proposals designed to grant citizen rights to a small
number of Muslims.94
However, the proposals were withdrawn because of the opposi-
tion in France and because of the threat of resignation en bloc
of the Federation of Mayors and councillors in Algeria.95
3.5.2. The Second World War crisis and its aftermath 
When the war broke out in 1939, tension was already high
because of the numerous problems that were still unsolved.96
Galloping demography and the economic impact of the war had
disastrous effects on Algeria. If the European population
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slightly diminished or stagnated between 1936 and 1948, the
Muslim population rose by one and a half million (from
6.121.000 to 7.600.000) in the same period. The population of
the countryside had risen by 20%, 	 of the cities by far
more. 98
The production of cereals fell to a tenth of what it had
been before the war. 99 In spite of this slump, grain requisi-
tions were made, allegedly for metropolitan France, but des-
tined, in fact, for Germany and Italy)- 00 In Kabylia, where
olive production constituted the main revenue, already in 1940
the production represented only a quarter of the usual figure.
Even wine production diminished by two-thirds and stabilised at
half the prewar level in later years)-°'
Muslim livestock was also affected. It was sometimes down
by half 1-° 2 and the revenues of Algerian exports fell drastical-
ly in spite of the dovaluation.1"
Because of its inadequate industry, Algeria was dependent on
France for most manufactured and consumer goods. 104 There were
no major salary rises, and prices according to government
official figures increased by a rate of 11% in 1939 to a rate
of 439% in 1945. 105 The most affected were essential items like
bread, coal and fuel. A bread shortage led to starvation.
Even the most essential commodities could not be bought as they
had become too expensive for the peasants. 106
With the landing of the Allied forces in North Africa in
November 1942 the black market established itself, but prices
were out of reach for most Algerians. 107 It was estimated that
during that period 10% of the population could manage to satis-
fy its basic needs, while 75% to 80% were poor and very
poor.108
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In spite of its disastrous economic situation during the
Second World War, Algeria nevertheless represented an important
strategic position. Oran had become one of the main French
bases in the Mediterranean. At Mers el Kebir, the Royal Navy
attacked the French marine. After the fall of France in June
1940, the French colonial empire assumed a special significance
both for Vichy and de Gaulle.'"
3.5.3. Dashed hopes at the Liberation
There were different resistance networks on Algerian soil
for espionage and sabotage. In collaboration with some Muslims
they prepared the field for the Allied forces landing and
participated in the successful putsch in Algiers that was to
secure power for the Allied forces)--°
During the war years F. Abbas, without encountering open
opposition, tried unsuccessfully to get the French government
free from parliamentary obstruction to start a programme of
reforms. 111 The defeat of the French army and the landing of
the American troops on the North African coast (8 November
1942) showed, in the same way as the defeat in the Franco-
Prussian war, the weakness of France as opposed to the strength
of the deployed American forces.
After failing to obtain any satisfaction from the French
authorities and after discussions with D. Murphy, personal
representative of President Roosevelt, about the implementation
of the Atlantic Charter to Algeria, 112 Abbas sent a Message
des Representants des Musulmans Algeriens aux autoritês re-
sponsables in the name of the Algerian elected representatives.
His attempt to internationalise the issue by invoking the
declaration of the American President on "the right of self-
determination of all people without distinction of race nor
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religionn113 provoked anger and disapproval in France.
De Gaulle and his government had been too busy with the war
to make any effort towards solving the Algerian problem. How-
ever, on 7 March 1944, some reforms were formulated tending
more towards "assimilation" than anything else, realising the
wishes expressed ten years earlier by the Blum Violette propo-
sals. But this was too late as even the less radical of the
nationalists were hoping for a federal system with an autono-
mous Algerian Republic. 114 As a result of his more radical and
popular appeal, as well as his continued imprisonment, Messali
had become by the end of the war the leader of the Algerian
people.
In May 1945, on VE Day, tension was high and pacific demon-
strations turned into riots after skirmishes with the police
who had tried to take the banners from demonstrators chanting
nationalist slogans and asking for the freedom of Messali.
About a hundred Europeans were killed and several hundred
injured. The repression was the most severe that had been seen
to date, with a death toll among the indigenous people varying,
according to different sources, from 15,000 to 45,000, with
recurrent and repeated use of bombing of civilian villages,
executions, imprisonment, and forced labour)-15
3.5.4.
(1947-1957)
After the war a number of proposals were introduced in the
French parliament by different political groupings in Algeria
and France to improve conditions in the colony)- 16 A govern-
ment proposal, adopted after several amendments, introduced
reforms in respect of social equality. Further, it created the
Algerian Assembly, 117 but maintained the two colleges, which,
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while remaining unrepresentative, now had an elected membership
of sixty members each. The inequality of representation was
weighted in favour of the small community of colonists, which
numbered 922,000. 464,000 Europeans and 58,000 Muslims elected
the same number of delegates as the 7,860,000 Muslim community
with its 1,300,000 voters.
De Gaulle opposed the statute and declared on 18 August
1947:
Souverainete de la France, cela signifie
d'abord que nous ne devons laisser mettre en ques-
tion, sous aucune forme, ni au dedans, ni au dehors,
le fait que l'Algerie est notre domaine. Cela sig-
nifie encore qu'il n'y a aucune matiere concernant
l'Algerie, ofl les pouvoirs publics francais, exec-
utif, legislatif, judiciaire, puissent aliener leur
droit etleur devoir de trancher en dernier
ressort. 118
The nationalist parties had recommended abstention from
local ballots, yet won an important majority. After the adop-
tion of the statutes of 1947 and the arrival of the new Gouver-
neur general and former education minister, E. Naegelen, "good
elections" were ordered for the Assemblee Algerienne, and the
candidates backed by the administration obtained an absolute
majority. The history of French Algeria is rich in these
instances of bonnes elections. They were denounced on several
occasions but were always validated by the French authorities
in France, and especially by the Assembly of the Fourth Repu-
blic.119
The French authorities in Algeria were rightly convinced
that force, repression and cunning would maintain the status
quo to the extent that in April 1956, when the Algerian Assemb-
ly was dissolved, it had not even discussed the tasks given to
it by the Statutes of 1947.1"
However, Algeria had changed. The MTLD was gaining greater
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influence among the masses and preparing as well as organising
them through the PPA's clandestine organisation and activities
and its underground branch and secret army, the Organisation
Spêciale (OS) .121 0.S members had even robbed Oran's post
office in 1949 to provide funds for the organisation - they
included Benbella, who later escaped from prison. The O.S.
fought French forces, which managed to dismantle their network
(1950-1953) .122
The general condition of the indigenous population had not
improved. It could only have worsened because no additional
measures had been taken by the French authorities in agricul-
ture, industry or education, and because of the increase in the
birth rate. The fact that the poor tend to think usually that
children are their only wealth, 123 improvements in health care
and economic problems contributed to the high birth rate which
in its turn exacerbated the original economic problems.124
By 1951, one third of the best cultivated land (the value of
which was often three times that owned by Algerian peasants),
more than 5 million acres, belonged to 21,650 European set-
tlers, while the Muslim population of 6,3 million (in 1954)
lived on the rest.125
The education authorities had made an important effort but
it was not enough to absorb the increase of the population. In
1955, the capital, Algiers, which could be considered as the
most advanced place in relation to education, 64% of the popu-
lation (over 6 years old) was completely illiterate. 126 Nei-
ther the French political authorities in Algiers or France, nor
economic and financial interests, were aware of the enormous
effort that was needed to find solutions to the multiplicity of
the problems at the root of Algerian society. 127 There was no
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adequate response to this critical situation from the French
government and parliament. The settlers were suspicious of any
changes that might alter the "power relationship" and French
public opinion was indifferent to the plight of Algerians. Even
the most basic aspirations for human dignity were deliberately
ignored. 128
In March 1954, unaware of the real problems at the core of
Algerian society, one of the experts on North African policy
wrote in Le Monde:
Dans la tempéte, l'Algerie tient ferme. 11 est
vrai que le statut n'apporte pas par lui-même une
solution definitive a toutes les difficultes... Mais
une sorte d'equilibre interne a ete atteint, nous
avons la une bonne base de depart. Ii est vrai que
les Musulmans accedant de plus en plus a l'instruc-
tion et la plenitude des droits politiques, pre-
ndront peu a peu plus de poids auprês des Chretiens
et des Juifs. Mais la francisation elle-meme ne
cesse de progresser. Les textes sont d'ailleurs
souples et le statut contient bien des viTtNalites
qui se pretent A des evolutions diverses."
Only a total unawareness of the gravity of the Algerian
problem, or indeed of its existence, could explain the style
and the confidence of this statement, confidence which was
shaken seven months later when the country flared up in a
bloody struggle which was to threaten the Republican founda-
tions of the French state.
3.6. The Closing Years of the Fourth Republic
3.6.1.	 Prelude to 1 November 1954 
By the autumn, the desire to resist foreign invaders by the
inhabitants of the Central Maghrib, noted centuries earlier by
Ibn Khaldounl " (1332-1406), and more recently by Paul Balta,
was again in the air.
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3.6.2. Ripe conditions for a Nationalist uprising
There were already subjective conditions present, such as
the idea of an Algerian nation, united by its culture, common
history and traditions, language, religion and territory. All
of these provided the cement for the anticolonial struggle of
the Emir Abdel Kader, El Mokrani and Bou'Maaza and, much later,
to the Ulemas, the ENA and the PPA. There were also more objec-
tive reasons on the ground militating in favour of the anti
colonial struggle.
Through the destruction of the old economic structures by
the colonial order, the economic conditions of the Algerians
had deteriorated.131
The social and political evolution of the Algerians had also
been blocked for over a century, through the lack of political
emancipation and repeatedly rigged elections. The lack of
schooling, widespread illiteracy, and the inability of the
system to integrate the indigenous fraction of the population
heightened the feeling of alienation.
The Statute voted in 1947 remained inapplicable to Algeria
because of the resistance of settlers.132
In the various economic, social and political fields, the
evolution of Algerian society had been held back for so long
that another violent uprising was inevitable.133
3.6.3. All Saints Day, 1 November 1954
After an initial period of growth, the revived Messalist
MTLD was experiencing difficulties throughout 1953 which were
to lead to the division of that movement in two: the Messal-
ists, faithful to their leader, and the Centralists, each
organised their own congress, respectively in Hornu in July
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1954 and in Algiers in August 1954, expelling their rivals from
their own organisations.134
The FLN, founded on 10 October 1954 (see also Chapter 6)
called for an armed struggle with the aim of restoring an
Algerian state dêmocratique et social dans le cadre des prin-
cipes islamiques. The first sparks of an eight-year-long war
were lit with the first "terrorist" activities taking place on
All Saints' Day (1 November 1954).135
It was already clear quite early on that it was not a disor-
ganised movement, 136 but one with precise political objectives,
and one which was ready to present the French authorities with
a serious challenge. 137 The CRUA138 had kept imminent attacks
absolutely secret. This meant that despite rumours, the FLN
managed to surprise the French authorities.139
The uprising of 1 November took place at the time when the
nationalist leaders were annoncing in Cairo:
* the birth of the FLN to lead the armed struggle for "the
liquidation of the colonial system" and "national independence
through the restoration of the Algerian state" ,140
* and their rejection of all "relics of reformism". 141
3.6.4. The French Reaction: the initial stages
The response of the French was to reject totally any idea of
negotiation and declare through Mitterrand that the only form
of negotiation would be total war against the enemies of
France. 142
Initially, the French authorities in Algeria resorted to the
very ineffective action of imprisoning all known nationalist
leaders and militants, although it was clear at the time that
they had nothing to do with the "troubles". 143
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The initial response by the French was to repress the move-
ment militarily, as most French authorities insisted on the
restablishment of order, a policy which was soon to be given
the name of "pacification" .144 Estimating the number of "re-
bels" to be around 800 men divided into 15 groups, the French
authorities used their 60-70,000 strong French troops; and
those numbers were soon to be increased.145
Even later on, still believing socio-economic causes to be
at the root of the discontent, the French government instituted
agrarian reforms, set up medical centres in the villages, and
encouraged the spread of education by building hundreds of
classrooms and staffing them with soldiers. 146
3.6.5. Soustelle takes over from Leonard (February 1955)
In February 1955 Roger Leonard was replaced as Governor
General of Algeria by the Gaullist Soustelle, whose candidature
had been suggested by Pierre Mendbs-France prior to his
demise.147
During his time in office, there was no revolutionary
changes in terms of policies, apart from a modification of
earlier ineffectual reforms and policies with the concession of
very small changes. 148
By using the full powers and resources of the army, 149
Soustelle did not change his approach in any way in dealing
with the rebellion. Troop numbers were increased from 56,500
to 83,400 in February 1955 to include a number of
conscripts.15°
Unwilling to climb down in public, the authorities followed
officially and practically a policy of repression. Acquiescing
to Army requests, France sent more troops to Algeria up to a
78
total of 120.000.
Additionally, emergency laws were promulgated on 3 April
1955 151 to continue the struggle and deal with the insurgents,
estimated to be 1,000 men. Self-defence groups were also set up
by settlers (groupes d'auto defense), who did not always attack
the culprits.152
Towards the end the middle of 1955 more counter-revolution-
ary methods 153 were adopted with the creation of the Specia-
lised Administrative Sections (SAS). 154
Ironically, France was intensifying its military effort in
Algeria at the time when international opinion was being pro-
gressively swayed by the anticolonial powers with the Bandung
conference of newly-independent nations in April 1955; 155 and
when Tunisia and Morocco, French protectorates since 1881 and
1912 respectively, were edging their way toward total indepe-
dence without too much resistance from France.156
In the international arena, the nationalists played on the
errors of France and, given the support of the Third World,
managed to have the Algerian question tabled for discussion at
the U.N. on 30 September 1955. When the UN decided to consider
the question, 157 France walked out in protest.
Internally, the FLN extended its politico-administrative
organisation network on the population 158 but not without
experiencing serious difficulties on the ground, epitomised in
the opposition of the Messalists of the mNA.159
3.6.5.1.Internal Dissensions and divisions of the National-
ist movement
The opposition between the FLN and the MNA has been empha-
sised on numerous occasions to show that the FLN was terroris-
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ing many indigenous people.
The struggle between the MNA members, who remained faithful
to Messali, and members of the FLN, over the dominance of the
population raged first in Algeria. However, when the MNA was
losing the fight in Algeria, it continued its struggle against
the FLN in France's mainland over the 120,000 Muslims who
worked there. In 1956 the number of Muslims killed as a result
of those struggles numbered 86.
Occasionally the French were able to exploit the enmity
between these two movements. The incident of Melouza needs to
be seen in that context. 160
The debate over the MNA-FLN conflict could be sidestepped as
having been marginal. It could, for instance, be argued that
both movements had opted for independence. Hence the struggle
between them is to some extent irrelevant, in that both of them
had a common enemy, the French colonial system against which
they were fighting with the tacit and implicit support of the
population. Material help was also forthcoming in terms of
logistic support, food and shelter being given to the combat-
tants.
Many argue that that the nationalist movements had a hard
struggle to gain control over the local population; as in the
case of many revolutionary movements, the latter is thought to
have been slow to join the rebel forces ,161 even though it
usually offered tacit or implicit help and at times open sup-
port in the form of shelter and logistic assistance, including
supplies.162
3 .6.5.2. The FLN an Unpopular Movement?
Possibly because of the Muslim victims of the FLN, there
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were grounds enough for some historians to conclude that the
FLN was terrorisising the population at large. Although this
aspect is not to be rejected out of hand, as the FLN did manage
to terrorise some people in its own ranks, let alone outsiders,
it is hard to see how the Algerian population, unhappy under
the colonial system, failed to espouse the rebels I cause. The
FLN's attacks against the population have to be seen, or so the
FLN would claim, in the same light as the resistance fighters
in France under Nazi occupation, engaged in the Liberation
struggle and seeking to establish control to undermine the
occupying force.163
In view of the number of indigenous victims in the Algerian
conflict in general, some have argued that the "first stage of
the insurrection was entirely military in character and had no
support from the Muslim masses" other than what was obtained at
"pistol-point" 164
Some critics maintain that it was the comparative failure of
the 20 August and 30 September demonstrations that brought home
to the FLN that the Muslims masses were indifferent, not to say
hostile, to its cause.
In discussing this question, the key factor of terrorism has
been given, in my view, as in the MNA-FLN conflict outlined
above, overdue emphasis in relation to the universal Muslim
dislike of French rule.
But even for O'Ballance, who argued this case, it was
apparent that by December 1955 the ALN was a force to be reck-
oned with, if "for no other reason than to escape an assassina-
tion for alleged collaboration with the French authorities". 165
He stated that the campaign for the minds of the Muslim
people started in December 1955 and lasted for about 3 months,
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"during which the revolutionary ideas and aims of the FLN were
fully explained" • 166
His explanation is not convincing since it is very difficult
to see what the FLN did in order to win over successfully the
minds of the people when the French efforts had failed over a
much longer period. In any case, the intensive FLN propaganda
campaign was said to have been so successful that by February
1956 the bulk of the Muslim population had become pro-FLN. They
were reported as anxious and willing to help the ALN in its
insurgent activities -without the presence of terror, threats
or the fear of reprisals if they did not do so.167
With the bulk of the Muslim population on its side, with
the help of arms suplies across the borders, and with more
recruits coming forward and new enthusiasm for the insurrection
sweeping throughout the country, the FLN became a real military
force leading a vast offensive against French forces throughout
the country. 168
Referring to Plum , Aussenpolitik, 1956, p. 597, Opperman169
gives the figure of at least half the Algerian population as
supporting the rebels, who are also said to have had an impor-
tant influence on trades unions and workers in France (250,000
to 400,000). It is undisputable that from 1955-1956, the FLN
was taking over MNA's strongholds)-70
Although not a large movement, it has to be said that the
FLN conformed to the strongest aspirations within the Algerian
people. 171 Harbi argues that it would be an exaggeration to
suggest, as Yves Courribre does, that the first reflex of the
Muslim population was to play ostrich (rentrer la téte dans les
dpaules).172
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3.6.5.3. From the August 1955 Events to the Popular Front
A dramatic incident took place on 20-21 August 1955. FLN
fighters of a Willaya in the Northern Constantinois, assisted
by the local population, unleashed an attack on 36 centres of
colonisation. This was a suicidal operation which resulted in
123 deaths, including those of 71 Europeans. The assailants
lost 1273 in the attack. The gap between the two communities
was growing into a chasm. In their reprisals, the Europeans
regarded all Muslims as rebels; and many of them were killed
simply because of who they were.
The FLN fighters became celebrated as real heroes, Mujahid-
dins fighters in a Holy War; 173 and the French war effort
intensified.
Shocked by what was happening, and some say impressed or
intimidated by the FLN, the Muslims dlus resigned. In the
Algerian Assembly even old official candidates began to speak
of the "Algerian national idea" .174
After the dissolution of the French Assembly on 2 December,
France tacitly returned its verdict through the victory of the
Republican Front of Guy Mollet and Mendbs-France, which heral-
ded the rejection of integration and the recognition of an
Algerian identity. The clear mandate was to put an end to the
"troubles".
3.6.6. Guy Mollet takes over (26 January 1956)
With his fresh mandate, the newly-appointed Prime Minister
of the Republic made preparations to appoint a new man in
Algeria and to go there and see for himself.
He appointed Catroux, who had been a former Governor of
Algeria during the Second World War. But Catroux, who had
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identified himself with de Gaulle's 1944 reforms, was rejected
by the Algiers mob. Mollet's visit to Algiers on 6 February
was met with the famous demonstration by Europeans, who made
him feel unwelcome and intimidated him until he gave in. Under
the settlers' pressure, he appointed Lacoste to the post of
Minister Resident in his place (10 February).
In March 1956, the two neighbours, edging their way towards
independence, denounced French use of NATO troops against the
ALN, and pledged their support for the Algerian fighters.
At the same time Guy Mollet obtained special powers from
the National Assembly, including the Commmunists, to re-estab-
lish order and introduce a measure of democracy. From then on,
the Governor General, elevated to the role of Resident-Mini-
ster, assumed dictatorial powers)-75
Lacoste gave priority to the military effort, requesting the
recall of the 1953 and then of the 1952 national service in-
takes, and gave the army extended powers. The strength of the
army was now increased to 400,000 men, practising a policy of
guadrillage (division of the country into military zones) and
building a huge fortified barrier seperating Algeria from
Tunisia. The policy of ratissage (combing the countryside),
which ensued, was designed to go hand in hand with the resump-
tion of control of the native population.176
The army, commissionned to build a new Algeria, became the
principal political force in the country. In 1956 France deci-
ded the dissolution of the Algerian Assemblies and the aboli-
tion of communes mixtes. These moves could have increased the
number of Muslim representatives and may have provided the
French with a Third Force, an "alternative interlocutor" op-
posed to the FLN. They failed, however, partly because there
84
were no volunteers for this Third Force, and partly because
such political reforms gave way to simple administrative
changes in tune with army requirements. 177 The limited measure
of local government reform, allowing Algerian Muslims to direct
communes, coincided with the takeover of responsibility of
communities by the SAS of the army)- 78 The agrarian reform,
announced as a revolutionary measure, ended up by being of
little effect.
With the dissolution of the all elected councils (5 December
1956), the government reverted back to the old "regime of the
sword" • 179
1956 also saw the intensification of the war effort by the
FLN, which was scoring notable successes on the political
front. These took the form of rallying various political forces
such as the Ulêmas, the underground PCA, "moderate" nationalist
leaders, such as Ferhat Abbas, and Lamine Debaghine (the latter
became the first president of the FLN executive). The FLN
enlisted the support of various trades unions (UGTA, UGEMA,),
was supported by strikes of students and school children, and
desertion by soldiers and officers from the rank and file of
the French Army.
In Algeria, support for Mesali collapsed. With the FLN
success, came the signs of a rift beginning when the FLN lea-
ders decided to hold a congress in Soummam on 20 August 1956,
allowing no time for external leadership to be there.'"
3.6.6.1.The Soummam Congess (20 August 1956)
200 delegates from all parts of Algeria attended the confer-
ence. This led to the setting up of a CNRA, a sort of committe
or governing body of 17 members (with 17 substitutes in case of
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casualties), entrusted with the political leadership of the
movement. The meeting affirmed the collegial leadershi p181 and
the conference went on, due to good security arrangements,
thanks to the organisational skills of Abane Ramdane. The
French were unaware of the conference until its findings were
made public on 1 November 1956,
The Soummam conference also created an executive body (CEE)
consisting of five members)- 82 It also agreed to launch a
"terrorist" offensive throughout Algeria and laid down princi-
ples of organisation)-83
Additionally major decisions were taken, and the ALN provi-
ded with a single general staff under Krim Belkacem.184
In France, the SFIO Congress declared itself in favour of a
cease-fire and a negotiated solution. The Prime Minister,
Mollet, arranged contact with the FLN, but contacts were broken
off at the end of September 1956, after two exploratory meet-
ings at Rome and Belgrade. On 22 October, a Moroccan aircraft
carrying, amongst other Algerians, four of the main leaders of
the FLN (Ben Bella, Boudiaf, Ait Ahmed and Khidder, who were to
remain interned in France until 1962) was intercepted on the
orders of Max Lejeune, Secretary of State of the Armed Forces,
in charge of Algerian affairs.
3.6.6.2. The capture of Ben Bella and the FLN leaders
The capture of Ben Bella and the FLN leaders is the next
momentous event of 1956. It was a virtual kidnapping of Ben
Bella and of the FLN leaders, when on board a Morrocan airplane
flown by a French crew. The latter seemed not to have been
involved in the plot, but were talked down by the French Air
Force on 22 October 1956.185
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This incident caused great indignation in the Arab world
and proved to be a good propaganda coup for the FLN. Neither
the French government nor the Resident Minister, Lacoste,
claimed not to know anything about it. 186 Thus, yet again, the
intelligence service had sprung a surprise,- 87 depriving the
FLN of its leadership. At the same time, several directives and
a list of French European and Muslim agents and contacts being
used by FLN was made available to the security forces. On the
basis of this information, they arrested many agents, and a
number of ALN projects were consequently thwarted.-88
Further negotiations were now impossible. Furthermore, the
French together with the British were engaged in what was to be
known as the Suez crisis against Egypt, from the point of view
of the French, the training and support base of the FLN.
With the salvos fired by the two superpowers and the retreat
of the two major colonial powers involved, Britain and France,
the FLN increased its international standing. Pacification did
not seem to be assured of success. The Muslim population was
increasingly running away from the French. 189
3.6.7. The Second phase: August 1956 May 1958
European counter-terrorist activity can be said to have
begun on 30 June 1956, when a bomb exploded at the headquarters
of UGTA in Algiers. This was followed on 17 July by another
explosion in the Communist newspaper office. These were fol-
lowed by other incidents with increasing frequency during the
latter part of 1956, including a bomb set off by the ORAF
activists in the Rue de Thebes in the Casbah (10 August 1956).
Anti-Muslim feelings erupted in anti-Muslim riots on 29
December on the occasion of the funeral of a murdered European
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mayor, when crowds shouted "l'armee au pouvoir” .190 Extremist
European organisations engaged in terrorist activities and
propaganda, encouraged by Soustelle, and the French govern-
ment's inability to control events in Algeria.
The French army was also scoring some successes. It hit hard
in its quadrillage, killing FLN fighters in numbers.- 9 -
The civilian authority was being lost progressively in
Algiers with the city becoming a scene of daily acts of terror-
ism and death. In December 1956, there were some 120 terrorist
incidents in the city, especially in the Casbah. 192 This housed
80,000 people, 4,000 of whom were said to be connected with
terrorist activities, according to French intelligence sources.
Under the leadership of Abane Radmdane, whose scruples were
lost as a result of the Casbah bombing,'" the movement was
beginning to be swayed by the arguments in favour of more and
more indiscriminate terrorism. The Prefect became totally
helpless. With the approval of Lacoste, he called in the army
to take action.
By the beginning of 1957, the FLN had a series of small,
partially succesful strikes, culminating in a major strike in
January 1957 to coincide with the UN debate over Algeria.
The European population was still without any understanding
of the Muslim revolt. It reacted with increased anger, accusing
the Socialists of wanting to abandon Algeria.
The funeral of Amedee Proger, 194 who was killed by Ali La-
pointe, was the occasion for violent demonstrations by Eur-
opeans followed by terrorist attacks of their own.'" After the
execution of two convicted ALN guerrillas, the FLN turned to
urban terrorism. Lacoste gave paratroopers the order to destroy
"terrorists commandos” by any means.
88
In February 1957, the 10th paratroop division commanded by
General Massu, with a strength of about 10,000, descended upon
the Casbah. It rooted out the FLN, using informers, forcing
about 1,500 of them to cooperate with the soldiers.196
The Battle of Algiers, from January to September 1957, ended
in the military destruction of the FLN in the capital. However,
it was psychologically a pyrrhic victory, as the Muslims were
now united against the French army. French public opinion was
shocked to hear of the torture of young women and the torturing
to death of a young university teacher, Maurice Audin.
When Ben Khedda and Abane Ramdane left Algiers for Tunisia,
Yacef Saadi took over the fighting in Algiers until his surren-
der on 24 September. His successor, together with "23 terror-
ists", were killed on 8 October. This more or less ended the
FLN organisation in the city: and in many other cities too, but
not to the same extent. Abane Ramdane was blamed for the fail-
ure and killed by order of other FLN leaders)-97
With the bitter ongoing fighting in Algeria, the FLN found
enormous difficulties in rebuilding its strength without arms.
The efforts made by the French to round up and regroup the
population in "Centres" contributed further to increase their
isolation, despite the fact that they managed to keep a tight
rein on entire regions in the East of the country. Thanks to
Tunisian help, they also retained bases in the East, making
occasional crossings over the fortified Morice line until it
was completed.198
Internally, the political leadership of the FLN was forced
out of Algiers, after the capture and execution of Ben
Mhidi. 199 It then took refuge in Tunis and Cairo.
The French government was disturbed by the formation of
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North African front at the UN and turned its back on any
discussion of statutes with an elected Muslim body. Instead, it
worked on a loi-cadre (outline law) promulgated on 13 September
1957, seven days before the UN was due to discuss the Algerian
question. This law, which was not to be negotiated but imposed
by France, promised to respect Algerian identity while keeping
it at the same time as an integral part of France.200
Approved by Parliament on 5 February 1958 with more re-
signation than enthusiasm, the loi cadre allowed for the recog-
nition of five territories. The FLN described it as a ridicu-
lous attempt to dismember Algeria, and forbad the Muslims from
standing for the various assemblies it proposed. Lacoste had to
appoint councillors in the communes. However, he did not suc-
ceed in persuading them to appoint members of the territorial
assemblies before time ran out.
3.6.8.The Collapse of the Republic (13 May 1958)
1958 opened with the French Air Force bombing the village of
Sakiet Sidi Youcef, in retaliation for raids by the FLN. The
Tunisian government immediately obtained the good offices of
the US and Britain for a mediation, which was designed to
internationalise the Algerian problem even further.
The Gaillard government fell. The involvement of the Ameri-
cains and the British, through their offer of good offices,
made France look vulnerable internationally. Submitting to the
offer made through Jean Monnet, France's hand seemed to weaken.
This heightened the alarm amongst Europeans in France and in
Algeria.
On 26 April, the Europeans in Algeria came out in street
protests. While the Gaillard Government fell, Lacoste , con-
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vinced that he would no longer figure in the new ministerial
line up, commented that France was heading towards a political
Dien Bien Phu, and thereupon left Algiers.
On 13 May, fresh demonstrations provided the pretext for the
occupation of the Governor General headquarters (the centre for
the administration of Algeria) by a small commando of European
activists. But on this occasion, the "Comittee of Public Safe-
ty",	 set up in Algiers according to a familiar French tradi-
tion of rioting, was immediately taken over by the army and
demanded the formation in Paris of a government of Public
Safety. General Salan whispered the name of de Gaulle to lead
this government, as he was the only person thought to be cap-
able of avoiding civil war. The French offered no resistance,
except for a left-wing demonstration in favour of the Republic.
All on the scene expected de Gaulle to put an end to the con-
flict. This legendary figure was the saviour that France was
expecting. But his statements were obscure in the sense that he
appealed to both those who hoped for a military victory and to
those who were keen to arrive at a negotiated settlement. On 1
June, when he was appointed the regime's last Prime Minister,
the Fourth Republic was virtually dead.
3.6.9. Conclusion
As we have seen, Algeria and its people seemed to have
resisted foreign invasions and dominations throughout history.
Like others before it, the colonial venture of France was met
with the most ferocious resistance. Using ruthless methods, the
French progressively established a colony of settlement displa-
cing the indigenous population and depriving it progressively
of its dignity and the means for its survival. It failed to
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deliver the self-proclaimed civilised order.
Modern nationalist movements were developing. However, they
achieved very little because of their divisions, and the unwil-
lingness of the French authorities to concede more than super-
ficial and ineffective reforms.
At the time of the uprising, Le Monde appeared to display a
startling ignorance of the Algerian situation. Is this the case
after 1954 as it had been before that date? To what extent did
Le Monde's view of things from an official and government
perspective after 1954? Did it offer its readers a variety of
views? How objective and balanced were Le Monde's reports of
the various protagonists, events and situations?
A more thorough examination of the paper's coverage of
Algeria between 1954 and 1958 will shed more light on the
subject. This is the main thrust of this work.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4.REPORTING A COLONY (1944-1954)
4.1. Introduction
Before looking at Le Monde's coverage of issues relating to
the Algerian war, it would be useful to see how the paper
covered Algeria from the time of its launch. This is made
necessary by the need to be aware of the historical background
and also in order to examine claims made by some researchers
about this period of Le Monde's history. This chapter examines
how Le Monde described Algeria and looks at the attitude the
paper adopted towards developments in the colony up to the 1954
uprising, through the reports of the paper itself as well as
through a study made of those reports by T. Firchon.1
Firchon's findings identify three periods between 1945 and
1954: March 1945 to August 1947, August 1947 to March 1951,
March 1951 to November 1954. Within this framework he identi-
fies a change in Le Monde's attitude around 1951, the year of
Governor General E.Naegelen's departure from Algeria. 2 Although
these major periods have not been strictly adhered to by Fir-
chon, sometimes for legitimate reasons of contrast and compari-
son, they will be used as subsections in this chapter.
4.2.Period One (March 1945- August 1947)
4.2.1.Limits set to manifest aspirations 
What clearly appears in this period is that Algerian natio-
nalist aspirations were known to various journalists of the
paper 3 but were not thought of, by the Europeans, as desirable
and inevitable. 4 This was not seen as problematic in anyway by
the paper. Hence, events of the magnitude of May 1945 uprising
were not foreseen by the paper, nor substantially reported.5
Firchon expressed justifiable concern at the lack of
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information and at the silence about the event which could
hardly be explained, especially since E.Sablier witnessed those
events, as revealed in an article ten years later. 6 The
possible excuse put forward - the youth and inexperience of the
paper, barely six months old- could not stand up. Given Le
Monde's self-proclaimed conception of journalism, one would
have expected it to have informed its readers about those
serious events, which lasted more than three months, in some
way other than by simply publishing the debates of the Assembly
and the communiqués of the Ministry of Interior.7
In the reports in Le Monde, where reference was made to the
troubles, there was an overall consensus (although with differ-
ent emphases) as to the various sources of the troubles 8 toge-
ther with unanimity on a firm policy. There was also a consen-
sus about the attitude to be adopted towards this outburst of
violence.9
A number of parameters of the problem do seem to emerge,
despite the lack of clarity. While the paper saw that "Muslims"
had aspirations for freedom which it echoed, 1 ° it pointed out
the limits of such aspirations and journalists set the boundar-
ies for what was acceptable in terms of these aspirations.11
4.2.2.A particular perspective: the communities and the 
economy
Even when he provided more information about the topic in
his account of "Algerian reality", G.Messud saw the problem in
terms of two populations, 12 with the European element being
well integrated 13 and not the Muslim one. 14 These populations
are seen in terms of deux blocs juxtaposes et irrêductibles15
between which "peace can be established only by tacit agree-
ment".
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In terms of the economy, the picture drawn is that of a
population benefiting from the system. Messud found no indu-
stry, only local workshops; and he stated that the economy was
based on agriculture, which occupied 25,000 settler families
(some 200,000 Europeans) and seven million of the indigenous
population.
The portrayal of Algeria was quite encouraging. 16 Despite
its increase in size and the drought that killed off half its
cattle, the Muslim population did not seem to be having a rough
deal because the problems seemed to have been dealt with by the
growing European sector, which, supposedly, by making up the
difference, constituted the main element in the prosperity of
economic life.
In economic terms, Algeria was treated as an autonomous
country, because journalists were writing in terms of the
balance of exports, of shortfalls made up by the colonial
sector, and even implying the country's self sufficiency. An
important assumption was that the prosperity of the European
section could make a difference to the Muslims' plight. It is
clear, however, that there was very little connection: indeed,
quite the reverse was true, in that the prosperity of some was
very often acquired through the misery of others. In fact, the
growth of the European sector might well have been at the
expense of the best land taken from the Muslim community. The
Muslims were still trying to scratch a living from poorer soil
under an economy basically geared for export, in which they
could barely maintain a level of subsistence.17
All these negative factors added to natural calamities, such
as drought, to the inevitability of the debt crisis, the im-
possibility of investment and the like. Readers could only con-
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clude, no doubt, that the War affected everybody, and that
nothing could be done about it. They would remain quite unaware
of the specific nature of the Algerian problem.
4.2.3.Political trends and developments 
In terms of policies, Firchon pointed out that Pierron was
more moderate than J.Driand, but, according to him, the essen-
tial point for Le Monde was to avoid "thoughtless generosity"
(genêrositê aveugle). This does not say much for a paper claim-
ing to be libera1.18
In the pages of Le Monde, Firchon found an echo of new
aspirations -but also an insistence that France must remain
sovereign at home. 18 He maintained that more attention was
given to European than to indigenous problems, and that no
interest was shown in the nationalist parties and their lea-
ders. 20
In relation to political developments, the reader could only
learn that the Ulemas wanted to end the "sacrilege" caused by
the fact that the Christians held spiritual power in Algeria
and controlled education, justice and religious worship. 21 The
outlawed Parti du Peuple algêrien (PPA) had become the Mouve-
ment pour le Triomphe des Libertês dómocratigues (MTLD) and
was "now" asking purely and simply for independence. 22 But more
information was progressively made available on Abbas, the
leader of the Union Dêmocratigue du Manifeste Algêrien (UDMA)23
and on the Parti Communiste AlOrien (PCA), the next day. Even
if one were to conclude that some of the facts were there, what
is still missing is the causal link. Le Monde was not interes-
ted in sharing out the responsibilities.
Firchon could find only uncertainty over the choices to be
made, 24 although it was clear that Le Monde found it paradoxi-
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cal that "our three departments" should be transformed into "a
foreign nation", 25 which was one of the demands of the natio-
nalists.26
The paper seemed forward-looking as it examined what the
future held, but the solutions envisaged were very limited,27
the limit being: Ii y a des renoncements inacceptables.28
Indeed, Le Monde was attached to the idea of keeping the
colony and categorically opposed to its separation from the
mainland -the nationalist feelings and mood were quite strong
at the Liberation. Having forcefully rejected separatism, 29 Le
Monde saw only one way: this was through association, through
giving the powerless Assembly competence over local matters.
This obviously constituted a move towards liberal reform and
democracy, but only in so far as local affairs were concerned.
The extent of this competence was not so explicitly discussed,
but the modalities of election to the Assembly were: "it could
never be elected by a mixed electoral college... justice is not
a matter of giving power to the highest number, but ensuring a
balance between the two communities".3°
Firchon thought that Le Monde's articles gave the reader
some elements to assess the situation, but did not show how.
Perhaps these elements were compatible with the paper's view or
attitude, or likely to justify them. However, the framework of
this action to be taken can clearly be identified as keeping
France's place amongst the world's powers:
Seul le succês de l'Olaboration de l'Union
frangaise permettra &4.# France de garder son rang
de puissance mondiale.-".
In suggesting what was possible, the paper rejected assimi-
lation which, Firchon pointed out, was "unthinkable" because
the two communities, alien to one another, were not "able to
97
associate and fraternise". 32 It could not accept separation
from the colony either. 33 This attitude was described by Fir-
chon as "anti separatist" for "economic reasons" (Maghreb:
place de choix) as well as for "questions of prestige."
The paper accepted the need for reforms, but stated that
France should act alone "at home". It warned of the danger of
internationalisation, while at the same time advocating a
certain mênagement des USA.
Le Monde remained opposed to any "precipitous" act which
would fail to take into account the "major principles" and the
"realities" of the country concerned. On the Algerian front it
seemed that the events of May 1945, according to Firchon, made
the paper distance itself from the indigenous problem and that
its main concern was for the Europeans of Algeria -providing a
voice for their bitterness.
Although Le Monde seemed full of admiration for the British
decolonisation movement as early as l947, 	 was no
evidence of any enlightenment or understanding of the new post-
war nationalism and the need for the emancipation of the people
of the French colonies. All that was still to come. As far as
Algeria was concerned it was time for the 1947 Statutes and
even that was resented at the beginning.
If Le Monde's reports on Algeria were said to be frequent,
this did not mean that they were balanced or complete. 35 The
drawing up of the Algerian Statutes 36 was greeted with equa-
nimity by Le Monde, as Firchon pointed out: nous avons promis
un statut. Chose promise, chose due. Acguittons nous au plus
vite. 37 Clearly, here it was the promise that seemed to count,
not the need for it, or any other justification.
As for the reforms, they were not to be brought in hurried-
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1y38 and it goes without saying that the paper was opposed to
the question of the Maghreb being tabled, 39 let alone being
discussed, at the UN."
Le Monde outlined the main points of the statutes. 41 Weight
was given to the European point of view and to the parity of
seats attributed to the two communities, despite the striking
imbalance of representation.42
Even if we do not take into consideration the fact that
Muslim delegates had withdrawn in order not to give credence to
this reform, it is clear that, within the measures approved,
there were enough provisions for the European minority to block
any reform it did not accept. The possibility of requiring
approval of a two-thirds majority made the rest of the "dispo-
sitions" of the law (the suppression of communes mixtes and the
extension of elected municipal local assemblies, the indepen-
dence of the Islamic cult and the teaching of Arabic at all
levels) a dead letter from the very start. At this stage one
can conclude that the paper did not show intentionally or
otherwise any shrewdness of analysis. This is reinforced by
its treatment of the elections.
4.2.4.A particular view of the elections 
What is worse here is that there was as much a flaw in
Firchon's analysis as there was in the analysis of Le Monde,
which was his source. Exaggerated importance was given to
elections in Algeria, for the purposes of chronology and analy-
sis, despite the unequal representation. This was also done
despite the awareness of both the paper and Firchon that, in
Algeria, politics in the metropolitan sense were insignificant,
that the existence of "political life was completely alien to
Algeria", and only the business of the most initiated (le fait
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de quelques inities), a phenomenon, which Firchon described as
very striking.43
The elections which were to have taken place on 15 January
were postponed until April. When they took place they showed,
according to Firchon, that the Statutes were not welcomed
either by Europeans or by the Muslims, and consequently they
resulted in gains for the "extremists of both camps". 44
In Le Monde, Firchon found ample developments about the
preparation of these elections to the First College, but his
expectation of finding a similar analysis for the Second was
in vain, despite the "remue-ménage", "attentats" against the
"friends of France" in Kabylia since October, which Le Monde
only mentioned in February.
For the municipal elections of 19-26 October 1947, Messud
had noted a certain hardening of position. The proportion of
abstentions in the Second College was more than fifty per cent:
for Le Monde, these were les voix de ceux qui tout au moins
consentent A la France (...) qui attendent d'elle le signe
qu'elle a repris confiance en elle- même.... This kind of
reasoning, labelled a-contrario by Firchon, could hardly be
believed. 45
Showing bias in his expectations, Firchon would also have
liked Le Monde to have picked up the fact that those designated
by the Administration were more numerous than the Messalists as
an encouraging sign. But at that point neither Firchon nor Le
Monde was concerned by the indigenous problem, nor did Le Monde
express a preference for any of the nationalist parties of the
time46 which had fielded candidates. 47
Seeing voting for nationalist parties as wrong, and the ab-
stentions as being in favour of France, demonstrated total
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disregard for the nationalist aspirations.48
4.3. The second period: August 1947- March 1951
4.3.1.Admiration for the Governor General 
In February 1948, Edmond Naegelen, who had shown une antipa-
thie viscerale a l'egard de toute idee de separatisme and had
been trained from a very early age to fight Alsatian autonom-
ism, 49 was appointed as Governor-General of Algeria.50
Le Monde seemed to be in complete agreement with the new
Governor General, who saw separatism as treason, stating that
France govern[ed] in Algeria, it dfidi not plead.51
4.3.2. A peculiar conception of democracy
Analysing the results of the elections, Messud brought to
the attention of the readers the news that the Communists had
been wiped out (which seemed to please the paper), and that the
number of Socialists had dwindled. Apparently condemning the
previous Governor General, he remarked that things had now
changed for the better with the new appointment:
Ce qui a change, c'est que le representant de
la France a cesse de donner son appui au Maniaste
et il a cesse de tolerer les violences du PPA.'"4
Le Monde's coverage of the two nationalist parties, MTLD and
UDMA, 53 was merely factual, though it began to show a prefer-
ence, or at least more understanding, for Abbas's group, when
it conceded that equality was a prerequisite of justice. 54 But
in practice this mattered very little. 55 The main conclusion
drawn by the paper was that the Assembly, seen as a gift to
Algeria by Jaeger, 56 had a big enough majority to work without
snags (sans heurts). 57
The paper developed arguments against the concept of "Alger-
ian personality" put forward by the Communists, stressing that
Party's defeat in the election.58
The attitude of Le Monde towards elections was patronising
and smug, despite the fraudulent results. It claimed that
France had no lessons to learn from the Arab League.59
In its general attitude, and its review of the press, the
paper seemed to be more on the side of Le Matin, France Libre,
l'Epoque, which wrote of a good day for France, than on that of
those indignant voices in l'Humanite, Combat, Franc-Tireur,
which wrote of truquages flagrants."
The elections were indeed rigged. 61 And Le Monde's justifi-
cation was given much later (in 1952), as Firchon pointed out,
when the expressed position of the paper was to present the
choice as being not between free elections and rigged elec-
tions, but elections rigged by the nationalists and elections
rigged by the Governor General's office, 52 and to portray the
Algerian electorate as being not ready to vote and unable to
understand what was at stake. 63
It is odd indeed to discover a statement by a journalist and
a paper in the land of the 1789 Revolution -so strongly imbued
with that culture and heritage- so keen to disenfranchise
people nearly two centuries after the Revolution."
No matter what one's view on French political culture may
be, the paper seemed to think that Algeria was not mature
enough for an electoral system constructed on "metropolitan"
lines simply because the outcome might have been different from
what the paper would have hoped for or preferred.65
During this period, Firchon pointed out that the paper did
not write much about Algeria 66 because the country was calm.
But this did not mean that the paper lost sight of the prob-
lem. 67
It would appear that problems and aspirations in matters of
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food, health and education had to be met, but not political
aspirations." The paper had noted that Algeria cost more than
it was bringing in, but, as Firchon presented it, the reasons
for keeping Algeria French were more to do with strategy,
prestige and the civilising mission of France."
4.3.3. A willingness to accept views -to undermine them
In Le Monde, there was a willingness to consider opinions
other than its own -very often contrary to its own. But the
paper invariably tried to undermine them when it strongly
disagreed with them.
This was illustrated in the case of the speech made by Andre
Mandouze, a lecturer of Algiers University, 70 at an interna-
tional congress for peace under the title "Algeria in a state
of war".71
But, as Firchon pointed out, when Messud quoted Mandouze, he
had no intention of leaving the readers with impressions given
by the latter. 72 Displaying irony about "this charitable pro-
gressist Christian" suffering from a "colonialist complex"
which is "in the process of disappearing", 73 Messud argued that
the most important thing was that:
la misere est en regression et que ... leg
hommes se sentent devenir des egaux entre eux.14
Firchon raised the possibility that the paper deliberately
avoided printing news which might instil doubts in the minds of
the readers. 75 The desire of Le Monde to minimise problems is
manifest. 76 Certain events appear only because they were dis-
cussed in the Assembly; and sometimes they were mentioned
months later without explanation, a fact which could illustrate
the desire of the newspaper:
de vouloir conserver intacte cette atmosph45e
de pail qu'il s'est plu a decrire dans ce pays."
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In any case, the picture that the paper painted of Algeria
at that time was a peaceful one. It stressed the peaceful atmo-
sphere of political renewal with the decline of nationalist
parties, especially the MTLD, which "not long ago could with
impunity call people to revolt and murder". 78 Then, due to
other developments, the coverage of Algeria is then paper was
eclipsed until around March 1951.
4.4.The third period: March 1951- November 1954
4.4.1.Dismissal of a changing world perspective 
By this time Third World countries'search for an independent
role had become a predominant concern. This, for instance, was
the case with Indochina but also with the Maghreb following
Libya's independence. 79 The independence of Libya 80 and the
revival of the Middle East seemed "to spell disaster" for the
French. 81
The campaign led by Bourguiba with the aim of achieving
independence for his country was called by the paper "a demago-
gic campaign against the French presence in North Africa". 82
Nothing of interest was reported by Le Monde83 on Algeria,
which was still described as an oasis of calm throughout 1951,
despite increased tension in Morocco and Tunisia and several
nationalist events and meetings taking place. With the situa-
tion becoming more critical in the Maghreb, 84 one of Le Monde's
journalists, E.Sablier, started writing on North Africa about
les chances móconnues de la France en Afrique du Nord, 85 arti-
culating his views around three objectives.
The first was to awaken metropolitan France and those "diso-
riented French people", who do not know much about North Afri-
ca, 86 and to save their "guilty conscience" by dissipating the
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belief that the settlers were exploiting the indigenous people
(faire suer le burnous).87
The second concerned mainly Tunisia and Morocco, where
genuine reforms were advocated, involving a repudiation of
immobilisme."
The third was to deal with the Americans who, under the
"pretext" of being a former colony, would declare themselves
opposed to any form of colonialism. 89 The fight against Com-
munism being seen as necessary, and the Americans being the
main ally, it was recommended as advisable to enlighten them of
the French position and intentions in order to persuade them
to adopt a more favourable attitude in relation to the French
position."
4.4.2Le Monde's alleged U-turn 
According to Firchon, the change in Le Monde took place
around 1951 with the departure from Algeria of the Governor
General E.Naegelen.91
The paper at that time (we are told) was a fervent defender
of the Europeans'case, of the necessity of implementing the
"union" so dear to Le Monde.
During that period, Le Monde believed Algeria was really
part of France and different from the two neighbouring coun-
tries. It described the country as being characterised by a
peaceful atmosphere, which sometimes made the paper forget the
Maghrebin context and even the existence of Algeria itself
when other events came to the fore. 92
In this new era Le Monde began by introducing the new Gov-
ernor General. It was the first time, we are told, that the
paper provided such an introduction. It sketched a picture of
the electoral situation, 93 stating that the electoral campaign
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was dominated by a schism in the First College, but without
being more explicit about it.94
When analysing the election results on 20 June 1951, Le
Monde found a double indication in Algeria which it saw as
favourable: firstly, the success of pro-"rapprochement" candi-
dates in the First College and, secondly, the failure of the
nationalists and the Communists in the Second College.95
Electoral fraud, which continued, was finally dealt with by
J.Gudrif. 96 He recorded the numerous cases where candidates had
been selected by the Administration and not chosen through the
ballot by "Muslim" electors, suggesting that candidates who did
not benefit from the Administration's support experienced
difficulties in getting their manifestos and vote papers prin-
ted, or even their list accepted (deposees).97
The tone of the paper, even when it reported vote rigging,
years after the habit was entrenched in Algerian politics, did
not indicate any signs of outrage at the abuse of political
rights, freedom and democracy, but rather a suspicion that if
Messali were in power, similar methods would be used.98
However, it was not long before the paper went back to its
previous practice of keeping quiet about Algeria." It would
not be far-fetched to take it further and state that the paper
misled public opinion in France. If people had been given
accurate reports of what was going on in Algeria, pressure for
a debate could have been exerted on influential circles, and
people100 could actually have made decisions with full know-
ledge of the subject at hand.
4.4.3.Economic, social and political problems 
Agreeing with Frederix's article of 3 April 1952, Firchon
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argues that there were two problems in Algeria, a political one
and an economic one. But Firchon did not give them the equal
importance accorded to them by Frederix.
Firchon saw the political problem as concerning a minority,
the Muslim elite in search of equality. He wrote that for the
majority of Muslims it was a question of hunger, and hence
economics. The political aspect for the majority was
secondary. 101
Frederix 1" distinguished between the metropolitan French
(somewhat progressive in outlook) and the (rather conservative)
French in Algeria.'" The European, it was stated, who would
open his door to members of the indigenous population in France
would not do the same in Algeria because of the "conservation
instinct" that made him believe that his self-preservation
resided in the homogeneity of his group.
Seule l'homogêneitê de son groupe (minoritaire)
pouvait l'empécher d'être submerge.
This was said to be a question of choice, which would only
be denied by people who had never set foot in Algeria or those
who did not want to see reality. 104 Then European fears were
put forward and emphasised.
Les Europ6ens ont peur d'être un jour une
minoritê maltrait6e, comme celle dont l'histoiv des
êtats islamigues nous fournit tant d'exemples.."5
Le Monde106 argued that agrarian reform would not solve
anything, and would not resolve the fundamental problem of
insufficient production. It would not create new jobs but only
replace a number of badly-paid agricultural workers by an equal
number of peasant land-owners)-07
Because of the consensus-° 8 that the problem in Algeria was
essentially one of hunger concerning primarily the Muslim
107
masses, 109 it was argued, by both Firchon and Frederix, that
the dream of industrialisation entertained by the nationalists
was not an "Open Sesame" to a better world, 110 on account of
the soaring population birth rate and because of the revenues
brought in by France, which would disappear if she ceased to be
a client. 111
Firchon approvingly reported that the solution of Algeria's
economic problems through indigenous industrialisation was
unlikely to succeed because of the high cost of energy. 112 He
agreed with Frederix that the real solution had to be found in
agriculture. 113
There was some interest in industrialisation. Le Monde
referred to the project of industrial zones for Colomb-
Bechar. 114 Industrialisation was sometimes presented genuinely
as the only way out. 115 But, as Firchon remarked, it lay in
the future. For the present, the essential sector for the
present remained the agricultural front. Here the problem, we
are told, was to fill the gap between Muslim and European
agriculture. Firchon pointed out that for the first time the
paper provided much historical background about the organisa-
tions created to help agriculture and deal with its specific
problems. 116
Firchon agreed with Le Monde that this problem could be
overcome only by educating the "Muslim" youth and reminded us
that the paper had touched on the problem before:
(..) on a calculd que pour étre total et rapide
l'dquipement scolaire exigerait des centaines de
milliards alors que des investissements plus pro-
ductifs s'imposent dans le domaine 6conomique.
Firchon also noted the contradictory reports on the achieve-
ments under the Statutes. Proposals for change within the
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framework provided by these Statutes were not lacking, but the
Conservative block remained determined to prevent any
changes 117
Firchon also reported that Le Monde was aware of the danger
of repercussions over the whole of the Maghreb and internation-
ally of events in Tunisia and Morocco. In this period of deco-
Ionisation and emergence of a strong anti-colonialist movement
in the UN, with the British involved in their decolonisation
policy, the paper was concerned by "Anglo-Arab solidarity ...
being built at the expense of other Europeans".
It was also concerned with the implications that the War in
Indochina and the EDC debates were having in terms of divisive-
ness on parties, public opinion and government's efforts. 118
When the situation became critical during 1952 and 1953 in
the Maghreb, and even in Algeria and France itself, Firchon
remarked that the paper had no comments to make, except for one
sensible contribution.119
4.4.4. The state of the country as perceived in 1954 
Le Monde attacked the influence of the Middle East 12 ° and,
begrudgingly accepting reforms, the paper also attacked the
administration for being a "veritable hurdle", denouncing the
"factitious and provisional character" of increased immigration
in France which "could not go on for much longer". 121 The paper
offered many contrasting views122 and published letters in its
free opinion columns which were critical of the state of Alger-
ia. 123 It was inclined to suggest some concessions before
everything was lost:
Perdrons-nous le Maroc comme l'Indochine ? ...
Les gouvernants frangais ont une conception de la
dignitó qui les empéche de faire des actes et QiNq
concessions a l'heure oil us sont profitables.w*
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For Le Monde, the position on Algeria was not comparable
with that on Morocco and Tunisia "plus que jamais Algerie
frangaise". Le Monde was keen to prevent it from having a
destiny similar to that of the neighbouring countries, asking
the state and financiers to invest, to improve the social
conditions, to mitigate the inseparable political and economic
problems. The error, Firchon wrote, was perhaps to believe that
by solving one the other would disappear automatically.-25
4.5 .Conclusion 
As we see from the examination of the coverage, although the
paper was aware of the many nationalist aspirations, it gave a
slanted perspective in many fields, including the two communi-
ties, the economy and the elections. It dismissed the real
historical pull of the changing world environment. It empha-
sised agriculture instead of a real programme of industrialisa-
tion, accepting a peculiar conception of democracy instead of
revolutionary changes, allowing views advocating those changes
only to undermine them. The paper failed to highlight the real
problems and find the real solutions. Hence, it did not succeed
in pointing the right way forward.
Its keenness to keep Algeria French, its smug attitude
towards the real dangers, its silence over repression, the
portrayal of Algeria as a calm and peaceful oasis while a time-
bomb was ticking away, made it impossible for the paper to
anticipate the flare-up. 126
As far as Firchon's analysis is concerned, it failed to
reveal many of the paper's weaknesses, because it was itself
flawed.
In analysing the presentation of the Algerian question by Le
Monde, Firchon did not wish to retrace the history of Algeria
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through the "facts" reported by the paper but decided, in-
stead, to put himself in the "shoes of the reader" in order to
find out what the latter's knowledge of the question would have
been. 127 Firchon might have thought that an intuitive approach
and his own perception of the reader's views could save him
from having to impose on himself a framework of academic ri-
gour. This makes his method particularly flawed, despite his
thoroughness, in that it assumes that the mind of the reader is
blank, a tabula rasa, not subject to any preconception of the
problem, or prejudice towards the question. It also assumes a
uniformity of reaction to Le Monde, in terms of readings and
interpretations)- 28 The image he is trying to build up of
some model reader might have had nothing to do with that reader
and could well have turned out to have been exclusively his
own. For, having stated that the subject of his study was the
reader's perception of the problem, he reverted back to emo-
tional appeals in the writings and presumptions of journalists
like G.Marey129 to back up his points.130
Firchon agreed with many of the positions of the paper,
which he described positively by stating that it was in favour
of the Statutes and critical of feudal landlords, 131 Algerian
elections and missed opportunities. He saw in Le Monde a slow
but real evolution: i'evo/ution, pour lente gu'elle soit , n'en
existe pas moms. But what blurred its vision at the time,
Firchon argued, was the calm, the mask of serenity, which gave
a false impression of security. This could hardly be Compatible
with his view that the information provided was serious132
and abundant.133
The evolution, which Firchon noted from 1951, 134 towards a
supportive attitude towards the aspirations of the indigenous
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populations was perhaps seen and presented as normal for other
countries. But this was not the case for Algeria.
Even if we were to accept Firchon's statement that Le Monde
realised that from 1951, it was a mere realisation not a
stand)- 35 To talk of a U-turn is quite inappropriate)-36
Firchon also claims that Le Monde was persuaded that the
"Statutes" were a panacea, but even he had to admit, after four
years of implementation, 137 that very few problems had been
resolved. The departure of Edmond Naegelen symbolised this
failure. This could not last indefinitely, wrote Firchon, and
it did not.138
The fact that the paper eventually recognised the existence
and reality of the "electoral farce" in Algeria and that it
allowed the opinions of Professor Mandouze and of Jacques
Madaule to be heard139 is no consolation.
What could not be disputed was Firchon's statement that Le
Monde saw the problem in Algeria from a purely French, a purely
European angle, that it was only interested in the economic
demands of the autonomous movements and that separatism in this
field was clearly rejected.
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SECTION TWO: THE PROTAGONISTS
AN IMHAIANCED VIEW OF THE PROTAGONISTS
SECTION II: THE PROTAGONISTS 
5.0 Introduction
There can be no doubt about which political actors constitu-
ted the protagonists in the Algerian war of independence; this
is not a controversial matter. They were the French army, the
Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) and the civilian population
in Algeria: the Algerians called "Muslims" and the European
settlers called "Europeans." These constitute the three main
chapters of this section, which, in the framework outlined in
the introduction, constitutes another fold in the examination
of the what or the content of the newspaper, that is to say the
message conveyed by the newspaper.
This section, amply exemplified and illustrated, sets out
to assess the particular bias of Le Monde in its reporting of
these three protagonists. It is commonly thought that all media
betray some bias, and that neutrality and objectivity are very
often myths. However, Le Monde's claims and its reputation for
neutrality and objectivity are taken for granted by many of its
journalists, editors and readers. The paper claimed to give
space to all shades of opinion yet retain a responsible and
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authoritative voice.' Contrary to this, the evidence presented
in this study would strongly suggest that Le Monde's coverage,
in many respects, was shaped by information from army and
official sources. 2 Far from giving support to the independence
struggle and cause or to the FLN, Le Monde's construction of
events and discourse justified the use of special powers, 3 the
army's role in putting down the "terrorists" and "criminals" of
the FLN, whose "undemocratic" nature was highlighted and whose
claim to nationhood was dismissed outright. As far as the
civilians are concerned, the bias is also evident in the sense
that the preoccupations of one community were highlighted over
another. The aspirations of the Muslims, though at times per-
ceived, did not weigh heavily in the balance when it came to
sacrificing the interests of the Europeans. The following
section will attempt to show how and illustrate this.
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CHAPTER FIVE
5. THE FRENCH ARMY
5.1. A dominant, influential and authoritative coverage
5.1.1.Prominence of army views: Une muette p/uttit bavarde 
The Army could scarcely be considered to form part of the
intellectual class, but even at a time when the army was still
considered to be /a Grande Muette, individual high-ranking
officers wrote and published books, memoirs and articles,
recounting their experiences, dispensing their wisdom for those
wanting to share it. It could be argued that the views of high-
ranking officers intrinsically have a great influence on the
reader because of their first-hand knowledge (one-sided, never-
theless) of the situation and the prominence of their posi-
tions. The impact of these views was reinforced by the weight
attached and the space given to them by the paper.
Through such writings, Army chiefs expressed their views of
the problems at hand and took positions on the major issues of
the day. 4 Le Monde seemed to give great credence to these
publications, since its journalists reviewed the main ideas
discussed.5
Marshal Juin's book was reviewed and his ideas discussed by
Le Monde. 6 His advocacy of severe repression combined with
preaching a language of "love and charity" to the masses, his
denial of France's responsibility for the war and his call for
introducing conscription to prevent the "rebels from enrolling
youngsters by force" (pour soustraire les jeunes gens a l'enrci-
lement par la contrainte par les rebelles) were echoed un-
questioningly by La Monde.7
Le Monde shared Juin's belief in the "complexity" of the
internal8 and external 9 causes of the uprising in the North
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African territories, to which were added poverty, a high birth
rate, and a lack of administration (given in a number of books)
considered to be at the root of the Algerian problem."
Juin's conclusions were said to be authoritative, as was his
recommendation that the minimum that could be demanded of the
two "presumptuous neighbours (Morocco and Tunisia), prematurely
promoted to independence, is to stop believing in extravagant
dreams" and to suspend their help to the Algerian "rebels". 11
The main theme of the argument in favour of maintaining a
French military presence against the opinion of some "Paris
circles" was noted in Le Monde from Lyautey, 12 whom it appre-
ciated and described in flattering terms.13
A great deal of attention was paid by Le Monde to official
publications by the Ministry of Defence such as the Revue
Militaire d'Information, which elaborated on the concept and
the practice of revolutionary warfare.14
When doubts were expressed inside the Army as to what should
be done in the "unique context" of the Algerian war, when
excessive repression methods were being used and denounced by
journalists French and foreign, and even within the Army
itself, 15 a situation which left many soldiers and officers
alike confused, Le Monde generously provided the advice given
by General Ely for the conduct of the Army in "revolutionary"
times in the mouth-piece of the Army and government Revue
Militaire d'Information.16
Evoking the fact that some may refuse to obey through
"spectacular moves" (a possible reference to Bollardi6re), the
advice for the commander was to take and not disengage his
responsibility. 17
History was said to forgive the Army for unease and confu-
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sion but not for failing its duty to "preserve civilisation". 18
In this duty there was only one choice to be made, without any
limitation or nuances. 19 If discussion occurred, it should not
lead to weakening. The leader alone must resolve the problems
of conscience. Soldiers should carry out orders and not wea-
ken, it was suggested.2°
Le Monde's readers had to wait about three months before
finding out the real reasons for General Bollardiere's resigna-
tion.21
In the context of army publications, Barberot 22 was presen-
ted very much as a loner, the only dissenting voice when Ceux
d'Algêrie was published, 23 giving the impression that the Army
was still doing an excellent job.24
The paper was reasonably complimentary about Michelet, the
former Defence Minister, when it stated that his work, though
concentrating on Algeria, went far beyond it -although it did
not share his pessimistic conclusions.25
Le Monde's references to work relating to the Army also
included the book produced by one of its own journalists.26
Echoing with approval his views about the Army not having any
ambitions about leading the country, Le Monde stressed its need
for a technological and psychological revolution.
5.1.2.  Army matters given considerable importance 
Besides its publications, there is no doubt that, generally,
the coverage of the army in Le Monde's reports received con-
siderable prominence. Important news of the army, 27 information
relating to troops, 28 the means 29 and funds 30 at their disposal
and decisions affecting it 31 are featured on innumerable
occasions.
Le Monde's reports were often based directly on views from
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Chiefs of Staff or Headquarters, 32 which described enthusias-
tic officers without a hint of skepticism, as they were con-
vinced of the legitimacy of their fight and their ultimate
victory.33
The army in Algeria was not initially very large. But,
increasingly, it became the main instrument for keeping Algeria
under control. 34 A noticeable and regular flow of information
about troop numbers illustrated the high level of interest in
military matters 35 but also, as is made clear in many of the
articles referred to here, a readiness to take the official
line.36
5.1.3. Ambivalence of the discourse: the "war with no name" 
As in many later conflicts (Northern Ireland) and even
though troops were dispatched in significant numbers, Le Monde
adopted the official phraseology in not referring to the on-
going fighting as "war" but as merely "troubles".37
It was obvious from the content of the articles, even at an
early stage, that what was being described were genuine bat-
tles. 38 But it was claimed that this fight was to rid the place
of 250 salopards.39
It is abundantly clear that the paper did not portray this
conflict as one in which a community had taken up arms against
an occupier. The reader could not help wondering if that was
really the case -as the readiness to believe what was being
written does not mesh with the description of the fighting. It
is quite easy at times to detect that the paper was not shrewd
in its evaluation and assessment of the situation; perhaps it
had fallen, unwittingly or otherwise, for the ploys of the
propaganda machine."
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5.1.4.The cause of "troubles" seen from the army's perspec-
tive 
Over a period of time, the paper stated that the origin of
the troubles was "crime" (banditisme), "fanaticism", "external
interference" and the "poverty of the masses". A year into the
conflict, the paper was still considering that the army was not
fighting against nationalism as "nationalism was difficult to
find" amongst these "quarrelsome clans". 41
Eugene Mannoni, also putting across the view of the Army,
wrote that the origin of the troubles in Algeria was to be
found in the long neglect of the country and the contempt that
some Europeans had for the indigenous population.42
The journalists who often accompanied the army could not
help seeing the problem through army eyes. Hence Mannoni wrote
that the false implementation of the policy of assimilation was
seen as responsible for the trouble.43
There was, however, an acceptance that other reasons contri-
buted to the Algerian problem. These included:
[/a] misere, le sentiment de frustration 6prou-
v6e par les fellahs dont les dêsirs de justice, de
dign4t6 (d'eqalite), ont êtó trop longtemps mêcon-
nus."
But having stated his case, the journalist turned to ex-
plaining why this was so, who had turned these "brothers in
arms": des "salopards" was his answer; their task was made
easier (according to the army, although this was thought to be
at times an excessive and summary judgment), by the indiffer-
ence of the Europeans to the "extreme poverty" of the
Muslims.45
5.1.5.A positive image 
The overall picture was that the French army was managing to
rebuild everything, restore order and security, and that part
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of the blame for what went wrong lay with members of the Muslim
community, who had abused their position of power.48
On the whole Le Monde gave a positive image of the army,47
outlined its fears 48 and praised its discipline, its organisa-
tion, its perfected methods and skills thanks to the Indochina
experience.
The paper thought that with some alterations, more appropri-
ate equipment, rapidly made available, further improvements
were still possible.49
Writing later on in February 1956, for those wondering how
210,000 men (250,000 on 1 May) could not get results against
15,000 or 20,000 "rebels," Blanchet explained sympathetically
that it was not easy.5°
5.2. A dismissal of revolutionary warfare?
5.2.1.  The Cold War and Indochina 
To a certain extent, Le Monde did situate these "troubles"
in the Cold War context by providing the readers with some
sense of the Cold War, albeit influenced by army views, since
much of the work carried out by the troops was of a psychologi-
cal nature. According to the paper, the army carried out this
task with resounding success. Yet, despite that, possibly
fearing disquiet on behalf of the readership and its possible
disaffection, 51 Le Monde continued to adopt the official per-
spective and denied, sometimes clumsily, any similarity between
the Algerian and Indochinese "problems".52
5.2.2.Revolutionary and psychological warfare 
Le Monde did much to give credence to the theory of revolu-
tionary warfare 53 as a justification for army action. Some of
its reports were based on that theory and information published
by official Ministry of Defence reviews such as the Revue de la
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Defense Nationa/e, 54 and the Revue Militaire d'Information.55
Philippe Herreman went to the area of Orleansville, which,
at the beginning of 1957, was one of the most "infested,"
according to him 56 and described the "successes" of the
"psychological action".57
Similarly, the previous year, articles had discussed the
theory of revolutionary warfare and had claimed that the rebels
were implementing it.58
Reporting from official sources, Le Monde thought the army
was coping admirably in view of its increased responsibilities.
As illustrated earlier, the military measures taken were seen
only as palliative if they were not integrated into a full
policy. However, military actions and operations were invari-
ably portrayed as successful 59 in ridding the areas of the
"gangs of outlaws", at times very quickly. 60
The picture given by Le Monde was that of a successful army,
performing its duty as it should, arresting authors of crimes,
despite finding, occasionally, more numerous (battalion
size), 61 better skilled, 62 more audacious 63 opponents (thirty
"outlaws" attacked a military post with fifty-two men), a
strong phantom enemy (enemy nevertheless) after 150 trees were
felled blocking four roads leading to El Milia.64
Even when it acknowledged that the other side had come off
better in an incident, this was very exceptiona1, 65 and the
success of the French army was never questioned. Although,
occasionally, the paper had to admit that "terrorist activi-
ties" had continued, and that the army was obviously unable to
quell the unrest, 66 and at times that the situation had dege-
inerated materially and psychologically, 67 it s certainly the
case that most of the descriptions of the Army were far from
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critical. In the reports the journalists would describe the
army as doing its best (even if not managing too well). Very
often it was its successes that were highlighted, even if some
reports betrayed some reticence.
Already by mid-December 1956, Le Monde's reports, echoing
the official line, tone and even slogans," gave the impression
that people were back in their places of work, in the fields,
children were at school being taught, the "Muslims" were drink-
ing and smoking despite the FLN ban, 69 and some were even
requesting arms to fight the FLN and defend themselves. 70 At
times like these, and this happened frequently, the reports of
Le Monde followed the official line and tone.
5.2.3.Uncritical reporting: an instrument of propaganda? 
It could easily be shown that Le Monde did not very often
cover the whole nature of the operations in its reports. These
were covered more thoroughly by other journalists.71
It fell victim to the official propaganda campaigns, in
spite of being aware of the methods of psychological warfare.
Le Monde was not very shrewd in its reporting, 72 nor was it
perspicacious in its account of what was happening. Le Monde's
naiveness and its blind acceptance of the official version are
astonishing in some respects as the likelihood, the veracity
and accuracy of some items of news, presented like a piece of
reporting, leave much to be desired.73
There were frequent reports of people being killed on suspi-
cion when the paper described them as suspects using the very
terminology (without inverted commas or qualification of any
kind) provided by the army to justify killing (and injuring,
but this occurred less often,) "Muslims", whose guilt or invol-
vement were in no way established. 74 Many reports of innocent
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passers-by being killed or injured were laconically reported
without an form of questioning or protest.75
Le Monde also appeared to have been an easy instrument of
official propaganda when the troops tried to find out the
authors of terrorist acts, for which innocent "Muslims" were
made to atone, and their guilt readily established by their
simple presence or their refusal (which could be read to mean
inability) to help the investigators. When the punishments
seemed quite harsh they were still reported in the most neu-
tral terms by Le Monde. 76 When Taleb Abderahmane was arrested
by the parachutists, Le Monde gave details of the bombs "they"
had made and the particular incidents in which they were used,
as well as the number of victims "they" caused, without any
trial and without these alleged "terrorists" being heard by
anyone other than in secrecy by their torturers.77
Very frequently also a very high number of "Muslims" would
be arrested, without having been guilty of any crime other than
that of being Muslims.78
5.2.4.A restrained Army
In spite of this, the army was described as protective
towards the inhabitants as well as discerning 79 and restrained
in the use of its force."
The picture which emerged was that the army did not really
want to fight these people whom it considered to be friends.81
The army appeared full of scruples, 82 even when faced with the
brutalities of everyday life. The most skillful and the more
humanitarian of its officers were said to have kept their cool,
and that of their men, and refrained from hotheaded actions
even when sometimes it was admitted that the action of the
troops had been ênergique sinon rude. 83 The overall impression
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of the French army that Le Monde gave its readers largely
reflected the contents of most of the French patriotic press.84
This depiction of the army contrasted with that of most of
the left-wing press, which was giving more and more credence
and space to Army "excesses." Amidst the various attacks
against the army by the left-wing press, especially weeklies
like France-Observateur and L'Express, as well as publications
of the Edition de Minuit and Le Seuil, Le Monde provided a
forum in which the defence of the army found a voice which
helped minimise the extremist nature of its actions in the
eyes of public opinion.85
5.2.5.Pacification: an oversimplified view
The very words and concepts used by the official terminology
and reported by Le Monde to describe the work of the army and
its campaigns in Algeria, is that of pacification, thus la-
belled by government to imply that it consisted of measures
designed to "pacify" the population." The choice of the term
pacification was obviously full of implications. It gave the
war effort a peaceful name, or a connotation of peace, and
removed from it any implication of what transpired later as
being the full meaning of the army activities in Algeria.87
Even when reporters travelled to Algeria, the reporting of
army activities, based on army and official sources, led to
many very real aspects of the Algerian war being played down
and not shown up under their true light for mainland readers.88
The means used by the Army, especially the paratroopers (as
well as the police in Algeria and even in mainland France), to
quell the unrest were very harsh indeed. These included the use
of brute force, torture and even summary execution.89
Many operations by the forces of order and decisions taken
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by the civilian authorities in the colony resulted in Algerian
countryside dwellers being moved from their already impover-
ished land, being deprived of its meagre resources, and kept
under the supervision of the army. 90 In fact, it was the pro-
gressive establishment of concentration (euphemistically
called "settlement") camps which was insidiously being deve-
loped.91
Even when Le Monde had the opportunity to report accurately
what was going on, it chose to reveal only part of the truth.92
The paper tended to give "pacification" a double aspect:
that of destroying what was bad and building what was good.93
Hence the paper showed more interest in establishing a parallel
between times of troubles in the past and the present in order
to demonstrate how things had improved. It compared 25 August
1955 94 when, bouleversês par d'atroces massacres d'Europêens
et de non moms severes reprêsailles, 95 only three Europeans
and two Muslims remained in the village, and the present time
when the officer in charge of the troops, who was also acting-
mayor, had managed to appease the numerous population which
could be found there. Now, according to the paper, "Muslim"
children were playing outside, a situation previously unimagin-
able.
It could not be argued that Le Monde was genuine in its
conception and reports of pacification and that it really meant
it as a peaceful enterprise. Nor could it be accepted that the
paper was confused as to the meaning of the word, because some
articles indicated that that was not the case.96
There was a manifest effort to present the action undertaken
as being not simply a military exercise, by insisting that
other measures, economic and social, were being taken, and
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should be taken, but all that articles of this kind contained
was information about military measures.97
The journalist Mannoni discussed at length the role of the
military, in the construction of roads and villages, falling
victim to the fellagas yet providing tangible results, and
transforming the area. He stated that the Muslims welcomed the
soldiers (and himself, us), right hand held out, left hand on
the heart. 98
5.2.6.A Boyscout image
In doing this, Le Monde tended to report the work of a very
small section of the army, whose task it was to gain the confi-
dence of the Algerian population, as being the general pattern
for all its activities. It was stated that great numbers of
affaires indigénes and SAS99 officers were very enthusiastic in
their task and doing a great job in discharging their "pacifi-
cation" duty. 100
The army, in general, was described as doing a splendid job
and coping magnificently, despite its lack of resources. Their
dedication and achievements were praised so much that the
journalist concluded that since the officers at work instilled
confidence, were liked and did everything for the people, there
is a need to believe that "the nightmare is going to endi l .101
This description of the army as boy-scouts 1" really stret-
ches the imagination of those Algerians who confronted the
everyday realities and had been running for their lives.'"
No doubt a large effort was made by the soldiers to go to
areas which were then too remote for everyday contact with the
French army or civilian population, and to try and get to know,
and subsequently, to gain the sympathy of the inhabitants of
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the countryside and the remote parts of Algeria.'" But this
kind of activity, described as caring for the peasants in terms
of health, educational and social matters, was undertaken by
very few members of the military, who very often did not have
the means to carry out this action.
The reports of caring officers were manifestly coloured with
optimism. Le Monde wrote on the "experience of the black
commandos" and of lieutenant J.-J. Servan-Schreiber's optimism
after serving in that army corps (le lieutenant Jean-Jaques
Servan-Schreiber tire des raisons d'optimisme) . 105 Then, full
of optimism for the future, the article discussed the discovery
of the "small miracle of trust" and what could be saved and
built of this country if only people were considered as people,
in practice and not only in legal texts. 106 Needless to say, a
completely different picture emerged when, upon his return to
mainland France, Servan-Schreiber wrote his articles in L'Ex-
press and published the book, which retold his experience.'"
5.3.A "troubled" Army
5.3.1. More than a malaise 
It soon became clear (because of the nature of the "trou-
bles") that there was growing discontent within army ranks,
even at the highest levels. Since the paper did not consider
this to be more than a mere "malaise," it failed to give
"incidents" the perspective needed and limited thereby their
full significance. 108
5.3.2.High-ranking officers getting restless 
From the role of a docile instrument of the Republic at the
beginning of the conflict, La Grande Muette was slowly heading
for a takeover in 1958 and a fully-fledged coup d'êtat in
1961. 109
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Le Monde closely monitored the Army's central position on
110 yet it failed at times to give eventsthe Algerian scene,
and their impact their real significance.
Covering the case of General Faure ,111 Le Monde explained
that he had been arrested because he was linked to a "plot",
the implications of which had not yet been defined. 112 Le Monde
merely quoted Le Figaro11- 3 and official communiqués on the
matter, 114 but its own statements made it difficult to see
whether it believed the accusations or not.115
It was only on 9 January 1957 that Le Monde stated cate-
gorically that the general had "made contacts with civilian and
military circles" which went beyond mere imprudences verbales.
Its reports then were quite sympathetic .116
Having acknowledged that Faure had made several contacts
with the Federation of Mayors of Algeria, Le Monde wondered
whether one could really talk of "a plot" 117 and included a
brief quote of the AFP reporting an official declaration not
taking the attempt seriously and Lacoste's description of it as
"puèril". 118
A few days later, Planchais offered an even more sympathetic
view of the problems of the Army. 119 Examining pacification,
Planchais asserted that a large majority of the officers were
neither "extremists" nor "reactionaries, opposed to any evolu-
tion", 120 and maintained that they, nevertheless, had reasons
for grievances and discontent.121
According to the paper, the war in Indochina gave career
soldiers the impression of being the victims of politicians'
failures ,122 that their survival123 was under threat and that
something had to be done. 124 Though Planchais concluded his
explanation of the difficulties which the Army was experien-
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cinq125 with the words of general Boyer de la Tour, expressing
satisfaction that France was not the country of military
revolts, his own prophetic conclusions were not so
optimistic. 126
Trouble in the army was not brewing just from the right. The
use of torture and various other repressive methods by the army
was widespread. 127 Le Monde's comments on this important sub-
ject were quite sparse)-28
When General Paris de la Bollardi6re asked to be relieved of
his duties, 129 he was described in very fair and even compli-
mentary terms, but the paper failed to see the importance of
the gesture of this high-ranking officer in the circumstances.
The paper offered a very timid defence of the man13 ° and,
though quite doubtful of the veracity of the official version,
it challenged it very timidly. 131
Le Monde, thereafter, continued to report on the case- 32 and
on the sanctions being considered)- 33 But when Bollardiere was
put under house arrest for sixty days, Le Monde did not even
question the decision. On the contrary, it even provided fur-
ther arguments that made his condemnation look even more justi-
fiable.134
5.3.3.Algerian Officers in protest (19571
The indigenous fraction of the army was not immune from
ferment. The inaccuracy of Le Monde's reports, due to a blind
adherence to the official version and to an extraordinarily
weak emphasis on army action, was very striking.
Some of these Algerian officers serving in the French
army135 expressed resentment about the policy of repression
being followed by the Army in Algeria. Their various protests
fell on -deaf ears. In the end they resorted to writing to the
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President of the Republic, Coty, as "the representative of the
French nation", a letter in which, according to Le Monde, us
exposent ... le cas de conscience que leur pose la politique
poursuivie par le gouvernement en Algerie.136
Two days later, on the basis of official statements, Le
Monde stated that sanctions had been taken against fifty-two
Algerian officers, and that these sanctions were "exclusively
for an infringement of disciplinary rules," as they refused to
execute an order to move from one area to another)- 37 It was
only later that it reported that sanctions were being taken
against one of the Algerian officers, who was now charged with
participation en connaissance de cause a une tentative de
demoralisation de l'armee and subsequently detained in Fresnes
prison.138
In a very minor article, Le Monde reported that a request
for bail made by the lawyers on behalf of Rahmani had been
turned down, 139 and three weeks later, along with other pa-
pers, it stated that Rahmani had been bailed. 140
The paper undertook no serious defence of the stance taken
by the officers until it was enlightened by a letter sent by
one of them, -41 who reminded the readers and Le Monde itself
that present legislation exempted legionnaires from fighting
against their blood brothers or compatriots. 142 But the real
preoccupations behind Le Monde's concern for Muslim soldiers
and officers were too evident)-43
5.3.4.0pposition to the conflict by conscripts and con-
scientious objectors 
As we saw, above, dissent with regard to what was going on
in Algeria could be seen to some degree through careful reading
of the paper, which in no way reported the whole story.
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This dissent was not limited to high-ranking officers. It
was also to be found amongst the conscripts and those recalled
for military service duties in Algeria, a number of whom pro-
tested against their dispatch to Algeria.
Opposition to the war in Algeria and unwillingness to parti-
cipate in the war effort were to be found especially amongst
communists and pacifists. 144 Le Monde reported these facts
every now and then, and also the trial of those charged with
related offences- 45 as a result of these actions. But it did so
in neutral terms.146
It is clear, however, that in the coverage of incidents of
mutiny amongst those being drafted to serve in Algeria, and
also when reporting their trials, the explanations given to the
readers reflected the official view.147
There was a public outcry from the conscripts themselves but
also from their families, concerned for the safety of their
loved ones in the troubled shores of North Africa. Le Monde,
however, tried to show, from the start, that their morale was
good and that these conscripts understood their role. 148 De-
spite the worries expressed, 149 the paper assumed a very reas-
suring 15 ° and protective role.151
5.4. Conclusion
However, despite the fact that an entire army had been
dispatched to the other side of the Mediterranean, the authori-
ties still refused to acknowledge that a war was indeed going
on in Algeria. 152 Le Monde remained faithful to that represen-
tation, and to the official line, and hence failed to see and
describe the "troubles" it was reporting with accuracy.
The conflict which Le Monde's readers were invited to con-
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struct via the pages of the paper consisted of "troubles" which
were being sorted out by the French army, but that at the same
time economic and social interventions were also being made.
The constructive role of the French army was highlighted at
the expense of its more immediate role, which was left to other
communiqués.
The "boy-scout" image of the army was very much echoed in
the paper. It emphasised the role of the conscripts and active
soldiers who functioned as administrators,doctors, teachers,
builders and helpers -and even protectors of the indigenous
population.
The reports of Le Monde also made much more of a case for
the role of a very limited branch of the army specialised in
helping local communities, and gave a misleading impression of
what the army's task consisted of. The army appeared in the
reports in a very pacifist light. The reports gave a very
oversimplified view of what was in actual fact a severe and
pitiless attempt to crush a nationalist uprising.
Consequently, the characteristics of the army had to be
presented under a good light. This is to be expected at a time
when nationalist pride in the army was paramount after the
debacle of the Second World war and Indochinese conflict.
However, the reports were used to give a rehabilitating image
in view of the recent memory of the War and Indochina, still
very fresh in the readers' minds. Contrary to many other pa-
pers, 153 Le Monde presented the army as kind and discerning,
active only against "criminals" and "terrorists". It denied
the kind of behaviour exhibited by the troops in the implemen-
tation of Pacification, that euphemism for what had become for
the Algerians the most extreme repression against any form of
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nationali st dissent. 154 The pacification behaviour was exempli-





6.THE FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE
6.1. Introduction
The FLN was the direct descendant of the nationalist move-
ments that preceded it.' It was the failure of these movements
and parties which led to a small group of men launching the
armed struggle. They set up a political organisation that was
to assume the political direction of the radicalisation of the
struggle against the colonial system.2
6.2.A Negative image
6.2.1.The construction of the FLN: murderers. bandits, 
terrorists... 
The terminology used to describe the nationalists is of
paramount significance. It tends to legitimise or criminalise
those concerned and therefore attract the sympathy of the
readers, or, alternatively, alienate them. Besides, it reveals
what perception the paper had of the people concerned.
To start with, Le Monde used the word FLN in inverted commas
until it progressively became part of the everyday language.
For the paper the name FLN stood for "rebels", "terrorists",
terms which the paper continued to use to describe the move-
ment, even when it dropped the inverted commas, as the movement
became part of the everyday scene and was recognised by that
name. The rebels were also for a long time simply fellagas
(coupeurs de route) 3 which meant bandits, that is mere crimi-
nals without any nationalist philosophy. Other favourites of Le
Monde were salopards4 and fanatics.5
The FLN were very often described as particularly callous,
diabolical and indiscriminate murderers, placing bombs in
public places, such as bus stations and bars, where their
potential victims were more likely to be women and innocent
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people.8
The FLN were perceived as being bent on terrorism and de-
struction, 7 assassinating those who collaborated with the
authorities, "confirming" their attempt to wreck local govern-
ment reform by every mean available and undermining any Franco-
Muslim cooperation.8
The rebels were said to be compromising people and forcing
them to commit acts of sabotage. 9 They were also described as
financial blackmailers and extortionists, 1 ° inflicting much
harassment. 11
The FLN were also said to be experts in the use of propagan-
da methods "next to which Nasser's appear derisory". 12 But the
propaganda on the French side was even more obvious, as the FLN
were given objectives which they did not set themselves, pos-
sibly so as to try and prove how impossible these objectives
would have been, or still were, to achieve. In most cases their
deeds and actions were reported from French authorities or the
army perspective, as their attacks were often described accord-
ing to what was thought of them in Algiers, 13 depriving their
actions of any legitimacy.
6.2.2.The FLN maximalist and intransigent 
The FLN demands for independence were seen by the paper as a
form of extremism, 14 and FLN members were, therefore, per-
ceived as "maximalists," wanting to a obtain a maximum, which
was not considered as being a realistic proposal and for which
France was not ready. 15
The paper described the "FLN" as "intransigently" opposed to
any cease-fire proposals, 16 emphasising the appeal made by the
Prime Minister and the renewal of the offer of a cease-fire,
specifying that it was not capitulation that he wanted. In the
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eyes of the paper, that ought to have been enough to make them
want to take "an honourable way out," and then prove they can
triumph legally and implement their demands through really free
elections, 17 demands which of course, they could not, "now
more than ever, impose by force on their compatriots".
6.2.3 .Uncompromising
In presenting this intransigent portrait, Le Monde 18 was
perfectly aware of the positions adopted and the demands formu-
lated by the FLN, since it often reported statements received
from their leaders or originating from their headquarters)- 9 Le
Monde knew that since its emergence, and more so since its 1956
congress, the FLN had been constantly requesting
independence 20
In reporting their position, the journalists also played on
the violence of the tone and delivery21 in order to put the
responsibility for failures on the nationalists; rejecting, for
instance, both cease-fire and free election proposals.22
Consequently, nationalists were seen as indifferent to, if
not careless of, international opinion and prepared, therefore,
to alienate it. For the journalists this indicated a willing-
ness to shoulder the responsibility of the refusal which "would
not be well perceived (even disapproved) by the few capitals
where there was still some credit left".23
As we see, if it was not in the content, there was always
in the tone a negative portrayal of the nationalists' view.24
The descriptions attracted by the nationalists in the papers in
general and in Le Monde had very negative connotations.
The nationalist movement was always described as uncompro-
mising, and even worse, as constantly remaining intransigent or
as hardening its positions, refusing all proposals at hand, all
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efforts made by liberals (as in above), by the authorities
trying to pacify them, including those by other foreign natio-
nalists.25
This emphasis on insisting upon independence or the right to
self-determination was presented as not enjoying the acceptance
by the majority of people and states-26
6.2.4.Anti-democratic 
The FLN was characterised as being an undemocratic movement.
When the nationalists were said to be refusing elections unless
they could lead to an Algerian Assembly able to opt for inde-
pendence, they were described as not genuine in their accep-
tance of the idea of elections, suspicious and cunning. More-
over, their possible acceptance was presented as always atta-
ched with provisos and conditions.27
Despite the objections put forward, and the real fears
expressed by the nationalists about the conduct of elections in
Algeria, 28 which it sometimes reported, 29 Le Monde presented
these nationalists as being profoundly hostile to the demo-
cratic processes.
The paper thought that the FLN would not be interested in
elections either at a local level or at a French parliamentary
level, where the thirty or so potential MPs would be "drowned."
Taking some of their points on board," the paper put the
accent on the FLN's "fundamental hostility" to elections in a
revolutionary period, basing its arguments on some of their
writings 31
According to the paper, the FLN had stated that because it
was "indissociable" from the aspirations of the Algerian
people: il est superflu de se livrer a une consultation êlec-
torale guand l'histoire est en marche. The FLN, the paper conti-
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nued, believes "one-sidedly and without discussion" that it
has a mission; and that in the present circumstances it consid-
ers electoral consultations superfluous. The paper concluded
that the FLN was fearful of elections (Dans ce sens on peut
dire qu'il la redoute) and tried to suggest that the movement
was fundamentally anti-democratic.32
6.3. The FLN: a force that alienates everybody
The FLN was portrayed as alienating almost everybody, French
intellectuals as well as the Communists, Morocco and Tunisia as
well as the UN. 33 The FLN was presented as rejected by demo-
crats and the French intellectual class.34
6.3.1.0pposed by those most critical of Army methods 
Even when the news broke that France was fighting the war
with dirty methods and after it had become widely known in
France, Le Monde had a sharp reminder for those who were in-
clined to sympathise with the nationalists from Pierre-Henri
Simon, one of the few people who were openly critical of tor-
ture and of the atrocities committed by the Army. 35 Having made
his criticisms, he thought it important to point out to the FLN
that he was not on their side.36
Simon further stated that his request to his compatriots to
examine critically a shared responsibility was not meant to
serve the propaganda services of the FLN -but to give them an
example in order to foster a feeling amongst them that this war
was cruel and too absurd. This would then set up a moral
climate in which the word "negotiation" would acquire a politi-
cal meaning. 37 In his view, this should also signify to the FLN
that there were chances for realistic negotiations. But if the
FLN saw this as a defaillance francaise devant un devoir his-
torique evident, he wrote, then it would be "gravely mistak-
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en" 38
6.3.2.The FLN and the working class movement 
The description of the struggle against communism and revo-
lutionary warfare39 did not square with the description of the
nationalist movement itself." Quoting El Moujahid, Le Monde
pointed out that, for the Front, the bureaucratic leadership of
the Communist party was severed from the masses, and had failed
to assess the revolutionary situation. It was argued by the
paper that the Communist party had lost on this front and on
the European front as well, as it "disgusted" (êcoeure) the
Europeans of Algeria, whose votes it had never been deprived
of . 41
The FLN was also said not to have forgiven the CGT, symbol
of the Franco-Muslim community, 42 for having recommended the
brotherly union with the French people or the acceptance of the
vote of special powers by the "lap-dog" of the mainland.
It could also be argued that Le Monde failed to see the
social and political demands of the trades-unions as other than
in "terrorist" terms. It saw these groups as instruments in the
hands of the FLN only, not worthy of having genuine demands
that should be satisfied; and those demands were identified as
being those of the FLN itself.43
6.3.3.An alienated movement disregarding French and world
opinion 
Le Monde presented the FLN and its leaders, who "knew of the
harm that their methods were causing them" among world and
French opinion, as being indifferent about their impact, since
they were not expecting to rally French opinion, or to convince
it of the nobility of its cause, or its legitimacy.
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The paper stated that they were aware of the harm done to
their cause by their methods, but that they were oblivious to
it. "They dont ignore that French public opinion if divided on
the future of Algeria, it was unanimous in its condemnation of
the methods used by insurrectional forces," continued Le Monde:
Mais les hommes du Front n'en ont cure. us
n'esperent pas se rallier l'opinion metropolitaine,
la convaincre de la noblesse de /eur ideal, ou de la
legitimite de leur but. Ce qu'ils cherchent c'est la
pousser a bout en lui faisant violence; c'est arri-
ver A la negociation par la force et non par la
persuasion. Le couvre-feu a Paris, m'a dit i'un
d'eux voila ce qui obligerait les Francais a refle-
•	 44chir.
According to the paper, what the FLN wanted was not to
persuade it, but to force it to submit to them, to push it to
the limit, using violence which would force it to negotiate.45
The paper intimated even at times of "terrorist" respite
that they were only reorganising to strike better as for them
the only efficient weapon was terrorism."
The result of a presentation of that kind would be to alie-
nate French opinion and readers from the FLN all the more since
the authorities were said to be disappointed by the national-
ists refusal to embark on negotiations without the recognition
of the right to independence. 47 Official commentators were also
said to be not hopeful since the first step demanded of the
French government would have to be the renunciation of Algeria
as an integral part of France, as it amounted to doing away
with article one of the loi-cadre; 48 there were therefore no
illusions on the chances of negotiation.
6.3.4.Sustained by the outside yet out of step with it 
On this issue, the FLN was also presented as being in dis-
agreement with the neighbouring countries and threatening the
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North African front. The FLN was presented as out of step and
very different from the nationalists movements elsewhere. It
was perceived and presented by the paper as being disapproved
of by these "brothers" (Morocco and Tunisia), who thought that
it was on the "wrong tracks" when it defied French, world and
even Muslim opinion.
Elle [la position du FLN] est de plus reprouvee
par les Tunisiens et les Marocains pour qui, il ne
s'agit pas de construire n'importe quelle Algerie,
par n'importe gue/ moyen. Pour ces «freres>> le FLN
fait fausse route lorsqu'il defie les reactions de
l'opinion frangaise et mondiale, voire celle de
l'opinion musulmane.
The nationalists were described as being dissatisfied with
the Moroccans 49 but having less significant conflict with
Tunisia. The paper pointed out, however, that even in the
darkest days of their struggle for independence Tunisian and
Moroccan parties (Neo-Destour and Istiglal) distinguished
between French liberals and the others and even, on occasions,
played one group against another. This was not the case with
the FLN spokesmen, stated Le Monde. For the spokesman, whom the
journalist said he had met, there was no distinction between
the liberals and the rest. Instead of using the liberals to
bring negotiations nearer and justifying those who talk of
negotiations by softening their methods, or utilising the
divisions between the various groups, the FLN were said to
consider Right and Left "en bloc" as representing the "colonial
power" they were fighting against. The paper argued that the
Algerian nationalists were therefore rejecting dialogue with
any party. 50
According to Le Monde, the Algerian nationalists were only
prepared to agree to enter into a dialogue with the non-
communist left if it renounced its "restrictions", its
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"stages" and its "compromises", and supported the struggle of
the Algerian people for their independence "without reserva-
tions". 51
The FLN hard line was said to have damaged the North African
front set up before the UN debate, which in the eyes of its
creators, was to augur (prefigurer) the united Maghreb of
tomorrow.
The FLN were said to be disappointed by N.A.T.O. and the
Americans and thinking of looking East. 52 The paper even
speculated that the leaders were trying (but hesitating to do
so in the end) to extend the Cold War 53 to North Africa, de-
spite the reluctance of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 54 The FLN was
described as a disappointment to the UN and US delegation. And
the "maquis's thoughts" of rapprochement with the East were
dismissed outright as the paper was doubtful of total revision
of FLN <<diplomacy>>. This was said to be only a manoeuvre to
alarm the Americans and persuade them to put pressure on the
French.
There seems to be a profound contradiction in the discourse
of the paper in the sense that, although these rebels were
alienated and in disagreement with Morocco and Tunisia, they
seemed to be sustained to a considerable extent by them. Since
the activity of the "rebels" continued and was, at times, on
the increase in spite of the efforts by the army, it was sug-
gested that they were only kept going by help from the
outside. 55 In fact, on many occasions the paper conveyed the
idea that the nationalists appeared to have been pushed by
outsiders. Pressure would be seen to have come from the Commun-
ist bloc, and also the Arab world, which who were said to be
directing their nationalist panarab and Islamist anti-French
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currents against France. Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, all
were seen as helpers and abetters of terrorism, assisting in
terms of arms, funds and training, as well as providing shelter
for the terrorists. 56 The help provided was said to have inclu-
ded the supply of arms to the "terrorists". 57 Occasionally, the
paper reported that the Egyptian ambassador had been summoned
to the Quai d'Orsay over this issue.58
6.3.5.Some strengths but many weaknesses 
Le Monde assessed the FLN as having a few strengths but many
weaknesses. They were seen as not having a very easy time,59
but the paper had obviously no sympathy for them. 6° When one of
Le Monde's journalists, Eugene Mannoni, examined the strengths
and weaknesses of the FLN, he indicated that the leaders of the
FLN had realised that they could not triumph militarily, seeing
that the real battle, which was going to be decisive and which
both sides were trying to win, was a political one.
In the FLN's favour, Mannoni illustrated the sense of inse-
curity, 61 with people not being able to go about their leisure-
ly activities and holidays (to go skiing or go to the beach). 62
But, despite accepting that, according to experts, 63 the secur-
ity forces needed four times as many troops as their adversar-
ies, the paper made quite clear (perhaps wrongly thinking
along the lines of a traditional war) that they had gained no
strategic position and there was no paralysis of the whole
system. 64 But the paper had to concede that the FLN had some
hold over the population and was gaining sympathies even
amongst former "Muslim" members of the Resident Minister's
cabinet.65
However, the general impression that the paper gave through-
out was that the population was being terrorised by them. Even
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when conceding that one of the strengths of the FLN was the
backing of the population and accepting that this was an impor-
tant factor, Mannoni, nevertheless, refused to commit himself,
telling the readers that he was uncertain whether this backing
was freely given."
Unwilling to concede that there was a real desire on the
part of the Algerian people for emancipation and independence,
Mannoni went on to state that the influence of the Front had
increased67 as the leaders of the nationalists had the advant-
age of popularising the seductive idea of nationalism. The idea
of independence, he wrote, was more appealing to the people
than the reforms, the implementation of which was prevented by
terrorism." But Mannoni hastened to emphasise the inability of
the nationalists to run an independant country, because of
their "inability to convince the international community of
their ability to take the destiny of the country into their
hands"."
6.4. The FLN: a divided movement
6.4.1. Problems of divisions 
Le Monde emphasised the divisions of the nationalist move-
ment. Disputes over the legitimacy and control of the Algerian
people were highlighted between the MNA and the FLN," between
the ALN and the FLN, 71 but also within the FLN itself. The
inevitable result of this representation would have been to
undermine the credibility of the nationalist movement as there
is no strength without unity.
The paper stressed that the FLN was a divided movement
riddled with rivalries, ideological and ethnic splits, and
internecine strife. In reporting these splits, Le Monde went so
far as to suggest that there were assassination attempts of FLN
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leaders on each other. 72 There were also reports of demotions
and deprivation of leaders' command on the basis of mere spec-
ulation.73
Le Monde insisted at times on differences along ideological
grounds. On many occasions, Le Monde highlighted the differ-
ences between the politiques and the militaires in the FLN. The
paper presented Abane Ramdane as the most extreme of the mili-
tary (whereas he was mostly thought of as a shrewd political
man) and stated that he was contrasting the illusions and
failures of the politiques with the "successes" of the ALN.74
At times the paper combined these antagonisms with ethnic
conflict and differences. 75 Although, occasionally, Le Monde
warned that caution must be exercised until further information
was available, it was clear that a movement characterised in
this way could not gain legitimacy, and could not be taken
seriously when it was caught up with in-fighting. So when
later, Le Monde, in more serious reports (UP), had to deny some
of the stories, 76 the F.L.N.'s reputation had already been
damaged in the eyes of the readership. In the Algerian war the
psychological dimension could not have escaped the attention of
the paper, and news of that type could certainly not be seen as
benefiting the nationalists, even if it were true. In fact, in
the propaganda campaign, when accusations were exchanged be-
tween the Algerian nationalists and the French government the
paper reported the accusations of the FLN but also provided the
readers with the official French version. This invariably made
it look as if the nationalists statements were not taken ser-
iously. When the FLN accused the government of having refused
the cease-fire, Le Monde went over the various occasions on
which the Prime Minister (Pineau) and the Governor General
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(Lacoste) had repeated their proposals ( through leaflets and
through radio broadcasts). The paper stated that it was the
FLN, which, in their press conference of 22 March in Tunis, by
putting independence as a precondition to any cease-fire
(French government reasoning) were refusing the first stage of
the government offer.77
6.4.2.Problems of leadership 
It is not altogether surprising that the paper should have
presented the FLN and its leadership, with which it did not
sympathise, negatively, or portray it as experiencing a host
of problems.
Problems of FLN leadership featured frequently in the pages
of the paper. The FLN was presented as unable to impose a
leader on particular areas and regions and the area leaders
were portrayed as helpless and unable to establish authority.78
On this question of leadership, whatever form the FLN adopted,
it could not win the sympathy of the paper. The fact that the
FLN did not have a single leader79 was said to have "deprived"
it of a useful leader, to have given it a picture of "Leninism
without Lenin or Stalin, fascism without Mussolini, Panarabism
without Nasser" and nearer home "Neo-Destour and Istiqlal
without Bourguiba and Allal el Fassi".
Even this refusal to have a single leader, this collective
leadership that the "revolution" had given itself in order to
avoid a personality cult, was not properly acknowledged and
that "collegiality" was seen as a negative feature." It was
used to prove that, unlike Tunisia and Morocco, Algeria could
not be independent.
There was negative reporting of the FLN despite the paper's
acknowledgment of the capability of the movement, its pervasive
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action and its efficient organisation which enabled it to keep
a low key struggle going despite the severe blows it had re-
ceived.81
In general, there was no love lost between the paper and the
leaders of the FLN, and this appeared clearly during the
arrest of the five FLN leaders whose plane was hijacked by the
French military. During this episode what could be seen in the
paper was an expression of tacit and sometimes explicit support
for the operation.
6.5.The arrest of the potential negotiators
6.5.1.Attempts at peaceful settlement 
Le Monde had very little sympathy for the FLN leaders and
this showed clearly during their arrest by the French authori-
ties. In 1956, after two years of conflict, a number of efforts
were made to stop the war in Algeria. A series of meetings took
place between Algerian nationalists leaders and representatives
of the French government, but they not achieve much.82
During the week of the arrest it became progressively clear
that Monet's government had initiated talks, altogether about
five meetings, between the "rebels" and the Socialist leaders,
amongst whom was Pierre Commin, general secretary of the
SFI0. 83 It was established that, although the delegates to
these talks were all socialists, they had represented the
government. The latter was free to decide whom it wished to
consider trustworthy enough to represent it. 84 The fact that
Mohammed Khider, one of the arrested leaders, had been present
at these meetings seemed to confirm Liberation's line about
throwing the potential negotiators in prison.
Although at the time Le Monde included an article referring
to a declaration by Mohammed Yazid in New York, in which he
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stated that discussions had taken place between the FLN leaders
and representatives of the Guy Mollet government, the paper
also published, the next day, another statement from the
authorities declaring that these meetings did not lead to any
agreement; 85 and this was due to, according to Commin himself,
prealables inaccessibles."
At the time, Morocco and Tunisia had recently become inde-
pendent and were thought to be ideal intermediaries, likely to
intercede successfully between the French government and the
Algerian "rebels." In the Autumn of 1956, five leaders of the
FLN were guests of His Majesty King Mohammed V of Morocco to
take part in a series of preliminary discussions. The result
was that a summit conference to seek a peaceful solution to the
problem was to be organised in Tunis which these leaders were
to attend. They embarked on a Moroccan plane, bound for Tunis
on 22 October 1956. The French authorities in Algeria contacted
the plane and ordered the French pilot to land in Algiers.
After negotiations with the pilot, the French Air Force com-
pelled the plane to land in Algiers airport and the five lea-
ders were arrested.
6.5.2.Legitimation of Piracy in spite of official protests 
and resignations 
Le Monde wrote about the implications of this event and
presented its readers with various reactions to that event and
subsequent developments.
There were official protests from both the Moroccan and
Tunisian governments, from the Arab League and from French
liberal groups in Morocco which were echoed by Le Monde.
For Morocco, Tunisia, and the Arab League the act was no
less than an "act of piracy which could have the most serious
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consequences". They denounced the betrayal by France which,
they said, encouraged these meetings between official leaders
of Morocco, Tunisia and nationalist leaders. The Moroccans
claimed that the talks which took place between the Algerian
nationalist leaders and the Moroccan head of state, prior to
the arrest, did so with the full knowledge and consent of the
French government. It was also claimed that this meeting was
seen on both sides of the Mediterranean as an effort to bring
about peace in the area.
The arrests also led to a wave of protests. A street demon-
stration ensued in Morocco accompanied by protests from the
French liberal groups in that country. 87 The protesters handed
motions to the French and Moroccan authorities, attacking the
action of the government88 and warning of serious unrest.89
The resignation of three of the main politicians involved in
North Africa could have been perceived as a protest against the
arrests, which deserved some form of formal comment." But Le
Monde did not seem to share this view. It was only three days
after the first articles on the arrests that Le Monde tried to
explain, very inadequately, the resignations. The reports which
the paper published were merely factual and lacked any incisive
or judicious comments. 91 The paper's reports, in general,
consisted mainly of official declarations, 92 and of national
and international reactions in the press.
As far as the national side of the press, which included
Algeria, the paper reproduced some of the most ecstatic state-
ments. 93 For Le Monde most of the national papers in France
and in Algeria was delighted by the arrests. 94 Judging by the
votes, two papers seemed ill at ease95 and only one appeared
severe in its judgment."
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Some international press reactions were also included.
Readers were told that the Indian papers were critical97 while
The Times of London was understanding.98
6.5.3.Legitimacy of piracy through Le Monde's own position 
Besides this general coverage, in our attempt to understand
the attitude of the paper to the FLN leaders, it would be
useful to see what could be assessed in terms of Le Monde's own
comments and reactions to the events.
Despite the few hostile reactions to this operation reported
by Le Monde, no strong condemnation is to be found in the
paper. What is more, the paper seems to have approved and, to a
certain extent, justified this initiative taken by the French
authorities in Algeria without the prior approval of the French
government in Paris. The editorials dealt with the event in no
uncertain terms. The paper could not but see the FLN leaders as
enemies of France and the tone was more than threatening to-
wards Morocco and Tunisia.99
6.5.3.1.Arraisonnement not dêtournement 
There were also some subtle elements, such as the more
frequent and deliberate use of the word arraisonner (arraison-
nent) instead of dêtourner (d6tournement) to legitimise the
action taken by the security forces. 100 The use of these con-
cepts in this context is deliberate and biased l01 and reduces
the need for the paper to dig deeper and to ask more pertinent
questions. 102
6.5.3.2.France legally justified
Moreover, the paper clearly tried to make the operation
appear legal in international law.183
Furthermore, from the comments of some journalists, the
action was seen as perfectly legitimate even if it had taken
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place without the consent of the governmentl" which, in
actual fact, it had.
According to Fauvet, nobody could reproach the security
services of the Air Force, nor the Resident Minister, for
having approved the operation before the landing of the plane;
nobody, "military or civilian, in charge of Algerian affairs"
(responsable des affaires alOriennes, civil ou militaire)
could have hesitated and every single parliamentarian, and
every single minister, was rejoicing.105
Confirming that it was not the first day that a government
was faced with a fait accompli, Fauvet explained that the
structure of power was such that the executors (6xecutants)
were free to do their job, but that the executive was unable to
do its job, and stated that it would have been unthinkable to
have acted differently. 106
Once the arrests had been made and despite the previous
efforts to arrive at a settlement through negotiations, Le
Monde showed a tendency to see the arrests as an acceptable
move and, despite the government unawareness of the initiatives
of the authorities in Algiers, as a justified action, blaming
Morocco and Tunisia for the whole affair.1°7
Even the director of the paper intervened in the debate. In
an editorial published after the paper confirmed that there had
indeed been talks between the FLN and the French government's
representatives, 108 HEM clearly demonstrated double standards
in his conception of the fight for freedom-" when he could not
see that freedom from Communist oppression might be as signif-
icant as freedom from French domination.--0
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6.5.4.  A Forum of debate supporting the arrest
This is not to say that there was no opposition included in
the pages of the paper. Le Monde opened its columns to a debate
through the Libres opinions rubric, which obviously did not
commit the paper's editorial board. Two contributors (of the
articles),JM Domenach and Andrd Philip, were critical of the
operation. Domenach 111 saw the operation as double edged one
with on spectacular and satisfactory side l1- 2 but also another
side which shamed him. 113 For him, "Operation Tintin" led to
political vacuum and set back the efforts made towards a solu-
tion. 114 He thought it was not a proof of the government's
strength and victory but evidence of its weakness and the
subjugation of its authority. 115 The second critical article116
of that category examined the legal and moral problem of the
"good trick" (bon tour) which satisfied public opinion, and
argued that French Socialists were wrong to act in that
manner. 117 He recommended some mitigating action such as the
non-prosecution of those rebels arrested to get out of the
situation. 118
However, the opposition to the operation covered in this
forum was followed by expression of support, of views in favour
of the operation. The line of argument taken by the two above
writers in Le Monde was soon to be followed by similar articles
which argued strongly in the opposite direction. One of the
most significant articles was written as a reply to A. Phillip
by M.Debre.
In the same "Libre Opinion" column , M.Debre, then Senator
for the Indre-et-Loire, 119 gave his own interpretation of what
Morality, 120 Right121 and Honour122 were. These obviously led
to a justification of the arrest and a condemnation of the
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enemies of France: the rebels and those who undermined French
interests and rights. On all three grounds he condemned the
attitude of Morocco and Tunisia who showed, in his eyes, a
failure to keep their promise and a readiness to lead an anti-
French operation. 123 The arrest of the nationalist leaders was
equated with the defence of Algeria, and to defend Algeria was,
for him, a patriotic task, a legitimate national activity, an
expression of morality, right and honour.
Morale, droit, honneur, tout contribuait A
pousser ces fonctionnaires, ces militaires et ces
ministres a agir comme us l'ont fait. C'êtait meme
pour eux une obligation. Et en tant gue serviteurs
de l'Etat, us ont donnO yn exemple aux dirigeants
comme aux citoyens(..).-L2'*
Although Debre accepted that the failure of the French
leaders to provide a programme of reforms, on the basis of
which France could maintain its influence and its mission, he
legitimised the arrests on the basis of the "right to serve
the motherland" (le droit de servir sa patrie).
Examining the paper over the period, the prevailing view
that one obtains from reading the different articles and edi-
torials is that the event was more or less acceptable and that
the French government had apparently acted in a legitimate
fashion. The paper did, however, through letters and free
opinions, provide a forum for debating issues (thus including
views for and against the operation), and some of the ideas
expressed within that forum were in no way similar to those of
Le Monde, (as the arrest seemed to have been condoned by the
paper). The only slightly sarcastic note came from R. Escar-
pit's column, Au jour le jour, which he entitled «Das 1st
Krieg» . 125 This small comment of the day, which basically
criticised the means but not the aim, did not want to examine
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international law, deontological codes nor political opportuni-
ties and implications, but sought instead to "please his Muslim
friends" in stating:
us ont au moms remporte cette victoire sur
les Francais, gu'ils les ont amenês a consid6rer
sans honte, ni horreur, des methodes gu'ils
croyaient avoir depuis longtemps depassêes .126
Even in April of the following year, Le Monde did not see
the arrest of Ben Bella and his colleagues as a kidnapping.
Reporting on the international commission of lawyers being
instituted and due to meet to discuss the "diversion" (dêroute-
ment sic.) of the plane, the paper stated that the lawyers were
chosen A titre personnel and would have to consider in strict
legal terms "the conditions in which the aircraft of Air
Atlas-Air Maroc took to Algiers instead of Tunis the five
leaders of the Algerian rebellion" .127
The nationalist leaders arrested always refused to acknow-
ledge the legitimacy of their arrest or answer any questions
put to them by magistrates. The latter was not put to the
readers until over a year later. 128 Their request for political
status was ignored by the governement and journalists of Le
Monde alike until the regime of their detention was slightly
better. When the conditions were slightly improved (half way
between criminal and political) this was thought to be excep-
tional.129
6.6. Conclusion
The picture of the FLN that emerges through the reports of
Le Monde is a negative one. They were seen as bandits and
criminals, extremists and intransigent, cruel and uncompromis-
ing. They were also portrayed as anti-democratic and alienated
from the rest of public opinion in Algeria and abroad, finding
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no sympathisers and acting in contradiction even with those
that might have been helpful to their cause. Despite their
acknowledged strengths, they were described as having many
weaknesses. Their inability to lead the country was made very
clear by the paper which had no sympathy for the leaders,
perceived to be involved in constant squabbles. The bias
against the leaders, whose collegial leadership was not seen as
a democratic feature, appears clearly during the hi-jacking of
aircraft transporting those who might have been the negotiators
of a peaceful settlement.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
7. THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
7.1. Introduction
In order to understand the positions of the paper towards
the various sections of the population that were affected by
the Algerian war, it is useful to examine the paper's coverage
of the issues in which they were involved, looking at aspects
which received scant attention in Lebrazi's survey (1987).1
Such an examination would help establish whether some trends
or patterns can be identified in the content of the various
articles and reports. It would also help us grasp more clearly
what attitude the paper adopted towards the various sections
involved, what sympathies, if any, it had for certain ideas and
views, what conceptions it disliked.
The coverage of the civilian population was examined in
depth by Lebrazi (1987), who dealt with both the "Europeans"
(colonisateur) and the Algerians (colonises). But many aspects
were left untouched. It is therefore essential to explore this
coverage further, to survey the way in which the various sec-
tions of the population were reported in the paper to see if an
inherent bias, or explicit support, may be identified.
7.2. The Settlers
7.2.1. European views, an inherent dominance 
One of the dominant features of Le Monde's coverage was the
space given to the views of the settlers, despite the claims of
the virage of Le Monde made by Firchon.2
It is clear throughout Algerian colonial history that the
European settlers could form and join political parties without
difficulty, and that they had newspapers which could express
their wishes and opinions. Their views and opinions could be
articulated, whereas those of the indigenous Algerian popula-
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tion could not be. This was especially the case if they dis-
played any nationalist tendencies. The few "emancipated" Alger-
ians who joined the "European" parties would have had to play
by the rules of these parties and conform to their ideologies.
Both rules and ideologies were hardly going to challenge the
existence of the colonial order. Parties likely to do that had
to be of a specifically Algerian nature. As far as these were
concerned, their history is chequered with phases of illegal-
ity, name changes -internment of leaders and members alike- as
soon as the established order appeared to be questioned. In any
case, most of these parties were disbanded. Needless to say,
the means of expression at their disposal, and especially the
few newspapers which expressed some opposition to the estab-
lished order, were also outlawed.3
The only coherent body of opinion given access to public
opinion and political decision-makers in France was that known
as the colonial lobby. This affected all decisions relating to
Algeria and prevented the implementation of any liberal mea-
sures, like the 1936 Blum-Violette4 and the 1947 Statutes. 5 As
far as the Algerians were concerned, the only body of opinion
coming out of Algeria that could express itself was that con-
stituted by those people chosen to represent (besides the
Europeans) the "Muslim" community and who did not antagonise
the government's official position.
7.2.2.  A defence of settlers' views and interests 
This inherent bias in general was reinforced by a dispropor-
tionate coverage given to it by Le Monde, which, after the 1954
uprising, continued to report the views of the settlers spokes-
men6 and those of the colonial lobby through the statements and
motions of their various groups, especially the right-wing
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Federation des Maires Europeens d'Algerie.7
Le Monde noted, through the motions being discussed and the
questions raised in the Algerian Assembly, that there was a
divorce between the First (European) College, expressing mostly
colonial lobby's views, and most of those expressed by the
delegates of the Second. A number of voices in the First Col-
lege could also be heard in defence of the indigenous popula-
tion and against government policy.8
There were occasionally balanced reports in Le Monde of what
went on in Parliament or in the Algerian Assembly. 9 But what
could easily be shown, apart from the frequency and abundance
of European views expressed in the paper, is that when the
views of this European minority were reported they were presen-
ted as being pervasive throughout the whole of society or, at
least, as being the feeling of the majority. 10
The Algerian population as a whole was not organised, in the
sense that it did not have any authorised institution through
which to articulate its demands. 11 What could be perceived
more forcibly, among the opinions expressed in the paper, were
the attitude and position of the settlers and their opposition
to any kind of concessions; concessions which were seen as a
threat to the French presence in Algeria.12
The worries of this minority constituted some of the most
important concerns of the paper. 13 From the different state-
ments and attitudes, it may be readily deduced that Le Monde
was concerned about the protection of life and property of the
settlers, and about expressing their views and attitudes to the
various political developments.14
The events of February 1956 15 and the demonstrations that
took place could help us illustrate uniquely the heavy bias in
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favour of the Europeans which can be found in the paper.
Although the views of "Muslims" were included in Le Monde's
general reports, 16 far more space was devoted to reporting the
views of the minority of European settlers above that allotted
for their statements.17
Apart from the weight and the importance given to coverage
of the Europeans i views, the content itself was quite revealing
when the reader sees them at times presented by the paper as
hard done by and abandoned. The image given of the European
population at this decisive time (period of 6 February) was
that of helplessness. It was also suggested that the fact that
the Europeans felt abandoned 18 explained why so many delega-
tions had been to Paris to express their plans, to warn or to
explain "the real situation in Algeria".19
Amongst the multitude of opinions expressed (which of course
included those in mainland France), ample space was also allot-
ted to so-called liberals, such as J.Chevallier, who reacted
against the proposed policies, especially the Single College,
as well as similar opinions insisting on keeping Algeria
French, yet requesting that some reforms and some concessions
be made. 20
To other papers, which were more eager to emphasise the
"Muslim side of things", Le Monde pointed out that the Social-
ists ne peuvent s'etonner que le Prèsident du Conseil ait êtê
egalement frapp6 par le fait frangais and that /a reconnais-
sance de /'un ne peut exclure le respect de /'autre.21
Despite accepting that some might think the situation had
gone too far, 22 the paper maintained that the situation was
calm and that all was not yet lost.23
The margin of manoeuvre was described by Fauvet as narrow-
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ing24 by the day between the French who want "to send the fleet
to Alexandria and the Muslims determined to ask for their
national identitym , 25 thus leading to a loss of common
ground. 26 However, only one or two journalists sensed the
extreme gravity of the events and assessed accurately the
government's surrender to street pressure.27
7.2.3. A shifting of responsibility
Although a strong position was taken against the anti-Mollet
demonstration28 and concern expressed that the "game was rig-
ged", the settlers themselves did not take much of the blame.
Chénebenoit blamed the government itself for announcing the
visit in advance, thus depriving it of its element of
surprise.29
The paper did not really put the blame squarely on the
settlers, and the overall assessment of 6 February played down
considerably the significance of events and the surrender of
the government to the streets. 30 This assessment (of this total
surrender) was further weakened by a poor appreciation of the
impact and by an evident desire to play things down even by the
shrewdest of journalists.
P. Minay, who was to question whether there was not a
reversal of policy, 31 concluded that the events were the work
of "kids". He thought the number of victims (14) "low" but that
the demonstrations, which had been swept by an "undetermined or
spontaneous ground swell", 32 would have a lasting memory.
Despite the above uncertainty as to the cause of the out-
burst, the journalist stated more or less adamantly that the
demonstrations were the work of youths, and amongst them a
great number of students. 33 Later Le Monde even published a
reader's letter reinforcing that point of view. The reader, a
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teacher who said he attended the demonstrations, described the
demonstrators as between thirteen and twenty years of age, many
of them pupils playing truant (having deserted their classes
with the complicity of their parents), whom he said he had
tried to direct towards occupations or activities more in tune
with their age, but had failed. The teacher also complained
that teaching had become difficult in Algiers:
Enfants dont l'assurance n'a d'êgale que la
mêconnaissance d'une situation três complexe et A
qui l'on a donnó le sentiment qu'ils ont sauv6
l'Algerie en descendant dans la rue.
J'ai entendu des bambins de l'ecole communale
hurler & la mort d'un vieux g6n6ral qui a servi en
Afrique du Nord avant que as parents de certains
manifestants y debarquent.'
This procedure of trivialising the responsibility of the
settlers illustrate the unwillingness of the paper to subject
them to criticism. It is evidence of bias which tends to reveal
certain sympathies or affinities for a particular groups'
interests. Further, evidence of this can be seen in the cover-
age of the student community.
7.3.The student community and the Algerian Question
Traditionally, the student community in France is one of the
most politicised sections of the population. The main Union,
UNEF, created at the turn of the century, saw its membership
increase five-fold in the fifty years of its existence.35
Student organisations could not escape from becoming involved
in the serious problem which their country was encountering.
The left-wing section in the UNEF main student body progressed
from a minority position to take control of the organisation.
The Algerian question became a dominant topic of debate around
1957.
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7.3.1.  The students t splits over Algeria and the support of
simplistic neutralism 
Le Monde announced that splits threatened the student body
UNEF. 36 The newspaper seemed to favour the adoption of a neu-
tralist stance by the Union over Algerian matters as it listed
several (regional) organisations, which expressed their dis-
agreement (desolidariser) with the "office" of the Union, whose
intentions represented "a break away from the apolitical
stand" (apolitisme).37
It seems rather simplistic that the paper should consider
this as a debate between politicising the Union and keeping
politics out of it, as opposed to two conflicting political
conceptions, views and philosophies.38
The neutralist stance is also surprising because it seems to
play down the fact that the students might have had a real
political grievance against the state. 39 Here, also, it seems
paradoxical that the question of the Algerian desire for inde-
pendence, and the attempt to stop the continuous use of certain
methods by the army and police, were considered and treated as
a political question (when it was a simple matter of criminal
activity in Algeria even in the pages of Le Monde).
7.3.2.  Minority views receive a better coverage 
What is noticeable about the coverage of this episode by Le
Monde is that substantial attention was devoted to opponents of
the majority in the union, giving the impression that the main
thrust of the Union work had no sympathy in public opinion.
Although the University was presented as favourable to the
Union," in general, the opposition of the Mayor of Paris, M
Ruais, and others to the line followed by the Union was more
than over-represented, 41 as were the views of ex-members of the
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UNEF, such as Le Pen. 42 Outside support clearly seemed to weigh
heavily in favour of personalities opposed to the Union major-
ity. But so did the coverage of the congress itself.
Expressing regret over the absence of some faces 43 when
reporting the UNEF congress, le Monde described it as concerned
with the limitations of apolitisme, 44 and treated the question
very lightly in terms of a "family quarrel".45
When commenting on the split of the Union, 46 Le blonde's
sympathies seem to have been with the minority view. It was in
July 1956, wrote Bertrand Poirot-Delpech, that the majority
changed over, 47 with the European students of Algiers leaving
the movement as well as most of the "Muslim" and overseas
delegates breaking away from it:
faute d'avoir obtenu d'elle une impossible (my8
ital) approbation de la rebellion nationaliste.....2
From the outset there seemed to be an attempt to define and
present this problem as an even split between two conflicting
currents, whereas in fact two thirds of the Union were solidly
in favour of the politicised stand being taken.49
Much more emphasis was placed on the issue of the split. One
has the impression that too much was given to the issue, and
especially to the position of (Europeans) students from Alg-
iers . Much was made (on the basis of rumours) of splits which
were somewhat exaggerated -with the impact of strengthening the
views of the minority over those of the majority, 50 giving a
general impression of an even split.
The impression of a split was reinforced in an article of 27
April, when the paper wrote that a few hours before the end of
the debates, the outcome of the Algerian question, the last
point on the «agenda>>, was still uncertain. The paper repor-
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ted that a good offices commission was still trying to concili-
ate between
les positions des deux tendances sur lesquelles
se partagent les congressistes.
Aware that a majority was still in favour of drafting the
letter to Mollet to protest against the «exactions>> of the
security forces and to recommend a peaceful solution to the
conflict, on the basis of hearsay Le Monde reported that a
strong minority (about twenty associations) was ready to leave
the Union because of this proposal, thought to be unacceptable
for an apolitical movement, or to propose as a last resort a
text expressing the students'desire to see human rights respec-
ted but without favouring any political move.51
Wondering whether a reconciliation was still possible, 52 Le
Monde gave disproportionate coverage to the minority 53 and
overstated the Algiers Students' case.54
Then, as in previous articles, Le Monde continued to give an
inordinate amount of coverage to the views of the Algiers
delegation, in spite of the fact that it was only represented
by its president, M.Jean Gautrot, who merely had guest status
at the conference. 55 Le Monde presented the Algiers group as
having acted in the name of patriotisme. 56 It had certainly
done a good publicity job for them in airing their views and
making them heard.57
The paper was even sorry that the debates of the congress on
the overseas territories risquent d'être pdnibles and would
give the impression that the students of mainland France were
abandoning their Algiers comrades.58
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7.3.3. Weaker Support for Algerian Students 
If the bias in favour of minority views, here essentially
those of the Europeans in Algeria, continued, 59 this did not
mean that the sympathetic coverage of "Muslim" students could
not be found in the paper."
Le Monde echoed news of the arrests of various students and
their leaders on occasions 61 when it was made public or direct-
ly sent to the paper. 62 But if it is true to say that there
were some expressions of sympathy, there was indeed a sharp
contrast with the way the paper dealt with the "European"
students (above) as the views of the Algerians were very seldom
heard. 63
7.4. The Catholic Church: a subject of interest for the
paper
7.4.1. A natural link
The picture would not be complete without looking at another
section of European population, or at least one of its impor-
tant dimensions.
Le Monde seemed to share the concern of the Church as it
published its findings and statements about Algeria." But this
did not constitute a very strong, antagonistic and politicised
stand.
Because of the upbringing of the newspaper director, the
Catholic tradition of France and the Church were always a
subject of interest for Le Monde. 65 The interest given by the
paper to Church questions was amply demonstrated by the series
of articles and even studies devoted to the Church, such as
those of Georges Hourdin, explaining the state of the Church
and examining a number of its aspects."
Le Monde's coverage included various statements by various
organisations regarding Algerian issues throughout the con-
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flict.67
7.4.2. Appeals to and by the Pope
Papal pronouncements on the subject formed part of the
reports of the newspaper. Statements by the Pope against tor-
ture were included in an encadró, reminding the readers of Pope
Pius XII's statement to the Criminal Law International Congress
of 1953. 68
The appeal of personalities to the Pope during the conflict
were also given coverage, even if they had been published
elsewhere 69
7.4.3.  Human face of the Church 
As can be imagined, during the Algerian conflict, the Church
was placed in a very difficult position. It represented the
faith of the European dominating power but, at the same time,
witnessed the many uncivilised aspects of the war which was
waged by the army and the police. The claims of the civilising
influence became more and more tenuous."
Although it denied the claims of the racial superiority of
the Europeans 71 and expressed sympathy for the suffering, 72 the
Church was reported mainly as not wanting to get involved in
politics, 73 refusing to take sides, 74 and proscribing political
pronouncements on the issue 75 even if some organisations de-
flounced some of the atrocities. 76 Yet most of the reports
erroneously portrayed the Church's position as divided.
7.5.The "Muslim" Community in Algeria
7.5.1 Introduction
Notwithstanding the analyses made elsewhere of Le Monde's
treatment of the Algerian community in its news coverage and
reporting, it is particularly illuminating to examine how Le
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Monde covered the Algerian community at the time of the general
strike of 1957. This was one of the most important features of
the "popular struggle" within Algeria at the time when the
question of Algeria was about to be tabled again at the UN. At
the beginning of 1957, the FLN initiated an eight day general
strike and a wave of civil disobedience requesting shopkeepers
not to open their shops in protest against France, with the
aim of highlighting the problem in the international arena
where it was about to be debated.77
7.5.2. Unfavourable reporting of the general strike 
Although Le Monde was aware that the majority, if not all,
of the traders intended to close their shops, it reported
General Massu's communiqué, outlining his intention to open by
force any shop found closed and not to protect the goods found
inside, without objecting to this denial of one of the most
basic rights.78
Without bothering to outline the deep-seated reasons for the
strike, 79 Le Monde not only reported it as being imposed by
duress, 80 but it described it as provocative and likely to
cause violence. 81 Moreover, the paper played down the impor-
tance of the strike in France 82 and in Algeria, where the
participation was said to be very quickly falling.
For Le Monde, the Muslims were being ordered to go on strike
and this constituted a "showdown of strength" (6preuve de
force) in Algiers. Algiers was described as a city that was
almost deserted and reported to be under an impressive
silence.83
On the third day of the strike, Mannoni reported that people
were progressively going back to work either spontaneously or
under "injunctions" from the army. The first areas of weakening
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(flechissement) were said to be in the commercial sectors.84
Le Monde wrote in terms of "controlled coercion", of passiv-
ity of the workers. 85 But it was clear to Le Monde that Muslims
were "hit hard" and knew that some of their colleagues in
Algiers, Oran and Constantine had been sentenced to between a
fortnight and six months in jail."
Yet, writing on the fourth day of the strike, Le Monde
portrayed it as a success for General Massu, who was reported
to have ensured that work restarted and that violent clashes
between the two communities had been avoided. 87 The paper
concluded that the strike was already losing its unanimity, a
unanimity which, one should point out, had not been reported.88
But was it simply because more Muslims could be seen?, asked
Le Monde. The paper mentioned that the Belcourt youth had some
"bitter confessions," but did not say what these were. 89 This
was clearly a case of understatement when almost everybody that
went to work was forced to do so. 90
What Le Monde was evidently keen to point out was that
Algiers had not become the "little Budapest which some promised
and others feared". 91 Using the third person, Le Monde wrote
that international observers might see the protest as "implac-
able" on Monday as it did when it started. They were now said
to have noticed no violent reaction but could see signs of
passivity and "lassitude".92
The paper's reports seemed to be confused (by the strike and
numbers of those striking). In spite of conceding figures of
98% success in the railways, and without bothering to ask for
their opinion, the newspaper wrote that the organisers must be
disappointed.93
Despite some 98% administrative workers staying away, Le
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Monde reported that the strike finished that day and was even
considered to have been over the day before by the authori-
ties94 which were "loosening their grip" around the Casbah. The
absence of traders in the shops, which remained open and empty
(Le Monde had failed to indicate to the readers that these
shops had been raided and looted of their goods and when this
was done), demonstrated for the paper that the "mot d'ordre"
had been followed until the end by some, even if this were not
clearly visible from the outside.95
The paper stated that the constant pressure of the army
during the first three days of the strike (implying perhaps
that there was none afterwards), the weariness of the poorest
sections of the population, and the delay taken by the UN to
examine the Algerian case, broke the bloc sans fissure% into
what the paper saw as several categories.97
On 4 February, Le Monde's special envoy reported that shops
were still closed, workers were having their papers checked by
soldiers in town and "rejoining their places of work". 98 And
even then, an important number were still reported to be away 99
since the paper admitted that it did not know whether this was
a week's strike or a complete eight-day strike)-00
Even when Le Monde seemed to attempt an objective assessment
of the strike, its reports were most tendentious. 101 One of the
main reasons could be found in the sources which , even if they
seemed varied, 102 were not necessarily balanced.103
Apart from the conclusions that can be drawn from the above,
others can clearly be seen. Despite knowing the objectives of
the strikers, 104 Le Monde did not recognise their pacifist
intentions and the peaceful nature of the protest)-05
As seen above, the strike constituted from the beginning a
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protest movement rather than a prelude to insurrection. This
did not prevent Le Monde from being alarmed and even wondering
whether any large scale action was being contemplated at the
borders. 106
The paper continued to insist on length as being a major
factor and to ask whether the length of the strike was exces-
sive, whether the effort needed would be beyond the capabili-
ties of a population, whose conditions were described as being
difficult.107
In the view of the paper, the FLN would not content itself
with just one or two days'strike (which was never its inten-
tion) but was "trapped" by its own recommendation. It therefore
had no choice but to persevere in order not to lose out at the
last moment.
The preoccupations of the paper did not differ from those of
the army as it was precisely the length of the strike which
became the issue, and on which the authorities were relying to
win over the Algiers populace (la masse a1gêroise) .108
The passive resistance of "Muslims" under special powers and
emergency regulations to "injunctions" and military orders (as
if civilians could offer any resistance to them when ordered to
leave their home) was described as not being successful, even
though the paper admitted that these "Muslims", having been
forced to leave their homes, wandered aimlessly in the streets
and that many were still refusing to go to the docks or to the
firms where they were employed.109
The paper played down the significance of events110 and
even reported the strike as having no effect. 111 Moreover, the
paper stated that the fact that the strike was over 112 "before
the UN debate began" (now postponed)	 deprived it of its
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impact.113
7.5.3. The under-reporting of the means used to break the
strike 
The paper also minimised the looting aspect during the
strike. Although a number of settlers looted the "Muslims"
shops which had been forcibly opened by the soldiers, Le Monde
reported that these Europeans did so in a very few lines, from
AFP press releases, 114 when it did not imply that it was the
work of Muslims themselves.115
Also, it was very clear that the looters received a better
deal from the courts than the strikers [see below]. But Le
Monde did not see fit to draw a parallel, or make any compari-
sons. 116
When reporting the methods used to break the strike, Le
Monde was guilty either of a disinformation campaign or, at the
very least, of an attempt to play down the significance of the
factors surrounding the strike.
The army's role was seen as that of broker, when Le Monde
wondered about the possibility of the army intervening to
intercede between the two aiements crispes de la population.
And the special powers at the hands of Massu were seen as a
possibility of diminishing the risk of intervention by "irre-
sponsible elements".
Whatever the steps taken, they were presented as
inevitable. 117 For the paper, the threat of the strike "had
forced the authorities to take exceptional measures to keep the
peace". 118 But the reality of the tension can clearly be seen
as Mannoni commented that Algiers had not seen une semaine
aussi tendue et aussi calme.119
Le Monde did not make a major issue of the military's role
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in breaking the strike, or its repressive activity and the
intimidations which the AFP press releases (published by Le
Monde) had mentioned briefly. The paper noted "constant army
pressure", but only during the first three days)-2°
When the shops were (forcibly) "reopened" by the army, Le
Monde's readers could not possibly be shocked by the "deafened
sound of mallets". 121
The army, however, did not hesitate to use heavy tactics to
break the strike. Indeed, the methods used were so severe that
they are believed to have done much to benefit the cause of the
nationalist movement. 122
This was far from obvious from reading the reports of the
newspaper)- 23 Whereas Governor-General Lacoste had ordered
that the strike should be broken at all costs and by any
means, 124 most of the repression went unreported. Le Monde even
implied that the army stood guard in front of gaping doors
"opened" by the army, revealing abandoned stocks. Commander-in-
chief Massu was reported as having softened his approach by
stating that looters of "Muslim" shops would be prosecuted.125
However, Le Monde did give a hint or two, though insignifi-
cant in the overall reporting of the strike, as to the way the
army "opened" the doors of the "Muslim" shops: ont ete arra-
chêes, enfoncêes ou parfois simplement et plus habilement
ouvertes. 126 This did not prevent the paper from continuing to
defend the authorities 127 and to offer them advice.128
The paper finally gave the impression that everything was
becoming normal again on the second day of the strike - with
Algiers deserted in the morning experiencing its normal bustle
in the afternoon (although the streets of the Casbah remained
empty) and the Resident-Minister even going for a walk in
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town. 129
In any case, Le Monde made a poor case of the sanctions
taken against the strikers and the harsh measures used by the
army to break the strike. The sanctions taken against the
"Muslims" were reported in a laconic way, 130 played down and
characterised as leading to confusion. Sometimes they were even
justified. 131
The harshness of the measures132 used by the army and
reported much later by Le Monde did not push the paper to make
any comment or take any position. The bias becomes evident when
we discover the sympathy with which other strikes were repor-
ted. 133
7.5.4. Conclusion
It could be said that the coverage of the strike in many
instances amounted to a mere campaign of disinformation134
which the paper justified by a sense of "national
discipline" 135
The severity of the problems encountered by Algerians was
revealed much too late to have any real impact on the strike.
It was only at the readers'initiative and under pressure from
them that Le Monde corrected its record of the strike
movement.- 36 It was doing so, not as an objective piece of
reporting, but by a process of conveying to the general reader-
ship contents of the letters that some of the readers had sent
to it, with the odd comment added. The excuse given by Le Monde
for not publishing these facts there and then ("at the time of
the UN meeting") speaks for itself and illustrates the patrio-
tic feeling and mood of the paper.137
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7.6. The Algerian Community in France
7.6.1. Introduction
If it could be conceded that the poor reporting of the
Algerian community was due to the distance separating the
paper from that community, then it would be reasonable to hope
for a better coverage of it in France. Le Monde's coverage of
the immigrants in France seemed to be very meagre but informa-
tive at times as to their situation.
7.6.2.  A people deprived of status and identity
The terms used to refer to the various people involved is
very significant. If the population of European extraction in
Algeria was every now and then referred to as "Algerian" to
distinguish it from the population of mainland France, that
adjective was seldom used for the Algerians themselves who were
called "Muslims", with reference to their faith. The settlers
were not called Christians but Europeans. In France the "Eur-
opeans" remained the "Europeans" but the Algerians living in
France were invariably referred to as "North Africans") -38
In the official jargon, the "Muslim" Algerians were called
Francais musulmans, which in a sense was true since the 1947
Statute made the Muslim community French legally but only on
paper. 139
7.6.3. Human concern but little commitment 
Algerian immigration started at the beginning of the century
and went through various historical phases of development)- 40
The reasons for immigration given were that it was essenti-
ally caused by a demographic evolution with which Algeria could
not cope and which made it a necessity for that country in
1955. 141
When it looked at the immigrants in the Paris area, Le Monde
174
reviewed the different phases of influx in the area of the
Goutte d'Or, starting with the foundations of the market of La
Chapelle in 1900. 142
Though there was interest in the immigrant community- 43 and
concern about their fate, there was no deep commitment towards
them and the problems they encountered in their every day life,
despite the fact that immigration of Algerians to France was
officially encouraged by the French government.
Their living and working conditions were erroneously de-
scribed as satisfactory, 144 when this was clearly not the
case. 145
Describing them as different, some of the reports were less
than complimentary. 146 Prostitution was seen there, more than
anywhere else, as a necessary evil. Without it, it was stated,
the young girls in the area "would feel during the day the
fears that prevent them from going out at night". 147
The language and aspirations of the Algerian immigrant were
seen as alien to French society 148 and at night even the campa-
niles of the Sacre-coeur took shades of a minaret. The Rue des
Gardes was said to become a Souk where faces were marked by the
same nostalgia -where, "like it or not..., passions can be
born". 149 Algerians were given worrying characteristics-5°
which invaded and threatened Parisian life.151
7.6.4. Immigration rife with gangsterism and rivalries 
Another fundamental aspect of the coverage of the immigrant
community in France was the internecine strugle between the FLN
and the MNA152 as the fighting in Algeria was bound to affect
that part of the community which had emigrated in France.153
Le Monde wrote that passions were running so high that there
was talk of mainland terrorism (terrorisme m6tropolitain) .154
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The attacks on Algerian cafés by Algerian immigrants were
reported as frequently as they happened throughout France.155
Although the attacks only involved Algerians themselves, 156 the
coverage was the least sympathetic. And despite accepting that
it was erroneous to see fighting between nationalists simply as
a struggle between "gangsters settling their accounts", 157 the
paper treated them as such in most of its reports.158
While some reports 158 of violent incidents (in Metz, for
instance) were without any suggestions as to their causes ,160
the possible reasons for some attacks were gratuitously given
as being possibly the failure to respect fasting in Ramad-
han. 161 The most common explanation put forward by the paper
for these attacks was racketeering for the nationalist organi-
sations. This term was not without implications, and would
obviously alienate them from any sympathy from the readership.
The other possible cause given was the struggle between the two
factions of the MTLD, 162 which by then was entirely inaccurate.
It was only in March 1957 that other reasons were put for-
ward for these attacks and the readers were told of the politi-
cal connotations of the conflict between the "Muslims". 163 on
this occasion some of the victims were said to be neutral
people who (exceptionally) refused financial contributions to
the nationalists, and some for refusing to strike during the
debate in the UN (6 of the last 25 killed in the previous month
of February) " six ont pay6 de leur vie leur refus de faire
gréve a l'occasion du dêbat de l'ONUR .164
Despite being aware that that most of the immigrant commun-
ity was made up of peaceful citizens, 165 descripti ons such as
"gangsters" and "criminals" were quite common- 166 At times the
paper insisted on the criminal aspect,167 stating that crime
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had never been as important nor as "tainted with politics."
Though the political aspect was conceded in the thirty or so
dead, numbered since January of that year, Le Monde could not
quote one single non-political murder.
Although Le Monde could clearly establish that there were
deep nationalist aspirations, 168 the nationalist organisa-
tions- 69 were accused of being involved in heartless blackmail,
starving the immigrants who did not lack the desire to escape
the pressures that "leave them no choice between hunger and
death" .170
The nationalist activities were not seen as a reaction but
as an act of provocation ( see also general strike).
mutism of victims and witnesses was reportedly not making the
work of investigators easy.172
The inability of the authorities and the paper to find the
precise reasons for these attacks led to the conclusion that
there was complicity between the aggressors and the victims. It
was as if une loi etrange de silence semble her agresseurs et
ogresses.
Consequently, "North Africans" were described as unhelpful
to the police forces in not providing them with information
likely to ease efforts to find the culprits, whether out of
collusion with the attackers or in fear of reprisals.173
7.6.5. Silent victims? 
The silence of victims and assailants alike was confirmed in
an instance in Paris when police inspectors came to pick up a
dead body. The journalist wrote that "justice without appeal
had been rendered according to the brothers of the victims",




Very few complaints to the police were noted (5 complaints
in 2 years) as when the time came to sign statements or identi-
fy assailants all the witnesses retracted their statements.
Whether motivated by "fear" or as "reflex," Algerians did not
involve the authorities officially and were said to be playing
into the hands of "bandits".175
7.6.6.  Favourable presentation of repressive measures 
Though, as we saw earlier, there were very few cases of
criminal activity per se, huge repressive measures were taken
by the security forces in France.
The "terrorist" activities of immigrants in France led to
severe measures of repression being adopted. Arrests sometimes
were made for the most trivial reasons, such as being in pos-
session of a large sum of money. 176 The motive for the arrests
ranged then from collection of funds 177 to failing to register
their lodgers, as far as some landlords were concerned. 178 If
some were jailed for carrying guns, leaflets 178 or even a
knife, 18° some were arrested simply for not having papers or
being without a job)- 81- News of these arrests were frequently
brought to the attention of the readers.
Despite this most extreme form of harassment-82 which was
often done exclusively on the basis of race or "skin colour"
(as these people looked, and lived in areas that were, differ-
ent from the majority of Frenchmen), the checks operated by the
police were presented as being normal and necessary, and the
fact that very few arrests were made for possession of fire-
arms, as opposed to the huge number of people questioned and
searched, did not seem to prompt the paper to any critical
examination of the strategy and the tactics of the police.
In other words, the climate of fear and insecurity which
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characterised the Algerian community in France was in no way
the concern of the paper, other than when it was caused by
their compatriots. On many occasions, it saw the intervention
and the activities of the police as perfectly legitimate. The
fears of, and intimidation by, the police themselves were
simply not perceived by the paper -they simply did not
exist. 183
The measures taken against the immigrants were not limited
to harassment and arrest. Some were deprived of their liveli-
hood)-84 Even the right to demonstrate, the right to parade on
labour day (1st May) were denied to the Algerian workers.185
The various powers adopted and legal measures taken against
the Algerians (still called North African although there was no
need for any activity by the Moroccans or Tunisians as the two
countries had gained their independence in 1956) were put under
a favourable light and portrayed in a sympathetic way. 186 Some-
times they were even justified 187 and, despite the severity of
sanctions and sentences alike, they were presented as too le-
nient.188
Needless to say, Le Monde had hardly a word of protest
against these obviously excessive measures and the harsh treat-
ment to which the immigrants were subjected. 189 News of the
community suffering never seems to have been reported by the
paper until it was seen under a better light)-90
7.6.7. Conclusion: a better life in France?
What was more ironical, in a sense, about the coverage of
the immigrants by the paper was that, despite the bad treat-
ment, the repressive measures and the poor living conditions
(which made living in France for an immigrant far from ideal),
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the paper perceived their conditions as having been a very
positive thing -as the Algerian worker is said to be "privi-
leged" during his stay which changes the worker completely when
he returns home.
ii devient plus exigeant a l'êgard de sa famil-
le, plus revendicateur sur le plan social. Sensible
aux 6gards dont il a êtê l'objet en France, il
supporte Rql d'être traite diffèremment dans son
This was done without the paper putting any evidence forward
in respect of this "privileged position," except for mentioning
that the Algerians had priority over other immigrants. The
paper was aware that they were not considered, legally, to be
French nationals and that this preferential treatment in terms
of employment was more fictitious than real, as they were the
first to suffer the consequences of an economic downturn)-92
If the kind of treatment and life outlined earlier in this
section were said to be equivalent to privilege, what could be
said about the treatment of Algerians in Algeria, and about Le
Monde's reports being close to reality?
The Algerian community on both sides of the Mediterranean
was deprived of a national status and was subjected to a hard
repressive regime without the paper springing to its defence or
recognising its legitimate interests. On the contrary, the
paper accentuated the inherent dominance of the views of the
European minority in Algeria and even on the mainland, when its
interests were at stake in the UNEF students'forum.
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7.7. Conclusions
This section has illustrated clearly the coverage of the
protagonists through the pages of Le Monde. The army was seen
favourably by opposition to the FLN. Trying to do their best,
with barely sufficient means, the troops were portrayed as
boyscouts and the nature of the conflict played down. By con-
trast, the image of the FLN, unlikely to be popular in France,
was made to look even less attractive, through the emphases put
by Le Monde on characteristics less likely to endear them with
French readers.
The bias seen in favour of some communities in relation to
others makes it clear that there was a "right side" to be on
throughout the conflict. Aspects deliberately played down,
others exaggerated, gave a coloured picture of the protagonists
to the readers who would have been less capable of understand-
ing the Algerian cause, let alone sympathising with it.
181
SECTION THREE: THE SOLUTIONS
COLONIALIST ANSWERS TO DECOLONISAT ION QUESTIONS
SECTION THREE: THE SOLUTIONS
COLONIALIST RESPONSE TO A DECOLONISATION PROBLEM
8.0 Introduction
The aim of this section, apart from outlining its general
coverage of Algerian matters in relation to the various govern-
ments, is to determine whether or not Le Monde fought against
government policies -policies which were designed almost ex-
clusively to keep Algeria French and resist the independence
movement.
The need for this section is made even more crucial, in
view of the antagonism between the government of G.Mollet and
Le Monde 1 and the claim made by many (editors of the paper and
journalists alike) that this opposition, as well as the various
assaults on the paper, were essentially due to the progressive
views of the paper on the Algerian question. This implies, when
is not asserted openly, 2 that in conformity with its princi-
ples and philosophy, Le Monde was at loggerheads with govern-
ment policy over Algeria.
This task can best be achieved by examining the paper's
coverage of the various governments and their policy pronounce-
ments in relation to specific Algerian issues. We will examine
Le Monde's coverage of the different governments and Governor-
Generals and the response of the paper to their programme and
to their views and perceptions. We will seek to highlight the
differences, if any, over specific issues, and determine to
what extent the views put forward by the journalists them-
selves were in concordance with government policies, whether
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the journalists adopted a supportive line, or whether their
views and positions sought to undermine government positions as
well as deconstruct and criticise them. In either case, the
procedures used by the paper and its discourse will be high-
lighted. In the scrutiny of articles and editorials, we will
look for praise and criticism of government views and the
recurrent themes developed throughout. The three periods cov-
ered, correspond to the three governorship of R.Leonard,
J.Soustelle and Y.Lacoste. Some consideration is also given to
the journalists' discourse itself and that of the intellectuals
in the following two Chapters (9 and 10 respectively).
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CHAPTER EIGHT
8.AN OVERALL DEFERENCE TO THE AUTHORITIES
8.1. The last years of Roger Leonard (1951 1955)
8.1.1.0fficial coverage
Since Le Monde tried to distinguish itself from its prede-
cessor, claiming total independence from political parties and
financial groups, 3 it may seem somewhat surprising to find that
the paper devoted a very substantial part of its coverage to
official reports and pronouncements. 4 This is only an apparent
contradiction, as the official coverage represents a large part
of any newspaper's content; and major statements by politi-
cians, especially those in power, occupy very prominent posi-
tions in the medium. But a potential danger arises if these
official statements and declarations are not assessed critical-
ly (which was often the case), as they provide major themes of
debate and a source of information for the reader.
In 1954, Algeria, itself, did not represent a major issue
for the paper. 5 It made the front page only at times of cata-
strophes. 5 Le Monde did, however, gather news of the "official"
political debate in or about that country.
Faced with the inaction and the lack of initiative of people
in power, Algerian "Muslim" delegates started urging reforms
and changes in the structure of the system in Algeria.7
Interestingly enough, the desire of the government not to
have an Algerian problem on their hands was also conveyed in
the paper.8
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Exaggerated emphasis was given to the elections in Algeria,9
despite their relative insignificance for the majority of
Algerians)- 0 When reporting Algerian elections, Le Monde was
frequently neither analytical nor very critical)-1
This kind of superficial and non committal coverage of the
paper was typical of that period and it extended to many
spheres of reporting. 12
Given this superficial coverage, Algeria seemed unaffected
by the problems experienced in the two neighbouring countries
(Morocco and Tunisia). It was hardly surprising that public
opinion in France had been lulled into a false sense of secur-
ity and passivity so that it was completely taken by surprise
by the outbreak of violence on 1 November 1954.13
8.1.2.The Outbreak of Violence and the Government response 
Le Monde of 2 November 1954 announced on its front page the
"extension of terrorism" to Algeria, which, until then, "seemed
threatened only in its Eastern part". Although the paper was
"led to believe", because of the "spontaneity of the attacks"
in a "concerted action" it, nevertheless, gave prominence to
the Ministry of the Interior's communiqué stating that the
attacks had been committed by "isolated individuals", that
troops were on their way, and that for the majority of the
population:le calme regne.14
Needless to say, the official reactions echoed by Le Monde
all treated this uprising as work of "terrorists" and "bandits"
who should be punished "without mercy." And from a very early
stage, the solution advocated was to crush the rebellion and,
given the population growth and the stated economic deprivation
in the country, to introduce economic and social measures with
time)-5
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The official discourse represented an important part of the
paper's coverage. 16 The travelling of officials and politicians
as well as their activities, meetings or speeches continued to
be reported. 17 The great majority of reports were invariably
based on official statements.18
Parliamentary debates on Algeria (and incidents in the
Assembly) 19 were reported, so were written questions (demandes
d'interpellation) to the government and the different motions
voted in its favour. But it was the official statements 2 ° which
dominated by far the content of the medium's discourse through-
out the first few months of the crisis. The news, in this
sense, amounted to the official communiqués.
8.1.3. Predominance of official communiqués 
At this stage most of Le Monde's reports took the form of
communiqués of government officials giving their version of the
events and policies. The declarations by the Minister of the
Interior and the Governor-General were the most significant at
this stage, and lengthy quotes of Mitterrand' s21 statements or
speeches could be found regularly in the paper. 22 No doubt the
communiqués were also used to deny other versions of events
given by other sources (which Le Monde had not previously
reported), and which might have been gaining credence.23
The view given through these communiqués presented the
population as being neutral, passive, and living in fear of
"the terrorists" . 24 Two clear trends seemed to dominate the
envisaged solution of the Algerian problem: reform and repres-
sion.
8.1.4.Recommending a policy of selective repression
With the understanding that this was a rebellious act which
did not have any justification, and given the account of the
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situation put forward to the readers, the paper recommended
punishing the "rebels" 25
However, repression of the insurgents was to be a selective
process for some of the journalists. From the very start,
P.A.Martel stressed that repression was necessary, but that it
should not be indiscriminate. 26 This position was reinforced
by other viewpoints.27
This insistence on selective repression did not in any way
mean that the paper implied that the army's activities were
excessive in any way. Two days previously 28 the paper was
categorical about repression being selective.
8.1.5.A call for reforms 
Coupled with the need to repress the terrorists selectively,
other topics and trends started to appear more forcefully: the
themes of reform, development, criticism of the system and the
long-awaited application of the 1947 Statutes. 29 At times, such
themes seemed to be abundant in the coverage of the paper. But
it was more in the form of various groups' demands 30 than the
paper expressing its viewpoint.31
Throughout 1954 Le Monde continued to echo most of the
policies and decisions of reforms, as well as the reactions to
them. The reports seemed to indicate that reactions to reforms
were negative. A.Leveuf indicated that political circles expec-
ted Mitterrand's proposal to implement the provisions of the
1947 Statutes to "stay in their boxes" as long as order had not
been restored.32
There was also in his reports alleged surprise at the Mini-
ster's "haste." However, some personalities, it was reported,
observed a "prudent reserve" and used neutral terms, whereas a
number of "our compatriots find the moment badly chosen for the
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implementation of the reforms".33
In Le Monde's coverage, the most minor modifications were
presented as major and very objectionable changes. 34 The idea
conveyed was that the reaction should have been "to wait, and
refuse any discussion under this violent threat".35
Although it was stated that it was too early to have a
icomplete picture, 36 it s clear from the reports that the
opinions of a small but powerful minority were thought to be
important. 37 These, for the most part, tended to reflect the
view that these reforms would "appear as a real revolution for
many" 38
The astonishment of Mitterrand, highlighted by the paper39
in early 1955, at the objections formulated against reforms
tending to give "the same rights to citizens of the same com-
munity" now becomes more understandable to the researcher. At
the same time as criticism was expressed by the settlers'new-
spapers in Algeria which, as Leveuf reported, had concluded on
a sacrifie l'economique au politique, it was emphasised by the
paper that farming interests reacted violently against the
reforms, and commented on la fuite de M. Mitterrand vers un
avenir inconnu, le dos tourne au present." Despite the consid-
erable importance given to the settlers'minority views, very
little space or opportunity was given to the views of the
majority of people living in Algeria, the Algerians, or as they
were known in official terminology, the "Muslims". 41
From what precedes, it becomes apparent that the opinion of
the State and that of officials provided most of the coverage
and constituted the majority of all the views reported to have
been expressed on Algeria at the time. Because the paper had
given considerably more coverage, and much more space, to the
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settlers group, which was numerically smaller but predominant
in terms of strength and political power, 42 one would expect
to find, for the sake of objectivity, some of the views expres-
sed by this section of the population which had gone to war
against France. Reports from nationalist sources were denied,
and Le Monde did not even consider the possibility of inter-
viewing any nationalists to give their version of the facts.
The paper did, however, report, but somewhat less extensively,
the reserve of the UDMA, the only legal "nationalist" (reform-
ist and not independentist) group, which, although concurring
with the need for economic development, was still concerned by
the insufficiency of the measures taken overall.
8.1.6.Imminent fall of Mendes-France: a defence of the 
government 
This is not to say that when it needed to express an opi-
nion, the paper did not do so. The threat of the collapse of
P.Mendes-France's government, attacked by the MRP and the
Moderates, brought at least some of the journalists out in the
open. J.Fauvet himself put pen to paper in a leader to advise
Mitterrand and show the legitimate side of the proposals:
Ce sera a M. Mitterrand de rappeler que les
mesures	 proposees ne visent qu'a appliquer la
loi, c'est A dire le Statut de 47. Si l'on refuse
d'aller un peu plus en avant dans la voie de l'inte-
gration de l'Algerie,a la France, veut-on reculer
vers la segregation?'
He reminded the readers that the unanimous stand of the
"Muslim" delegates of the Second College in favour of equality
of duty and rights, ne peut pas ne pas frapper l'Assemblee
Nationale.
The next day, it was M.Duverger who, in Le coup de l'Indo-
chine, defended the government and its policy in North Africa
189
against the Right and the MRP: les conjures de /a droite et du
MRPveulent faire a P.M.France, comme ii /'a fait a Lanie/
(leader article).
He violently accused the government critics of being at the
root of the current problem in Algeria, and the initially luke-
warm attitude of the paper was suddenly transformed into a firm
stand.
Qui a ferme les yeux sur les violations du
Statut de l'Algerie, sur le truquage des elections,
sur l'absence de politiques sociales, causes reelles
des difficulCOs presentes? La droite avec la compli-
cite du MRP.'"
"They want to put an end," he continued, "to the policy of
the government, to start again a policy of prestige for
France".
"The fall of the government," he concluded, "would neces-
sarily lead to the end of the experience of <<pacification»
undertaken in North Africa" and "would lead the government to
embark again on a policy of force which would lead in the end
to the loss of those territories essential for our prestige
(rayonnement) in the world". 45 The strong position taken by Le
Monde did not seem to be spurred on by the reforms themselves,
but by the possibility that the government might be defeated
and that blood would be shed.
His last plea was to the deputies of the MRP , hoping that
some of them would hesitate at the last moment and
penseront a tout le sang que leurs bulletins de
vote risquent de verser.
8.1.7. Recommendations for a solution
As regards French options in Algeria, the paper stated (the
next day) that admittedly:
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Le devoir de la France consiste a nourrir cette
population en croissance constante car to hommme n'a
rien a perdre quand ii ne possede rien. 4 °Ce qui est
le cas pour de nombreux Alqêriens.
When the paper clearly acknowledged the degree of disposses-
sion and poverty existing in Algeria, it seemed to have done so
to oppose Mendes-France's adversaries.47
8.2. Soustelle's episode 1955- 1956
8.2.1.Expression of reserve, then support, for the new Gov-
ernor-General 
Upon receiving news of the appointment of Soustelle, 48 Le
Monde first adopted a prudent reserve towards the new appoin-
tee, a Socialist member of Parliament and a local councillor in
Lyon (RhOne), 48 reporting the various reactions of political
circles before expressing its whole-hearted support of the
appointment.
After having informed its readers of the appointment in
large letters, 50 Le Monde proceeded to carry a few favourable
reports in the press on the hope of "Muslim circles" and the
"reserve" of the First College, 51 before going on to cover his
arriva1, 52 and his views that "Algeria was only going through
a growth crisis".53
In the paper reports critical of the two colleges, and of
his nomination followed. It was pointed out that this was not
to him as a person, but to the policy of the government, since
the solution preferred was "outright repression of
terrorism". 54 However, this was really the "Europeans" view,
which P.A. Martel conveyed in his support for the nomination
since he was in a very congratulatory mood; 55 and, as for his
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predecessor, ample space was progressively devoted to his
speeches and statements 56 as well as to his travels and
visits.57
8.2.2. A rejection of nationalism but an explicit acceptance
of the need for reforms 
Under Soustelle the official discourse was contemptuous of
any Algerian nationalist or political dimension, and could not
see the uprising as a struggle for freedom, emancipation and
independence. This meant that that particular concept of the
"troubles", which dominated the discourse, denied any political
dimension or legitimacy to Algerian nationalism. This was the
case for practically all the political statements and declara-
tions made by officials and people in positions of power. And
these constituted a great deal of Le Monde's coverage. The
uprising was considered to be the work of "bandits" and "ter-
rorists", who needed to be punished for their criminal activi-
ties. This was so in the official discourse 58 but, importantly,
it was also the case in the paper's own discourse, exemplified
by journalists such as Blanchet. 58 After "analysing" the sour-
ces of the disease, Blanchet found that it was not too late to
remedy it." Irrespective of others peoples' doubts and the
salient facts, 61 Blanchet was more than generous in terms of
his advice on how to remedy the defects of the administration
and how to win back the hearts of the indigenous population,62
even though his recommendations were often based on very shaky
grounds 63
The desire for reforms outlined during the previous govern-
orship continued" with Soustelle. 65 The paper perceived an
agreement between Paris and Algiers that they should be imple-
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mented. 66 The official discourse reported dealt with public
order and the use of the security forces, but also with the
need to put an end to the unemployment and to the "misery".67
This was present as much in the coverage of the official dis-
course as in the discourse of Le Monde itself. Other statements
reported went as far in their reformist programme as to urge
the government to introduce a liberal and reforming transforma-
tion of Algeria."
The recurrence of the theme and the space given to Soustel-
le's views showed that there was actual support for the policy
followed and the solutions advocated which went beyond the mere
reporting of official statements.
In other words, Le Monde still believed in the future ef-
forts allegedly made in order to implement, albeit progressive-
ly, a law which had been on the Statute books for eight years.
The paper was still underestimating the degree of resistance
that different French governments faced in trying to implement
any liberal measure in Algeria, especially these long-awaited
1947 Statutes.
Sympathetic reports were written about the Interior Mini-
ster, M.Bourges-Maunoury, and the Governor-General's efforts to
implement the programme of social and economic measures estab-
lished by him." On paper this looked positive and helped to
convey the idea that something was being done in order to
dissipate people's fears. In practice, however, nothing was
done to resolve the crisis at hand.
The paper also discussed the measures proposed by the Gov-
ernor-General," but close examination of the text reveals that
the only money released and quantified five billion francs71
was to be allocated to a house-building programme for the
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gendarmerie. 72 In fact, it expressed a different emphasis
altogether, unless the gendarmerie were to be put in charge of
the projects, which obviously was not the case. Was this simply
a confusion on the part of the journalist trying to put differ-
ent factors together in the same article? It seems unlikely. Or
was it a deliberate attempt to disguise the investment of a
large sum of money in military or paramilitary spending as an
economic and social investment? '" It is difficult to prove.
In any case, through statements like these, Le Monde proved
to be a good medium for an uncritical propagation of the gov-
ernment programme. 74 When rectifications were made the loss of
impact on the reader and the lack of critical weight are evi-
dent.
8.2.3. A case of fairness or duplicity ?
As a "liberal" newspaper, Le Monde could be expected to be
advocating reforms in Algeria throughout this period; and the
paper did seem to favour some sort of reform as a solution of
the Algerian problem. 75 However, these calls for reform,
especially the more significant ones, were often weak, and
offered a "diluted" view of what was needed.
Moreover, having opened its pages to the proponents of these
reforms, Le Monde did not ignore their opponents' criticisms
which were also given space in the same pages. The fact that
the paper gave extensive coverage to the statements of politi-
cians advocating reforms, while simultaneously covering the
protests of their critics could be seen as a measure of even-
handedness and unlikely to reveal duplicity in the paper.
However, suspicions are bound to arise, in the sense that the
paper must have been aware of developments concerning decoloni-
sation all over the world. It was evident that the paper conti-
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nued to be blinkered in the new dawn of decolonisation, and was
unable and unwilling to perceive that changes might have to be
radical and rapid rather than piecemeal and gradual. Neverthe-
less, Le Monde continued to cover the Governor-General's pro-
gramme and offered little criticism.
Indeed, Le Monde was more a proponent than a critic of the
Soustelle programme, especially since it favoured most of the
programme involving the implementation of the 1947 Statutes. In
the same way as for the previous Governor-General, Le Monde
echoed the economic and other measures being suggested, and the
reforms that Soustelle was proposing without much criticism,if
any. 76
8.2.4. The last days of Soustelle: considerable criticism
but overall support 
During his stay in Algeria, Soustelle slowly became one of
the staunchest advocates of a French Algeria. He declared his
intention not to "surrender to the rebels", to implement a
policy of "reforms" and integration measures as the only solu-
tion to the problem. This was all reported by Le Monde, which
pointed out his dislike for any or of federal goNernment and
for the phrase itself.77
Commenting on a report the Governor-General had submitted to
the Council of Ministers, J.Fauvet wrote of the "equality of
rights and duties" which would lead to the fusion of public
services and the unification of social security within six
years, which involved sacrifices preferable to those that
"might be incurred by the end of French Algeria."
Fauvet's article discussing the measures proposed 78 con-
tained both praise and criticism, as in his view the proposals
were mostly "clear and constructive," but also "dogmatic and
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lacking precision" as to the number of Muslim deputies who
would be elected (30-35 even up to 100).
The expected rift between the way in which the two communi-
ties would receive the proposals continued to be outlined. As
usual, they were thought to be too much for one, and too little
and too late for the other, 79 which they were, since the mea-
sures had already been accepted in the Statutes of 1947 but
never implemented.
Subsequent articles were more in support of Soustelle."
When Le Monde denied news of the latter's resignation in the
middle of January, 81 it took the opportunity to reiterate his
position and his refusal to talk to terrorists, despite rumours
of negotiations. The next reports echoed Soustelle's imperative
to inculcate the "absolute conviction" that France would remain
in Algeria, highlighting the need to reestablish security,
solve the fundamental economic, social and political problems
and end the confidence crisis resulting from government hesita-
tions.82
The recurrence of the theme and the space devoted to offi-
cials like Soustelle indicate that the support within the paper
for that kind of policy was real and went beyond the mere
reporting of official statements. This can be clearly seen in
the need to hold on to Algeria; and this can be identified in
both the official and the paper's discourses.
8.2.5.A desperate need to hold on
The need to introduce reforms in Algeria, combined with the
view that repression was necessary and should be undertaken,
can be explained by the authorities' desperate need to hold on
to Algeria.
The more numerous statements maintaining the stance seen
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previously throughout 1954 were adamant as to what France's
position was in relation to Algeria and about what its methods
were going to be. 83 Various other pronouncements included those
made by Prime Minister E. Faure 84 and incumbent ministers, 85 as
well as former officials." This continued to the end of Sous-
telle's reign, when the acceptance of some sort of Algerian
identity was increasingly becoming acknowledged. The major
theme was that it was in Algeria's best interests to remain
French, and that a feeling should be instilled in the Algerian
population that a future without France could bring nothing but
misery to numerous families.87
8.2.6. Journalists reproduce the official discourse 
The view that Algeria should remain French, which underpin-
ned the views of French politicians, was also shared by Le
Monde's journalists. Just as in the official discourse, it
seems unlikely that the journalists could have thought the
resolution of the Algerian problem was possible outside a
French framework. This common belief that Algeria's problems
could not be solved outside a French framework, and, indeed,
the desire to keep Algeria French, appear explicitly in the
articles of the journalists themselves. It was illustrated in
the various solutions proposed by journalists such as Blanchet
(above) but also others such as Duverger and Fauvet (below) and
Yves Florenne, who expressed his views quite openly, leaving no
doubt as to what Algeria should be: "Algeria was and should be
a Frerch territory". 88 In his view Algeria had already been
French, the Sahara remained to be made French.89
By January 1956, Andre Fontaine (subsequently the director
of the paper) was aware of the urgency needed and did not hide
his frustration."
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8.2.7.The replacement and departure of Soustelle 
When the new administration took over and outlined its
programme, Le Monde reported official news of new government
appointments and reshuffles. The nomination of G. Mollet and
his vote of confidence in the Assembly was the subject of front
page coverage. 91 At the time most commentators, including
Fauvet92 and Duverger, 93 pointed out that Algeria remained at
the heart of the debate.
As usual, the paper presented the official statement of the
new administration while outlining the difficulties it faced.
Having heard G. Mollet talk in his investiture statement about
"recognising and respecting Algerian personality", R.Gauthier
found it vague and reckoned that the next task of the govern-
ment was to define it. But from what he had heard of the ex-
pressed view by Mollet and Catroux (see below), on the accep-
tance of an "Algerian identity", he did not see anything that
would question the view already expressed by the paper and made
some forecast of what this identity would be.94
Understanding that Algeria's fate would not be determined
unilaterally, and that the government programme included elec-
tions, 95 he thought that these would not be straightforward,
as the Algerian press had come out against the Single
College 96
8.3.From Catroux to Lacoste: Le Monde and G.Mollet at log-
gerheads? a refutation of a received idea
8.3.1. A new Governor General is appointed
The new Governor General, Catroux, was presented as aware of
the Europeans' pressure, but hopeful that he would still find
enough representative personalities who would be acceptable97
to the people who had not joined the "rebels," or lent them
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their support." The intentions and the intended policies Of
the new Governor-General were also outlined by Le Mo12de99
together with the problems and the hostility facing him.100
In general Le Monde highlighted the opposition of the Eur-
opean settlers to the new administration and its programme much
more significantly than it did issues affecting the Algerians
themselves.101
From the start Le Monde reported the regrets at the depar-
ture of Soustelle and the concern, felt by the "Moderates" and
the Republicains sociaux, for the future following the appoint-
ment of General Catroux. However, it explained that they were
always apprehensive about new initiatives overseas, before
rallying to them. 102
Le Monde finally reported Soustelle's "last message" before
his departure, stating that the demonstration in sympathy for
Soustelle quickly degenerated into a demonstration of hostility
towards Mollet and Catroux. 103 But Escarpit l" was a little
irritated by the "fetishism" he saw in the demonstrations of
support for Soustelle.05
The demonstrations and violence which irrupted during the
visit of the new Prime Minister to Algeria (6 February 1956)
were to lead to the resignation of General Catroux, which, Le
Monde quickly and obediently acknowledged, might be beneficial
in removing
aux excessifs le moyen de creuser le fossó, aux
obsêdêsqg cfascisme le prêtexte d'une mauvaise
besogne."-u°
Giving in to street pressure, G.Mollet substituted Robert
Lacoste for the General. The paper thought that the new ap-
pointment would solve the problem in Algeria, but the only
concern expressed was that it would also leave the government
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with the difficulty, if no ministerial changes were made, of
having to find a competent-enough replacement to take over his
job.1°7
There was, however, no defence of governmental position over
the appointment of Catroux when opposition to Mollet from the
settlers forced the government to back down over the appoint-
ment as the result of the 6 February 1956 demonstrations.
8.3.1. Attitude towards the new team
Mollet's government marked the start of the longest term of
the Fourth Republic. While this government appeared very fra-
gile in view of the opposition to its policy and accusations of
"betrayal" expressed by the Committee of Public Safety on the
one hand and the Muslim delegates' request for national recog-
nition on the other, 108 most of Le Monde's articles and reports
expressed support and confidence. Gauthier presented G. Mollet
under a good light, as a discerning but determined leader.1"
The events of 6 February 110 did not shake the confidence of
the paper in Mollet, nor did they cause its support to waver.
Hoping that Mollet might be able to save the situation, Chéne-
benoit urged support for him.- 1- He thought that the affair
started badly, but was confident that the majority of French
people and MPs in Parliament would not keep up this "destruc-
tive snub" .112
Needless to say, in reporting the statements of G.Mollet, Le
Monde gave more weight to them when it was arguing that he
might be the only one to have all the facts in order to make a
judgment)-13
Mollet's coverage after his appointment became more promi-
nent and the treatment his statements received was increasingly
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favourable in tone. Even early reports showed him as sincere,
patiently searching for the truth in a background of violent
speeches made by those who "have taken it upon themselves" to
find the "salvation of Algeria". 114
Apart from the confidence expressed in him, Mollet's spee-
ches and broadcasts asserting the French will to remain in
Algeria became prominent.115
8.3.3. Lacoste: the "last hour" slogan becomes widespread
Although aware of the difficulties he would be facing,
Monde gave an overall positive coverage of the new Governor-
General, Lacoste, and soon presented him as having a reformist
perspective. His trips and speeches inside and outside the
National Assembly were always reported by the paper as well as
government decisions on North Africa.
The positions taken by Lacoste also began to feature more
prominently in the reports, asking for discipline on behalf of
everyone to maintain Algeria French and help safeguard the
"prosperity" of the country. 117
The view offered by the paper was not dissimilar to the
government's line. The official version was easily accepted by
the paper since, as before, there was a heavy reliance on
official statements and versions of events .118
Lacoste's slogan of the "last hour," widespread in official
and military circles, was adopted as a headline in the paper
before becoming widespread in public opinion. 119 M. Lacoste
continued to be reported as wishing to reestablish order from
the outset and to implement social reforms.120
8.3.4. Articles justified and excused the government 
At the end of Mollet's premiership two tendencies became
116 Le
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apparent in the paper. While some articles became more criti-
cal, many of the reports and the comments made by journalists
justified as well as excused government inaction.
Absolving the government in its assessment of what needed to
be done in Algeria, J Fauvet wrote that most of the deputies
had thought that the government had given itself until the
following UN session to solve the Algerian problem, or at least
"define a solution for it", and that a series of events (some
of which were linked to the rebellion itself) had "thwarted"
its plans. 121 Fauvet noted that "many" thought it inappropriate
or inopportune to act without awaiting further developments
from Cairo.122
The reforms, which were apparently to be implemented, never
materialised. There was even an article justifying their non-
implementation, stating that their early introduction would
have resulted in failure.123
Although most of the articles of Le Monde presented the good
side of government policy, with favourable reports or comments
by journalists offering the reader a view of the question not
dissimilar to the one the government would have wanted to
propagate, every now and then there was an occasional nudging
of the government, with some of the journalists clearly putting
forward the view that the status quo could not be prolonged.
Much less frequently, there was also an outburst by a contribu-
tor or journalist who, aware of the economic plight of Algeria,
did not mince their words and clearly questioned the govern-
ment's action (or rather inaction). 124 However, overall it was
left to people and places outside the paper to take a more
critical line on government administration and policy, except
for criticisms occasionally published in the Libre Opinion's
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columns.
8.3.5. Real but ineffective criticism
Most of Le Monde's reports either used an army background or
were a mere reproduction of a "digested" (and accepted) offi-
cial version; and although Le Monde perceived the alternatives
facing the French government in Algeria, it did not provide any
perceptive answer. When Mannoni put the question in terms of
"Reforms or a free Algeria?", he did not commit himself to any
answer. 125
Criticism was beginning to emerge, even though it was not
very penetrating. Nevertheless, Fauvet advised that the time
had come to re-examine the problems of North Africa as a whole
and their developing international implications, and to go
beyond declarations et appels passes du gouvernement. 126 He did
not see in what direction, nor how fast, it should proceed.127
Sometimes, however, particular reassurances were unconvin-
cing and seemed to betray an acute awareness of the real poli-
tical questions .128 When a political solution seemed to be so
close to being accepted, invariably the fears of the admin-
istration were always present and clearly expressed)-29
The Algerian Affair had to be resolved as a pre-requisite to
any major government plan. As political leaders in parliamen-
tary debates were pulling in so many directions,'" Fauvet came
to recognise that the solution might require new political and
economic structures, new sacrifices through political and
economic reform, which the Assembly might require from another
government, if G.Mollet's were unable to deliver)- 3 -
Even towards the end of 1956 it was very much the hesita-
tions of the government, as of Le Monde's journalists them-
selves, 132 that became problematic.
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For instance, although still a supporter of Algeria remain-
ing French and against independence, which he saw as a politi-
gue d'abandon, Julien Le Moyne was beginning to show signs of
impatience when he learned of the postponement of the govern-
ment's statement of policy in Algeria concerning the granting
of a new statute to be granted to the country)-33
And he was not the only one. Gauthier, who showed greater
consistency in his assessment of government programmes and the
problems confronting France, was also criticising government
dilatory tactics 134
Slowly the reader is led to believe that the status-quo was
no longer acceptable in the eyes of the paper.
Ce n'est pas davantage l'interet des Frangais
de maintenir cone que codte une formule administra-
tive depassee.'
But no sooner was the change accepted than the break with
the past seemed hesitant and half-hearted. Although the jour-
nalists began to realise that the status-quo was no longer
acceptable, they were reluctant to accept a total break with
the past. They wanted an intermediate solution which was not
likely to satisfy anybody. Julien Le Moyne stated that it was
not to the advantage of the French to maintain an outdated
administrative system regardless and argued that France, in the
interests of the Algerians themselves, should not concede a
more radical formula by abandoning all the previous systems in
one swoop.
De Blame ne peuvent-ils ceder, dans l'interet
même des Algeriens, a .I'attrait d'une solution
radicale -que certains trouveraient facile- ev„
abandonnant d'un coup tout le systeme ancien.'
The new year saw a more critical retrospective look and
approach by the paper. 1956 had been an "agitated year" for Le
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Monde, which was now obviously letting its readers know (as if
they did not) that G. Mollet, elected on a "liberal ticket"
with a commitment to end the conflict in Algeria, was unable to
solve the problem.137
Le Monde was aware that the government was only delaying
concessions because of its fear of the wrath of the
settlers. 138 Whether one would find that a good reason for the
suffering endured is another matter. The paper wrote:
La politique gouvernementale a consiste a ne
donner que progressivement satisfaction aux musul-
mans afin de ne pas provoquer les bru tales reactions
des Européens. C'etait la lecon que G.Mollet avait
tire du 6 fevrier. Mais les incidents de samedi
donnent a penser que ce qui a ete perdu d'un ccite
n'a pas ete gagne de l'autre... le fosse continue de
se creuser entre /es deux comnautes sans profit ni
pour l'une, ni pour l'autre.-""
The failure even led Fauvet to point out regretfully that
the government had not used the opportunity given to it by its
position of strength. 140
Questions began to be asked only when the government post-
poned its declaration d'intention -but old habits were hard to
change. While becoming a little more critical of the govern-
ment, 141 the paper remained staunch in its defence, and firm in
its support of the French stand in the UN142 and in the cover-
age of the general strike.143
The paper accurately pointed out that the reform had been
adopted ten years previously (at the time the Algerians had
considered it to be a step forward) 144 and that the measures
had no effect on Algeria, except for raising the opposition of
the "extremists". It was adopted, the paper continued, to help
the UN adopt a better view of French policy and was given a
good place in the UN dossier.145
But the paper was not too critical for long. Quite the
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reverse, the paper gave considerable attention to the measures
which looked good on paper but were completely inefficient. 146
It was clear, then, that for most Algerian "Muslims" this
meant no change whatsoever from the corrupt and unrepresenta-
tive system which had for so long prevailed in Algeria and
which had hitherto characterised the hierarchy of command in
that country. Le Monde itself conceded that it found no new
element in the declaration offering a political solution, and
suggested that it might be yet another case of "too little too
late." When expressing its views, the paper emphasised, never-
theless, that independence was out of the guestion.147
Despite the inefficiencies outlined by the "Muslims" and the
Europeans, and a coverage that on the surface looked
objective, 148 the paper was dismissive of the FLN claims to be
representative. 149 It criticised many of the aspects of their
"surprising" statements15° -considerably more emphasis was
given to the opposite point of view and to the Europeans'stand-
point. For them, and the view seems to have been shared by the
paper, the influence of the FLN on future elections was thought
to be, 151 as the title suggested, a threat to their freedom:
L'influence du FLN peut rendre illusoire la libert6 des elec-
tions. 152 Le Monde suggested that that "interpreted feeling"
was shared by the representatives of the settlers' community,
for whom the FLN represented little else but terrorism and
threats.
When giving substantial coverage of the declaration of
intent of Mollet's government and outlining that he had written
to all political leaders inviting them to approve the broad
principles, 153 Le Monde explained that behind this lay the aim
of persuading the other leaders to make a commitment. This
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would deprive the "rebels" of any hope of contemplating any
change from other political parties or any change of govern-
ment. Suggesting that they may have been merely asked to ap-
prove a fait accompli, 154 the pragmatic Fauvet, as a measure of
expediency and underlining the urgency, stated that the discus-
sions at the UN gave sufficient reasons for the groups reques-
ted "to defend one way or another, not the credit of the gov-
ernment but that of France even if, once the debate was over,
another government team could take the necessary decisions".155
He even sprang to Mollet's defence, arguing subsequently that
the Prime Minister had been right not to have consulted the
various groups before his declaration ("as he would still be
writing it") and continued to predict easier times ahead.156
While periodically echoing slight criticism made by oth-
ers157 combined with a mistaken trust in Mollet and Lacoste, Le
Monde continued to express confidence in the government of the
day and report favourably on its decisions.158
Fauvet presented Mollet as standing firm on the FLN158
while, by the same token, making him appear conciliatory and
progressive. 160
If criticism did appear in Le Monde, and the paper did show
some independence, and times some impatience, 161 its sugges-
tions did not go beyond mere proposals, which in themselves
were insignificant. 162
Martel was also keen to see a faster pace for "reforms" when
he stated that the communes de plein exercice, celles qui ont
trugue toutes les elections passees, were still in place, and
that it was time for action, 163 but he ignored the reports of
his colleague, Mannoni, on the ways and means used to implement
this action. 164 But even Mannoni thought that the reforms had
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been hailed as a desire to give administrative democracy to
Algeria. 165
As we see repeatedly, when Le Monde ventured its own criti-
cism, it was soon counterbalanced by yet another expression of
confidence in the authorities.
Recommending that the Minister Resident could modify the
atmosphere by showing some firmness towards the ultras and
should give the "Muslims" the impression d'être traitês sur un
méme pied d'ègalitê, the paper argued that the government could
make public opinion understand the real facts of the problem,
if it renounced "nationalist demagogy", and that the solution
was not easy but not impossible. 166
However, a month later 167 Fauvet was to emphasise that
Lacoste was not trying to be optimistic but (from his conver-
sation with Army chiefs of Staff) had established that peace
mnad be restored within three months; and he outlined, a few
days later, Lacoste's confidence in meeting that deadline
(through quashing the rebellion and accelerating reforms) .168
8.3.6. The Fall of Mollet
Despite a successful vote of confidence in the Assembly,
fully reported and commented upon, 169 the government fell in
the last week of May 1957, a fall which the paper was not keen
on. 170
The outgoing Prime Minister was even afforded a right of
defence by the paper, when he was reminded of his electoral
promise by Waldeck Rochet, who did not want to give him "the
limns to carry on an imbecilic and hopeless war". 171 Guy Monet
was given space in the paper to defend what he meant, to ex-
plain his position and to maintain that he stood by his pro-
mise, despite all evidence to the contrary. 172
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The difficulties preceding the fall of the Mollet government
attracted a degree of sympathy from the paper. But, after its
fall, its performance was not spared sharp and pointed criti-
cisms by a number of journalists -some of whom were still
showing compassion.173
An assessment of Mollet's 15 months and 21 day leadership
was provided at that time, in overall positive terms, except
for the Egyptian episode, which was now seen as ill-conceived
and ill-presented.174
Even if it accepted that the government had tried to weaken
the "rebels" while searching unsuccessfully for help from the
Allies, the paper thought that the Suez failure and US attitude
could have been anticipated.
While identifying the immediate and not so immediate reasons
for the fall of Mollet, Le Monde provided the elements of a
solution which would alter not so much the aims of Algerian
policy as the means of achieving it.175
For Le Monde, the ousted government had great ambitions in
the diplomatic field, which, with hindsight, appeared "quite
contradictory" and have "led sometimes to catastrophic
results" , 176 and wasted the moratorium it had benefited
from. 177
This leads us to conclude that irrespective of the received
wisdom concerning Guy Mallet being opposed to Le Monde and
vice-versa, as far as the period covered and as far as the
coverage of Algeria at the time are concerned, there seems to
be no more antagonism or more opposition between the two than
there has been between the paper and any Prime Minister at any
other time.178
209
8.3.7.  Towards the end of a Republic
In opposition to his predecessor, the new Prime Minister,
Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, was not made to feel welcome by some
on the newspaper team)-79
In his assessment of the Homo novus in the sarcastic au jour
le jour column, a condescending, but not dismissive, R. Escar-
pit hoped that the new PM would last longer so that "he could
be used again". Knowing that Lacoste's policy would be conti-
nued, he urged those currently opposed to the PM to give him
time and not to "use up the luxury of getting rid of newer men
with every crisis")- 80
Les pessimistes, les scrupuleux, les protest-
ataires, les professeurs enf in, auraient quelque
raison de souhaiter une chute rapide a M.Bourges-
Maunoury. Dans la mesure oil leurs voeux -une fois
n'est pas de coutume- pourraient avoir de l'effet
sur les evenements, je les supplie de ne rien faire,
du moms pour le moment. Attendons le nouveau presi-
dent A l'epreuve. Nous ne sommes pas si riches que
nous puissions nous payer le i .ltlixe de gaspiller des
hommes neufs a chaque crise.L°J-
Two days later, 182 it was the regime that Chénebenoit
attacked together with the electoral system ( which brought
such results), on which it was based:
le sourire amer qui reste notre seule defense
contre les inconsequences du regime, le denouement,
si l'on ose s'exprimer ainsi, que l'Assemblee lui
[le vote] a donne.
Reluctantly, at a time when he thought the government of
France needed the unity of all forces around it to give new
meaning to the effort required, he had to concede that the
crisis, no "banal parliamentary incident", was still apparent
because the new government majority was less clear than ever.
For Chénebenoit, as for Escarpit, the new government did not
solve anything. Expecting a Clemenceau-type Prime Minister,
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imposing a strong hand on a failing assembly, in order to save
the regime, he expressed concern at the "political power va-
cuum" and desolation at the sight of this man:
(..)symboliquement seul A son banc, isole aussi
sa tribune parce que sans soutien visible A
l'hemicycle, et qui luttait bien mal, il faut le
dire, pas meme pour s'imposer, mais simplement pour
se faire accepter. De memoire de vieux parlementaire
on avait rarement vu un orateur aussi peu convain-
cant face A un auditoire aussi peu dispose A etre
convaincu. Et il etait manifeste que si chaque
depute avait eu le courage de sa fonction, seulement
meme le courage de son opinion, le ministere
Bourges-Maunoury aurait dd bier rester dans les
limbes.
He then delivered a scathing attack on the government, which
he did not see as being up to France's expectations; he did not
need in any sense to wait and see it at work in order to be
convinced of its inherent weakness.
Est-il possible encore, pour juger un mini-
stere, de l'attendre a ses actes, comme on dit en
cedant A une coupable resignation, alors qu'on le
sait condamne congenitalement a vivoter d'aumônes,
de l'un ou de l'autre et de marchandage de tous?
Est-il encore possible de dire qu'on espere qu'il
apporte une derniere chance au pays alors que creve
les yeux /a disproportion dramatique entre ce qu'il
faudrait a /a France et pour qu'elle croie A son
redressement, et ce gouvernement da4le dont l'as-
semblee a si peniblement accouche?±"
Fauvet was more moderate in his assessment of the new gov-
ernment. He thought the P.M. lacked the assurance needed to
inspire confidence and the eloquence which could have remedied
that deficiency.184
He saw two "noteworthy differences or omissions": there was
no talk of a Single College, nor of an executive or legislative
body at an Algerian territorial level. He also compared the
general situation of the government with the 1946-1951 period,
when the government (which included Radicals and Socialists)
could not rely on their own parties' support.185
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8.3.8. A more positive assessment of Felix Gaillard
In contrast, Gaillard was treated better after the change-
over of government (5 November 1957). When it reviewed the
performance of its predecessor, Le Monde described it as being
quite negative and characterised by two long ministerial
crises- its two positive achievements being the European trea-
ties and the loi cadre for Algeria.
The paper was more positive in its coverage of Gaillard and
his government. It was extremely surprised by the strength of
the new PM and reported that his statements were well received
by the Americans. 186 It found it quite understandable that the
PM did not talk of the past187 in his last declaration, since
the previous government's heritage had long been considered
"unenviable" 188
In fact, Le Monde was quite complimentary about Felix Gail-
lard. It stated that it had been pleasantly surprised by his
openness, his good experience of affairs of state, his serious
knowledge of European affairs, and the breadth of his views
over the whole range of international issues. Fauvet wrote
that, in his new job, the PM had confirmed the qualities he was
knc.um for ("intelligence and hard work") but also an authority
that was "surprising for his young age". 189
8.4.Conclusion
At the beginning of the year of the fated fall of the Fourth
Republic, Le Monde was still giving much coverage to official
communications, 190 the government being described as continuing
its reformist policy. 191 Even Lacoste appeared in a good
light192 after earlier rough treatment)-93
The paper was still echoing the opposition to any abandon of
Algeria by politicians194 and Algerian newspapers'opposition
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to any troop reduction)- 95 In the same way as it had done since
the beginning of the conflict, Le Monde gave a positive cover-
age of the release of prisoners, which was presented as a
détente measure by a détente-minded government and heralded as
yet another promising move.196
This leads me to conclude that, far from being critical of
the official discourse on Algeria, Le Monde's stance seemed to
have been supportive despite occasional criticism. The paper
reflected the official discourse on the Algerian problem and
its own journalists reproduced it favourably. Though not op-
posed to the various reforms proposed, Le Monde was in no way
an advocate of radical change, let alone self-determination for
the Algerians. There does not seem to be any connection between
Guy Mollet's alleged antagonistic attitude to Le Monde, 197 and
the paper's stance on Algerian policy. Indeed, the paper's
criticism of Bourges-Maunoury reveals a positive bias by com-
parison. In actual fact, Le Monde was no more opposed to Guy
Mollet's government than it was to any other under the Fourth
Republic, despite the fact that some governments, like that of




9. TIMIDITY OF A JOURNALISTIC DISCOURSE
9.1. Introduction
The official discourse carried by the medium had a definite
political message, a message which played down the troubles in
an attempt to reassure public opinion, and which refused to
accept Algerian nationalism as legitimate; it also refused to
entertain any idea of Algerian independence. The discourse
conveyed attacked the views opposed to it as defeatist and
guilty of demoralisation. While other media carried a message
which did not square completely with the official version of
events given by the authorities and reported by Le Monde, there
was in the latter a constant desire to reassure the readers and
the population and to play down the effects of terrorism,
especially through prominent places given to official state-
ments) There was also a noticeable tendency in the paper to
deny the legitimacy of Algerian nationalism even if a minor
evolution of the country was thought to be possible. This
naturally excluded independence as a possible outcome.
9.2. Reassuring themes
9.2.1. Reassuring discourse 
Even the newspaper itself and its journalists, just as they
had done previously after the insurrection (Chapter 8), seemed
to be continuing their attempt to play down the seriousness of
the situation in order to reassure public opinion in France.2
These and other reports emphasised the killing or the arrest
of insurgents and rebels. The state of affairs as well as
statements of policy came largely from official sources, such
as Roger Leonard, declaring that repression was an 85%
success, 3 or Prefet Dupuich, giving an account of military
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activities in his area. 4 They constituted the core of the
information about Algeria and the state of affairs in that
country.
Most articles of Le Monde5 attempted to reassure the readers
about Algeria. With Mannoni, the tendency to state and empha-
sise that things were getting better in Algeria would have had
a reassuring impact on the readers, who might have been worried
by other media reports about the situation in Algeria and
would have alleviated any fears of the possibility of losing
Algeria.6
9.2.2. Things are getting better 
The idea that things were improving was the other theme
traditionally found in the pages of the paper alongside those
showing pro-government sympathies. It was an attempt to avoid
creating public panic and to reassure the public that things
were not as bad as they seemed.7
Throughout the reports, there was also a feeling of a mas-
sive troop presence crisscrossing the country (quadrillage),
providing security for population and travellers almost every-
where. In spite of the dangers, the defections and the troubles
outlined, Mannoni seemed to reassure people. 8 Even if the
situation was not rosy, it was important not to create alarm.
That seemed to be the feeling permeating this article, despite
the proximity of another article announcing that battles had
started again in various places and that 130 "rebels" had been
killed or captured in the Djebel Amour.
Mannoni also established a parallel between 25 August 1955
(see p. 125), 9 when only a handful of people could be found in
the village l° because of the prevailing insecurity and the time




been "appeased" by the chasseurs alpins and their commanding
officer. The journalist depicted peaceful scenes of children at
play and ended on the following note:
D'autres maisons construites par l'armee s'eri-
gent encore au Khroubs oil les hommes n'oublient pas
qu'un de leurs correligionnaires, policier - blame
et deplace leur imprima sur la paume de la main
ou sur le front un cachet encre pour pouvoir plus
sdrement proceder a une	 operation de contreile
d'identite...
The journalist intended to leave the reader with the impres-
sion that the French army had managed to rebuild everything,
restore order and security, and that part of the blame for what
went wrong, if not all of it, lay with members of the Muslim
community who had abused their position of power.11
Mannoni was not alone in this. Although admitting that the
situation was "abnormal", Julien Le Moyne 12 described the army
as successful and the "rebels" in "disarray" and "losing".13
9.2.3. Against defeatism and demoralisation
Propagating that kind of information was to try to defeat
what was perceived by the authorities to be a campaign of
defeatism and demoralisation. A constant flow of official
statements echoing these concerns was found regularly in the
pages of Le Monde. This was the case, for instance, for state-
ments by the Minister of Interior, M Bourgës-Maunoury, who
intimated that numerous reports tended to exaggerate the situa-
tions in Algeria and the Nord Constantinois. 14 More specific
attacks by the same Maunoury on reports exaggerating the extent
of terrorism and the seriousness of the situation 15 followed
the reassurances and warnings by Soustelle after his visits to
certain areas, 16 which preceded further warnings, in a Constan-
tine speech a week later, where he declared that:
se laisser aller au defaitisme, c'est faire le
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jeu des rebelles.17
9.2.4 A docile propaganda instrument? 
The very content of these statements seemed to indicate that
there were other sources of information providing such "false-
hoods" and "exaggerations", and that Le Monde was a consenting
medium playing the role (as did many other papers) of a source
of denial at the disposal of the government. Le Monde behaved
as a docile instrument providing nationalistic and patriotic
support to a government in difficulty, 18 trying to combat
other media sources which were more critical of its policy and
actions.
It could be objected that perhaps the paper was merely
deceived, in the sense that it must have believed in being
cautions about defeatism and the reporting of "falsehoods,"
thus limiting itself justifiably to making safe reports. This
would be inconsistent with the philosophy of the paper, which
was to give objective coverage to the views and versions of the
facts being put forward, allowing the readers to make up their
own minds, rather than simply feeding them selective
coverage 19
Another theme linked to those above, and which could be seen
clearly in the paper, is the assertion that, despite the simi-
larity of the two colonial situations, there was no parallel
between Indochina and Algeria.20
9.2.5. "Algeria was not Indochina" 
In the reports of Le Monde another theme was present, which
the paper was keen to emphasise: this was that the situation in
Algeria was not comparable with that in Indochina.21
In Mannoni's articles, the tendency to differentiate between
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the two situations would have had the immediate impact of
reassuring those worried by other media reports about the
situation in Algeria, and would have alleviated any fears of
losing Algeria.22
At the end of twenty-five months of "struggle , for a long
time indecisive" (only then is one informed) "was it the end?"
asked Eugene Mannoni. Referring to the "definite Yes" of the
Resident Minister, he wrote:
Peut-être songera-t-on malgre soi, devant cette
assurance -A cause de cette assurance- a l'indo-
chine, et aux promesses d'une victoire qui ne ces-
sera de reculer jusqu'a Dien-Bien-Phu.
It would be wrong to do so, he stated categorically to those
who, "despite themselves were expressing that fear." He was
also keen to indicate that the rebels did not control the
field, that there was no area inaccessible to the army and its
helicopters, and that it would be fruitless to look for any
area from which the rebels could launch any reconquering of
Algeria which, in any case, would be in vain.23
Both the content of the article and the title of the section
(Des <<mauvais souvenirs>>) tended to suggest to other media
and public opinion that Algeria was not another Indochina and
that France was not on the verge of another Dien Bien Phu,
illustrating clearly the length to which Le Monde's journalists
went to emphasise that point of view.
The analogy which could be made between "pacification in
Algeria" and "the war in Indochina" was dismissed as nonsense
on various grounds -in terms of Algeria's proximity to France,
outside help and number of troops involved.
The paper stated that French troops had pushed back the
rebels and eliminated any possibility of incursion by them or
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of any dêferlement populaire. Then, describing the
troops"other victory," the paper went on to emphasise the
"psychological results" achieved in certain areas through the
use of the military as administrators, doctors and teachers
(see also Chapters 5, 11 and 12). In this instance the Indochi-
nese model appeared to be useful for the journalist who, de-
spite having stated in the opening section that any analogy in
this field was unfounded, wrote that:
L'expórience indochinoise avait enseignO (...)
certains off iciers qu'au milieu du XX6me siècle
(...) on ne pouvait se borner & affronter un adver-
saire aux moyens d'une action extrftement diversi-
fiOe sur le seul terrain des armes.'
Despite the contradiction, and the failure to prove its case
in trying to differentiate between the two conflicts, Le Monde
did attempt to distinguish unjustifiably between the two very
similar situations of colonial domination being progressively
eroded and destroyed by a nationalist struggle. It is quite
clear that the parallel with Indochina was used when it suited
the paper to attract the sympathy and support of the anti-
communist sections of public opinion in the conduct of the war
and that it was rejected when the comparison was perceived as
detrimental or when it could suggest the possibility of a
similar resolution of the conflict.
The view that Algeria was not comparable to Indochina propa-
gated by the official discourse was shared by journalists such
as P.Herreman. 25 The success of the psychological warfare was
emphasised, 26 together with the methods used to achieve it.
These were said to rely mainly on propaganda.27
9.2.6.Critical forum: the libre opinion column 
This did not mean that the paper did not carry a very criti-
cal discourse. Articles which were distinctly vitriolic in
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their attack on the government of the day and its policies did
find their way into the paper. But it was in the form of a
"free opinion" expressed by outsiders. And the writers of those
signed articles had ultimately to assume responsibility for
what they were saying. It should be added that these columns of
the paper were opened to all shades of opinion. Many of the
articles defended the colonial system and the role and prestige
of France overseas. But some were anti-colonialist and opposed
government policy in colonial matters.28
Despite the circulation of the official discourse with its
many ramifications outlined above, there was, however, sharp,
relevant criticism of the situation in Algeria, but it did not
come directly from the journalists themselves taking a stance
(supposing there was a stance to take), but from people writing
to Le Monde who were allowed space on the libres opinions
column of the paper.29
One such "Free Opinion" dealt with the subject of elections
quite early on in the conflict. Referring to the abstention in
Algiers local elections, Abdes lam Meharra, an indigenous former
councillor, attacked "the mayor's confederation of Algeria and
the unfair electoral system" by which the choice is decided in
advance. 31
Another critical attitude to the government was expressed in
a letter sent to M. Pierre Commin by Andre Phillip, in which he
reproached the government for its policy in the Middle East and
North Africa.
The letter had been sent to state A.Phillip's intention to
express his views freely because the "Comite-directeur" had
refused to convene a Conseil national or an "extraordinary
session of congress." Since free debate had been stifled in
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their ranks, some Socialists felt deprived of the right to air
their grievances against the policies of the party, and wanted
to set up a "tribune libre".32
Expecting very little change, Andre Phillip accused the
Radical-Socialists of being unable to fulfil their govern-
mental function, which was to give a new hope to a deceived
people and of being responsible for prolonging the war in
Algeria.33
It is clear that there was a great degree of opposition, and
sharp criticism was levelled against Mollet and his government.
However, it should be emphasized that this type of discourse,
which could be glimpsed occasionally in the pages of Le Monde,
was not profuse in the paper; and, when present, it was not
penned by Le Monde's own journalists. Furthermore, in the
various party congresses, Radical-Socialists were expressing
the most virulent criticism of government policy. This was
reported as taking place but was not in general taken up by the
various journalists of the paper.
Another meaningful, although not exactly vitriolic, criti-
cism of government policy, which did come from people outside
the paper, was provided by Pierre-Henri Simon.
Examining the perils and the chances that France's histori-
cal development faced, he wrote that France was responding
badly to the pesdes de l'histoire of the last 30 years with its
political power falling, its international prestige decreasing,
its colonies braking up, its currency weakening, its dependence
for its arms on the outside world increasing, and its powerful
allies sometimes even making it feel its isolation. The danger
in this was the pleasure of the "toboggan slide" -an easy
feeling of happiness derived from living off the wealth of the
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work of previous generations.
For Simon, the "cascade of government" continued with the
frequent permutations of ministerial post, in total disregard
of the national interests; this indifference to the problems
confronting France was accompanied by blame attributed to "the
Americans or the Russians, the trusts or the trade unions, the
Democrates chrêtiens or the technocrats, the worker priests or
the colonels, or anybody else but the person speaking..". He
saw general apathy as breeding an excessive and unhealthy
nationalism at a time when the future was at stake and when
France was faced with choices which it should make in all
realism and full awareness of the risks.34
9.3.Independentist nationalism hard to swallow
The exploration of the general themes and the overtone of
the discourse has provided a general idea of what is latent in
Le Monde's discourse. But, in order to complete the picture, it
would be essential to find out what is more explicit in the
journalists' discourse. In other words, what were the possible
solutions to the Algerian problem that the journalists of Le
Monde or its occasional contributors openly contemplated? What
kind of evolution did they envisage for the country?
9.3.1.Interpreting nationalism and refusing immediate inde-
pendence 
Despite the existence of nationalist movements committed to
independence since the early part of the century, and the
resistance met by French colonisers on the ground during most
of the previous century (Chapter 3), Le Monde, like the greater
part of French public opinion, seemed reluctant to accept that
what was starting in Algeria was a liberation struggle by
nationalists against a colonialist system, aimed at its de-
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struction and the establishment, or rather the restoration, of
an Algerian independent state.
In what looked on the surface like an attempt to understand
from the start, Le Monde wondered about the meaning and the
origin of the outbreak of violence in Algeria. P.A.Martel asked
whether Fellaguisme was "nationalism" or "an Arab
initiative", 35 only to put forward the view that it was not
nationalism.38
Ii faudrait admettre que l'on se trouve en face
d'une organisation êtrangére aux formations nationa-
listes, comme & /a population. Elle recruterait en
Algêrie des groupes ....
Pout se passe comme Si une main invisible
cherchait & ruiner les solidaritês verticales
France-Afrique du Nord des l'44stant même oil l'on
parait pouvoir les renforcer.-"
The next day38 the paper thought that it was manipulation
from abroad trying to fill the empty dossier of the Maghreb
question in the UN and an "exaltation" from the broadcast of
Radio Cairo and its "fanciful figures".39
For Le Monde, as for the majority of French opinion, there
was a criminal streak and more than a touch of madness, when it
was not barbarism, in any movement fighting the civilising
influence of France.
However, progressively the element of "nationalism" in the
Algerian insurrection had to be accepted, but its legitimacy
was still denied. The aim of emancipating the colonised had to
be conceded, but the methods were never shared by the various
French governments nor by the paper. It was thought that it was
misguided nationalism fighting the civilising mission of
France. The colonialist age was drawing to a close in the UN
and many international fora and the dawn of independence and
self-determination were increasingly appearing on the world's
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horizon. Although it came to accept independence for Tunisia
and Morocco, the French government rejected it outright in the
case of Algeria. It tried to undermine any legitimacy the
movement might have had for that cause. What is perhaps sur-
prising" is that Le Monde was of the same view: in a number of
articles it clearly argued against the idea of independence,
which remained an anathema for the duration of the Fourth
Republic as far as the paper was concerned.
In case anybody thought of applying to the Algerian case
the idea of the model nationalism provided, Henri Laugier, a
former Associate Under-Secretary to the UN, produced his arti-
cle on exaggerated conceptions of sovereignty and People's
Rights to self-determination.41
The article written for Le Monde was designed to make lea-
ders of democratic countries think again about certaines for-
mules magiques qui pesent sur la diplomatie, sur les relations
internationales et sur les conflits de notre temps.
According to him the formula of a people's right to self
determination expressed a confused ideology resulting from
Wilson's thinking behind the treaties following the First World
War and the victorious nations' respect for the right to self
determination, more out of timidity and hesitation than out of
fidelity to an ideology.
Mais elles le respecterent. Passives, elles
s'inclinerent devant le droit des Italiens et celui
des Allemands de se donner des regimes de boue et de
sang tels qu'il fallut une guerre mondiale affreuse-
ment devastatrice et meurtriere, pour en debaraser
/a p/anête.
He argued that there was a significant confusion in the
ideology enshrined in the Atlantic Charter and in the texts of
the UN Charter (article 2.7) because of their imprecision,
since no person or text had defined authoritatively what exact-
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ly was a relevant matter of national sovereignty. Laugier
rejected any right of "interference by the UN organisations in
matters relating to national sovereignty" and dismissed the
absurdity of some types of nationalist ideology. 42 Since natio-
nalism was breaking the acceptable rules, logical limits had to
be imposed on it in the real world. 43 But sometimes indepen-
dence could hardly be ignored, since it was repeatedly put on
the agenda by the various movements. However, when it was
conceded as a possible solution, it was always put back as a
long-term objective44
9.3.2. Independence -a long-term objective 
Whilst accepting that independence should be the long-term
objective (the ultimate aim) of everybody's effort, Paul Rivet,
in the pages of the paper, dismissed this notion as not repre-
senting a panacea for all human injustices and miseries. Even
the acceptance of the independence objective in the long term
made it look as a solution that could not be achieved practic-
ally, unless all inequalities of an economic and cultural
nature had been possibly, if not completely eradicated, at
least sharply diminished.
Claiming authority for his comments after a recent world
tour, where he saw "immense cities where human beings were
born, lived and died without knowing the comfort of a home",
and having stigmatised some of the countries'record in terms of
"material and intellectual misery" (with Bolivia 's 70% and
India's 88% illiteracy rates), and perhaps ignoring that Fran-
ce's own record in the field was no better, 45 Rivet argued that
the improvement of cultural and material standards was a neces-
sary, but not the only, prerequisite for independence.
It would be unreasonable to disagree with some of the state-
225
ments he made (for instance that the hungry and the illiterate
are not really free), but what Rivet was really objecting to
was the non-democratic nature of governments which followed
independence." However, at that time, what was being practised
in Algeria by France could hardly qualify as democratic, and
there were many aspects of Algerian life under France (to which
he did not seem to object), which hardly differed from the fate
he so much feared independence would bring.
Rivet's real concern appeared in the inside pages, where it
was spelt out in terms of the role played by these newly inde-
pendent countries, whose "self-assured and verbose representa-
tives inside international organisations, were making the
developed western world (which, admittedly, had long shown an
"unbearable superiority complex" towards the "exotic people")
forget "the role of guide that its experience imposes on it" or
seek forgiveness for its social and economic superiority:
gue l'anciennete de leur civilisation et un
concours de circonstances historigues favorables
leur ont assure.
In his view, the behaviour of the new states was excessively
influencing the attitudes of the big nations within the debates
of international organisations, which could and should have
kept "a dispassionate and a serene climate in this troubled
world." This was creating a climate (..) empoisonne de de
concurrence demagogigue et de racollage degradant.
The solution of Rivet was to establish some moral order and
remove the "pseudo-democracy" 47 by introducing a weighted
system of voting, giving less weight to the newly-independent
nations, until they acquired "the necessary maturity and indis-
pensable experience" for the exercise of freedom. They need to
feel, he continued, that the path was through culture, which he
226
thought it was the duty of the Western world to impart.
Although Rivet admitted to having thought long and hard, and
even hesitated before committing his ideas to paper, he urged
that they should definitely be read by those seeking to improve
the material and intellectual condition of mankind without
distinction and wanting to establish peace without fascism,
racism or xenophobia.
Although he anticipated protests, Rivet was unashamedly
arguing in favour of a patronising approach and suggesting a
weighted voting system which gave voting rights inversely
proportional to the number of illiterates in the country repre-
sented in the UN. The solution before these countries become,
in his eyes, mature enough to exercise democratic rights, was
to acquire social, economic and cultural development through
the Western world. 48
9.3.3. An increased awareness of the wider context 
Pierre-Henri Simon's wider perspective enabled him to per-
ceive that the emergence of a Third World as a significant
force made the use of force in solving colonial problems an
obsolete concept. Simon was also conscious that the power
relationship (rapport des forces) had changed, and that:
[La France] ne peut pretendre au leadership
dans un monde oil des courants irrêversibles ont
constituê des nations-fourmilliêres et des Etats
Oants; que le milliard et demi des hommes de Ban-
doeng a introduit dans les problêmes d'outre-mer
une donnêe absolument nouvelle, et que le temps est
passé oü /'on rêsolvait une question coloniale en
faisant A Kemonter par une canoniére le delta d'un
fleuve.'"
But all he recommended was a change of methods when he
compared the two styles of approaches used by France to solve
her problems and commented that the virile action in Suez led
to the most negative consequences which included; oil supplies
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being cut off, banks, schools and teaching institutions in the
Middle East being shut down or destroyed (subi les plus grands
degats), the action of France itself being stopped after the
froncement de sourcil du cousin Boulganine..fet la] semonce de
l'oncle <<IKe>>, France's friends not being able to stand by
her, and the Soviet activities in Budapest obtaining the cover
of a good alibi.
Not underestimating the success of the Prime Minister and
his foreign minister, 50 Simon declared that were two ways of
doing things: the way outlined above in Suez and the successful
way used in the UN over Algeria, where France was granted some
respite and where success was on the government's side, helped
by the decisions taken over Black Africa and by the mistakes of
the "adversary" •51
Simon thought52 that the world was expecting France to think
"French Algeria" in a twentieth-century perspective. 53 And
despite the paper's clear awareness of the cruel realities of
the war, Le Monde still believed that world opinion was on the
side of France, which was able to get on peacefully with the
building of "French Algeria". 54 This could be achieved through
the "dissipation of the fictions of language and the intrigues
of power which block the path of peace". Simon was convinced,
though, that the world wanted France to find a solution to the
Algerian problem as a French problem and he expected that
solution to be "peaceful, democratic and fair".55
9.3.4. Limited perspectives and unrealistic solutions 
The lack of realism in the paper's content could perhaps
explain the number of far-fetched solutions being proposed in
its pages. Instead of envisaging a pragmatic and realistic
programme, the paper devoted its pages to airing various limi-
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ted and ill-thought-out solutions, ranging from a confederation
between Europe and Africa (Eurafrica), 56 to the views of the
Independents, 57 and many others such as Marshall Juin, 58 and
Jules Moch. 59
Moch did not think that it was sufficient to state that
nationalism and independence were outdated concepts" if one
wanted to preserve the coexistence of the two communities.61
The refusal to allow Algeria to go its own way was turned down
even when people in the paper were convinced that the country
would adopt a republican form of government, 62 as this did not
exclude the "possibility of conflict" and was detrimental to
the construction of a federal or confederate structure. When
the new Tunisian regime adopted a republican form, Le Monde
commented that Morocco should seek the arbitration of the
French over the future of this North Africa Unit and wondered
why the Sultan did not back the French presence."
Only Minay described the economic plight of the country
accurately64 and Sauvy was one of the few contributors ready to
accept radical changes. He also tried to provide readers with
the facts about the Algerian problem in a series of articles,65
in which he tried to show that it was unrealistic to defend a
policy of integration from a moral point of view by examining
economic aspects (maintaining that Sahara oil, contrary to
popular belief, would be insufficient) as well as social ones
in terms of costs and sacrifices." With economic difficulties
and the problems caused by supporting current policy, Sauvy
thought that there would be a transfer of power from those
dominating to those dominated, Sauvy, who was unwilling to make
France shoulder all the blame, did not recommend independence,
but (sharing M. Allais's views) expressed a preference for
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partition along the lines of Ireland which, although not very
"pleasant", was efficient, since by creating two zones, a
better defence of the borders could be ensured.67
The consensus which seemed to emerge in the paper over the
idea of keeping Algeria French did not materialise over how
that goal could be achieved amongst the occasional contributors
to Le Monde.
9.3..5. Consensus and divergence of journalistsiviews 
Although there was a clear desire amongst all journalists
writing for Le Monde that Algeria should remain French, some
divergence can also be noticed in the field of what regular
contributors were recommending as a solution to the Algerian
problem.
All through the texts of reports and editorials there was an
omnipresent desire and interest in keeping Algeria French and
in restoring order. Blanchet was more than generous in terms of
advice as to ways of remedying the defects in the case of
Algeria, but what directions were these reforms to follow?
Various journalists favoured various "solutions", reflect-
ing their political views. Duverger wanted a federal-type
solution, while Fauvet was a proponent of greater integration.
If total assimilation" were not thought possible and if the
idea of secession were rejected, a formula had to be devised,
and the stages of evolution and the structure of the "d6parte-
ments actuels" had to be determined."
At that time Le Monde tried to find some middle of the road
way which would avoid assimilating the Muslim population into
French society, while at the same time preventing the loss of
that community:
L'int6gration est fort diffórente de l'Associa-
tion qui est une chimére. Ii serait vain de recher-
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cher une identification des Algeriens aux FrangRis
que ni les uns ni les autres n'accepteraient."
Curiously, the wish not to impose integration (claimed to be
in place since 1947), which the Algerians did not want, ap-
peared only when it suited French interests. For the journal-
ist, the integration advocated by Soustelle acquired a particu-
lar meaning.
L'integration est tout au moms un refus: celui
de l'autonomie interne et celui du federalisme, deux
formules qui se,Wn le gouvernement méneraient A
l'independance."
C'est donc entre l'assimilation et l'indepen-
dance, egalement impossibles, que des mesures con-
cretes et rapides peuvent etre prises pour conferer
au fur et & mesure de leur evolution un statut
nouveau aux Musulmans algeriens.
It was obvious here that the new statute being recommended
(which had to be progressive) was a retrograde step, as it did
not represent full and immediate citizenship. However, it
appealed to the paper because it was a statement of the middle
ground. But even that was no easy task, as Fauvet clearly saw
the opposition to, and the difficulties of, the government in
announcing the development of this statute and defining the
general policy:
LA encore le gouvernement se heurtera a ceux
gui n'ont pas compris qu'ä vouloir tout conserver on
risque de tout perdre, et A ceux des nationalistes
francais, qui sont armes de cet esprit, rejoignant
ceux des nationalistes arabes qui, eux, n'ont pas
encore compris qu'A 1;ou1oir tout conquerir on risque
de ne rien obtenir.7'
He found the middle way best, and argued against extremism
on both sides and defining what the aim should be.
Agreeing to keep the word integration (the meaning of which
had been defined by the government), Le Monde did not wish to
give it a narrow meaning (au sens strict). For the paper it
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could not be: celle dont ne veulent ni les Algeriens ni les
Frangais, 73 but a solution between "assimilation" and "federa-
tion", a notion which was thought capable of gathering (<re-
unir) the advantages of the two solutions, since a restrictive
definition would limit participation to the most competent
parliamentarians.
The "revolutionary" conception of the Pleven "round table,"
proposing a staged evolution of Algeria with statutes compar-
able to those of British Dominions, did not escape Le Monde's
attention. The paper argued for a definition of the major
principles of this policy, and for understanding that a healing
process should be set in motion in order to bridge the gap
between the two communities, even if there were an immediate
implementation of the policy.74
In his article, L'AlgOrie, le Texas et 1'Ukraine, 75 M
Duverger tried to compare the relationship between Algeria and
France, on the one hand, to that pertaining between Texas and
the United States and that existing between the Ukraine and the
Soviet Union, on the other. He concluded that the Algerian
situation was complicated by the presence of Europeans, and
argued therefore that a more original, imaginative and intelli-
gent solution should be found.
He also maintained that the "dualism of fidelity" of the
Algerian people (some feeling more Algerian than French and
others more French than Algerian), which he saw as very expli-
cit in the educated factions of the population, should be
accommodated. In his eyes this could be done, "though the room
for manoeuvre is thin", only through a "Federal" solution which
implemented the reforms of Soustelle .
He thought that extremists at both ends of the spectrum,
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ultra conservative and ultra nationalist, did not accept this
solution because they did not think dispassionately enough. If
they did for one moment:
us verraient qu'il n'existe aucune autre
possibilite reelle de resoudre le probleme algerien.
Convinced that he possessed the only solution to the Alger-
ian problem, and without bothering to enquire what the majority
of Algerians would think of it, Duverger arrogantly presented
it as the only way forward.
For him, only one question remained. How quickly would it be
implemented?
La seule question est de savoir Si les solu-
tions inevitables seront appliquees rapidement avec
le minimum de con! lit, ou s'il faudra encore des
an:26es de sang et de haine avant qu'on accepte enfhp
de part et d'autre de s'incliner devant les faits."
With a slight change of mind three months later, 77 Duverger
outlined the contradictions and differences between the two
solutions of Federalism proposed by the Socialists and Soustel-
le's "Integration" or between respectively recognising Alger-
ia's personality and "Algeria is France".
Duverger commented that none of these statements expressed
the whole truth and outlined the fundamental dualism which he
saw:
Meme les colons les plus colonialistes ne se
congoivent pas comme des Francais absolument iden-
tiques aux autres: us ont aussi le sentiment
d'appartenir a une autre communaute en méme temps
qu'& la communaute frangaise. Mem les musulmans les
plus attaches a la nation algerienne ne se sentent
pas uniquement algeriens; us trouvent en eux mémes
une certaine presence frangaise; us ont le senti-
ment d'appartenir d'une certaine fagon a la commu-
naute franggise en méme temps qu'A la communaute
algerienne."
The errors to be avoided in searching for a solution were
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outlined as being: a solution on Moroccan or Tunisian lines,79
a federal solution, which, if adopted, would entail gradual
separation from France" and total integration.81
The main concern which exercised him throughout was that, in
giving or accepting any reform or making any improvement, the
interests of the French community in Algeria should not be
neglected, especially in terms of local and parliamentary
mpresentation.82
Paramount also in the mind of the journalist was that Alger-
ia should remain French. But a sense of frustration developed
at the lack of political action in the field. Journalists
multiplied their warnings, and a degree of urgency was soon
thought to be essential.
9.3.6. A marked preference for the links to be maintained
In reflecting the official discourse as well as in more
direct forms of reporting, Le Monde's journalists did not hide
their preference for a particular solution, nor was the paper
discreet in its support for a particular framework. Reporting
the economic and financial effort the government was going to
make, the paper excluded a particular framework for action:
le realisme commande aussi de ne pas chgKcher
hors de la France les chemins de la libertê."
In most of their analyses, Le Monde's journalists expressed
a preference for a solution that would help keep Algeria within
the French nation. Discussing the options facing the govern-
ment, and even when conceding that the notion of Algerian
identity (personalitê alOrienne) was already outdated (d6pas-
see), the paper clearly put forward the view that an Algerian
national identity ( thought to be "widespread by many obser-
vers") was "premature and unacceptable in present
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circumstances".
Sur le principe meme , la reconnaissance de la
personalite algerienne  peut apparaitre comme depas-
see, alors que celle du fait national algerien est
prematuree et de toute maniere impossible dans les
circumstances actuelles.
The aim was to find a solution which would go beyond the
former but stop far short of the latter, and that was no easy
task:
Aller au dela de la «personalite» tout en
restant en dega du «fait national>> n'est pas
facile.
Looking at the possibility of free elections revealed one of
the concerns of Le Monde, which could not help showing its true
colours:
Ii reste a savoir comment on eviterait que du
scrutin ne se degage une majorite de musulmans
favorables, sinon a l'independance, au moms au fait
national algerien qui, de l'aveu de tous, Vest plus
ou moms forge au cours des derniers mois.°4
It was not made clear why Algerian national identity was
impossible. Support for it may have been lacking amongst most
European settlers, or French politicians and media, but it was
definitely seen as the only way out for the Algerians who had
been deceived in the past. However, Le Monde certainly did not
share that feeling, and did not see independence as a solution.
With the concluding remarks ... le desir general de provo-
quer une «ouverture politique >> afin de completer le dossier
que la France plaindra devant l'ONU, 85 the immediate concern
and the aim of the whole exercise became clearer: the objective
was not primarily to find a solution but to make the French
point of view, right or wrong, triumph objectively by convin-
cing world opinion that something was being done, an objective
shared by the French government of the day.
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Even when conceding that the alienation of Algerian leaders
had been achieved through "our clumsiness," which made "the
situation of the overall North African problem more difficult",
Gauthier (who was one of the most critical journalists) main-
tained that they (the Algerian leaders) were unwilling "to
sever their links with «our» civilisation."
Gauthier urged a reconciliation" and advocated action in
setting the conditions and making available the means for the
necessary reconciliation, thus eliminating any idea that the
solution could be found outside France.
The search for a solution compatible with that end (a recon-
ciliation) entailed very dubious means at times, even for
Gauthier himself.87
Anxious to keep Algeria French, or that at least the solu-
tion should be a Franco-Algerian affair, and aware of the
contradictions, Gauthier wrote of the:
(..) sentiment patriotique qui se revolte
devant <<l'abandon>> d'une population francaise et
d'une terre qui l'est devenue, souci d'une position
strategique, volonte de ne pas renier l'entreprise
poursuivie depuis plus d'un siècle, desir de l'adap-
ter a l'dvolution des populations et des idees,
autant d'elements contradicWires qui se debattent
entre le coeur et l'esprit."
Ignoring the arrest of Ben Bella less than two months pre-
viously, like many other journalists Julien le Moyne argued
that Algeria did not have any leaders with the stature of HM
Mohammed V or Bourguiba, nor a coherent team representing the
whole country. 89 Trying to find a way forward which would
avoid a solution of "abandon", he advised taking into account
the interdependence of the North African countries with a view
to uniting the various Algerian groups ( including the FLN, MNA
and rallies) with the Tunisians and Moroccans and France to
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stimulate the setting up of a North African unit ("ensemble")
(the title said African) and use the wealth of the Sahara for a
"new future" for the countries concerned. Although he hoped
that a first step would be taken and that initiatives would
begin in Paris, like Fauvet, he clearly advised that granting
independence would be the wrong thing to do."
This piece of advice was given at a time when independence
was not unheard of as a possible solution to colonial problem.
Already towards the end of 1956 other groups amongst the most
informed had perceived that the only way to end the Algerian
conflict was through the granting of Algerian independence.91
When it reported the news Le Monde seemed astounded that the
idea of independence could be expressed without causing an
outcry (toile). The paper wrote:
Ii est tout de ma-me peu banal que	 preside
par le General Billotte et en presence de persona-
lites aussi peu suspectes de convictions progres-
sistes que le General Weygand, Bonnefous...,
Pinay... le rapporteur charg0 de la politique
exterieure... (Raymond Aron, 72 professeur a la
Sorbonne, chroniqueur bien connu) a pu affirmer
sans provoquer de toile dans son auditoire:
<<reconnaitre t6t ou tard que l'Afrique du Nord
est une unite, qu'il y aura un etat algerien et glue
dans un delai a fixer, il sera independant....9'
9.3.7.  The acceptance of change 
On that occasion, although the paper was convinced that
government policy should not stand still, it had not yet made
up its mind about the direction in which it should proceed
Ii n'y a plus maintenant de bonne Cu mauvaise
solution, ii n'y a que le choix entre des solutions
plus ou moms mauvaises 	 sinon Si nous nous
obstinons dans /a politique actuelle nous courrons
une catastrophe natioptqle a c6te de laquel2. le
traite de Paris de 1763 paraitra glorieux.7-1
The discourse of Le Monde was still dominated by a reformist
attitude. Confronting the party divisions on Algeria, Le Mon-
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de's J.Fauvet began to make favourable comments on the evolu-
tion of the African states. He began to praise the federal
ideas being developed which, he hoped, would have a lesson for
Algeria. He maintained his conviction that if a decentralised
system had been put in place a few years previously, it would
have modified the climate there too.96
Writing at the end of January, about the need to modify or
update the 1946 Constitution (section 8) to accommodate the new
relationship between Algeria and France, Georges Chaffard
defended this revision suggested by a number of politicians
(Devinat, Coste-Floret) in order to allow for an "Algerian
identity".97
These issues left no doubt about the paper's belief in the
"civilising mission" of France when it welcomed the "wisdom" of
the Africans in not requesting immediate independence dont us
mesurent les difficultes et le caractere illusoire, and stated
the capability of French know-how to guide them progressively:
(..) sans heurts vers le self-government,
compte tenu de ce que la cooperation franco-
africaine est une necessite vitale pour les uns et
pour les autres et un element determinant de la
communaute la plus large que l'on voudrait reunir.98
Fauvet thought that one of the initiatives, the one proposed
by the last Socialist Party congress, which was to fight
against extremists in both camps, was possible, but the condi-
tions for it were less favourable than they had been eight
months previously (in mid 1956) either in Algeria or in the
Assembly.
Fauvet, for whom the UN votes were a necessary but not
sufficient condition for solving the "Algerian Affair" and for
ending the paralysis which had been affecting political life
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since July of the previous year (1956), was eager to see the 9
January declaration implemented. In his view, this meant that
there should be a dialogue with the Muslim community which only
achange of methods or even a change of participants could
bring about. Inaction, he continued, could only contribute to
the "success of our adversaries".
Blanchet suggested a more subtle form of evolution, which
consisted in loosening the ties a little as the British had
done, "losing a colony in order to gain a dominion."
Full of admiration for the institutions copied on Westmins-
ter and the use of English, Blanchet could not say which was
more worthy of admiration: the wisdom of the nationalists
epitomised by Kwame N'Krumah, or the realism of the British
colonial power represented by Sir Charles Arden-Clark in know-
ing "how to lose a colony in order to gain a dominion."
But the fundamental difference Blanchet saw was that Moroc-
co, Tunisia and Viet Nam had not requested to be admitted
into the French Union
..alors que de son banc de premier ministre
dans un Parlement au cadre et aux rites copies sur
ceux de Westminster ( et ou l'anglais demeurera la
langue officielle) Kwame Nkrumah proclamait en
decembre dernier: «Noug nsommes heureux de rester
dans le Commonwealth>>.77
Despite the international context, Le Monde persisted in its
refusal to accept the nationalist trend as legitimate or that
the FLN had enough competent leaders l " and continued to regard
the Algerian problem, not in colonial terms, but as a conflict
between the two communities in Algeria.101
Upon the vote of the loi-cadre for Africa, Duverger sug-
gested a much more subtle way forward by modifying the unitary
structure of the French state through the reform of section
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VIII of the Constitution creating a de facto102 institutional
structure, which resembled more that of a federal state than
the unitary system of government, reflecting what had been
happening in Britain.
Duverger thought that the freedom requested could be pos-
sible with interdependence and that the impotence of the FLN
over the control of their troops and that of the French govern-
ment in respect of public opinion could make the situation in
Algeria develop into a Hungarian-type scenario)- 03 He did not
consider the Algerian problem to be in an impasse, "as all
problems have a solution, even the most difficult ones", and
he thought that, if the Resident-Minister showed a degree of
firmness towards the "ultras", and gave the "Muslims" the
impression that they were being treated on an equal footing
(impression d'être traites sur Blame pied d'egalite), this could
modify the general atmosphere)- 04 His other recommendation was
to use Bourguiba and the Sultan of Morocco to help constitute a
"North African Union" (un ensemble nord africain).
It was argued that if the French government could renounce
demagogic nationalist slogans and make public opinion under-
stand the real facts behind the problem, the solution, though
not easy, would not be impossible:
& condition de faire preuve d' audace et d'ima-
gination... que notre politique algerienne ne se
borne plus & claironner tous les quinze jours l'an-
nonce d'un <<dernier quart d'heure>> qui est en
passe de rejoindre «la route qv =fer>> dans le
Pantheon des mots historiques.'"
For the benefit of those who might have been puzzled by the
fact that nationalism was supported in Africa, Asia and even in
the "Popular democracies" but discouraged in France, Duverger
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explained that there were two stages and kinds of
nationalism, 106 which "like any ideology, could be interpreted
in two different ways" and ought to be judged "good" in a
particular context and "bad" in another. 1" He argued that the
two nationalisms combined together, especially in Asiatic and
African countries, and warned the French Left not to be taken
in and not to get involved in a fight which was not theirs.
Duverger discussed the solutions but never put the French
presence into question. For him, most of the people on the
mainland and in Algeria were against "abandon" but there was a
need for draconian measures, as reforms were always promised
but never implemented. Playing down the cycle of violence in
Algeria, Duverger wrote that the Europeans in Algiers were
living a terror, which excused certain extremes, as fascism
was a defence reflex of a class in fear of its existence or
privileges, 108 in the belief that a dictatorial regime would
save them. He explained that the same thing would happen in
France, given the same conditions. But the civil war (my empha-
sis) did not explain everything, in his view, every colonial
situation develops into an attitude which is contrary and
opposed to democracy.
The inegalitarian anti-liberal nature of the system ex-
plained, Duverger argued, the preference for authoritarian
regimes by the "Europeans" in Algeria. For him, opposition
between provinces was normal and not harmful, as long as there
was a consensus view (majorite exprim6e du pays). But for
Algeria after some 125 years, it was no longer the case and,
instead of bowing before the mainland, "our compatriots try to
impose their will on it.
Despite the shrewdness of his analysis109 of the resistance
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to change, Duverger was unable to offer a serious assessment of
the solution for Algeria. He still thought that an evolution
by means of reforms which would keep Algeria under the French
umbrella remained feasible.
9.4. Conclusions
The discourse propagated by Le Monde's journalists during
the Algerian war seemed to be reassuring as to the state of the
conflict. The reassuring themes which pervaded most articles as
well as the feeling, implied and stated, that the situation
was improving, together with the assertive tone over differ-
ences between Algeria and Indochina, echoed faithfully the main
thrust of the official discourse. Clearly, some articles were
specifically designed to counteract "the campaign of defeatism
and demoralisation" taking root in public opinion. This was
one of the main strategies of various governments, too embar-
rassed by events in Algeria, who could not even have survived
their extremely short mandate had the difficult reality of the
conflict been faithfully reported to the public.
Despite an increased awareness of the wider international
context, independence as a solution to the conflict was rejec-
tedby all of the paper's journalists who showed, despite
their divergence on the means of achieving it, a marked simi-




10.THE REJECTION OF PROGRESSIVE INTELLECTUAL VIEWS
10.1. Introduction
An examination of Le Monde's treatment of the ideas put
forward by an important and particularly well-informed section
of public opinion, the intellectual elite (writers, university
professors, prominent journalists and the like), could provide
a much sharper focus for testing our hypotheses on the attitude
of Le Monde towards the Algerian question, the Algerian problem
and its possible solutions, and offer a more complete image of
the Algerian crisis and the war given to its readers by the
parer.
A more rigorous look at how Le Monde presented statements
made by members of the intellectual community, ' and a better
knowledge of the comments the newspaper made on them, might
provide a better understanding of the views the paper expressed
and hence what its preferences were. This, in turn, would
provide a firmer assessment of its role.
This chapter surveys the kinds of discussions appearing in
Le Monde concerning the stances adopted by intellectuals during
the Algerian War, up to the end of the Fourth Republic. The
areas covered include the colonial status of Algeria, the
nature of links to be kept with this colony as well as the use
of repressive methods, including torture, to prevent the demise
of "French Algeria".
10.2.Importance of the Intellectuals in this context
As was seen earlier, throughout the Fourth Republic the
"Official reaction" to the Algerian uprising was to declare it
totally unacceptable that "three French dêpartements" should
rebel against France. 2 The struggle became more difficult for
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French troops and the French government sent in reinforcements
(conscripts and reservists). In April 1955 a state of emer-
gency was decreed and special powers assumed in March 1956.3
The methods used by the "forces of order" were increasingly
"dirty" and included frequent recourse to indiscriminate use of
force, collective reprisals, summary executions and frequent
cases of torture.4
The perception of the problems at stake and hence their very
solution tore France apart, and since the government considered
any views which did not support the military effort or which
criticised the use of certain methods by the army as a "breach
of state security" and an "attempt to demoralise the army,"
with the full panoply of sanctions that that implied, accusa-
tions of treason were legion and many writers, intellectuals
and journalists did not feel it was safe to say anything at
all.
It is commonly accepted that well-known intellectuals usual-
ly enjoy high esteem in France, and many of them took various
stances which put them at odds with one another and with the
State during the Algerian War. Without wishing to detract from
the importance of J.-F. Sirinelli's arguments 5 which, if adap-
tedto the circumstance, could be summed up in the well known
phrase "a picture (in Paris-Match) is worth a thousand words",
it should, nevertheless, be emphasised that the influence of
intellectuals 6 and what they say in a society like that of
France is important not only for the public at large, but also
for decision-makers and influential people in general; the
minority of decision-makers and their power to decide could
not go easily unchallenged for long if they alienated the
intelligentsia of the country. Mauriac was aware that a few
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well-written lines did have some impact.7
Some members of the intellectual community did speak, using
the only weapon at their disposal: their word or pen and their
voices were "heard" in the various newspapers and reviews,
particularly in Le Monde. Despite the restrictions, this
period is seen by many as the "golden age" of the intellectuals
and also of the periodical press for which they wrote.8
Very few statements were made during the first two years of
the war by the section of public opinion examined here.9
There were slightly more in 1956 and a considerable number in
1957, and the first half of 1958 when de Gaulle arrived on the
political scene. Although the war, and its everyday succession
of atrocities continued after the collapse of the Fourth Repu-
blic, attitudes in general, and those of the intellectual world
in particular, seemed to revolve around the position of de
Gaulle (when it was understood) and the solutions he was put-
ting forward to solve the colonial problem.10
Since the significance of French intellectuals in political
life and the importance of Le Monde and its influence, direct
or otherwise, on decision-makers are already well documented,
let us look at who was heard, when and how they were vresented,
and to what effect.
10.3. Francois Mauriac and Jean Amrouche
The debate between French intellectuals such as Francois
Mauriac, and indigenous (anti-colonialist) thinkers like Jean
Antrouche, was echoed in Le Monde. 11 Their dispute essentially
revolved around two incompatible conceptions of the Algerian
war: 12 a "liberation struggle" for Amrouche and a "family row"
for Mauriac," a notion unacceptable to Amrouche, who distin-
guished himself from the prevalent thinking of French politi-
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clans and most writers, for whom Algeria could be conceived
only as being part and parcel of France.
For Amrouche, colonialism was the negation of a people's
existence and honour, and the coexistence of colonisation
(whether equated with a slave/master or pupil/master relation-
ship) and equality was impossible for either states or indi-
viduals. Hence independence was essential, and the struggle
for independence was the cornerstone of the "restitution" to
the Algerian people of its right to exist and its honour.
Consequently, to ask the FLN to renounce this demand was not,
for him, to request a concession but was equivalent to "sign-
ing, for a long time to come, if not for all time, the death-
warrant of the Algerian people."
These clear-cut principles were rejected by Mauriac on the
grounds that independence could not be accepted by any French-
man. Addressing the FLN leaders (but not Amrouche in person) he
wrote that (quoted in Le Monde):
ce gu'ils ne sauraient ignorer [c'est] gu'il ne
se trouve en France aucun homme d'Etat pour procla-
mer, contre la volontê du Parleinnt et de la nation,
l'independance de l'Algêrie....-"'*
Amrouche was eventually given an opportunity to tell a few
home truths to the French of Metropolitan France and to expand
his ideas further. Despite finding them "bitter", Le Monde
published them, 15 but not without questioning his credentials
as l'interpréte des <muets>, a spokesman for the intellectuals
and the FLN youth, and wondering whether he really did not know
how one-sided and excessive his indictment was.
Justifying its decision to publish his article (but down-
grading it to a simple testimony), Le Monde wrote: Fallait-il
Otouffer ce cri d'un être dêchir6? His analysis was seen as
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"too cruel", but it was thought that a number of readers would
find his "testimony" worth hearing, [pour] la part de varitê
profonde qu'il met A nu et pour l'effort de rêflexion qu'il
peut imposer & tous.
His views, stigmatising the French egocentric attitude of
looking at things through their own eyes, of applying their own
standards which resulted in associating everything French with
universality and "treating the rest as barbaric, backward and
primitive", and of seeing France herself not as a "component"
but as the "end product of universal civilisation", were repor-
ted; so was his statement, made in the name of those who lived
under colonialism, that the confusion between "real France" and
"mythical France" has come to an end, leading to the discovery
of an "abyss" between what the French really were and what
they thought they had become, between the two realities,
"opposed to the point of absolute contradiction":
(...) France coloniale, raciste, avide, oppres-
sive, inhumaine, destructrice (inconsciemment sans
doute) de valeurs irremplagables, et la France
6mancipatrice, universaliste et salvatrice.
He rejected the idea that France could act as a mediator
("ultimate jurisdiction of appeal") for solving the conflict
between the two communities in Algeria as an illusion and an
extremely "serious misunderstanding" which should be removed as
it would lead France to an "irreversible downfall".
Situating the liberation movements in a world historical
context, he accused the "country of the Rights of Man" of
having chosen to back colonial regimes of oppression and saw in
the "policy of pacification" the traditional expression of
repressive measures:
(...) qui ne differe en rien de celle de Bu-
geaud et de St-Arnaud, par un prOsident du conseil
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socialiste et par un pro-consul socialiste, nanti
d'un pouvoir absolu (...) a compromis la France
(...) dans son ensemble en jetant le poids de ses
forces et de son autoritê morale dans une repression
sans merci (...).
For him, France could no longer be believed or trusted:
Les promesses trahies, les actes de piraterie
deguises en exploits [reference to the hijacking of
Ben Bella's plane in October 1956] ont epuise l'im-
mense credit moral que la France avait capitalise.
He dismissed the widespread view given of French culture and
civilisation as constituting a justification for colonisation,
stating that culture was often "stolen" by (voleurs de feu), as
opposed to generously bequeathed to, those colonised (heritiers
choyes):
Faire de la culture frangaise la justification
de la colonisation elle-même, c'est une imposture et
une indignite. On sait avec quelle precautionneuse
parcimonie la culture frangaise a ete dispensee et
quels obstacles les maitres coloniaux ont dresses
devant elle.
Although he admitted that, without unfairness, all the blame
for the errors and injustices of the colonial era could not be
laid at the feet of France (on les a commis en son nom [le
peuple] en abusant de son ignorance, en le trompant), he argued
that France's prestige would not be restored until other peo-
ples were free and independent and that the people of France
would walk free towards their destiny only when they wake up
from: la somnolence oü on l'a plonge, et qu'il marchera vers
son destin, non point seul ou suivi de valets en livree, mais
accompagne d'un cortege de peuples libres et fiers d'être ses
amis.
The subsequent publication of a selection of letters re-
ceived after the article appeared gives the impression that
Amrouche's views were very controversial and far from being
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accepted unquestionably by public opinion or by the paper
itself.16
10.4.Raymond Aron and Jacques Soustelle
The significant stance taken by Raymond Aron in the Algerian
conflict was given front-page coverage by Le Monde, 17 which
expected it to have some impact.
Le Monde stated that Aron's booklet had two parts, one of
which was devoted to convincing some of his "friends", who had
influence on public opinion, that the military effort should be
accompanied by a programme of reforms leading to the setting-up
of an Algerian state as the end product, but the newspaper made
no reference to the fact that part of the book had been written
six months previously, and could, therefore, have lost some of
its relevance. The second part was not initially intended for
publication but was included, since some of the contents had
been quoted and commented on in other publications)-8
The publication was described as emanating from a desire to
submit to the public "these analyses" which Le Monde also saw
as:
(...) des examens de conscience, avec les
doutes et peut-étre les contradictions que chaque
Francais 6prouve en lui-mOme.
Le Monde thought the operation, which smacked of Cartier-
ism, 19 not without risks, despite finding the editorialist of
Le Figaro less suspect and more protected against some attacks.
The paper considered that he, nevertheless, was exposing him-
self to "causing a scandal when he only wanted to make people
think" and wondered whether he would be forgiven for saying out
loud what so many Frenchmen, whether MPs or Ministers, thought.
Aron's book confronted the facts in the sense that he
thought that the war could not be won, that in the way it had
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been implemented, "pacification" had never been less likely to
lead to peace, and that Algeria was going to be a costly
proposition in economic terms, while at the same time it could
not be left in the hands of "fanatics". He saw one way out: not
to oppose in principle the nationalists' demands, to put condi-
tions on the "inevitable evolution" and to fix the time-limits
for the eventual creation of an Algerian state. He accepted
that it was a "difficult undertaking", and argued that, al-
though there was no guarantee of success, it offered at least a
way out between indefinite violence and sudden capitulation.
The realisation by a number of intellectuals including Aron
that the colonial empire, as a symbol of "grandeur," was for
ever lost, did not strike a chord with the paper which, never-
theless, gave his views reasonable coverage, since the economic
argument made sense and the outcome was not immediate.
R.Gauthier of Le Monde was keen to present Soustelle's
answer to Aron, 20 in which he spared nobody, including Aron
himself, 21 as a well known and confident position:
Aut ant toutefois les theses de M. R Aron ont
pu, sous sa plume, faire scandale, autant la refuta-
tion de M.Jacques Soustelle parait decouler de
positions déjà connues.
The offensive remarks and insults addressed by Soustelle to
those not sharing his views were described as merely origina-
ting from the "polemique" part of the book, while the tradi-
tional thesis was said to be the defence of an "Algerian people
committed to France" / for whom "sacrifices could and should be
made", if France was to avoid becoming a second-rate power, and
making the political mistake, as well as "committing the
crime", of repatriating 1.2 million people.
The ideas described as forming the serious part of the
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thesis, the reader was told, revealed that frank and loyal
cooperation would take place if it were not for "terror,
fanaticism and outside help".
10.5. Germaine Tillion and Albert Camus
Le Monde was grateful to Germaine Tillion's book, which it
also reviewed, 22 for giving the real causes ( although with
jugements nuances), of the "undeniable fanaticism" allegedly
at work in Algeria. The book was described as having many
merits in that it offered new ideas applicable to the rest of
the underdeveloped world. Exploring these ideas, Le Monde
seemed perfectly happy with the explanations the author gave
about a "planetary civilisation" enabling some countries to
improve their standards of living "quasi-mechanically", leaving
others, which had been "unable to enter the race at the right
time," bereft of all privileges, suffering from increasing
pauperisation and heading inexorably towards a universal pro-
cess of "clochardisation".
For her, outside help would only make things worse:
«Tout ce que nous leur donnons se transforme
dans leurs mains en feuilles seches», comme Si,
l'epoque atomique, le vieux mythe,qe «l'or maudit»
prenait sa pleine signification. "
Le Monde did not seek to resolve the contradiction evident
in her theory which, when applied to Algeria, saw only two-
thirds of the population as subject to this "disgrace" and led
her to conclude that only France, "not because of guilt or
culpability" but because of a sense of responsibility, could
help this country in the "middle of the ford," whose people
were members of both communities ( qui se ressemblent come des
fréres ... de meme developpement intellectuel et de meme niveau
de civilisation...), to circumvent the current and enter the
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race again through education, industrial jobs and a house-
building programme
It goes without saying that, in the eyes of the author
(Tillion) and the paper alike, this theory had the merit of
rejecting independence which would precipitate Algeria defini-
tely into an <<enfer de misere».
Ii n'est en effet aucun autre peuple que le
peuple francais pour faire participer, sans discrim-
ination, les Alger-lens & tous les avantages intel-
lectuels, economiques et sociaux, dont, des leur
naissance, beneficient les metropolitains. Sans
nous, aucun des problemes qui se posent en Algerie
ne pourrait etre resolu.
Le Monde wanted people on both sides to state their views
(se prononcer), but ran an advertisement for the book stating
that Le Monde, Le Figaro and L'Express, considered it to be un
livre capita1.24
As for Camus, who did not become fully involved in the
debate on the Algerian war, the only protests he made were
against the arrest of his friends 25 who had joined his call for
a "civilian truce". Le Monde reported how the writer had been
affected by the Algerian problem and how the launch of his
purely humanitarian initiative had been disrupted in January
1956, leading him to abstain completely from making any politi-
cal comment. 26
The writer came to the fore again in the paper during the
time of the award of the Nobel prize in Stockholm in December
1957. Reporting on the press conference Camus gave to students
in the Swedish capital, Dominique Birmann felt a touch of pride
for this "master of dignity", who argued successfully against
an Algerian at the conference. 27 He was soon corrected by the
letter Camus wrote to the paper expressing more sympathy with:
(...) [le] jeune Algerien, qui m'a interpelle,
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que je me sens plus prés de lui que de beaucoup de
Francais qui parlent de l'Algêrie sans la connaitre
(...) [1_1] savait ce dont il parlait, et son visage
n'etait pas celui de ka haine, mais celui du dese-
spoir et du malheur.2°
Le Monde never questioned the writer's statement indicating
his priorities and putting the "love of his mother" before his
",belief in justice", nor indeed his alleged assertion that
there was total and unfettered freedom of the press in France
(amended in his letter to "minor restrictions") in the same
week that several weeklies were seized.29
We can clearly see so far that the views advocating that
links between Algeria and France be maintained (even if some
were allowing for emancipation in the long run), but offering
reformist solutions were presented positively. Others, which
were more radical, were neglected or viewed very critically.
10.6. Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi
F.Fanon's book" received only a passing reference when a
few lines announced the author's expulsion from Algeria.31
A.Memmi's book32 indicting the colonial system was given a
subtle rejection. Le Monde liked the defence that Memmi under-
took of the North Africans, traditionally accused of "inherent
laziness" which took no account of certain factors:
(...) ni de la sous-alimentation, ni du manque
de formation technique, ni des bas salaires peu
propres A exciter l'ardeur au travail, qui fait
qualifier aussi injustement en Europe les paysans
d'Italie meridionale.
Le Monde even added the climate as a contributory factor and
did not contest the charges against the coloniser nor the
arguments for the colonised "driven to despair and exacerbated
nationalism, armed revolt and refusal of the assimilation
policy, they had wanted for so long".
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Although conceding that some might even agree with Memmi
(the author, Vaussard, did not say so, but presumably excluded
himself) in his judgment of the "reluctant coloniser" (le
colonisateur qui se refuse), Vaussard took issue with him on
his remarks that the effort of the likes of Mandouze and Barrat
would lead nowhere and with the fact, which Memmi found inad-
missible, that a "reluctant coloniser" should aspire to re-
main, and obtain a special status once the colonised country
has achieved independence.
What Vaussard found weaker and less wise was Memmi's objec-
tion that the undisputed progress achieved by the colonised
countries under colonisation was insufficient compared with
what would have been achieved without it, and he endeavoured to
remind him of:
(...) l'etat d'anarchie et de misêre oil la
France au debut du siècle a trouvê le Maroc, l'un
des territoires africains au passé le plus glorieux
cependant? Le Japon serait-il devenu la grande
puissance qui a failli dominer toute l'Asie aprês
1905 s'il ne s'ftait pas mis a l'ecole de l'Occi-
dent? L'immense Chine rougit-elle de ce qu'elle
doit a Moscou et l'Inde a l'Angleterre, qui continue
d'eduquer son elite pensante?
Vaussard rejected Memmi's ideas in this respect as pure
conjecture, unprecedented, and, indeed, "contradicted by his-
tory" and proposed to let history run its course to see if
countries like Ghana and the Cameroons would do better on their
own.
Le Monde reinforced Vaussard's view with a reader's letter
(who had not incidentally , by his own admission, read the
book) approving the journalist's "pertinent observations" and
requesting that Memmi and people like him, "indifferent to the
fate of their compatriots", should go back to their homeland
and direct their "misplaced indignation" at increasing the
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intellectual level of their community and bringing it out of
illiteracy, instead of "holding us responsible".33
10.7. Jean-Marie Domenach
The positions adopted by Le Monde over the issue of indepen-
dence could be more easily illustrated by the paper's analysis
and views of other intellectuals, like Jean-Marie Domenach who
believed that the independence of Algeria did not prejudice the
federal project (uniting Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria on one
side and France on the other), popular at the time with people
reluctant to sever the links between France and its dependen-
cies.
Florenne was not keen, either, on the "propositions raison-
nables" of J.-M. Domenach in Esprit on the right to indepen-
dence of Algeria which, in his view, was no more and no less
than what the FLN was asking for, but conceded that Domenach's
proposals for the setting up of a federal system were optimis-
tic despite the "not very encouraging examples" of Morocco and
Tunisia.
Florenne34 attacked the "simplicity" of Domenach's argument
that France, being who she was, could not but respect (unless
she were to deny all she stood for) peoples' rights to self
determination; 35 a principle with which Florenne agreed, but
found ambiguous to apply when he pointed out that those who
thought of this principle had historically defined people in
mind, and nationalities which existed prior to oppression.
Florenne then put a series of questions as to how and when a
people comes into being, requested a series of guarantees as to
the form in which, and as to the veracity and sincerity with
which, a people could express its wishes, ironically criticis-
ing the implementation of the principle to Algeria:
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S'il suffit d'une «minorite agissante» et
d'un maquis dans le bois de Boulogne, nous enten-
drons bientOt parler du droit a disposer de lui-même
du peuple du XVIeme arrondissement.
Having accepted that the integration of Algerians may have
failed because France never really wanted it to succeed, Flor-
enne doubted whether Domenach's proposal (to integrate the
European population into an Algerian state) could have much
success. Florenne did not consider that his "brave" but
"slightly provocative" concluding statement, 36 which he thought
Domenach "had picked up" in a quote by Comte, made much sense
either:
(...) parce qu'on ne peut restituer que ce
qu'on a pris ou ce qui a existe. En aucune fagon ce
qu'on a apporte ou ce qu'on a cree.
and he set about correcting him asserting:
(...) Ii conviendrait de corriger Auguste Comte
et d'avancer que les Frangais devraient donner
dignement l'Algerie aux Arabes.
But he stopped himself in mid-stream, finding a fictional
objector who might point out that the Algerians "would not know
how to use it".37
Florenne provided a very similar criticism of independence
when he examined the "Socialist proposals" of J.Ries in the
Revue socialiste:38
Or la consequence la plus sure de toutes les
solutions preconisees ou exigees par la gauche la
plus active et qui se veut ou qui se croit la plus
integralement socialiste, cette consequence serait
de ruiner, pour une duree indeterminee, toutes les
chances du socialisme en Algerie.
Florenne argued against any political mutation leading to
independence, seen as a backward step .
"<<l'independance» sous le couvert du nationa-
lisme fascisant et religieux est un leurre et une
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regression. Le socialisme se doit de denoncer egale-
ment le <<capitalisme (francais) et les regimes qui,
par une conception medievale de l'Etat, provoquent &
travers une baisse du niveau de vie déjà tres bas un
recul de la civilisation.>>
En somme, wrote Florenne, sans se laisser
abuser par le droit des peuples & disposer d'eux-
mémes ( qui n'est souvent que l'alibi des tyrannies
et des formes politiques condamnees), le socialisme
luttera pour qu'il ne soit pas dispose du peuple -oil
qu'il se trouve, sur quelque terre qu'il vive- dans
un sens qui l'ecarte encore davantage de sa liber-
ation veritable."
As we see, there was in Le Monde under the Fourth Republic a
definite aversion to a solution that would give the Algerians
their independence.
10.8 .Pierre-Henri Simon and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber
Of the books revealing the Army's implementation of pacifi-
cation methods and its use of torture, 39 only P.-H. Simon40 and
J.-J. Servan-Schreiber41 were reviewed but their effect was
understated. 42
Even though H. Beuve-146ry, the director and founder of the
paper, conceded that Frenchmen could no longer deliver the same
judgment on the "perpetrators of Ouradour and Gestapo tortur-
ers", 43 he tried to put forward excuses when pressed by read-
ers:
(...) Ii n'est pas facile d'êtablir avec certi-
tude, en tenant compte de toutes les circonstances,
ce qui s'est passé au fond d'une cave ou dans une
mechta perdue. Ii faut prendre garde de ne pas
blesser au plus profond de l'âme ceux, policiers ou
soldats, qui font simplement et honnétement leur
devoir. Ii est facheux en! in de contribuer, si peu
que ce s9It A pourvoir l'arsenal de la propagande
adverse."
His answer to the rhetorical question of P-H. Simon, which
made the headline of the article "Sommes-nous les <<vaincus
d'Hitler>>?, was that:
Si profond qu'il soit, apres l'occupation et la
1-6s/stance, apres la guerre d'Indochine et deux ans
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de guerrilla algerienne, le mal ne parait pas
incurable. Nous ne sommes pas encore comme le ,
redoute P.-H. Simon, «les vaincus
Le Monde remained in this half-way house between outright
condemnation and cover-up, accepting that unorthodox methods
had been used, yet minimising their impact or extent. It echoed
Mauriac's reply to P.-H. Simon that the French were no worse
than anybody else: "Nous ne sommes pas plus noirs que les
autres", as well as calls to "prosecute the traitors demoralis-
ing the Army", and expressions of outrage at the use of these
methods. 46 This made Le Monde's position fall far short of
the stance taken even by Andre Frossard in L'Aurore, who,
although also minimising the frequency of these "excesses",
remarked that "les services de /a Wehrmacht n'ont pas emporte
toutes les baignoires avec eux".47
Le Monde even fell into the trap (unwittingly?) of present-
ing M.Massenet as having understood the "frightening complexity
of the problem":
Tel qu'il se presente et la vole demeurant
ouverte a la discussion, le livre de M.Massenet a
le grand merite de depasser la pure polemique pour
preferer & la defense obstinee du pas0 la penible
recherche des solutions de l'avenir.4°
Anything that seemed seriously to question the status-quo
appeared suspicious to the newspaper, which treated popular
books and publications that did not deal with the political
questions at hand as objective, free of passion and polemic and
positively recommended them.49
10.9. Sartre and the militant Left
Publications like Le Dossier Jean Muller and Des Rappeles
têmoignent" received scant, if any, attention from Le Monde51
at a time when publicity and newspaper reviews of the very few
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"controversial" books published by the even fewer brave edi-
tors 52 were essential to bring them to the attention of the
general public.
The publication of evidence about the methods of military
action in Algeria in Des rappeles temoignent led Sartre to
write an article under the title "Nous sommes tous coupables";
he offered it to "a major daily" 53 which refused to publish it.
Sartre then resorted to his own journal but used a more sarcas-
tic title.54
Le Monde's Florenne55 stated that, even if Sartre spoke "&
huis clos", his voice was bound to be heard and that he, him-
self was fulfilling Sartre's wish by providing him with a
platform, but not with the aim (declared by Sartre) of inciting
people to read Des rappeles temoignent but only to read what
Sartre had written about it in Les Temps Modernes.
Arguing that the aim of the article had doubly been missed
because of the limited readership of Temps Modernes and its
inherent support, Florenne refused to share the common guilt
implied in the original article 56 and questioned Sartre's
"credentials".
C'est sur cette egalite dans la culpabilitd
qu'on ne s'est pas trouve pleinement d'accord et par
voie de consequences sur les titres et qualites
qu'on serait en droit d'exiger de notre accusateur
public.
Florenne wrote that other people denounced the excesses in
Algeria before him as they had denounced, before Budapest, the
"totalitarian enterprise of the Soviets and their crimes" and
that criticism could be better taken from them.
On a simplement pense que s'il fallait que
quelqu'un ou quelques-uns nous frappent publique-
ment la poitrine, nous le supporterions mieux de ces
hommes dont la lucidite et la conscience n'avaient
connu de longues periodes ou de larges zones d'obs-
259
curcissement et d'engourdissement.
Florenne accepted that "we were not great or innocent. This
we know" and that it was to protect "us from this silence, this
consent, this contempt, that brave voices have spoken and that
J.P. Sartre cried with real anguish", but it was "up to the
French on their own to find out about the French truth".57
The French have a bad conscience, wrote Florenne, but that
was better than "a conscience that was too good or no con-
science at all". Speaking in the name of "the least sleepy and
complacent conscience" but not using the first person, he
argued that the rapprochement made by Sartre could be disputed.
He criticised "the implicit justification, without
contrition", of what was not recognised by Sartre as a mistake:
"the blind faith (...) the complicity demanded by the Soviet
Communist state's raison d'etat".58
The parallel drawn by Sartre59 did not inspire Florenne, who
did not think much of his dialectic and contended that it was
not by telling the French that they had fallen into the lowest
form of abjection that Sartre would get them to read what he
wanted. He also criticised Sartre's "efficient but contradic-
tory" request to Frenchmen to face the truth which will demand
that they "condemn publicly or endorse in full knowledge of the
facts the crimes committed", arguing that the choice was not
really given as with the same breath Sartre stated that "we
cannot see the plain facts, the horror, our horror, without
wanting to tear it from ourselves and crush it".60
Florenne concluded that Sartre's statements were excessive,
since the guilt of the French "bore no relation" to that of the
Germans or the Soviets':
(...) et c'est ici gu'apparait le caractére
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abusif des rapprochements entre situations sans
commune mesure. Aucune veritê ne semble avoir pu
"mettre en demeure" le peuple allemand. Non plus,
d'ailleurs gue le peuple russe, -aprês Budapest
comme avant. Et cette horreur -la leur- ou bien, us
n'ont pu /a voir, ou bien, en la voyant, us l'ont
supportee sans tenter grand'chose, semb;v-t-il, ni
pour "l'arracher", ni pour "l'êcraser".°'
10.10 Conclusion
The intellectual world could be roughly divided into two
sections: the European one which, with very few exceptions,
sided with the interests of the coloniser, and the indigenous
one, which sided, with greater fervour, with the interests of
the colonised. These were generally the more visible lines of
demarcation in the loyalties, divided though they may have been
for some, with real tension and conflict of conscience, of the
intellectuals of the time, with one or two exceptions for which
the ethnic divide was irrelevant - in the case of Sartre, for
instance.
Several trends could be identified in Le Monde, as one would
expect of a "liberal" newspaper. But the paper was far more
critical of the views of an Albert Memmi, an Amrouche, a Fanon
or a Sartre. L'Express, France-Observateur, Têmoignage Ohre-
tien, the Editions de Minuit, Seuil and reviews such as Temps
Modernes, and Esprit, did far more than Le Monde to help the
cause of "the colonised" in a very hostile environment.62
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10.11Conclusions
The coverage of this section has illustrated how Le Monde's
discussion of the policies put forward by the government and
the views developed by the intellectuals on the burning colo-
nial issue was very much a moderate one.
Since the war in Algeria provided the occasion for intel-
lectuals to escape the mould of their party ideologies, embat-
tled in the pursuit of a blind policy of repression (see Chap-
ters 11 and 12), clinging on to old values and identifying the
loss of colonies with the demise of France, ideas which were
becoming more and more out of place in the Cold War and decolo-
nisation atmosphere of the 1950s, Le Monde, given its declared
independence (the only paper owned by its own staff -Chapter
2), could have provided an ideal forum for the intellectuals,
most informed section of public opinion in France and especial-
ly its more radical elements. In this respect, the paper failed
miserably.
Although the paper was at times clearly critical of deci-
sion-makers and it did, to a certain extent, provide a forum
where an exchange of views took place over the solution of
colonial problems facing France in the 1950's, alas! the paper
was far more conservative than one would expect and not at all
at the forefront of the decolonisation struggle. Some 63 have
explained the lack of radicalism of Le Monde by reference to
imposed censorship, fear of the authorities or of loss of
income. But it is clear to the analyst that there definitely
was a deliberate policy of self-restraint in not publishing,
and even opposing at tines, views of intellectuals for fear of
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damaging French prospects and interests."
Truly wanting a liberal outcome (through incremental
change), Le Monde aspired to improve the economic and social
plight of the Algerian "Muslim" population as well as introduce
some form of political reform but remained unable to conceive
of an emancipation outside the French framework, a liberation
without French supervision. The fact that La Monde was unable
to understand that independence and freedom could be conceived
and attained outside "westernisation" shows the degree of
parochialism of the paper.
Having pursued a neo-colonialist campaign in the case of
Indochina 65 and changed its views in the later stages of the
"sale guerre", Le Monde seemed not to have lost its neo-colo-
nialist views or to have benefited from that lesson in the case
of Algeria. If some aspects of the fight against colonial
views and oppressive trends could be seen in the paper, the
radical support for Algerian independence as a solution can be
noted by its absence and if present, by the critical and unfa-
vourable treatment it was given. 66 The interests of the Eur-
opean community living there were judged important enough for
the paper to toy with various views ranging from shared sover-
eignty to partition.
Le Monde's journalists, and especially outside contributors
like Duverger, with their critical comments on the more extreme
views of the "ultras" seemed to have had a moderating effect,
but the patriotic feeling within the paper and the desire not
to damage irreparably the prestige of France, the timidity of
its defence (and very often the lack of it) of the oppressed
people, self determination and the intellectuals, made it fall
far short of the general impression people have of the paper
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and of the objectives of impartiality and in ependence which(o;
the more illl.portant sectors of opinion and could ssibly have111, 1Io
it had set itself and the general philosopwy whic the per
declares to have established at its inception and has constant-
ly proclaimed since.
Although, arguably the Algerian war was not a television
arm-chair war," a lore supportive attitude on the part of the
paper, which already had a significant role in France, 6 on the
issue of the people's rights to self-determination and in the
decolonisation process in general might have had an impact on
quickly loved i llportant decision-making groups towards a speed-
ier resolution of the conflict.
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SECTION FOUR A DISAPPOINTING STAND ON CIVIL LIBERTIES 
THE REPRESSION OF A NATIONALIST UPRISING
SECTION FOUR: A DISAPPOINTING STAND ON CIVIL LIBERTIES
THE MEANS OF REPRESSION OF A NATIONALIST UPRISING
11.0 Introduction
From time to time in French history, traditional republican
values of democracy and the rule of law have given way, under
circumstances, to military rule and exceptional powers, includ-
ing martial law. In France, times of upheaval have led to the
military gaining the upper hand. 1 In Algeria, military rule
held sway throughout the history of colonial Algeria. Despite
the inclusion of the territory into France after 1848 as three
dêpartements, it was only after the 1947 Statutes, integrating
Algeria more closely to France, that the civilian authority
came to prevail. Even then, larger areas of the colony were
made up of communes mixtes under the total control of military
administration. However, with the 1954 uprising, the various
governments found themselves increasingly under the pressure of
events and felt the need to adopt emergency powers to deal with
situations which arose. The political and administrative au-
thorities progressively felt that the "limited" legal and
police powers were insufficient; they began to leave the job of
policing Algeria (including those areas under civilian control)
to the military. This was made possible by legally handing over
control to area commanders, and by the adoption of legislation
which allowed exceptional powers to be put in the hands of the
authorities dealing with the "troubles". Since Algeria was,
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officially at least, part of French territory, the government
had two obligations: to protect life and property and to main-
tain civil liberties. It could be argued that the governments
should at least have tried to steer a middle course between,
for instance, proclaiming martial law and maintaining civil
liberties. This is precisely what various govern ents of the
Fourth Republic claimed that they were doing. The reality, as
far as Algeria was concerned, was different, and what in fact
took place was a very harsh regime of repression, whose victims
included a large number of innocent people. This led to a loss
of civil liberties for all Algerians ("Musli s ) as well as for
most of the Europeans who espoused their cause. Le Monde's
coverage of these aspects of the war was to be quite reveal-
ing. The purpose of this and the following chapters is to focus
particularly on the many aspects of civil liberties in France
and Algeria under the impact of the war effort and their cover-
age in the pages of the paper.2
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
11. INSIDE THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
11.1. Introduction
This part deals with the "legal" measures adopted to deal
with the unrest in Algeria. It examines the way the paper
perceived and covered the adoption by the authorities of a
range of powers taken formally at a political and legal level
to deal specifically with the Algerian problem.
A State of Emergency was declared on 31 March 1955, and
Special Powers adopted a year later. In addition to these texts
and to the increased powers they conferred upon the authori-
ties, a large measure of discretion in the repression of
"terrorists" was given to the courts (civilian and military).
This section will cover these three areas under three main
headings. A fourth heading looks at the attitude shown towards
the same issues in France, and proposes to compare attitudes
and positions on both sides of the Mediterranean.
11.2. The State of Emergency (31/3/55)
11.2.1.The introduction of the measures 
After the fall of Pierre Mendes-France, 3 Guy Mollet's gov-
ernment decided to deal more severely with the situation in
Algeria. It adopted new measures introducing a State of Emer-
gency. These provided a legal basis for expediency as a means
of "solving the Algerian problem." These measures threatened
potentially and actually the remaining civil liberties of
Algerians (and their sympathizers) in Algeria.4
11.2.2  A necessary and intermediate measure? 
Le Monde justified the introduction of the measures on the
grounds that the military had no power of arrest, except in
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flagrante delicto at a time of increased terrorist activities
which were "causing anguish to the population in the Aures
area n . 5 This, of course, suggested to the readers that the law
was necessary and even overdue.6
Considerable doubts could be cast on the need for the intro-
duction of such emergency measures; at the time, reports indi-
cated that the security forces were being successful, without
the new measures. 7 One could legitimately ask why, if the
system were so efficient and had successful results in dealing
with terrorism, did the government, or, indeed, Le Monde, go to
such lengths to justify the measures and present them as ac-
ceptable, and even indispensable? The answer is clearly that
the paper was trying to serve two purposes by seeking to pre-
sent the government's need to take exceptional measures as
justified, while not wishing to indicate that the "enemy" might
be gaining the upper hand and even winning. This was why the
success over the terrorists went hand in hand with increased
discriminatory and exceptional legislation, without the contra-
diction being resolved.8
Another feature of the Emergency Law as characterised by the
paper was that of its being merely an intermediate measure. It
was presented as an attempt to avoid instituting a "state of
siege", seen as an "extreme solution" with "serious disadvant-
ages". 8 If the skeptical amongst us tried to see this positive
coverage merely as a journalistic presentation of the political
debates and proposals, then doubts could be soon dispelled by
the paper's explicit position and judgment on the measures.1°
This position was maintained even later, with a background of
protests against the State of Emergency's impact on civil
liberties 11
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11.2.3.A supportive attitude towards a better legal arrange-
ment? 
Although the Emergency Law was very much a measure which,
in a traditional sense, would not normally have many legal
connotations, it was presented as a "better" legal
arrangement.12
The paper also reassured the readers that la dur6e et le
champ d'application would be subject to Parliamentary appro-
val, 13 but asked no question when it later printed that there
was a possibility of that power being taken by decree, 14 nor
about the possibility provided for by the measures to deal, in
certain cases, with crimes and misdemeanours in military
courts. 15 Chénebenoit also reassured himself and his readers
that the measures would safeguard parliamentary prerogatives
and provide satisfactory protection against abuse by admin-
istrative authorities. 16
It was clear to anybody examining the articles of Le Monde
and the text of the law 17 that there were inconsistencies, and
that, if the new law were to be implemented, many liberties
would disappear, especially for the average Algerian. Indeed,
he gave a word of warning to democracies, which illustrated the
author's perfect understanding of what was at stake. 18 But
commenting on possible injustices, Chénebenoit presented them
as remote, and, given the general tone of the article, as
likely to occur only in very exceptional circumstances.18
If any reader glancing at the pages of Le Monde started to
worry about the possible implications or consequences of such
legislation and about the possible abuses that it might lead
to, Chenebenolt had a reassuring thought. 20 This clearly illu-
strated that he, Chènebenoit, seemed to have forgotten how
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unwise the Assemblies could be. It is unlikely that he, or any
other competent journalist, could have forgotten so rapidly the
lessons of 1940.
Considering the issue important, when it commented on the
actual passing of the law in Parliament, Le Monde found the
spectacle of a half-empty chamber surprising. 21
From the description of the debates and the final vote,22
one could legitimately ask where /a sagesse et la foi de l'As-
mddee ... dans la suite republicaine, which Chénebenoit was
so keen to evoke, were. The answer was not provided.
If the articles and discussions dealing with the State of
Emergency themselves were to provide a measure of the paper's
attitude, it was easily noticeable, even nearly a month later,
that the paper seemed to be supportive of the law.23
Le Monde also presented the "Emergency Law" as applicable to
the entire French territory and, therefore, not exceptional to
Algeria. 24 In spite of going to great lengths to explain that
this was not discriminatory legislation (legislation d'excep-
tion) (on page 1, see above), Le Monde printed (on page 5) a
four-column title, Le gouvernement invite l'Assemblee a insti-
tuer l'Etat d'Urgence et  A y soumettre l'Algerie pendant six
mois, without, nevertheless, resolving the contradiction.25
These measures could hardly be implemented in metropolitan
France, as the trouble-spot was Algeria, and the law was de-
vised to deal with it. The fact that administrative and mili-
tary measures were to be accompanied by economic and social
ones was emphasised. A great deal was to be written in the
articles and "issues" of the paper during the following years
on administrative and military matters, and very little on
economic and social concerns. The latter interests were
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eclipsed in favour of an emphasis placed on judicial and mili-
tary measures. The sum of 5 billion francs to be reserved for
economic measures was not immediately discussed nor commented
on, despite its allocation to spending of a military nature.26
But the paper's suggestion, which closely followed the
official line, was to reassure those who were apprehensive by
limiting its scope of application.27
11.2.4. Reactions: a welcome if somewhat unsuccessful mea-
sure
There was a constant desire by Le Monde to show that there
was a dual reaction to these measures and an attempt to bal-
ance the two views, but there was also an inherent bias.
Though the "Emergency Law" was perceived to be feared by
Algerian representatives, such as F. Abbas and Dr Ben Salem,
from the start, and the paper was aware of the implications for
the Algerian population/ 28 there was no precise evaluation of
the reactions of the Muslims as a community. However, from the
start, the paper was confident of the reassuring effect on the
European section of the population.29
The new measures obviously meant the increase in military
efforts and activity, which Le Monde reported, 30 and which had
resulted during the last "few weeks in important and signif-
icant success over the outlaws". 31 The results, however, were
not as clear-cut as these lines implied.32
The official statements in favour of the State of Emergency
continued to appear in the paper. 33 The paper even noted some
impatience to see the measures implemented.34
The measures, however repressive, did not always work. That
did not seem to please the paper. When P.A. Martel remarked on
the failure of the measures being deployed by the government,
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the tone was one of sorrow.35
Their failure was said to have occurred, even though the
government had brought into service active and experienced
officers. 36 Here the concern expressed for the "European"
community resurfaced. 37 Here also, the security of one commun-
ity was obviously seen as a force majeure for the insecurity,
the suffering and loss of liberty of the other community."
The implementation of the measures was to make possible many
abuses of civil liberties, causing part of public opinion to
protest against them. Without taking a major stand on the
issue, the paper continued to leave the protest to various
other political groups, organisations and personalities, giving
coverage to their views and protests every now and then.39
Though Le Monde did not overtly encourage the adoption and
implementation of the Law on the State of Emergency, overall it
did present it as an unavoidable process by which a government
was trying to reestablish order in an area that no longer
seemed to respect it. It is clear that the paper did not revolt
against this. The strongest attacks against the measures could
only be found in the Libres opinions columns."
11.2.5. Attacked by third-parties only
In this particular instance the attack on the new measures,
signed by Olivier Pozzo di Borgo, was quite virulent.41
The tone and the terms used clearly represented a very
strong position. But they were not Le Monde's. Many of the
measures were obviously not as innocent as they had been pre-
sented by the authorities and echoed in the press, including in
Le Monde. Many personalities took a stance against them. Le
Monde echoed the criticism, but also the praise for these
measures; and, apart from a brief critical comment or two,
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often made by outsiders, the paper did not see fit to show any
staunch defence of civil liberties.
11.3.Special Powers (12/3/56)
11.3.1.  Introduction 
A year after the introduction of the Emergency Law, nothing
of substance had been resolved in Algeria. On the contrary,
things had followed the same pattern or even worsened. Edgard
Faure's government had fallen, and had been replaced by
another. In order to deal with the continuing crisis in Alger-
ia, the Assembly (including the Communists) granted "special
powers" to Guy Mollet's government.42
When they were adopted, the reactions of the paper were very
much the same as they had been following the introduction of
the "State of Emergency".43
In fact, it was very clear to many politicians and to a few
newspapers on the left-wing of the political spectrum, 44 that
most of the measures introduced were mainly devised as exten-
sions of policing powers. These extensions included the trans-
fer of many powers to the military." This was not made comple-
tely clear in Le Monde, even when the paper was reporting
their adoption."
Under J.Fauvet, Le Monde's editorial team thought, and
continued to think, that special powers were helpful. It be-
lieved in the dual claim put forward by the government, as it
was alleged that behind the intentions of these measures there
was a dual purpose: to establish peace (to pacify) and recon-
cile the community (reform).47
11.3.2.A necessary and justified measure? 
While Chénebenoit, looking at it from a different perspec-
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tive, did ask why special powers were being adopted, comment-
ing that without a general policy, military means were ineffi-
cient," for most of Le Monde's journalists the adoption of
special powers 49 was justified; and the need for the adoption
of the measures was repeatedly echoed by the newspaper.5°
This was done in the full knowledge that many of the mea-
sures could have been adopted without resorting to special
powers. 51 The non-essential character of the powers for mili-
tary measures to be taken was evident when it came to commit-
ting more troops to Algeria.52
11.3.3.The repressive factors dominate 
After the vote for Special Powers (12/3/56) in the Assembly,
J. Fauvet described the measures being undertaken. What com-
prised essentially military means53 was not presented as being
exclusively repressive but designed to heel the rift between
the two communities.54
The emphasis placed on military aspects was made clear when
Le Monde showed that it shared the feeling of the government
of the day that applying reforms was inappropriate before
military measures were implemented.55
Subsequently, headlines asked whether the extensive powers,
thus granted, were likely to restore the situation in Algeria.
But apart from a few administrative measures, 58 all were very
weak measures. 57
Having been hailed as a necessary measure to repress and
reform, Special Powers 58 appeared to be a mere pretext for
removing what had been left of the legal constraints and con-
trols over the security forces in subsequent articles.
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11.3.4.  Army recall 
As a corollary of the increased repressive powers there was
an increase in troop reinforcements to implement the new powers
and to deal with the growing insecurity in Algeria.
Examining the alternatives, renforts ou rOformes, Le Monde's
J. Planchais recalled59 that the politique des petits paquets
had always been a mistake because of too few troops, sug-
gesting that the number of troops in North Africa" be in-
creased by a 100,000 to 200,000 -as "the house was still on
fire" . 61 This concern became exclusively military when he
reported that there were conflicting views within the govern-
ment. 62
J. Planchais was already working out troop permutations
between those who had been demobilised and those who were
called up (65,000 men) before the government had even made up
its mind about the numbers to be called up. 63
The recall of 100,000 troops, which followed, was decided by
decree about ten days later, 64 and was characterised by the
paper as reinforcements needed to prevent the situation from
becoming more "rotten" 65
11.3.5.  A successful measure? 
This time the measures were said to be successful. Le Monde
also echoed views, such as the declaration by Lacoste, that the
vote was producing "a profound sense of well-being in
Algeria" .66 The paper reported, and even gave front-page
coverage to, statements by officials indicating improvements
and expressing satisfaction after the vote of special powers.67
The emergency laws and the Special Powers provided the
legal framework for many repressive measures adopted in Alger-
ia, which were not necessarily clearly spelled out in the
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legal text, but which became an every day modus operandi for
dealing with the local inhabitants, who were becoming increas-
ingly suspect, justifiably or not, in the eyes of the security
forces.
11.4.General implementation of Repressive measures
11.4.1.Extensive use of powers of repression 
A whole series of other measures were taken by the authori-
ties to deal with the troubles in Algeria, 68 and the use of
repressive powers by the authorities led to many excesses and
abuse of freedoms. 69
The way Le Monde perceived these measures, when it reported
them (if it did so), is not without interest for the purpose of
this study. The nature of the measures implemented, the appro-
val and sometimes the justification of them are a clear indica-
tion of the support (or lack of it), for a particular repres-
sive policy. Let us examine briefly some of these aspects.
11.4.2. Exceptional measures justified 
The exceptional measures taken by the security forces, and
the civilian and military authorities in Algeria, were often
presented as if they were needed in the normal course of events
and in many respects as essential, no matter how they affected
the population, which was presented as accepting them, if not
with joy then with a considerable degree of consent.7°
The measures taken to restrict the movements of people
received similar treatment by the paper.71
11.4.3. Collective sanctions 
Algerians were made also to atone for the "wrongs" of the
"rebels" by building or rebuilding damaged roads and railway
lines, as well as by repairing telephone and telegraph lines
and communications networks. They were fined collectively for
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being unwilling or unable to point out the culprits. This was
reported by the paper, essentially from the point of view of
information, without comment and without any disquiet amongst
the reporters, even when the harshness of the measure seemed to
require it.72
11.4.4. Zones interdites and enforced population movements 
One of the measures particularly favoured by the authorities
was to declare whole areas (in this case Western Algeria) zones
interdites. This meant that anybody living in the area would
have to vacate their dwelling and meagre plots as the army
would shoot on sight anybody who remained.73
Decisions of this kind, taken at low level with hardly any
legitimacy, were described in laconic terms. 74 The paper even
justified the measure by stating that "the regions affected
were generally not easily penetrable (penetration difficile) or
heavily influenced by the rebels" (fortement marquee par l'in-
fluence rebelle).75
At other times, a hint of justification could be found in
the reports of Le Monde, which were written in such a way as
not to alarm readers who might be disturbed by such informa-
tion, or to deny other reports which might have given a differ-
ent version, unpalatable to the authorities.76
The paper played down the severity of the methods presenting
them as crucial for the "health" of the country.77
Le Monde also stated that the people who were evacuated had
received an indemnity enabling them to rebuild a dwelling in a
designated area, as though any wrong that might have occurred
as a result of their evacuation had already been righted; it
thus failed to understand the impact of the uprooting, the loss
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of land and livelihood, of neighbours and other members of the
wider family and assumed that compensation given was suffi-
cient.78
These measures might have been seen simply as the culmina-
tion of the efforts used to bring down the rebellion, and used
as a very last resort. But nothing was further from the truth:
these and other no-less severe measures were systematically
implemented from a very early stage in the conflict. Indeed,
some of these complemented, if they were not conditioned by, or
provided for, by the legal framework, when the need was felt to
implement them.
11.4.5. Special Powers continue 
A year after the Assembly ( which included the Communists)
gave special powers to G.Mollet, 79 Le Monde was still report-
ing events without any critical or negative comment apart from
the odd "explanation" and frequent clear or more subtle "justi-
fications" for their introduction and use. The language of
these presentations was itself very euphemistic, calling a
person detained Mberg6 for instance (sheltered/accommodated),
despite the extraordinary and most disturbing implications
being clear to a shrewd analyst."
After the fall of the government, Special Powers were repor-
ted to be still applicable (en vigueur). In contradiction with
previous reports, the paper tendentiously "reminded" its read-
ers that the next Premier could, if he wished, within ten days
of forming a government, request the prolongation of those
powers by Parliament.81
As has been previously illustrated, many of the protests
against these exceptional measures were left very often to
outsiders or contributors to the paper and to the rest of the
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press, while Le Monde concentrated on giving the readers the
"official versions".
11.5. The Coverage of Trials
11.5.1. Introduction 
The coverage of the trials of those arrested by the security
forces is of considerable interest. The sub-section sets out to
analyse the general views of the paper on the subject of the
Algerian question by examining its coverage of them.
11.5.2.Trials reports 
During the Algerian insurrection, many of the indigenous
population were to be taken to court to answer for their ac-
tions. They were soon to be followed by Europeans accused of
helping them. A number of Europeans, often devout Christians,
could not witness the excesses of the Army and the repressive
nature of its activities without feeling sympathy for the cause
of the nationalist movements. These French men and women took a
stand which they thought was in conformity with their religious
duty or conscience. Indeed, when confronted with the methods
used by the security forces, a number of these Europeans living
in Algeria, and, later, those living in France, identified
themselves with the Algerian struggle. This stand led them
actively to assist the nationalists by giving them shelter,
help, medicine, money and to stand by them before what they
saw as the unjust treatment meted out to them by the "forces of
order" in the name of France.82
If for some "Europeans" and "Muslims" the position was
merely one of intermediaries trying to intercede between two
communities in order to prevent a bloodbath, others definitely
assisted those fleeing from the army or trying to organise
resistance 83
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This involvement was punished by exile or banishment but
very often by the arrest and trial of those involved.
The offences under which suspects could be charged were
already legion and more specific legislation and powers were
introduced to reinforce the authority of the State when the
prevailing legal framework was thought to be insufficient.84
Algerians and Europeans alike85 were to feel the full force
of the "law" all through the Algerian conflict. At the start
civilian courts but soon military courts "dispensed French
justice", 86 after initial enquiries were made and charges
brought against the suspects.
The victims were French nationals, not only members of the
outlawed Algerian Communist Party and fellow-travellers but
also a number of teachers or intellectuals, professors ( A.
Mandouze 87 and H. Marrou88 ), doctors, churchmen and women and
Christians who held enlightened beliefs on the Algerian ques-
tion.
If, for most Frenchmen involved in the issue there was no
defence against the charges of threat to national security, the
people whose action was motivated by their religious beliefs
were not granted a better defence by the paper.
11.5.3. The trials of the Chretiens progressistes 
At the time of one of these trials involving people linked
with the Catholic Church, labelled Chretiens progressistes, by
the press, Le Monde merely echoed the	 appeal by the Arch-
bishop of Algiers, Monsignor Duval, to some of the press not
to infer (from the appellation "progressive" ) a relation
between these people (nuns and priests who were helping the
Algerians) and the atheist ideology of Communism.89
But, if the views of the Archbishop were echoed, so were
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those of the press expressing completely hostile views and
accusing those involved of having "curious ideals" and of
helping the "FLN executioners"."
11.5.4. Aspects of the reports 
Many points could be made about the coverage of this partic-
ular aspect of the repressive system as seen and reported by
the paper. At this point some trends might already be outlined
about the paper's coverage.
Le Monde's heavy and frequent reliance on non-independent
and biased sources 91 made its reports appear flawed. This is
clear from the particular lexical and syntactic choices used
which revealed an overall bias, 92 and through reports which
convicted people before they were even tried93 despite the
occasional corrections made after the fact.94
Another aspect revealed in the coverage is the interrelate-
deness of various factors, the feeling that everything was more
or less tied together, connected. For instance, Le Monde com-
bined in the same space (usually the same page 3 or 4) news of
terrorist activities, of arrests and the condemnation of ter-
rorists as well as their execution when sentenced to death by
military tribunals, giving readers the impression of interrela-
tion which may have been intended to justify the heavy sen-
tences and the death penalties. It is difficult to see whether
the paper could have found a more suitable arrangement 95 or a
different space-allocation in the paper other than mixing all
these different items of news under the overall heading of Les
evênements d'Afrique du Nord. It is clear, however, that this
sort of spatial juxtaposition of the varied items outlining the
"crimes" of some and the close proximity of sentences and
executions of others did make the sanctions and execution of
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those sentenced look even more legitimate- irrespective of the
fact that those committing the crimes and those being sen-
tenced or executed that day were not necessarily the same
people.96
Le Monde also seemed to defend the involvement of military
courts, and appeared less respectful of, or confident in, the
civilian court. In France civilian tribunals occasionally
dealt with the offences but very often the DST and the military
became involved. But in Algeria, although the civilian legal
system remained in place, it was made redundant by military
tribunals which expedited matters swiftly using their own
brand of justice.
The arrest and detention of civilians by the military were
not without problems for some "consciences." They led to a
number of complaints concerning non-involvement of civilian
authorities.
This issue prompted M. Patin (President de la Chambre crimi-
nelle de la Cour de Cassation) to publish an article (Recueil
de Droit Penal) arguing that the existing procedure gave guar-
antees, which were seen positively by Le Monde.97
11.5.5. An uncritical paper: a question of patriotic duty? 
In many of its reports Le Monde never seemed to scratch
below the surface to determine what was really happening at
Algerian trials. 98 In fact, the non-inquisitive nature of Le
Monde's reports is striking 99 and could only betray an unwil-
lingness to "rock the boat," motivated by patriotic considera-
tions.
Le Monde never appeared worried by the heavy sentences being
passed on Algerians. There were cases where the action had
clearly not been that of a criminal, but of a political nature,
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and had not resulted in any injuries or deaths. Despite the
paper's experience of trials ( in one case, it had inserted the
corrections and reported that the affair had been blown out of
all proportions), nO when discrepancies in sentencing were
manifest (with Algerians being more heavily sentenced than
Europeans), 101 Le Monde presented both the sentences and the
verdicts as "predictable" and merely described them as con-
stituting "a refusal by the court to confuse a spirit of
with nationalist action". 	
char-
ity 102 Le Monde considered this type
of sentences as "measured". 103
11.5.6. Trial irregularities 
The trials were riddled with irregularities (touched upon in
the case above) which the paper reported, 104 when lawyers
involved claimed that they were not in a position to ensure the
proper defence of those charged in Algeria because of the speed
of the procedures, because of their status being questioned,
thus making it very difficult, if not impossible, to discharge
their duties. One of the articles published (a communiqué by 21
Paris lawyers) outlined that since February, lawyers in Algiers
had been unable to represent their clients and that they had
been arrested themselves)- 05 These trials even brought ar-
rested lawyers (eg. Boumendjel) before Algerian courts for
their defence of nationalists and for allegedly passing on FLN
directives 106
But no comment or article appeared expressing the views of
the paper, let alone condemning the practice, which was con-
trary to the most basic principles of justice.'"
It is clear to anyone looking at the paper at the time that
there were very few indications l" of the extent to which the
Algerians had suffered at the hands of the security forces.
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However, even when Europeans suffered at the hands of the
security forces, Le Monde covered the news very superficially,
as when it devoted a few lines only to l'enquéte parlementaire
sur les sevices d'Oran continue, reporting that the commission
was still hearing witnesses about interrogation methods and
the alleged bad treatment handed out to detainees.'" The same
applied after the arrest of Collette Chouraqui, a bank employee
who belonged to the clandestine Parti Communiste Algerien, and
Jack Laik, who belonged to the Comite des Juifs liberaux and
was a teacher in the Lycee Bugeaud.110
During trials suspects would state that they had been vic-
tims of cruelty (for incidents of torture see section below).
Le Monde would tend to include this in its report, but not
emphasise it.111
11.5.7. Trials and executions
When trials for offences against "state security" in France
were leading to sentences of between six months to two
years, 112 they very often resulted in the death penalty being
used against Algerians.113
Trials were very often to lead to executions, even when
convictions were thought to be highly irregular and when ter-
rorist acts had not had the intention of injuring people.
This applied even to Europeans fighting for the Algerian
cause, apart from those who died illegally at the hands of the
security forces through torture. One European member of the
Algerian Communist Party, Fernand Iveton, was the only one to
die "legally"at the hands of French justice. 114
Hardly any defence or appeal was heard against the death
sentences and the execution of those convicted under the cir-
cumstances described above in Algeria. 115 It was other papers
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which became more involved in the protests, some of which were
merely echoed by Le Monde.--6
11.6. A different story for France:
11.6.1. Introduction 
Establishing a parallel between the events and procedures in
Algeria and in France and drawing conclusions from comparisons
might be quite revealing. For this reason it would be useful to
turn now to the assessment made by the paper of the rules,
practices and procedures operating in mainland France.
11.6.2. Civil liberties 
Civil liberties were held in higher esteem when they related
to the citizen of mainland France. One could go as far as to
state that even criminals received a better deal in France. The
defence of individual liberties in France was accorded greater
importance compared with the meagre efforts made against the
erosion of the rights of the individual in Algeria.-17
The pages of the paper were more open to debate when at-
tempts to reform the Criminal Code were put forward by Isorni
in the Parliamentary Commission of justice. 118 Articles favour-
able to the reforms emphasised the sanctity of civil liber-
ties118 and when the law was adopted (Text of modification
passed 26/6/57), Le Monde gave another chance to Me Garcon to
show his disapproval of the final text and present in full his
views on civil liberties in France.12°
Despite the protests 121 and the guaranteed access to medi-
cal examination by a doctor, "what of licit torture" he argued?
It seemed so unreal to him that for the first time since the
abolition of torture by Louis XVI, governments were justifying
the use of force during the interrogation of their citizens. 122
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11.6.3. Executions and the death penalty
Despite the dubious character of the convictions and the
even more questionable methods of obtaining confessions, the
wave of executions never led to any comment, let alone criti-
cism when it was mostly Algerian or Communist blood 123 that was
being shed. The question was totally different when it came to
death sentence and the execution of French criminals in France.
Yves Florenne expressed very strong views about a sense of
justice which he did not share when he wrote in the Au Jour le
jour column.-24
The strength of his feeling was made even more forceful by
his use of sarcasm towards those who ignored the views of the
intellectuals on this matter:
Seuls les intellectuels pervers -toujours eux,
partout, en toute circonstance- s'obstinent a penser
et & dire gue la logigue (laissons la simple huma-
nitê ou la charitê, toujours suspectes) gue la
raison et la justice ne sauraient, nulle part, se
trouver dans cette gireuse pesee de chair morte, de
sang et de couteau."
Unfortunately the executions of the Algerians on the other
side of the Mediterranean did not stir up such feeling.
11.6.3.  Camps d'hábergement
In Algeria, the sending away to detention camps of Algerians
guilty or merely suspected of "anti-French" activity, as well
as Europeans, liberals, Communists and trade-unionists- 26 was
not presented as being abnorma1.127
The attitude of the paper was a little different when an
attempt was made to extend the setting-up of camps in France
(even then it was expressed in articles by outside contributors
such as Duverger). Without a word about their previous estab-
lishment and use in Algeria, Duverger protested against the
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introduction of such camps in France.128
Although Duverger believed that the extension of terrorism
into North African milieux in France was serious, and that the
violation of public order should not be tolerated, nor the
security of citizens threatened, 129 he asked to what extent the
camps would make it possible to fight terrorism on the main-
land. 130
As these camps would cater only for people already convic-
ted, he saw in their introduction a scandalous attempt to pro-
long a detention system whereby, once his sentence had been
served, the ex-convict would then be "taken in charge" by the
administrative authorities 13]
He feared that the text would be interpreted loosely (and
arbitrarily) and he warned against introducing camps whose
symbolic meaning could lead to the downfall of Parliament
itself.132
11.6.5. Resistance to the introduction of special Rowers in
France 
When the government proposed to make special powers them-
selves applicable to all Algerians living in France 133 (who
were not until then legally subject to the harsh realities of
the special powers in Algeria), introducing the measures as
"applicable to all persons born in Algeria no matter where they
resided", Le Monde's protests became more vocal)-34
11.6.6. More vocal protests 
The protests against the measures became more audible, and
were given a higher profile, but they were still left to perso-
nalities opposed to them on principle, 135 or organisations such
as the Ligue des droits de l'homme to attack:
ilgarticle qui a permis d'instaurer un regime
de detention arbitraire contraire aux principes de
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tout le droit rêpressif frangais.136
Leon Lyon-Caen, 137 for instance, found it impossible for
the calls for special powers to be welcomed by any lawyers or
republicans. He commented on the known excuses put forward to
introduce exceptional legislation and stated that even if one
were to accept that conditions had been right earlier (in
Algeria on 16 March 1956), to claim that they were needed in
France was "excessive". 138
Referring to concrete examples 139 through which practices
were legalised in Algeria, Lyon-Caen commented that, if similar
practices (creation of camps) were legalised in France, the
country would find itself "on the slippery slope of arbitrary
power," which would be applied to non-conformist Frenchmen
opposed to the government's Algerian policy, who can now be
brought to book only through the penal system, and who would be
subject then to the arbitraire administratif. Legal principles,
the rule of law and democratic traditions, he concluded, must
recommend the rejection of such a plan. 140
Maurice Garcon before him understood the problems and formu-
lated some objections, but was ready to compromise. He141
analysed past history, when internal and external "political
convulsions" had led to upheavals in society and to the re-
course by governments (when d6bordê) to taking arbitrary
measures to maintain order (their custodian role). He argued
that lois d'exception gave easy solutions which conflicted with
constitutional principles 142
Acknowledging the difficulties over Algeria, the atrocities
committed by the "other side" and the need to take exceptional
measures, he commented: "It falls on us, because we wish to
make civilisation triumph over barbarism, not to confront
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disorder with injustice".
Only then, nearly two years after the introduction of the
first discriminating measures, did Le Monde, using an outside
contribution, provide a reasonable assessment of the measures
implemented in Algeria, when it was further stated that the
various laws 143 and such a regime were "not compatible with
principles of Public Law in a Republic". 144
Le Monde gave positive coverage to the explanation of mo-
tives on the whole 145 by stating that it was justified by the
need to prevent dangerous individuals using legal ways of
redress to resume subversive activities and escape the due
process of the law. It would make it possible for l'assignatic
a residence, explained Le Monde, to take place as soon as the
sentence was pronounced. What the paper did not explicitly
state was that the measures allowed for administrative deten-
tion even if the sentence was a mere fine without detention.1'
Despite constant favourable presentation by playing down t]
views against them, 147 the measures adopted were not really
warranted by the state of affairs in France.
11.6.7. Measures not warranted by the state of affairs in 
Prance 
What seems even more difficult to reconcile with the desire
to introduce the measures in France was the statement echoed by
Le Monde of the views given to it by the police chiefs, especi-
ally in Paris, which had the highest concentration of immi-
grants; views which were more reassuring than anything else and
which did not justify the extension of the measures to
Prance. 148
The activities of the police 149 indicated that it was an
exaggeration to talk of terrorism in Paris150 (and in France
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generally) and that the 100,000 immigrants wanted to work in
peace, while there were a few thousands "floaters", amongst
whom were "delinquents, common law criminals and pimps" (soute-
'neurs) who provided the nationalists with recruits.151
11.7. Conclusion
So, as we see, very few protests were voiced in the paper
and when they were, they came from outsiders to the paper. A
contrast can clearly be drawn between the positions over the
same issues in Algeria and in France.
The coverage of the adoption and implementation of repres-
sive powers in Algeria or against Algerians showed for most
part the price the paper was prepared to pay in terms of si-
lence and omissions so as not to undermine the authority of the
state or jeopardize the interest of the French nation. In
contrast the coverage of similar powers and issues in France




12. OUTSIDE THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
12.1. Introduction
Outside the "legal" or institutional framework, a range of
indiscriminate measures was taken against Algerians. These in-
cluded collective reprisals and mass executions, summary indi-
vidual executions and the shooting in the back of people sent
to fetch something or asked to run the corvee de bois. There
were also spontaneous or organised incidents of beatings or
lynching by troops and Europeans alike, as well as many in-
stances of torture, which became common practice and was justi-
fied at the highest level (by the Commander-in-Chief Massu).
Some of these measures will be explored in covering repression
on a more or less general scale, as for example the events of
August 1955, as well as individual acts of repression and, last
but not least, incidents of torture.
12.2. General repression on a massive scale
12.2.1. August 1955 
One of the incidents of repression on a massive scale during
the Algerian war took place on 20 August 1955, about a year
into the war, when Algerian nationalists attacked and killed
about a hundred settlers, with their family and staff, in the
Eastern part of the country. 1
The fact that a number of European civilians 2 had been
killed showed that now, as a reaction to the indiscriminate
ill-treatment inflicted on the Muslim population as a whole,
the FLN was prepared to accept casualties on the civilian
settlers'side. The reprisals by the troops were very harsh
indeed and the soldiers did not seem to be concerned with
291
establishing a degree of guilt before punishing alleged offen-
ders. As a result, thousands of Muslim civilians were killed
and injured, the majority of whom, if not all, were unconnected
with the violence against the Europeans.
12.2.2. Reporting the events of 20 August 
The unrest in August 1955 took place both in Algeria and
Morocco. To start with, Le Monde seemed to devote as much, if
not more, coverage to Morocco, despite the more important
nature of the events and the greater number of casualties in
Algeria. It was only on 22 August (the day the paper bearing
the date of the 23rd went to press) that it reported news of
the events in Algeria. 3 Its delay in publishing the news and
comments could have been for a variety of reasons, ranging from
a desire not to worry public opinion unnecessarily, to an at-
tempt to avoid awareness and possible condemnation of the
repression.4
However, whenever the paper did write about the troubles,
P.A. Martel was ready to pass judgment on the tragic day and on
the "fanaticism" of the Muslims.5
As for A Chenebenoit, he asked the instigators of terrorism
"to weigh up the atrocities of their crimes and the extent of
their mistake" (mesurer l'atrocitê de leurs crimes et l'ampleur
de leur faute). He found that there was an interaction, even a
synchronisation (denied on page two of the paper of the same
day), of events between the different North African problems
and a common will (solidaire) against the French presence in
North Africa in all its forms. 6 What seemed paramount in his
opinion was that "Algeria [was] French" and that any "armed
insurrection there was intolerable and must be, as a matter of
duty, brought under control".
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As it had repeated throughout that terrorist activities were
not the actions of the majority of the population, but those of
a minority, when reporting the events of 20 August, Le Monde
wrote that all "Muslims" were not rebels.7
The paper justified the repressive activities of the Army
in its main comments. 8 Penchenier's report, which seemed un-
clear about the repression, 9 was clear about the guilt of the
Algerians.10
In his story, 11 G. Penchenier covered the burial of European
victims and the protests made by the settlers against the
government (as well as complaints that they had not been armed
and prepared beforehand to defend themselves against this kind
of event). 12 He also mentioned that as a result of radio re-
ports, all males had fled from the hamlets and villages, so
that the troops could find only old people, women and children:
Les troupes hier mardi se sont donc trouvees en
presence de gourbis abritant uniguement des femmes,
des vieillards et des enfants.
This article of Penchenier caused a great deal of controver-
sy in France and abroad.
12.2.3.  The Penchenier controversy (1955) 
Admitting that he could not have participated in all the
"operations", he described the consequences of one of them and
stated that he was prepared to bear witness to what he had seen
(what he described as, but did not call, indiscriminate kill-
ings) in Carrieres Romaines (five kilometres outside Philippe-
ville), where 50 old people, women and children had been
killed)-3
Penchenier showed helplessness, even defeatism, when faced
with something about which he could do nothing. 14
Despite the attempt to play down the situation,- 5 on 26
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August, the journalist persisted with his account of the pre-
vious incident, in which he saw that there were numerous people
shot (fusilles) in Carrieres Romaines, where the <fosse com-
mune> contained "a thousand corpses", and maintained that the
operation had taken place on Saturday evening, when the news of
the massacre had just been announced and immediate and energe-
tic action was thought to be required.
Penchenier's first article and the reactions to it 16 could
not have pleased the government, which issued a denial that any
such deeds had occurred, published by the newspaper itself.
However, when confronted with this denial, Penchenier had no
alternative but to reply. 17 But thus confronted, he became more
specific 18 about what he had seen and what made him arrive at
his conclusions.18
12.2.4. The impact of Penchenier's article 
The Penchenier controversy was echoed in the international
press (see below). Reporting the murder of innocent victims by
Penchenier also spilled over even into the parliamentary de-
bates, which Le Monde reported religiously whenever they oc-
curred. 20
In his reply to the denial of the then Minister of the
Interior, Bourgbs-Maunoury, Penchenier 21 stated that he did not
wish to carry on this polemic with the Minister. However, he
did not subscribe to the official version of the "liquidation
of ZefZef" at the time, and, "not having said anything to the
contrary," he stated that he reported only what he had seen,
arguing that he preferred to inform public opinion in France
himself rather than let "foreigners do it". 22
12.2.5. Penchenier's assessment
Despite the objective approach23 in the factual reporting,
294
Penchenier's stance was that of the official, of the military
man, of the politician, of the Frenchman in genera1. 24 Trying
to answer possible questions, he put about what was likely to
happen to the leaders of the rebellion. In his eyes, they could
not possibly win (action perdue d'avance), they could only
retreat,
a moms qu'ils ne veulent par la entrainer une
tension qui <nous> conduise a multipljc@r les reprê-
sailles et a exasperer /a population."
In an article, <Les insurgês du Constantinois s'ils ont
perdu sur le plan materiel, us ont gagnO sur le plan id6ologi-
que>, Penchenier, opting for a middle line, found it as danger-
ous to exaggerate the importance of the events as it was to
minimise their consequences. He tried to dissipate the idea,
which he saw as erroneous, but which was widely current at the
tine, that the Europeans were asking for a change of policy
and, inversely, that severe repression would deter the indige-
nous population from taking up arms. This view, he thought, was
misleading. 26
1955 was a decisive year, for Penchenier, for choosing
between a political solution and a <lutte sans merci>. The
spread of the movement was described as "gangrene", taking over
the "tragic body" of Algeria, where even the South had been
contaminated" 27
He perceived, however, a stay of execution (L'Algerie en
sursis) as prevailing and nothing to justify large repressive
measures:
Rien de précis, rien qui autorise l'appareil
militaire A se mettre en marche.
La Kabylie ... ilöt berbére en monde arabe ...
toujours êtó... centre des insurrec49ns ... Dje-
bels..êternels refuge des insoumis."
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Le Monde tried to portray this, not as a general revolution,
or as an uprising by the whole country, but as a group of areas
of insurrection, which had always been troublesome, rising to
let off steam and then "quietening down" afterwards under
repression and fines, to give reasonable ground to the idea
that the movement could be brought to heel. It stated that it
was difficult to distinguish between "crime" (banditisme) and
"nationalism," but also that its undeniable patriotic concep-
tion was now slowly becoming established ( with the help of
Islam, the Arab League, disciplined contacts between the dif-
ferent regions, and with an army of liberation waiting in the
wings) 29
The feeling seemed to be, "One does not want to believe that
the liberation has started. What happened was a brief episode,
badly orchestrated but revealing, in which the Berber fellahs
waited for a new flare-up, even if they had to be amongst the
victims." Penchenier's awareness of the danger of repression to
innocents could be clearly seen here.
12.2.6. Le Monde's position and protest against repression 
Despite world protests, and even after the events of August
1955, when news of the repressive methods used to quell the
rebellion in Algeria were reported by some of the world media,
Le Monde kept to the same line.
With very few exceptions, and Penchenier's case was one of
them, Le Monde's readers could find out about excesses, 3 ° re-
pressive measures, all the very negative aspects of French
policy in Algeria, and its implementation in that territory,
not through the paper reporting those events directly but
through it's reporting of reports or statements made by politi-
cal groups, parties, politicians and other papers and
296
journalists. 31 Some of these political parties or groups which
protested against the methods used in repressing the unrest,
expressed their indignation towards these methods, and reques-
ted that new solutions be envisaged as the "old ones did not
work" 32
Clearly, apart from G. Penchenier mentioned above, there was
hardly any incriminating evidence against the security forces
put forward directly by Le Monde after these events.33
12.2.7. Reporting characteristics
If we look at the characteristics of the reports made about
the repression in Algeria we find that they were not commented
upon. They were also characterised as being isolated incidents
and/or that something was being done about them; but nothing
was said about what these measures were or what effect they
had. 34
When it mentioned these exactions, the paper reported them
in minor articles, devoting very little space to them, some-
times "losing" the information inside a single article, or
submerging it in a series of articles on official statements,
expressing support for government efforts for, as an example,
Soustelle's policy in every field. This tendency showed a
rosier picture, which gave the impression that the situation
was not too bad after all. 35
Sometimes this type of news was followed by news that a
parliamentary commission was being sent along (with reinforce-
ments) to make enquiries, giving the reader considerable reas-
surance. 36 At other times news of repression was put alongside
news of its denial (or on different pages of the same paper),
thus advancing two points of view.37
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12.3. Repression on a smaller scale
In the atmosphere of insecurity, confusion and controlled
information caused by the war, attacks on soldiers or Europeans
resulted in large-scale repression by the security forces
(examined above), but also in self-initiated retaliatory mea-
sures, generally taken by the security forces or members of the
European community, against Algerians, either individually or
as a group.
12.3.1. Difficulty of information and imprecise reports 
When measures of repression or reprisals were taken against
(often innocent) Algerians by the military forces, Le Monde was
invariably unable to confirm the fine details of what exactly
had happened.38
This was characteristic of Le Monde's reports. Le Monde was
unable to give information quickly, to state exactly what had
happened, to describe the situation clearly or to define the
circumstances precisely, claiming that there was still little
information that could be found, even when the per iiad corre-
spondents on the spot.39
One could not explain why the paper was obtaining less
information, while other papers could say more, despite having
the same facilities in Algeria." But even when the events
occurred in France, such as in Marseille, where Le Monde also
had a correspondent, the reports left much to be desired.41
Similar characteristics could be found in reports in which
the incidents involved European civilians taking their anger
out on Algerians.42
Apart from the less than favourable presentation 43 and the
inaccuracies of the reports, 44 there were further characteris-
tics.
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12.3.2. The security forces "provoked": not really their
fault
The reports of incidents seemed to indicate invariably that
the security forces had been provoked.45
In the reports," when the paper described how trois des
leurs ayant etê victimes d'un attentat, les parachutistes
stationnes a Alger ont violemment reagi, the paper put forward
l'hypothese de la provocation (though it accepted that provoca-
tion did not excuse the act). The paper stated that, despite
the recommendations of Lacoste, the soldiers had fallen into
the trap of "provocation" (tomb6s dans le piége d'une provoca-
tion), which was said to be confirmed by the discovery of a
"rebel" directive requesting them to harden their struggle 47
and attack soldiers near their barracks.48
The coverage of the security forces in these instances
seemed very understanding when it did not seek to absolve
them.48
12.3.3. Sources of the reports 
Perhaps this is hardly surprising, as a great part of Le
Monde's reports seemed to be based on official sources, includ-
ing governmental ones, the Government and the Minister Resi-
dent, the official press agency, AFP, and the Army.50
Sometimes Le Monde was only a secondary source for incidents
reported by other journalists, other papers or academics and
politicians. The incidents had to be brought to the attention
of Le blonde's readers only after they were brought to the
attention of public opinion by journalists, Academics, 51 by
debates in political milieux and by Communist or "Muslim" par-
liamentarians 52 or, more often, by other media sources.°
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12.3.4. Versions giving the benefit of the doubt to army and
official sources 
At first glance many of the reports mentioned provide a
semblance of objectivity as several versions were put
forward. 54
Le Monde presented itself as a neutral observer and reported
accusations of terrorism by L'Express and counter-accusations
by the government, and chose to publish the various allegations
with the government's denials, seen as une sdrie de prêcisions
officielles.55
But a more thorough examination of the text makes it clear
that many versions were giving the benefit of the doubt to army
and official sources.
The tone of the reporting and the views expressed by the
paper seemed to be more sympathetic to the official side and to
the plight of the security forces. The articles in the paper
revealed the existence of a slight slant in favour of the
official version and to a certain extent a kind of understand-
ing and sympathy for the official viewpoint.56
In thus reporting these events, by giving different ver-
sions, Le Monde provided an appearance of objectivity, but did
not question the plausibility of the versions put forward. If
one examines the underlying contradictions, that appearance of
objectivity withers away.57
When reporting the event drawn to the attention of public
opinion by Movietone and L'Express, 58 Le Monde declared from
the outset (in the title) that a foreign firm shooting the
newsreel had "bribed" (soudoy6) the gendarmes to perform the
act for the camera, according to official sources.59
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These allegedly confirmed that the film had actually been
shot by employees of Fox Movietone, who had given the gendarmes
the money. Without any tangible evidence, apart for the above
reference, Le Monde then stated that it was not a suspect but a
man who participated in an attack on a neighbouring village,
that the shooting was done in exchange for money, and that the
whole thing had been a plot organised to prejudice France
whilst the UN debate was taking place."
Although in this instance Le Monde did not seem to be
totally happy with the versions provided by the authorities, it
did try to show to some extent that the whole episode had been
a fix by the media, and put forward views accusing the "out-
laws" of being also guilty of atrocities that could not be
denied.61
In cases involving civilians, there were hardly any differ-
ences. Writing about the funerals of the victims of the Casino
bombing, which led to more horrific scenes, Le Monde stated
that there was an important service d'ordre and described how
Europeans had reacted violently to the incidents (attentats) of
the last few days, indicating that some Algerians were molested
"as others had been on Monday" 62 and that several organisa-
tions were enforcing the strike (mourning the dead Europeans)
with threats to compel shopkeepers to close down."
Some of the actions were ascribed to youngsters, whose
responsibility the reader might excuse, but whose indignation
the paper saw as legitimate, according to the report."
The attitude of the paper was very understanding indeed
when, despite a police presence, shops and cars were destroyed,
"Muslims" were molested, and the most horrific scenes took
place with people being lynched. There were also serious dis-
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crepancies in the report."
12.3.5.0ther sources more informative as early as 1955 
Already in 1955 other newspapers and magazines were more
accurate in their reports and more forthcoming with information
prejudicial to the official versions and the credibility of the
latter. 66 Most of the other media, even as reported by Le
Monde, seemed to have been less embarrassed either by the
articles or the photographs which were published.
12.3.6. A position of understanding
If the paper was not ready to justify the atrocities, it
was, at times, more ready to tolerate them, if not to excuse
them. 67 Yet, even though it was requesting that sanctions be
applied, as a rule it was after the authorities had announced
that they envisaged taking them."
12.3.7. Paucity of comments 
It was not unusual to find atrocities reported in the paper
without any comment." At times, Le Monde did seem to see
these incidents of beatings and atrocities, already played
down, as regrettable, 70 but even this was not usually on its
own initiative. 71 The slightly critical tone towards the
atrocities was based on disapproval on the ground, and often
(was) not initiated by the paper.72
The paper showed a measure of disquiet when certain unplea-
sant events were happening. But despite the glaring facts,
which, it would be reasonable to assume, the paper should have
tried to confirm and investigate for the benefit of its read-
ers, it failed to provide the readers with complete and accur-
ate information. Instead, the paper sought a declaration from
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the government at times, even when the events spoke for them-
selves.73
Sometimes, very rarely though, the paper blamed the authori-
ties for the lack of information. Asking for light to be
thrown, after enquiries, on the true intentions of France,74
the paper stated that it had already been noticed that in
Tunisia, for instance, versions provided by foreign agencies
had been allowed, and that accounts emanating from French
journalists had been deliberately rejected.
The delay ordered on publishing news was seen as revealing a
(...) souci de les etouffer, une censure qui
dit-on, ne dit pas son nom, se retournent finalement
contre le pouvoir qui adopte une telle attitude .
Plus la varitê tarde a se fairgjour, plus le
scandale qu'elle suscite est grand."
The paper even requested that the authorities become more
open. When it transpired, no thanks to Le Monde, that some
Algerians were just more victims of yet another act of revenge,
thus starting another wave of protest, there were mild requests
for openness and a desire to see more enquiries conducted to
establish the truth about incidents of repression.76
12.3.8.  A very measured protest
Every now and then, Le Monde showed a state of unease at the
events and adopted a position which could be seen by the au-
thorities as provocative. But there cannot be any doubt as to
the greater credibility given to the official version in the
case reported by L'Express above.
Using government replies and calling them "official", often
gave them more credibility, and calling them prêcisions even
more so, but surely the paper ought to have known better, as
officials in charge in Paris and Algiers, or in the places
themselves where these offences took place, could hardly hold
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themselves or their colleagues responsible for them.
In other words, the official point of view was hardly going
to come up with the absolute truth, especially if this were
likely to discredit the authorities or prevent them from imple-
menting what they saw as the right policy. Even when it was
clear that "incidents" or atrocities had taken place and were
acknowledged by the paper, the language used was quite signif-
icant.77
In my view it was quite wrong for professional journalists
to rely at that time on official sources or terminology. If Le
Monde needed proof of the worthlessness of the official side,
despite the pictures, film reels released showing without any
shadow of doubt the less "official" side of the incidents, it
ought to have referred to its own pages, when G.Penchenier
first reported incidents, which were denied "officially", but
maintained as true by the journalist himself.
The paper's correspondent in America stated that, frankly,
more than official communiqués from Paris and Algiers were
needed to convince the Americans of the excellence of "our
pacification methods". 78 Why was it not the same for France?
Even when it was apparent from other sources, especially
foreign ones, as in this case, that things were getting out of
hand, Le Monde was more worried about the impact of acts of
repression on international or national public opinion than by
the acts themselves. The different flavour was apparent when
the articles of the correspondent in the USA were published on
the same page of the paper.79
The journalist's conclusion was also typical of the paper's
attitude, stating that this explained "rightly or wrongly" that
French repression had been ferocious and disproportionate."
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Even in terms of terminology, the paper's correspondent,
H.Pierre, who was quite critical, was using expressions such as
"ferocious and disproportionate" when describing the repression
of the French side; for the rebels side, the word used was
"crimes" 81
But he was not keen when reports reached American media
uncensored. We see here the aim sought was to convince the
Americans of the justification of French methods, not whether
crimes against humanity had been committed by the forces of
democratically-elected governments.
The desire to influence French opinion itself in a particu-
lar way could also be illustrated, for instance, by the fact
that more than half the pages were devoted to official declara-
tions from France and Algeria.82
12.4. The use of Torture
12.4.1. Introduction 
Notwithstanding whether or not arrests and detention were in
accordance with the regulations, when Algerians and Europeans
were arrested, they were subjected to very harsh treatment at
the hands of their jailors (police, army, paratroopers). Their
arrests ended more often than not with condemnations at trials
and executions. During their arrest, many were subjected to
torture (Alleg), the extreme form of repression, which raised
its ugly head during the conflict, coupled sometimes with
disappearances (Audin), as it would have been extremely dama-
ging for the authorities and for the French cause if the vic-
tims had survived to tell the tale.
The coverage of torture by Le Monde during that period is
well worth examining, no matter how briefly, since the attitude
of the paper on the subject is quite significant.
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12.4.2. Evidence of torture not in doubt 
There was no lack of circumstantial evidence indicating the
strong possibility that torture was being used in Algeria. If
more evidence were needed to convince Le Monde, there were
many cases of denunciations, echoed in its own pages, 83 as
early as 1955, since it reported indirectly other papers'state-
ments over allegations of torture, as well as declarations by
the elected representatives of Algerian "Muslims". 84
But accusations of atrocities and torture by the French
police and the military, as well as the denunciation of the
methods used by the police in the interrogation of suspects,
were often made in other magazines and newspapers (like
France-Observateur, L'Express, Franc-Tireur, among others).
What could be found in Le Monde from 1955 were only allusions
and statements made by "Muslim" officials, deputies or well-
known personalities, when they happened to have been reported.
12.4.3.  Le Monde in possession of incontrovertible testimo-
nies
If the paper was not sure of the facts it would be reason-
able for it to adopt this kind of coverage, giving the story as
bon sides saw it. This would be more so, if we assumed that
the paper had no proof about the practices of the security
fares and thought it unwise to venture to take a stand without
being able to support it with evidence, unless the paper had
the means of investigating and giving its readers the true
version of the facts.
But the paper did have evidence of at least one case of
"ill-treatment of a "European" in custody, which occurred in
1956, when Le Monde reported that Evelyn Lavalette, arrested
on 12 November 1956 and taken to Oran, where she arrived two
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days later, had been subjected to "cruelties" (sevices) con-
sisting of deprivation from food for four days (from Tuesday to
Friday) coupled with beatings, gagging to the point of choking,
fainting and so forth. 85
When the story was denied by the authorities, Le Monde stood
by what it had published, while publishing also the denials by
the authorities." But even here (and less so in other exam-
ples), Le Monde had contented itself with giving the facts and
sticking to its story. There was no stand taken nor extensive
mnmentary made over the issue, despite the time lapse between
the incidents and the time they were made public.
12.4.4. "Passing the buck" 
Even when it became obvious to all those objectively in-
formed that there was widespread use of torture in Algeria, and
the paper itself was aware of the allegation confirmed by many
returning military personnel, 87 the stand taken by Le Monde was
not that of outright condemnation of a method repulsive to any
civilisation, but to open a debate 88 on the question, as if
there was a choice to be made on the issue. Because over this
question, it was not so much what to say, but what to think,
that seemed to have puzzled the paper . To resolve its dilemma,
the paper sought advice and help; this came from military and
spiritual sources.
The paper was not blind to the fact that a "decisive step"
had been taken by the authorities, whose attitude had shifted
from a position of "indignant denial" of any hint of torture by
the armed forces in Algeria, very often followed by legal
action against the "slanderers," to one of justification or
even of support for such methods.
The cases referred to by Le Monde included a declaration
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made by Le Pen89 and others made in various publications, such
as the one by R.F. Delarue (an army priest working with the
paratroopers). These two clearly justified the use of
torture. 90
Not unsympathetic, Le Monde seemed quite happy to see the
question of the legitimacy of the use of torture squarely put
before Christian consciences to the extent that "we" were 
driven by an atrocious terrorism and its indispensable repres-
sion.
Aware that "a single priest could not speak for the whole
Church," le Monde pointed out that it was up to the highest
authority, Cardinal Feltin, "to inform the faithful about what
can be expected of them in this revolutionary warfare that has
been imposed on them and what should be forbidden", and to the
Chiefs of Staff (commandment) to gauge the effects that some
methods of "repression and information seeking" can have on the
moral and morality of soldiers.91
Le blonde's "respectful request" and call for guidance was
answered by R.F. d'Ouince 92 who, debating the topic, tried to
discuss what could legitimately be expected from the ecclesias-
tic authorities and what it would be unreasonable and excessive
to expect.
Outlining the unease of the Catholics involved in the Alger-
iansituation, as well as that felt by readers faced with the
controversy it provided, the R.F. d'Ouince stressed the origi-
nal nature of revolutionary warfare and the difficulty of
fixing the boundary within the traditional framework of legal
conventions.
The article 93 also appreciated the difficulty of the army's
task, 94 for which the latter was said not to have been pre-
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pared, the complexity of the situation and the difficulty of
problems of conscience that might arise and at times lead to an
apparent conflict of duties.
Le Monde commented that in the various interventions by
theologians and the Church authorities, there may have been a
perfectly legitimate motive for their discretion.
Moreover, this "reserved attitude" was even thought "prefer-
We." The paper indicated, however, that R.F. d'Ouince had
suggested ways in which the Christians might reconcile the
demands of their conscience with those of the task with which
they are entrusted.
It was up to the leaders, it was pointed out, who are re-
sponsible for the consciences and the honour of their men to
find a way. "If they are Christians," the article continued,
"they will know that there is a way that reconciles these dual
demands and they will look for it".
This search was said to be led and actively encouraged by
the Church through the directives sent by the hierarchy, the
daily work of army priests (aumoniers) and by the efforts of
secular Christians (laics chr6tiens) "men of thought and ac-
tion" who had an impact on public opinion in humanising the war
and preserving some morality.95
If some of the acts were said to be obviously inadmissible
toa Christian conscience, 96 and if the use of the most human
methods were judged to be more likely to succeed in the long
run,
97 the Church's hierarchy was absolved from giving a
ruling when an element of doubt remained, and its silence was
perceived as a mark of honesty and prudence in such cases.98
Though Le Monde seemed quite satisfied with R.F. d'Ouince's
athrice, 89 this seems to have been quite ineffective as the
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paper appeared to give a "free vote" to all concerned on this
Despite having said that it was up to the leaders to find
the way forward, Le Monde was content to state what was unac-
ceptable to the Church, but did not make this recommendation
compulsory for anybody. 100 It was up to every individual to
hear and act according to what he saw fit. This hands off
policy must also have applied to the paper itself as its non-
committal approach can be illustrated by the coverage given to
the most well-known cases of torture in Algeria, as it is, I
think, very significant.
12.4.5. The coverage of well-known cases (Alleg and Audin) 
The best-known victims of torture in the Algerian war were
two Algerians of European descent, one of whom survived his
ordeal, Henri Alleg, and one who did not, Maurice Audin.
After the arrest of Audin and many others (including Ray-
monde Peschard, who was cleared by the court but disappeared
after her arrest), Le Monde rarely wondered what had happened
to those arrested. However, when the Oran court cleared a
series of innocent victims of the security forces, Le Monde
dared to ask:
Disparues, arrétees depuis plusieurs semaines ou plu-
sieurs mois, d'autres personnes n'ont encore comparu devant
ammn magistrat et l'on se demande ce qui est r6ellement advenu
de Maurice Audin, "enleve n le 11 juin derniff, come du Cheikh
Lmld Tebessi "enlevê" le 3 avril dernier.-""-
A brief look at the coverage of Le Monde shows that the two
men did not have access to their lawyers let alone the media,
except through their wives. Both women created a stir, writing
to the press and to the authorities. Le Monde echoed some of
their complaints and letters, but only as a series of reports
on what people were saying or what other papers were reporting
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about them. 102 The complaints mentioned that Mme Audin was
living through the same circumstances as Mme Alleg but fearing
the worst, since she had been told that her husband had es-
maped.103
Another article appeared later, stating that the lawyers had
still not managed to get in touch with their clients.104
Another well-known case is that of Me All Boumendjel, a
Dwyer taken away and interrogated by the military and alleged
to have committed suicide by throwing himself from the sixth
floor of the building. This time Le Monde reported the main
pretests as well as the official version of the death, which
made it look very much like suicide, together with protests by
people doubting whether the events had taken place in the way
described by the official sources.1°5
12.4.6. Conclusion
As we have seen, Le Monde's reports consisted simply of
echoing indirectly the complaints of the wives worried about
their husbands under arrest since June, in the cases of Audin
and Alleg, and the protests of a former teacher in another. It
hardly assumed any part in the fight against torture and
against government policy in this area, apart from reporting
the complaints of friends, wives or lawyers of the victims and
that of Alleg personally. Nothing in the paper suggested that




At a time when it was difficult, but quite possible, to be
open to French public opinion on the issue of illegal and
"uncivilised" means in the pursuit of a "noble aim," Le Monde's
attitude is striking by its reserve and moderation. At times,
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it is quite astonishing by its omissions and its "lack" of
information. The duties of journalism did not seem to outweigh
the responsibility that the paper felt towards observing the
"rules". Despite one or two rare exceptions, quite revealing
in their scarcity, the imprecision and the vagueness of the re-
ports gave the readers a very partial view of the troubles on
Algerian shores. Whether covering wide-scale repression or
individual incidents, the version of events given to its read-
ers in Le Monde's reports was one that was not unsympathetic to
the plight of the security forces, even when the crucial issue
of torture was involved.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
13 .AN AMBIVALENT ATTEMPT TO INFORM PUBLIC OPINION
13.1. Introduction
As previously examined, the threat to civil liberties, which
appeared earlier in Algeria with the adopting of State of
Emergency laws, was followed by wide-scale repression through-
out the autumn of 1955. The lack of success of these methods
led to the adoption of Special Powers. These powers and the
fight against "terrorism" led to a substantial number of atro-
cities and abuses of civil liberties on a wider scale (examined
earlier). The reports in Le Monde on the subject examined in
Chapters 11 and 12 seem quite reserved and ineffective.1
In this respect, it is worth remembering that when publica-
tions contained reports about repression, or revealed anything
sensitive relating to it, this was seen as damaging to security
or to the morale of the troops. Consequently, the publications
were seized and the editors and/or publishers prosecuted. How
did Le Monde see these infringements of press freedom? What
positions did it take itself when it was affected by them? All
these are questions that need to be asked.
With freedom of expression stifled, the freedom of the press
muzzled, public opinion and parliamentarians progressively
worried by reports and rumours of atrocities committed by the
security forces, there were clamours for commissions to be set
up in order to investigate and establish the truth for the
French people once and for all. How supportive was Le Monde's
attitude and how keen was the paper for that opinion to be
informed?
The following chapter will seek to show that it was possible
to give a different coverage and take a different position than
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those in Le Monde. This was not without consequences, as indi-
vidual journalists or intellectuals were punished for speaking
out. The attitude and the stand taken by Le Monde towards these
sanctions are of some interest to the researcher. The position
of Le Monde on press freedom also needs to be established. This
chapter includes an examination of the newspaper's position
towards censorship of the media (and seizures of newspapers),
including when Le Monde was affected. It also addresses legal
action and criminal proceedings against those people writing in
them to determine and assess Le Monde's position on these
issues.
Finally, the coverage of the debate surrounding the various
investigative commissions created, or requested to enquire into
the realities of the Algerian conflict, is the subject of the
third part of this chapter, as it is essential to gauge to what
lengths the paper was prepared to go in order to ensure that
public opinion was informed.
13.2. A Feeble defence of public opinion informers
For French, and even international, opinion, there was a
high level of interest in Algerian affairs. This interest had
to be satisfied and there was no lack of volunteers for the
job.
13.2.1. A braver commitment possible for journalists 
When we see the mild, if not tendentious, assessment of the
Algerian situation made by Le Monde in the previous chapters
(11 and 12), the poor way in which the paper depicted the
enormous apparatus deployed to crush the nationalist uprising
arid the dubious means introduced to achieve that end, we begin
to wonder if the conditions for realistic reporting from Alger-
iawere in any way propitious, and if it was at all possible to
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Thre public opinion in France a truer picture.
The simple answer to that is that, although the conditions
we far from ideal, it was still possible to report events
more realistically and accurately, as was proved by two very
dedicated journalists working for other papers.
13.2.2.The outstanding commitment of some journalists 
(R.Barrat and J-J Servan-Schreiber)
Two journalists were able to give public opinion in France a
picture of the "troubles" which differed strikingly from that
given by Le Monde. These were Robert Barrat, who was working
for France-Observateur, and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, co-
editor of L'Express.
Barret was one of the few people who spoke out unequivocally
against government policies and challenged its version of the
facts. The comments and statements he made, and the evidence
he gave, were seldom found in Le Monde, except indirectly.
Having understood the realities of Algeria, 2 he had an under-
standing, an accuracy and a frankness in expressing his views,
which went far beyond any of Le Monde's journalists at the
time.
He did not write for Le Monde, but had been given an oppor-
tunity to express his views in the libres opinions section of
the paper, where already in 1955 he clearly stated that, de-
spite the experience of Indochina, the French government "had
been involved in repression in Algeria during the previous
eighteen months" in order to reestablish the status quo ante
instead of tackling the real problem.3
He described the Algerian "resistants" as real heroes,
proposed to associate Algeria to the French Union, advised
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consulting the Algerians on their destiny, and asking them
whether they wanted to associate themselves with a "France
which is wider than France".4
Barrat was, however, a journalist committed to finding, and
giving his readers, the truth no matter how unpleasant it was
to swallow. He had carried out an interview with a rebel leader
anclpublished a serious article about the gravity of the situa-
tion in Algeria in France Observateur.5
He was not the only one to challenge the attitude of the
authorities. Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber, co-editor of L'Ex-
press with Francoise Giroud, spent a spell in the army when
called up as a reservist. When he returned, he was very well-
placed, because of his first hand account of "pacification" and
the easy access to L'Express, to report perhaps in a more
accurate way than any other journalist at the time.
13.2.3. Their position undefended 
As a result of their position, these journalists were sanc-
tioned by the authorities. What did Le Monde think of the
position of these journalists and of the authorities which were
proposing to sanction them?
Following his article in France-Observateur, Barrat was
arrested and charged with the non-denunciation of crimes com-
promettant /a sdrete interieure et exterieure de 1'Etat.8
Exceptionally, what happened in this case was that the govern-
ment in France expressed no objection to his release on bail.
In cases where similar charges were brought , the suspect would
be taken to Algeria, charged, interrogated and tried there.
This time, because of different negotiations and various
"dealings," Barrat was exceptionally released 7 on bail but
with some delay.8
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The news of Barrat's arrest caused uproar (for different
reasons) in most media and political circles, most of which
came out in strong protest.9
13.2.4. A limited philosophy of Journalism
No official protest was published in Le Monde by the house
journalists, but it did, as a paper, publish an article, or at
least a political commentary, signed by A.Chenebenoit, 10 indi-
cating the position of the paper. For Chénebenoit, the arrest
and legal proceedings against Barrat provoked des troubles de
conscience. This was the case when "clear-cut principles,
normally used as guidelines appeared hazy."
In this case, the problem for Le Monde was the existence of
two contradictory principles: the first rule, the right to
inform, which constitutes a journalist's raison d'être, was in
contradiction with another, which concerns the limits that a
journalist "must impose on himself" and on his right to inform.
Chenebenoit could accept that Barrat must have thought that
his right to inform was paramount, 	 rejected contacting12
the rebels as not being part of a journalist's remit but the
business of a politician.13
He argued that the publicity given to the fellagas (FLN
fighters), like that given to the Vietminh, had a negative
aspect: giving an audience for the actions of the fellagas and
their propaganda; but, what is worse, it gave them, in the eyes
of the undecided, some recognition and victory of sorts.
He seemed to think also that Barrat had a case to answer,
as he "had gone beyond" what any citizen had the right to do,
and was placing himself above the law and other citizens.
Because of his limited conception of the journalist's duties,
Chénebenoit concluded that Barrat had to pay the consequences
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of not doing his duty as a citizen. 14 It was only a few days
later, on 1 October 1955 that Le Monde published, in fewer than
bffmty lines, Barrat's explanation.15
A number of journalists signed petitions against R.Barrat's
arrest and prosecution, but they did so as individuals. Bar-
rat's understanding of the duties of journalism and the publi-
cation of his article in France-Observateur (September 1955)
met with a very lukewarm reception, an explicit admission that
he should not put himself "above the law" as citizen, and even
a clear dissociation from Le Monde's own articles.16
Thus, Le Monde revealed a very limited conception of the
freedom of the press, confirmed by the attention given to
official declarations such as that of the Prime Minister,
E.Faure, justifying the measures taken against newspapers or
journalists. 17 And the passing of time did not do much to alter
things. 18
When Servan-Schreiber, whose activities were not limited to
journalism per se, 19 was prosecuted by the authorities over his
articles on repression in L'Express, Le Monde reported both his
position and that of the government. As it announced that
SeaTan-Schreiber was being prosecuted for demoralising the
army, his article having been published with two controversial
photographs, taken allegedly in Morocco in 1955, Le Monde
accepted that legal proceedings be brought against him over
these photographs, which were unrelated to the events (ii est
de bonne guerre), but commented that, most importantly, the
content of the article itself had not been challenged.20
In a sense, the paper presented both cases to the readers
by publishing the positions of both protagonists. But by virtue
of it being called a mise au point, the official position (army
318
and authorities) was hence credited with some authority. 21
According to subsequent comments made in L'Express, Le Monde
reported that the paper had stated that the photographs, which
dated back to 1955 and had been taken in Morocco, proved that
the practice was widespread and not new, indicating that the
pictures had been selected deliberately so as not to incrimi-
nate anybody, and that the paper had genuine photographs of the
incident, which were too gruesome to publish.22
In the reports of Le Monde, other declarations of Servan-
Schreiber stating that the willingness to prosecute him over
the photographs showed the weakness of the case against his
evidence23 were published alongside protests by the Left, by
personalities and groups in favour of Servan-Schreiber, but
also official or governmental declarations that were opposed to
him.24
In the pages of the paper, there were accusations and coun-
ter accusations between Servan-Schreiber and the authorities,
and reports on various charges against him, making it look like
a real controversy for the readers, before constant pressure
put an end to the publication of Servan-Schreiber's articles in
L'Express.25
The full articles of Servan-Schreiber were later published
in a book with the same title as the articles, 26 an event which
was to restart the controversy. For J.-J. Servan-Schreiber, co-
founder of L'Express, the most positive contribution supporting
his case was an assertion by Le Monde that the real criminals
were not those denouncing excesses.
Apart from the two specific cases dealt with here, Le Monde
also reported somewhat briefly news of arrests of journalists
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and the charges brought against them in a mere descriptive
fashion. Claude Bourdet27 was followed by others including
Andrê Still, of L'Humanite, who had published the declaration
of the Parti Communiste Algerien (22 March 1956), with Le Monde
merely stating that he had previously been charged with similar
offences at the end of 1956. 28
Besides articles, the publication of cartoons was also
severely dealt with by the authorities. L'Humanitê was convic-
ted for a drawing of paratroopers, a machine gun smoking,
standing over a "Muslim" who had been shot down with the
caption urgence.29
Le Monde also reported law-suits brought against the outspo-
ken L'Express by Rivarol" and by L'Echo d'Alger and its
owner, the influential settler Alain de SOrigny.31
13.2.5.  A mild defence of the intellectuals 
Just as the journalists, intellectuals who took a stand
against the war and its methods, or who published articles,
books or pamphlets against the positions and policies of the
government, did not find a supportive backer or a dedicated
defender in Le Monde, even when their troubles started after
the paper's publication of their ideas and views.
Henri Marrou was one of the first intellectuals to have an
impact on public opinion with his stirring article, France ma
patrie, 32 warning that the country was "in danger", and in
which he wondered what had become of France, when sometimes
innocent victims were falling prey to collective and indiscri-
minate reprisals. A great deal of weight has been given to
this article (written as a letter to the Editor) and the role
of Le Monde in its publication greatly exaggerated. It must be
pointed out, however, that, if Le Monde did indeed publish this
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article, it was in the "Libre-Opinion" column, which did not,
in any way, involve the paper's responsibility, only that of
the article's author. Moreover, other articles expressing
opposite views were also included in the section. Then, when
the professor was harassed and persecuted by the authorities,
Le Monde, which was not troubled by the authorities over the
publication, contented itself by giving factual reports of
events and news of petitions signed in his support.
Peyrega's 33 ordeal after his "letter to the President",
protesting against the methods used by the army, and particu-
larly the cold-blooded murder by soldiers in his presence of a
innocent Algerian, produced, apart from a factual report of
statements, only a mild protest by Duverger, a Law professor
himself, against the staff of the University of Algiers for
setting a bad example to the students. This protest clearly
exonerated the students for conspiring against the Dean of one
of their faculties.34
A couple of years earlier, Andre Mandouze had fared no
better; the most explicit support for him came through yet
other libre-opinion columns.35
Just as a number of publications which emerged during the
war quickly ran out of stock because of a voracious public
*Ilion anxious to know the real story, or were driven under-
ground by censorship, bans and seizures, Henri Alleg's book
(see also Chapter 12) did not meet with a committed response by
the paper. In fact, Alleg's book 36 typified the tight-rope the
paper walked, when it was quite convinced that most of the
rumours, current among the public, were true, yet the paper
stated that Alleg i s version was as credible as stating the
exact opposite. Then, after the book was seized, the strongest
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position Le Monde could bring itself to adopt was to announce
in a few lines that it would be reprinted.37
13.3. A weak defence of freedom of the press
13.3.1. Introduction 
Apart from its feeble defence of journalists and intellect-
uals, who ought to be considered as opinion makers, what were
Letionde's positions and attitudes towards the freedom of the
press and newspaper censorship in general? What did the paper
think of the efforts made by the various government and civil
servants to prevent complete information reaching the public?
Press reactions to the Algerian conflict were diverse in
France and abroad. In fact, if not every newspaper spoke ovt
against the events of August 1955 abroad ( see Chapter 12),"
and there was diversity amongst the reactions of French newspa-
pers to the events, too. Though most of them, including Le
Monde, condemned the riots, blaming outside intervention and
help, and seemed to understand, even if they did not justify,
the reactions of the settlers and those of the army, some, like
Liberation and even Le Figaro were at times critical."
Compared with Le Monde, many newspapers and magazines had
more informative policies, by publishing news which did not
please the authorities. The latter ordered their seizure for
reporting such events to their readers. As a result, many
newspapers and magazines were seized by decision of the author-
ities for the stories and news printed in them."
It would be worthwhile examining the way in which Le Monde
reported such seizures, to see whether the importance given in
theory to freedom of the press was demonstrated (in practice)
in the actual reports in the paper.41
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13.3.2. hnalysis of revorts of press seizures/censorship
Directly or indirectly, Le Monde reported news of the sei-
zures of newspapers in various ways. The paper was at times
brave enough to give more information, mentioning, for in-
stance, the number of times a particular newspaper had been
seized. 42 But very often, for the paper that was a self-pro-
claimed advocate of freedom of expression, the articles refer-
ring to press censorship had a very low profile, stretching
from very few words43 to a few lines44 showing occasionally
some inconsistencies.45
Other publications frequently made reference to the use of
torture and repressive methods which Le Monde sometimes echoed,
but without specific comments." Often, when papers included
such references to the use of torture and repressive methods,
they were seized. When this happened, Le Monde did at times
report news of seizures without adding any comments. 47 Some-
times there were brief references to the authorities taking
particular decisions to censor or seize publications48 or to
the "legal basis" on which such decisions were taken. 49 The
"explanations" given by the authorities were always reported
when available." Frequently the paper added the motive for the
seizure, giving the topic of the offending article, the charge
under which the paper was being seized, or both.51
The incriminating articles were at times easily determined
by the paper, which had no difficulty identifying, for in-
stance, the letter sent to Servan-Schreiber by Bollardiére as
being at the root of the seizure, since the paper had that day
removed all articles relating to Algeria. 52 When the infor-
mation was not available, Le Monde used conjectures from other
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newspaper and included guesswork as to the reason for the
seizure.53
13.3.3. Le Monde's occasional comments 
The timid coverage observed in Le Monde's reports of press
censorship or seizures does not mean that the occasional
comments were not made by Le Monde, nor that protests by people
outside the paper itself, or by other newspapers about censor-
ship decisions taken by the authorities, were not included.
Progressively, more comprehensive accounts of the seizures of
particular newspapers were given. 54 There were occasional
denunciations made by the paper itself. But the very few timid
remarks that appeared in Le Monde were given a low profile55
and coming as they did, every now and then, these remarks
looked insignificant, as they were invariably lost in the
overwhelming mass of articles which remained faithful to the
official versions of events.56
Although Le Monde was enterprising enough to point out that
the authorities would not be able to prevent public opinion
from learning things that were common knowledge in Algeria "for
a year now," one cannot help wondering where Le Monde's own
readers would discover the information wanted, the truth about
Algeria, if the paper itself was not providing it.
The fact that there was an apparent desire to see public
opinion informed, together with the occasional complaint that
the media abroad were more informed than in France, combined
with the paper's unwillingness to provide the relevant informa-
tion needed, reinforce the suspicion of double standards that
one gets throughout the pages of the paper at that time.57
Many of the seizures revolved around the torture issue. One
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article, for instance, was a copy of a letter from a soldier to
his father (jeunes soldats devant la torture), published by
France-Observateur; this caused it to be seized by the authori-
ties. Le Monde seemed to be in an uncomfortable situation in
the face of all this censorship, 58 but its position seemed to
be very much withdrawn and reserved in relation to other media,
as it initially thought that the press could inform the Invest-
igative Commission (see CSDLI below) and give the evidence to
it, a role which was somewhat different from that of France-
abservateur, which was prepared to inform its own readers
directly, instead of doing it in the round about way Le Monde
seemed to be suggesting.59
As mentioned earlier, a number of texts and publications
victimised by the authorities dealt with the very serious
allegations of torture, which was being widely practised in
Algeria. 60 The well-known cases of the torture of Henri Alleg,
director of Alger-Rêpublicain, mentioned earlier, was also the
reason behind a number of newspaper seizures, without Le Monde
making a very strong case for the journalist, or making any
specific accusations against the State or the Military. 61 The
attitude of Le Monde on this occasion was also somewhat more
diluted than that of others, such as Franc-Tireur.62
13.3.4.  Space given to protests 
However, it would not be true to say that the reports of Le
Monde did not include some form of protest against the mili-
tary. Indeed, another characteristic of Le Monde's reporting of
these seizures and of press censorship was that the paper
included in its reports and articles the protests of journal-
ists affected by government restrictions, even if the journal-
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ists employed by Le Monde itself did not seem to be very vocal
on the topic. 63 It even opened its "free opinions" column to
the occasional spokesman of a victimised newspaper to defend
his paper and argue its case against the injustice to which he
thought it was being subjected."
In fact, throughout 1957, most of the articles relating to
the seizing of other newspapers were accompanied with, or
subsequently followed by, various declarations or complaints by
newspapers (or their editors or the journalists concerned),
organisations, or even individuals, unhappy with the circum-
stances. 65
It has to be said that quite often there was a combination
of elements, such as the legal motives behind the seizures, and
the protests of the publication," especially while censorship
measures were making editors publish newspapers with blank
pages. 67 But quite frequently complaints were specifically
made at the request of the organisations concerned."
The overall picture that develops is that of a paper report-
ing factually, with the characteristics outlined above. A paper
whose stand on freedom of the press is in no way similar to the
stance expected from either its position on issues that most
affected it, or from its declared stance on freedom of the
press. Even the illegality of the aspects of the seizures, when
pointed out in the pages of the paper, had been initially
highlighted by other papers and simply echoed by Le Monde."
13.3.5.  Press censorship and Le Monde itself 
The whole picture would not be complete if we did not look
at how press censorship affected Le Monde, and at how the paper
reacted to it. So far (except for the instance referred to
above) it seems to have escaped the attention of the censors.
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Was the paper unaffected by the seizures?
13.3.5.1.	 The first seizures of Le Monde
The short answer to that question is no. But further com-
ments need to me made on this topic. Indeed, Le Monde was
seized on a few occasions. Yet the paper did not seem to
object to the State of Emergency Law (31/3/1955), even though
some of its aspects clearly threatened freedom of expression,
including that of the press. As early as 1955, Le Monde was
able to realise the dangers to press freedom when the Law was
used in Algeria. In fact, Le Monde expected it to affect some
papers but voiced only mild criticism at the time. 7° But per-
haps that was seen as very remote and did not particularly
affect the paper.
The paper itself, however, first fell foul of the authori-
ties when it published the Penchenier story in August 1955,71
when the account of the incidents displeased the authorities in
Algeria, but the paper never even bothered to mention it.
Nevertheless, these first seizures did not seem to cause any
stir in the paper, which did not see fit to protest, nor take
any prominent stand over the issue. The whole matter seemed
unimportant to Le Monde, which, unlike some other papers, did
not appear to resent the fact that it was being seized, or that
its circulation was being prevented.
The paper was in trouble with the authorities again at the
beginning of 1957, when it published a report of an incident72
in which a punitive attempt by the paratroopers led to the
death of a young Algerian girl.
In reporting an "incident" in Algiers (see also Chapter 12),
Le Monde stated that the child had been "fatally wounded" but
that this was very likely to have been "accidental", as the
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paper specifically pointed out that she had been hit by "stray
bullets". 73 When the authorities in Algeria seized Le Monde,
this brought the Director himself out of his shell. What seemed
to have infuriated him was that the version given of the inci-
dert did not really incriminate anybody 74 and the fact that the
seizure was likely to alienate the paratroopers.
Beuve-Mery attacked Lacoste's "frightening" manoeuvre to
"raise the furore" of the paratroopers against Le Monde's
journalists and readers. He even went a step further and ac-
cused the government (in Paris and Algiers) of tending more and
more (be it in North Africa or in Suez) to "impose its own
truth, using and abusing all the means at its disposal".
"Would it not be better", he argued, "to put an end to the
absurd and odious hypocrisy", offering the Socialist government
a choice between refraining from using such methods or going
the whole way and imposing total censorship prior to publica-
tion.75
Two things became clear over this incident. One was that,
despite its awareness of the duties of journalists, to give
the truth to the readers, the paper was seeking information
from official sources. The other was that the newspaper was
subjecting its free reporting policy to certain rules.
It was made clear here that HBM explicitly recognised the
responsibilities of journalists and the newspapers to tell the
truth. If so, one can legitimately ask why such a consideration
was not taken on board in the many instances where the paper
chose to ignore that responsibility.
An element of explanation can be noted here in the sense
that before publishing the story, Le Monde was busy checking
details with the Ministry of Defence, which was the least
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likely source of accurate information at the time.78
Le Monde was not the only paper seized on this occasion; a
number of other papers, which had also covered the story, were
seized as well, despite the opposition of the Press Federa-
tion, whose protests Le Monde published. And here, a second
element of explanation could be suggested. It was only then
(the next day), in this indirect way, ie. through a careful
reading of the text of the Federation's protests, that the
paper revealed 77 to its readers that there had been a request
by the same Federation that "nothing" should be published
"that could aggravate the situation in Algeria."
Manifestly, Le Monde must have observed this rule without
informing its readers that it was doing so. By this action, it
was not fulfilling its primary duty of informing its readers.78
However, the reprinting of the story was its first attempt
at confronting the Socialist government, and the non-seizure of
the issues reproducing the story only helped the newspaper
reinforce the strength of its argument; as it commented:
Faut-il en conclure gue ce qui dtait attenta-
toire un jour a la siirete interieure et exterieure
de l'Etat ne l'etait plus le lendemain, ou que les
«autorites competentes» avaient cette Lois encore
abuse de leursquvoirs... ii re te la perte subie
par le journal. 
But even this half-hearted defence of press freedom by Le
Monde, being victimised when it thought it was abiding by the
rules, was short lived. Having been banned from "internment
camps" in Algeria, Le Monde waited until it was prompted by
correspondence from a reader advising the paper that it had
been seized in a camp d'hebergement to reply that it was aware
of the seizure in "all camps".8°
Le Monde could hardly be described as a paragon of the
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freedom of the press, or a symbol of anti-oppression and civil
liberties.
13.3.5.2.	 Other attempts to undermine the paper
This could easily be illustrated in the coverage of other
incidents. 81 Apart from the attempt to launch a rival newspa-
per, Le Temps de Paris and the pricing episode, 82 the paper
was hardly harassed by the authorities over Algeria. There was,
however, an unsuccessful attempt made on Le Monde when it was
taken to court by a number of interested parties, including the
Defence Minister, under the umbrella of a Veterans organisa-
tion, over an article published by Professor Duverger. 83 In his
article, Duverger had warned of the dangers of a "super-
police", sending to the government, to public opinion and to
the paratroopers, a signal about possible consequences -"triple
complex of power, humiliation and revolt which, Le Monde re-
called, "had more or less been behind the emerging of all
kinds of fascism, including hitlerism".
On this occasion, it was HBM again, the director, who put
panto paper to protest against the charge of public defamation
of the army, for what was essentially nothing but a form of
"clinical diagnosis of one of the 20th Century's major social
plmomena" .84 He clearly thought that Le Monde had been sin-
gled out85 and tried to exaggerate the paper's role." In order
to strengthen its case, i.e Monde echoed all the protests made
in its favour in the foreign press, quoting extensively from
what they said.87
Clearly, in so doing, Le Monde was making too much of the
few instances88 when it was being victimised on the Algerian
issue. It suffered much more on other fronts and took a more
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aggressive stance. 88 On the issue of Algeria it was virtually
unaffected under the Fourth Republic.
Other papers were more harassed because of their
reporting. 90 The harassment to which Le Monde was subjected in
terms of seizures represented about 3% over the whole period of
the war (1954-1962). 91 Other papers and journalists had a much
courageous attitude. L'Express continued to attack the govern-
ment, refusing to bow to its pressure and, in order to avoid
financial bankruptcy, which would no doubt have ensued if its
seizures had continued endlessly, the paper started publishing
blank pages rather than emasculated and sanitised
information. 92
Apart from Penchenier's 1955 article 93 and that of
Blanchet, 94 for which they were never prosecuted, there were no
cases in which the journalists of Le Monde themselves were
persecuted by the authorities. Under the Fourth Republic, most
of those persecuted for writing in Le Monde were not journal-
ists" working for the paper, but outsiders like Marrou or
Mandouze...or Duverger's case mentioned above. This pales into
insignificance if we examine the difficulties of journalists
like Barrat or J.J Servan-Schreiber.
13.4. A lukewarm call for freedom of investigation
13.4.1. Introduction
As was made clear in the previous chapters, a number of
atrocities were committed daily in Algeria in an attempt to
repress the nationalist uprising. This was a well-known fact in
Algeria, but not so well-known in France at the start. Pro-
gressively, however, throughout French society reports were
emerging daily of cases of "ill-treatment," atrocities and
torture, increasing the pressure on the governments to do, or
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look as though they were doing, something about what some on
the Left called "abuses of human rights" and what the Left and
the Right, as well as all governments, called "slanderous
statements" aimed at "demoralising the army" and "threatening
national security."
There was, to say the least, considerable pressure to verify
or deny the reports, to set up an investigative commission
which would examine what was really going on in Algeria and
report it to public opinion. A number of commissions were set
up and these visited Algeria to establish the truth, but
without any significant revelations for the readers of Le
Monde.
Apart from a few parliamentary groups of MPs visiting
Algeria, one or two commissions of enquiry could have consider-
ably helped public opinion to discover more about the atroci-
ties in Algeria, and it is to Le Monde's coverage of these that
I shall now turn.
13.4.2. The Provo Report 
13.4.2.1.	 A not so neutral Report
With opinion in France becoming increasingly disturbed by
the news and rumours coming out of Algeria, pressure was being
progressively put on Parliament to create an official commis-
sion of enquiry to go to Algeria and investigate the situation
there.
On 28 October 1956 the Provo commission 96 was entrusted by
the Assembly to report as soon as possible on the allegations
of "ill-treatment." The results were not to become public until
March of the following year when, after completing its enquir-
ies, the commission reported its findings with the dissent of
one of its members, 97 who would not accept the principle and
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the letter of the conclusions.
Despite this dissent by one member, 98 the fact that the
paper had formal evidence of the maltreatment of Evelyne Laval-
ette99 and also the realisation, by the paper itself, that the
Association of Cardinals and Archbishops of France "could not,
without reason, have unanimously thought it opportune to remind
people of certain principles," the paper headlined on the
conclusions of the report that there was no valid proof that
detainees had been tortured and that the exceptional measures
adopted in Algeria were fully justified.'"
As far as the report was concerned, the paper described it
as being sometimes "categorical", sometimes "prudent" ,101 and
concluded that, until further information was available, the
press and the Communist Party had indulged in an "intoxication
campaign which may turn against other detainees, whether Com-
munists or not".
Ignoring its own evidence in the case of Lavalette and the
fact that the commission had failed to arrive at any conclu-
sions about what were then euphemistically called cam s d'hê-
bergement, and which had been part of its remit, 11/2 the paper
devoted considerable space, however, to its °analysis° of the
report. 103 There were, in the text of the rec .rt, sentences
stating that torture had taken place and others denying it, the
weight of the argument tilting heavily in favour of the
second)-04 The report further contrasted the rights of the
defence counsel and the rights of the nation, concluding that
the latter were predominant and constituted a guarantee for the
former)-05
In a separate article, Le Monde gave coverage to the reser-
vations of the dissenting member of the delegation
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(Hovnanian)06 This could perhaps be seen as a measure of
objectivity by the paper. But le Monde did not attempt to
integrate or contrast the two pieces of information with other
available evidence -with the view to formulating its own point
of view.107
13.4.2.2.	 A variety of views
The conclusions of the report were later contested by the
seven lawyers 1" who, stressing the contradictions, silences
and omissions in the report, stated that these contradictions
had not been cleared up, and maintained, on medical grounds
(evidence denied by the report), that torture, including the
use of electricity, had indeed taken place. 1 " Instead of
becoming involved in terms of commenting over the issue for the
benefit of its readers, Le Monde "passed the buck" again to one
of its contributors and outsiders to the paper to express his
their views.
Duverger's views were very critical of the report, 110 which
in his eyes had the merit of putting the solution of the
Algerian problem squarely. 111 In total disregard of nationalist
demands, he thought that the government ought to be given all
necessary means of action. 112
Totally by-passing the problem of torture, 113 of which he
was not totally convinced, 114 he nevertheless expressed doubts
as to the path being followed in Algeria115 as far as it affec-
ted France itself)- 16 But one cannot help sense that his fears
had more to do with the possible impact on France, which was
paramount.117
Maurice Garcon took a different view. After examining the
agenda in greater detai1, 118 he showed more readiness to accept
their good faith.119
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Agreeing with the essential principle that, "whatever the
facts", one must not drift away from the "basic principles of
French civilisation", 120 he proposed an altogether not very
convincing way out of the dilemma by suggesting that it might
be necessary121 to resort to measures outside the norms of the
Law as long as a swift return to legality is sought. 122
Another brand of opinion was expressed by Cesar
Santinelli, 123 who welcomed the fact that a "wave of horror"
had swept public opinion, since he thought that the day public
opinion would be indifferent to it would mean that "France was
ripe for Barbarism".
There were, according to him, however, not only differences
of degree but also of kind between the Nazi and French activ-
ity, because the policemen indulging in "cruelties" (sdvices)
were doing so against clear orders and would be sanctioned if
found out, while the Nazis practised it under precise instruc-
tion and would be sanctioned if they did not. 124
Undesirable though they might have been for Le Monde, these
atrocities seemed to constitute as much of an embarrassment for
the paper as they were for the government. So much so that,
when these abuses of human rights were acknowledged, Le Monde's
headlines did not express outrage that atrocities had taken
place but were on the pattern of Mitterrand's statements to the
House Committee that "there had been fewer cases of torture
than previously reported" .125
Reports of sanctions, later revealed to be untrue, were
given prominence with the result that they played down the
authorities complacent attitude. This was the case for state-
ments made by the Ministry of Defence, incidentally acknowled-
ging the occurrences by insisting that all the incidents had
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fikft...f
been sanctioned by the authorities. 126
But, while these denials were taking place, the setting-up
of another commission was announced (see CSDLI below). One
could not help wondering, if these incidents had been fewer
than reported and in any case dealt with, why another commis-
sion was being set up? This sounded highly suspicious.
13.4.3. The commission de sauvegarde des droits et des 
libertes individuelles (CSDLI) 
13.4.3.1.	 A futile effort made to look worthwhile
Notwithstanding the lack of comment and realistic explana-
tion for the readers, Le Monde reported at the same time a
communique from the Elysee relating the setting up of the
CSDLI, and expressing the usual admiration for the troops'
successes and attacking the enemies of France, who were orga-
nising campaigns against her.127
This made the CSDLI appear as a supplementary effort of the
French government, since reports of "excesses" kept coming, to
reassure public opinion once and for all, giving the impression
that it was better to be on the safe side.
It must be emphasised that this presentation was made in
spite of Le Monde's awareness of at least three types of atro-
cities (exces) which might need investigation,
128 and despite
the awareness of strong opposition by the authorities in Alger-
ie, 129 whose desire it was to restrict the commission and
impose on it an advisory capacity only. This would prevent it
from having any real investigative powers. The pretext used was
that the investigation might raise suspicion of the army or the
administration. Le Monde's articles, just like its headline,
reflected the inability of the paper to make an effective and
accurate statement.130
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In the end the role of the commission did not seem to be
clear at all for Le Monde, as some understood it to be dêceler
et chAtier tout manquement individuel, while the others
thought it was a kind of reaction against the campaign orga-
nised by the "enemies of France".
Trying to occupy the middle ground, Le Monde stated that, in
its view, the numerous personalities from politics, religion,
academe or the judiciary, who denounced a number of excesses
could not be accused of treason; nor, on the other hand, had
anybody portrayed as "torturers" (tortionnaires) the 700,000
soldiers who had served in Algeria.- 3 -
Though timidly sharing the objective that the authors of
crime rather than the denunciators should be punished,- 32 Le
Monde looked very ineffective and on the defensive in relation
to the views prevailing in political circles.133
In the circumstances, the view of the paper came to be
expressed explicitly by Jean Planchais, who explained the
decision to create a commission as a spectacular move by the
Ministry of Defence to "protect the army against the campaign
of demoralisation" •134
Dwelling on inconsistencies and fluctuations in policy,
which "put the military in morally and materially nerve-shat-
tering conditions", and evoking the possibility of an army
rebellion in Algeria if it (the Army) were to lose (quoting Mi-
lites, March 1957), Planchais was still trying to defend the
honour of the army by explaining its role as a mere instrument
caught up in a vicious circle created by unclear and undefined
policies.
Despite some acknowledgement of errors, Planchais took up
strongly the defence of the military, by arguing that a lack of
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understanding on the part of some of the public, 'which "tarred
them with the same brush," was making the "soldiers either
scarecrows or scapegoats“135 and then turning against them.
Sympathetic to the army's role, 136 he criticised derisively
the attacks on military officers for not having spoken out or
complained through their hierarchical structure at the time.137
The whole exercise surrounding the commission, which Le
Monde did not object to and even encouraged, seemed pointless,
since the paper was aware of the possibility, in the hands of
those guilty people, of removing any evidence, and of the ease
with which it was possible to fool any enquiry by camouflaging
facts and diluting responsibility.138
Not really concerned about bringing the guilty to book,
Planchais' paper turned to the future, recommending that an end
be put to "condemnable practices" in the name of efficiency but
also of unity of the country, 139 as the morale of the army
could not be maintained if morality was not respected.140
13.4.3.2.	 The poor findings of CSDLI
Towards the end of the following month the membership of the
Commission de Sauvegarde had still to be decided. 141 Reports
of the setting-up of the Commission, its membership, its free-
dom to determine its attributions were followed by the announ-
cement of its planned departure for Algeria the following week,
without Le Monde seeking to remind either the commission or its
own readers of the urgency142 of the task on which it had
earlier seemed so keen.143
There were already indications of the weak part the Commis-
sion was going to play. The files to be submitted to the mem-
bers were to be split individually amongst them, and cases
would be followed on an individual basis, which would obviously
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detract from the official, solemn atmosphere that a court
hearing or investigative commission, with its formal setting
and its proceedings, would have given it.
It was also announced that members of the investigative team
would travel separately and that anybody could apply to be
heard in writing, so long as they included documented evidence.
All these details made any real outcome uncertain. Furthermore,
the inauguration speech of the Commission indicated that it was
not only to receive complaints of atrocities, but also to
adjudicate in cases of "exaggeration" or "calumny" against the
army,-44 discouraging thereby almost anybody from speaking out
or contacting the Commission. Le Monde seemed oblivious to the
outcome and the debate moved to public opinion and outsiders to
the paper)-45
Only two members of the Commission, General Zeller and
Professor Rochet, spent six days in Algeria before the Commis-
sion fell into the doldrums shortly afterwards.
The Commission handed in its report in September 1957. The
government had no intention of publishing it. Le Monde did not
s(mqc to publish it either, despite holding a leaked copy. 146
Instead of informing the readers straight away, the paper
waited until 14 December 1957 before publishing the text of
the rapport de synthêse, a very mild version of the whole
report. 147 The journalists were said to be in total agreement
about its publication- 48 then, and subsequently proud, of
having drawn the attention of public opinion to the irregulari-
ties of the methods used in Algeria by the security forces.149
It must be pointed out, however, that the rapport de synthêse
was itself a very mild and edited version of the complete
report, which included many more damaging accounts of methods
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brought about substantial changes, Le Monde a •peared keen on
and incidents of torture and atrocities, which remained secret
for many years, 150 and which would then have indicted the
government and the security forces in the eyes of the readers.
13.4.4.  The International Commission against detention
(CICRC) 
In the meantime another Commission of investigation was
being set up by the Red Cross, under a French chairman.151
13.4.4.1.	 Another investigation made to look promising
In the coverage of the paper, it looked to be an important
investigative commission with an international dimension, being
authorised by the French government to enquire about the
sanctity of individual liberty and right to defence in Algeria
and, particularly, on conditions of arrest, detention of
prisoners in Algeria, and the prosecution of cases. The organi-
sation which was to meet to constitute the delegation was said
to have been "moved" (s'êmouvoir) by information received,
relating to police practices.152
Over a month later, Le Monde reported the constitution of
the Investigative Commission in a plenary session of the Orga-
nisation.'" Stating that a previous commission in Tunisia had
this Commission, as it gathered information on it and revealed
the names of the members of the organisation and their support
for the enquiry into civil liberties (rights of defence, condi-
tions of detention, arrest and trials). 154
The text of the responses gathered by Le Monde also re-
vealed that all detentions would be investigated, as well as
the willingness of the group to speak to detainees in private
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and their intention, after the twenty or so days of the en-
quiry, to inform the Prime Minister, the General Secretaries of
the UN and the LBO (BIT) before making their findings public.
13.4.4.2.	 A sense of balance exposing the other
side
When it was published, the report of the International
Commission was judged to be "balanced and measured" by Le
Monde, which praised it for being drafted in a "measured way
and with great concern for balance and moderation," despite
containing severe judgments in parts. 155 The paper commented
that, while establishing fundamental distinctions between
judicial and administrative authorities, the report revealed
serious cases of excesses -of arbitrary detention, disappear-
ances, torture- but established that there was no systematic
implementation of these measures and that several people in
charge had been punished by the authorities.
For the paper, this was sufficient reason not to deprive
Hune opinion travaillde par 1-es passions" of an honest element
of assessment, and that it was more than ever important to
provide complete information)-56
Hence, the paper was keen to provide further details of the
findings by Dr Georges Andre, commenting on the lessons to be
learned from the enquiry,- 57 and emphasising the personal
remarks he made returning "frightened by the atmosphere of
terror," and "shocked" (boulevers6) by the "savage treatment
and mutilation cases" by "fellagas" on Algerians (in quotes),
on which he was said to have brought ample documentation. Le
Monde was also keen to point out that he refused to compare
Algerian "rebels" with the European "Resistance" during the
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Second World War158 and that he personally thought that accu-
sations against the French authorities were "excessive," de-
ploring, however, that a General Inspector of the Administra-
tion had justified "certain methods of interrogation" as "the
only way of saving a great number of lives."
Given the atmosphere of the time, this did not seem to be a
step forward in "illuminating" opinion. In every respect, it
was a mild assessment, with only twelve possible cases and only
three definite ones, in relation to the "atrocities" of the
"other side." It was not likely to create a revolution or set
wheels in motion for a possible change of policy in Algeria.
13.4.5. The Radical Commission 
13.4.5.1.	 An exceptionally promising commission
The enquiry which was most likely by far to reveal anything
at the time was made up of a group of parliamentarians from the
Radical Party, not necessarily in the pocket of the government.
This was the Radical Commission)- 59 Because of its independence
from the government, this Commission could have been used as a
front, if the real intentions of the paper had been to ensure
that the public knew the facts about Algeria no matter what the
costs were.
It was a glimmer of hope, as far as establishing the truth
about atrocities in Algeria was concerned, which came with the
wish expressed by part of the Radical Party to send a team of
their own to investigate.
Despite the insufficiencies and the criticisms- 6° of the
CSDLI, non-existent until then, the lack of progress towards
its creation and various critical comments by groups wishing to
see human rights respected ,161 the proposal for a Radical
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Commission of Enquiry did not receive a particularly warm
welcome by the paper.
At the time the government commission remained at a stand-
still, 162 the pressure for the new Radical Commission was
mounting, with statements that it would be made up of respect-
able Parliamentarians, politicians and lawyers, and that it
would devote the first audience (but also successive ones),
during the ten days it intended spending in Algeria, to the
Resident Minister. Further audiences would then be given to
civilian and military authorities respectively.
13.4.5.2.	 A biased presentation of the opposition
Yet, despite the declared similarity of objectives, no warm
expressions of support could be found in Le Monde for the
Commission. The organisation was greeted very lukewarmly by Le
Monde, which in no way put itself out to help its search for
freedom of information. Instead, the paper adopted what seemed
to be a neutral reporting stance.
Although apparently keen to see something between a commis-
sion eteignoir and a commission fantOme installed, and aware
that people were becoming more and more concerned about the
atrocities committed and unhappy about the state of affairs in
Algeria, when it was announced that an eight-member Radical
commission had been appointed, Le Monde reported on the argu-
ment within the Radical Party between people like Maunoury163
and Pierre Mendes-France (out of the government since 26 May
1956), without taking a definite stance, describing the ex-
changes as a "dialogue of the deaf" .164
On the one hand, Le Monde reported the Radical Party's
insistence that its commission be given sufficient powers of
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enquiry to conduct its investigation and fulfil its mission
independently from the military and civilian authorities in
Algeria, so as to enable it to inform public opinion. 165 On
the other, it also stated that the Commission was criticised by
the Right and opposed in the same way by Europeans in Algeria,
especially war veterans, who requested that the Commission
should never set foot in Algeria)-66
Le Monde reported both on the intentions of the Radical
Commission to enquire about the whole situation in order to
fulfil its duties absolutely independently of any interference,
and to go to Algiers as soon as possible to help establish the
truth and conciliate the rights of all, and the protests of the
Algiers War Veterans Organisation against the Commission, as
well as their clearly-stated intentions not to tolerate "liqui-
dators", who have "the effrontery to want to set foot on Alger-
ian soil," and to "defy and insult [them] inside [their]
walls" .167
As far as the coverage of the paper revealed, there seemed
to be a consensus against the Radical Commission as the paper
further reported that the civilian and military authorities
would refuse to cooperate with the Commission.
For the paper, many of the various European and right-wing
organisations (Mayors) gave the impression that there was a
consensus against the Radicals'visit and that this consensus
had the sympathy of the authorities there.
But it could be argued, however, that, notwithstanding the
apparent consensus of opposition, the groups involved in the
protest represented only the right-wing faction of the European
population and the authorities whose attitude had made the
"excesses" possible.168 Even if liberal-minded Europeans were
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to be included in this consensus, it would nevertheless mean
that the opinion of 90% of the population was not even sought.
This opposition from the Right, as well as from the Extreme
Right (reported on page p. 1), and from the Socialists in
Algeria (reported on p. 2), which represented only the inter-
ests of the few, was described as a real levee de boucliers. It
was to lead, to start with, to a postponement of the trip by
the Radicals, at a time when no progress had been made over the
Commission de Sauvegarde.169
Listing the War Veterans Organisation as an argument, the
Poujade Mouvement (which asked for a strike) and Bourges-
Maunoury, who had not opposed it, Le Monde added what it called
a "warning", but which looked very much like a threat, by
Lacoste himself that the Algiers population (he meant the
settlers mostly) would not be able to control itself (La popu-
lation algeroise ne saurait maitriser ses emotions) .170
It was manifest that none of the victims of these sevices
(which this, or any, commission of enquiry would investigate)
or their sympathizers were listed in the opposition to this en-
quiry. The Radical Commission seemed to be the most likely
organisation to report objectively on the excesses and looked
as though it deserved some support from the paper for the sake
of establishing the truth. The paper could have pointed out
the need for, or even have defended, the Radical Commission's
right to investigate and enquire.
Instead, while reporting on the Radical Valoisiens progress-
ively giving in, the paper stated that this did not dispense
the government from setting up the Commission de sauvegarde
(promised more than a fortnight previously), and was quite
content to believe and to remind readers that G. Mollet had on
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two occasions over the previous fortnight publicly expressed
his wish to discover the whole truth (hautement proclamO et a
deux reprises /e 9 et /e 14 avril son desir de savoir toute la
verite). 171
This view was reinforced by the series of articles and the
information subsequently published by Le Monde the next day.
Coupled with headlines emphasising that some of the associa-
tions in Algeria were determined to prevent the Radicals from
carrying out their task, the content of the article on the
inside pages revealed that the various organisations involved
had not heard of the Radicals' decision not to visit Algeria,
since they were reported as having gathered in thousands invad-
ing the airport lawns, 172 for a "welcoming ceremony" prepared
for the Commission which consisted of a double row (double
haie) of demonstrators, made up of "victims of terrorism,"
hostile to the visitors, blocking their way.
Other revelations, such as the one indicating that with the
threat of smashing all the furniture in the hotel, where the
matters of the Commission were supposed to be staying, the
management had cancelled the booking, and the text of the
telegrammes, exchanged between the Minister Resident and the
delegation, were also included)-73
This was followed by a statement of relief, that serious
incidents had been avoided, and comments made by various perso-
nalities and newspapers, which reflected the indignation about
the "arrogance" of the Radicals in the various criticisms of
the Radical Commission in the French Press.174
Thus, we see, in this example, a wide range of opinions and
a substantial amount of information likely to help a critical
reader assess the situation more or less objectively. But,
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given the objectives of the Commission and the composition of
the opposition to its mission, Le Monde seemed to keep a
certain distance from the enquiry, and to be far from indignant
over an issue, which was tantamount to preventing respectable
politicians from investigating the truth or allegations of
atrocities in Algeria.
13.4.5.3.	 Not devoid of objective criticisms
Although the paper highlighted some inconsistencies in the
position of Lacoste, as for instance, when it reported that he
did seem to have fought against the Commission, 175 despite his
previous statement on 6 December 1956 (which was along the
	
1
lines of: je me permets d'inciter tous les hommes de bonne foi,
appartenant aux pays libres, qui voulaient venir voir de leurs
propres yeux la raalitê alOrienne, de ne pas hêsiter A le
faire) and posed some judicious questions, 175 there was only
mild criticism, which, in the light of the circumstances, did
not absolve the paper from putting a strong case for the de-
fence of the right of inquiry by parliamentarians and politi-
cians.
Although Le Monde pointed out that Lacoste's claim to speak
in the name of all political movements, except the PCA and the
FLN, was to give the Radicals "a bias in favour of the rebels,"
which was not justified, given that criticism of the Resident
Minister was coming this time from milieux "least suspected of
sympathy for the PCA and the FLN," the interrogative form used
by the paper in most points on which it questioned the govern-
ment seemed merely to have been designed to make the reader
think. Le Monde showed less willingness to commit itself to a
strong "liberal position" as far as establishing the freedom of
enquiry in Algeria. Instead of adopting a strong position, or
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even of simply following the lead of Combat's Georges Art
Schuller (p. 5), the paper was happy to press for a speedy set-
ting-up of the "Commission de Sauvegarde" 177 which looked
impotent from the start.
A sense of collusion clearly appeared in this context when,
sensing a little urgency, 178 the paper revealed itself ready,
following the rest of public opinion, not to rely too much on
the conclusion of the report made by the previous commission
led by Provo.179
13.5.  Conclusion
What could be found in the coverage of Le Monde was an
ambition to please all concerned. Le Monde's policy seemed to
be to report alternately the opposition to the authorities with
statements in favour of their defence. The publication of the
letter of resignation of the Socialist Senator from Algeria, A.
Doumenc, in protest at the policy of Lacoste l" and the protest
of the Radical Party at the policies of Lacoste- 8 - were com-
bined with declarations by the authorities in their own de-
fence 182 and even arguments put forward by Lacoste himself,-83
stating that it was not just Algiers but the whole of the
population of Algeria that was opposed to the Radicals, and
that more than 3,000 troops would have been needed to protect
their arrival. As far as one can see, apart from this desire to
try to reflect the variety of opinions expressed, the paper
failed to contrast and compare these positions with the aim of
drawing conclusions and outlining clearly where it stood. This
was implicitly a stand in itself. The paper thus did not suc-
ceed, in my view, in making a serious attempt to understand,
comment and report on the Algerian situation clearly; therefore
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it could not have helped many (of its) readers to come to grips
with the matter.
In view of what the paper knew and came progressively to
admit to, this was not far from contributing to the conspiracy
of silence that surrounded atrocities committed by French
troops then, and still does, to a certain extent.
13.6. Conclusions
Looking at the coverage of press freedom and the freedom of
investigation, we find that there were outstanding journalists
and intellectuals at the time whose commitment to their job
and to their readership was without regard to their own perso-
nal safety, and without regard to the persecution they suf-
fered.
One is also struck by Le Monde's feeble objections to the
sanctions imposed on, and the persecution of, the intellectuals
and journalists who dared question the colonial world or the
methods used to preserve it, and the lack of support for wri-
tei-s who sympathised with the colonised population. The exer-
cise of restraints, the absence of comments are sometimes
	 .4
eloquent in themselves. As silence over such important issues
as sanctions taken against intellectuals and journalists seem
at least as relevant and important as the potential comments
that could have been made on the publications themselves.
These journalists and intellectuals held freedom of expres-
sion and information in higher esteem, as they were more often
willing to risk much more than those employed by Le Monde. The
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defiance of a Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber or a Robert Barrat
was manifest. They, in a sense, preferred to face prosecution
and to suffer imprisonment for the sake of giving their readers
the unadulterated truth when Le Monde's journalists or its
editor adopted a more "collaborationist", if not a timid, atti-
tude to the truth and the freedom of the press.
In Le Monde the only bold evidence about repressive methods
used by the security forces has to be found in the article of
Sablier about the repression of 1945, which came about eight
years after the event, and in the more immediate testimony made
by Penchenier in 1955. 184 But here, Le Monde's defence of
Penchenier's views and reports was not very forceful. 185 The
paper did not appear to be involved, as Penchenier looked as if
he was one of the protagonists in two versions of the same
story. 186
The seizure of Le Monde, which thought it was playing by the
rules, without the paper rebelling (or when it did -rarely and
in reserved and mild terms) is bad enough. But it is somewhat
more serious when we see an impassive paper not react to being
banned, not through the expression of a point of view nor of an
opinion, likely to cause damage to national security, but over
the simple reporting of facts. As indeed, strangely enough,
except in the case of Duverger already examined where a law-
suit was undertaken against him, in all the actual seizure
decisions taken, it was the factual reporting of events that
was being objecting to.187
Moreover Le Monde never attempted to make a general assess-
ment of the extent of press censorship, of the number of in-
fringements of civil liberties in the field of freedom of
expression, or that of the legal suits brought against journal-
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ists, even if it did publish the estimates given by the mili-
tary paper, Le Bled.188
The restrictive definition of journalism illustrated here
put the journalist in an impossible situation of not being able
to report incidents, elements and facts (which are part and
parcel of his job), a situation in which, therefore, he cannot
perform his job as a journalist, which consists in giving as
complete a picture as possible, reporting to the readers facts
that they might not be able to find on their own. Should it not
be said in this case that the journalist should look for an-
other job? Or perhaps Le Monde thought that these controversial
areas in law should be avoided by journalists?
This attitude taken by the paper, it could be argued, demon-
strated a very weak and diluted understanding of the right of
expression and information, but it still would not be so bad,
so misleading and could easily be forgiven, had the paper not
devoted such an importance to the freedom of the press when it
punished a series of articles by Jacques Kayser, one of the
media experts at the time.
What we find in our examination of the paper on this ques-
tion is that nothing damning to the authorities was stated, nor
was the whole truth established for the readers. In fact, the
conclusion to be drawn from the coverage of the enquiries into
atrocities and severe repression is that the motto, "publish
and be damned", did not constitute, in this respect, a modus
vivendi. This attitude was taken and this position adopted at a
time when the paper clearly showed that it was unhappy about
freedom of information, as far as other media were concerned.
Before deploring from its own reading of The Times and The
New York Herald Tribune, that public opinion in Britain and in
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America had, up to then, been better informed than France, and
while being aware of the conclusions of various commissions'
reports and of the truth about the repression in Algeria, Le
Monde criticised other media for their lack of information.189
It could be argued, however, that if the paper had been so
genuinely concerned, why had it not done something about it,
and why had it been incapable or unwilling to put an end to




14. A MISINFORMED AND MISINFORMING MESSENGER
14.1. Introduction
The importance of the mass media in today's world no longer
needs to be demonstrated. This is especially the case since
they have acquired a global dimension, now that news can be
relayed instantaneously with the development of world communi-
cations. This does not minimise the importance of understanding
their coverage of historical events and of particular periods
in history, as they may relate, in one way or another, to the
dominant values and perceptions of society; and because they
illustrate, consciously or subconsciously, the beliefs and
positions of influential members of that society.
The society examined in this study was France, one of the
major world powers, a society about to undergo a radical meta-
morphosis from a colonial empire to an industrial society; a
society beginning to turn the page of its colonial past and
looking towards a more prosperous and serene future in Europe.
This colonial past, not all of which has been swept away,
has been the source of many of its problems, especially during
the Fourth Republic. This was one of the most significant eras
of French history: the Algerian "problem," which was more than
instrumental in the downfall of the Fourth Republic, played an
essential role in de Gaulle's return to power in 1958. Further-
more, it contributed to the collapse of a tottering state and
constitutional system plagued by immobilisme.
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14.2.A paper with high expectations but many unfulfilled
promises
14.2.1. prestigious and independent? 
The importance of Le Monde could not be overemphasised. Le
Monde was born out the troubles of the Second World War and
became the most prestigious newspaper in French society, an
institution in its own right.
The progressive views which the paper claimed to have ex-
pressed during the critical years of the decolonisation debate,
and the positions alleged to have been taken by its journalists
and editor, 1 constitute an important body of data for analysis.
This is particularly the case in view of the paramount impor-
tance that the paper acquired within French society in less
than fifty years of its history.
The investigation of the paper's background (Chapter 2), as
shown in the description of the paper's launch, structure and
mode of operation, suggests that it was, indeed, an independent
medium capable of taking brave positions against all odds. Its
background, combined with the spirit of independence of its
director and most influential chairman-manager, made it unique
in the French context.
In spite of some difficulties experienced by the paper,
epitomised by the conflict over pricing policy, the launch of a
rival and some attempts to destabilise it (as illustrated in
chapter 2, which can partly explain its moderate and reserved
attitude), the paper's independence remained, nevertheless,
=rivalled in financial and political terms.
A study of the paper allows the reader to build up a set of
expectations. These relate to objectivity, thoroughness and
speed of reporting, and to a whole philosophy of journalism of
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the paper. This set of expectations made it look capable of
adopting outspoken positions more than any other paper. It
seemed likely to report the situation of the time objectively,
suggesting that it was well placed to provide a lead in inform-
ing and enlightening public opinion of the time. In this re-
spect, the data on the readership (Chapter 2) showed its impor-
tance within French society.
The framework used to analyse the coverage of Le Monde in
this study has been set out in Chapter 1.
What the readership ("to whom") was told by the paper ("the
who") has constituted the most important part of this work.
Indeed, the analysis of the detailed content of the newspaper's
message (the what), explicit and implicit, regarding the colo-
nial situation of Algeria, constitutes the bulk of this study.
As a country, Algeria always strove to keep or regain a
degree of autonomy and independence (Chapter 3). If the nature
of that independence is subject of controversy, and to a cer-
tain extent will remain so, its aspirations for freedom,
resistance to oppression and domination, and the willingness of
generations to sacrifice themselves for the freedom of their
people, was never in doubt.
Chapter three also indicated the impending changes: the
successive uprisings, the rise of modern nationalist movements,
the deteriorating social and economic conditions, all of which
pointed the way towards change. This change that was going to
sweep away the injustices of a colonial order, based for the
most part on claims of a Western nation's civilising mission.
These claims could not be maintained -as the declared objective
of emancipation could not be reconciled with the subjugation of
the society being "emancipated." On the contrary, Algeria's
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aspirations for freedom were met with even more violent at-
tempts to crush its peoples into submission. If the Director of
Le Monde and the paper's journalists understood anything about
colonialism, they had to see that the colonial order, under all
its forms, had to go, and that freedom of oppression was the
sine qua non of the fulfilment of the colonised people through
self determination. This meant that the people had to take
charge of their own destiny.
Unfortunately, during the Fourth Republic, though they
accepted that some improvement of the colonised people's situa-
tion should be undertaken, and, at times, adopted a reformist
outlook, Le Monde's personnel refused to accept the Algerian
people's right to self-determination. Yet, years after the
events they claimed otherwise, and through various publica-
tions, gave the impression of having been an integral part, if
not at the forefront, of the decolonisation struggle. However,
as we have shown, this allegation could not be proven by the
analysis of its columns. These findings constitute the histori-
cal and political significance of this work.
14.2.2. An establishment paper? 
To determine whether or not the paper was supportive of the
idea of decolonisation years before anybody else, or, indeed,
to analyse whether the claims of the paper in this respect
could be verified, it was helpful to ask a series of questions.
1. First, if the paper's stand was as brave as it is claimed
to have been, should this not be reflected in its editorials
and many of its articles relating to the various protagonists
in this conflict?
2. Secondly, independently of our investigation of the
position vis & vis the protagonists, we asked ourselves if
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there was any support expressed for the views and positions
i
	
that sought to undermine the colonial order and to fight for
the liberation of the colonised people.
3. Whatever the views on the solutions to the Algerian
problem, the methods used by the French authorities to maintain
their domination in Algeria and crush the uprising included the
most severe form of repression. We needed to ask additional
questions. What was the position of the paper towards the
adoption and use of these methods, which had serious repercus-
sions on civil liberties? Did it denounce them or condemn them
in any way?
4. Regardless of whether the paper chose to accept or refuse 	 1
the repression of the uprising in Algeria, or whether it chose
to applaud or condemn it, or whether it perceived civil liber-
ties as paramount, or preferred to abide by the serious ques-
tion of "state security," we also needed to find out if the
paper approved the denunciation by other sectors of public
opinion of the methods used, with the resulting infringements
of civil liberties? Did it take a decisive and supportive role
towards those who sought to inform public opinion? Did it
defend the freedom of the press? If Le Monde was in no position
to comprehensively infOrm public opinion, did it consider the
right of others to do so as paramount? To what extent? To what
lengths was the paper prepared to go to see these freedoms
upheld?
As regards the first set of questions, the findings clearly
suggest that while the French army was given a favourable
coverage (Chapter 5), the FLN's coverage (Chapter 6), on the
other hand, was less than sympathetic. Furthermore, the depic-
tion of the civilian population (Chapter 7) further illustrat-
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mi
ed this bias in favour of the "European" civilisation and its
people -to the detriment of the indigenous population on both
sides of the Mediterranean.
Regarding our second series of questions, what emerged from
the analysis, is implicit and explicit support for most of the
governments' views and policies at the time -views and policies
which indicated that these governments did not accept the fact
that the world was changing. More often than not, they equated
the loss of the colony with the demise of France and the loss
of French prestige. Far more indicative of the paper's posi-
tions than the sympathetic portrayal of governments (Chapter 8)
was perhaps the reassuring discourse of the newspaper (Chapter
9). Despite the crisis, it refused to make comparisons between
the Algerian situation and Indochina (Chapters 5 & 7), refused
to concede the existence of a legitimate nationalist aspiration
and appeal, refused to accept the possibility of independence
as a solution to the conflict, and, finally, emphasised the
importance of keeping Algeria French. These positions and
biases were further illustrated by the paper's preference for,
and positive assessment of, the ideas of reform. These contras-
ted with the positions adopted by radical intellectuals which
were unambivalent (chapter 10).
Indeed, the reassuring discourse and the unquestioning and
unchallenging reports of the paper, attempting to lull and
reassure public opinion, most clearly indicate how the coverage
of the paper was skewed. To lend more legitimacy and ideologi-
cal justification, the paper rejected progressive and revolu-
tionary views put forward by some intellectuals, portraying
their contributions as controversial, and criticising many
aspects of their observations as unacceptable.
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The rejection of progressive views and discourse put forward
by the intellectuals is a further indication of Le Monde's
position on the issue. By suggesting that Algerian independence
was not the way forward, even if colonisation, as it had been
since its early form, were to change, the paper showed the
strength of its patriotic values.
Strong, even blinding, belief in the civilising mission of
France, as expressed in the desire not to see international
involvement in "French internal affairs" in Algeria, was demon-
strated beyond a doubt by a hopeless attachment to the idea
that only France should determine the fate of Algeria (refusal
to accept the failure of the colonial system to bring about
emancipation), and not the Algerians themselves.
14.2.3. "Soft" on civil liberties 
This position was maintained whilst the most abject means
were used to preserve the colonial order. The use of brute
force, of the vilest methods of repression, the very anti-
thesis of the civilising mission, made the "civiliser" sink
below expected standards of civilisation. The recourse to
wide-scale repression, including bombing, torture and mass
executions, was so extensive that many Algerians, and indeed
outsiders, called them crimes against humanity. Had Algeria
been in 1962 in a similar position to the Allies after the
Second World War, she would have been able to hold her own
Nuremberg trials. When we consider the record of M Papon during
the Second World War and during the massacre of Algerians in
Paris in the early sixties, the links do not seem that tenuous.
Le Monde was made aware of the extensive use of violence by
the security forces. Yet it played down the repressive measures
as implemented legally (Chapter 11) and illegally (Chapter 12).
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In so doing, it masked the realities of the situation for the
readers. Far from objecting roundly to infringements of civil
liberties, if not to their total suppression, it accepted them
in many respects as legitimate. The paper was not brave en-
ough, except on very few occasions, to confront the official
discourse in this field. Indeed, there are at times clear
indications that the paper failed to supply even clear, com-
plete and accurate information. And at times it could be said
that it betrayed hard evidence of collusion in not revealing
that information sooner. Sometimes the information was "doc-
tored," or omitted altogether, because of what seems to have
been perceived as the "national interest" of France.
The inadequate efforts made by the paper to inform public
opinion, the lukewarm support for freedom of the press, the
lack of strong continuous protest against newspaper seizures,
the ambivalent attitude towards freedom of investigation
(Chapter 13) -all these provide an indication of the vacilla-
tion, if not the actual unwillingness, of the paper to take a
stand which would have been more in conformity with its stated
philosophy and policy, and the high moral grounds which it
occasionally claimed.
14.3.A Disinformed and a Disinforming paper
14.3.1.The characteristics of brainwashing and disinforma-
tion
Indeed, it is well-known, however, that at times of con-
flicts like Indochina, Algeria, and many examples could be
cited, newspaper coverage may not be as accurate or full as
would be expected in other circumstances. There are also, of
course, variables in political culture.
There is no doubt that many believe that the Algerian war
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was par excellence the terrain and the ideal time for the
implementation of brainwashing techniques (intoxication). 2 What
is, perhaps, less well known is the part that Le Monde played
in this misinformation. Indeed, the paper was no exception,
and, in many respects, its everyday content revealed to what
extent the "disease" was widespread.
As Freund (1991) pointed out, it was the time when laconic
communiqués followed in rapid succession, in which the names of
the places or people changed, but very little else.
The kind of coverage found in the pages of the paper
throughout the Fourth Republic would have been expected from
most of the French right-wing press, not in a newspaper like Le
Monde. It is most unfortunate that, apart from the explicit
position (as indicated by the themes listed under chapter
headings), many of the techniques associated with the lack of
objectivity, disinformation and misinformation (Chapter 1)
could easily be identified in the paper.
14.3.2. Paucity and surfeit of information
Examples of both cases of partial information and informa-
tion "overload" have been identified.
Economy of information entails paucity of details about
various incidents ranging from torture (Chapter 12) to repres-
sion of the general strike (Chapter 7). This strategy deprived
the reader of the ability to make informed judgments. This
includes the paucity of comments, especially in the absence of
strong criticisms or condemnations which could have shaped
public opinion.
Partial information, superficial information, events covered
only in part were justified by referring to the possible impli-
cations at the UN with reference to the 1957 strike (Chapter
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7). The coverage of repression and torture (Chapter 11, 12 &
13) demonstrate a lack of a sound analysis. This approach could
safely be construed as disinformation.
On the other hand, there was also a surfeit of information,
which we can term information overload, in relation to the
various protagonists. These included details of incidents, of
acts of terrorism and information relating to the army (Chapter
5) which, given their cumulative effect, bred indifference.
At times, the excess detail may have confused the reader,
who may have had little power of selection in the deluge of
information or images provided -or even imposed.
Moreover, the construction and images provided to the read-
ers were inaccurate and misleading.
14.3.3.  A shifting of responsibility and sanitised informa-
tion
Despite its alleged objectivity and the alleged bravery of
its stances, we find no evidence of this outspokenness either
before (Chapter 4) or after the start of the war. On the con-
trary, many of the techniques associated with disinformation
and misinformation have been identified in this study. In some
cases, inaccuracies of reports even constituted blatant lies.
The blind use of some ambiguous concepts, such as pacification,
the constant praise of the armed forces and the constant criti-
cism of the opponent, clearly raise questions and doubts for
the analyst.
The paper used loaded concepts often without discernment or
warning. Terrorism was only present on the Algerian side. The
mere evocation of "fellagas" would send shivers down the read-
er's spine, in view of the "horror" of their "crimes," and the
"atrocity" of their deeds. In contradistinction, the Army
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represented generally the "forces of order" and "justice"
responsible for "protecting" the people. On the ground, not all
Algerians benefited from that protection. In fact, most of them
suffered -as for them, it acquired a different meaning altoge-
ther. 3
The French Ministry of Defence was hardly used in a defen-
sive role; and the "disorder" created made the activities of
the police appear inevitable. Often these activities and exces-
ses were openly defended, excused and justified by the paper.4
The shifting of responsibility and the perception of events
as a tragedy with unfolding consequences, which could not be
helped on one side, made the blame seem attributable to every-
body and everything that was not French. This released the
French of their undoubted responsibility for the source of the
conflict and the state of affairs in the country.
Furthermore, just as other analyses have established a
"class reflex," as exemplified by journalists covering the
miners strike, 5 a comparable "French reflex" could be identi-
fied in journalists working for Le Monde who stressed the
inevitability of the conflict. However, the paper also diluted
the blame, by failing to allocate the responsibility for the
situation and for the oppression of the Algerian people on
successive governments, the army, or the settlers -who were
often accused.
There were also many cases of sanitised reporting of the war
effort giving connotations of a surgical "cleaning up opera-
tion", to stop the "disease" from "spreading" and "infesting"
or "infecting" other areas.
The frequent use of sevices, certains faits, represent an
effort to deny or minimise current practices. 6 We know that
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even the use of the word "torture," very infrequently used in
Le Monde's coverage, had very much the impact of defining
downwards, or dismissing the concept of torture 7 -all these
represent a practical process of desemanticisation which is a
significant feature and a characteristic of denial. The euphem-
ism of pacification, derived from Pax, is but a further illu-
stration.
14.3.4.  Serious consequences: a victim of psychological 
warfare? 
Psychological warfare in the hands of the authorities was a
very useful strategy. It meant that the opponent could be
beaten, the supporters rallied and the sympathy of public
opinion swayed. Its conscious or unconscious use by the press
mild have had a determining effect.
Its use meant that public opinion in general, and readers in
particular, would have confused the reality lived by Algerians
and the fictionalised accounts of events. It is very likely
that the usual forms of logic were stretched, and even subver-
ted, in the coverage provided by Le Monde.
The same standards of comparison were not used. Even in Le
Monde, the difference of treatment and the use of double stan-
dards are striking. On one side, we could see the condemnation
of the terrorists' acts and their labelling as "crimes against
humanity." On the other, the same concepts were used different-
ly, when similar occurrences or actions were undertaken by the
security forces for reason of state.
The problems of alliance in the 1950's presented the East
West conflict as a real problem at a time when colonisation was
really important. It may be suggested at this junction that Le
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Monde was as much a victim of psychological warfare as any
other newsmedium. 8 And it could perhaps be said in Le Monde's
defence that it had no part in this. But rather that it might
have fallen victim to the sophisticated efforts of the authori-
ties in their successful attempts to disinform public opinion.
However, available evidence does not point that way at all.
The paper's knowledge and awareness of psychological warfare
and its methods are only too clear in many of its pages. It is
also clear that other news media succeeded where Le Monde
failed. This excuse may not, therefore, be justifiably made on
behalf of Le Monde.
Another hypothesis could be advanced for Le Monde's short-
comings in this respect. Indeed, the loss of prestige for
France, perceived by the paper through the loss of a colony
like Algeria, could quite conceivably be a strong motive behind
the paper's silences and omissions. Its concern "not to rock
the boat," or to ruin France's chances in the international
arenas, seems quite plausible in view of the contents of some
articles.
In fact, the reasons for Le Monde's " imperfections" were
more to do with a certain conception of nationalism and fear of
France losing her prestige as a major nation. From a national-
ist:perspective, this is understandable after the defeat of the
Second World War as well as the loss of empire from Indochina
to North Africa, and the "shameful" retreat over Suez.
Some9 have sought to explain the lack of radicalism of Le
Monde by reference to imposed censorship, its fear of the
authorities, or possible loss of income. But this study makes
it clear that there was a deliberate policy of self-restraint
in not publishing, and even opposing at times, views put for-
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wuelby intellectuals, and of more accurate and complete ver-
sions of events, for fear of damaging French prospects and
interests.10
As we have demonstrated and summarised in the above subsec-
tions, Jean Planchais i statement ll that Le Monde would have lost
many readers, as a result of the paper adopting more radical
views than it did, simply does not hold up for the Fourth Repu-
blic. Moreover, those publications that took a more radical
position against the war, and ceaselessly denounced French Army
atrocities, without fear of seizure or sanctions, and sought
to inform their readers fully, actually increased their reader-
ship.12
14.3.5.Le Monde: a problematic historical source 
The result is that the paper could not be compared to L'Aur-
onaat the turn of the century over the Dreyfus affair, though
some intellectuals tried to use it in that way. Nobody in the
paper could even aspire to the mantle of Zola, even if one or
two intellectuals did, indeed, suffer persecution as a result
of expressing their views in the paper.
There was no comparable case of Le Monde returning journal-
ists from Algeria, like Gloria Emerson, 13 who went to Vietnam
and came back a converted pacifist militant, and proceeded to
rectify the onesidedness of the reports of colonial conflicts.
Nor were there examples of journalists like those who went to
Central America, and, upon their return, clearly spelled out,
witlithe sanction of their paper, their conviction that Wash-
ington was backing up "unworthy regimes". 14
However, despite its shortcomings, Le Monde did, indeed,
contain some of the most outspoken criticism of the colonial
order and of the methods used to preserve it.15
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Some of the authors interviewed (Mandouze, Vidal-Naquet),
active at the time, defend the paper. They even suggested that
it took up positions that at the time were extremely outspoken.
Such statements, however, seem to have been made by people
whose links with the paper were not so strong 16 and were, in
any case, counterbalanced by opposite views.
It also true to say that the pages of the paper indirectly
reveal a picture which, by counterbalancing contradictory
reports of events, could be said to be quite realistic; and
which in many respects could be seen as more realistic than hz
been suggested so far.17
This leads me to two further substantial, but more moderat
conclusions in relation to the coverage of Le Monde.
The first is that a further study of Le Monde between 1958
and 1962 needs to be undertaken to assess the balance sheet of
the newspaper over the whole period of the Algerian war. There
are many indications that the position taken by the paper under
the Fourth Republic changed in the early sixties , when the
paper was victim of increased censorship and its journalists
victims of extremists'attacks.
The findings of this research clearly suggest a general
cveat for other researchers of the period: they should be very
wary of using media sources, including Le Monde, as an objec-
tive source in their work. They should be extremely circumspect
when this encompasses matters relating to the war and colonial
conflict. The reports of Le Monde at the time should not be
used without safeguards as incontrovertible evidence in histor-
ical research on account of the unconscious and, now revealed,
bias. Indeed, the researcher will need more references to
establish an accurate picture of France at the time when it was
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"at war with itself" and "with the Algerians" (as most French
historians like to portray that period of French history).
Part of the answer to today's debate about war memories 18 is
that few French media or individuals, and very few institu-
tions, were able to confront the facts of a cruel colonial war.
Although the position may have partially been corrected since,
the paper should be used only with caution as an immediate
source of history and not a mirror of society of the time.
Completely lifting the veil over this traumatic period of
French history may prove to be a difficult process. France is
now facing the difficult but essential task of reclaiming its
memory and its past, which it seemed to have lost, but is
slowly trying to bring to the surface with various publica-
tions. The tremendous efforts achieved in respect of the
Second World War could, perhaps, be seen as an encouraging sign
for a better acknowledgment and understanding of the Algerian
war in the next decades.
Indeed, numerous people have helped: Jules Roy, Jean Lacou-
ture, Benjamin Stora, Jean-Pierre Rioux, Andre Mandouze, Pierre
Vidal-Naquet, Jean-Luc Einaudi l9 and others have done a great
deed in this field. But is it not time that, instead of making
unsubstantiated claims, a paper like Le Monde should admit in
all realism, its modest, and somewhat controversial, contribu-
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Claude Julien, Les problêmes du <Monde>, Dêbat, No 24, March
1983, p. 17.
See also Chapter 2.
(112)
Relying on an unsubstantiated reference in J.-N. Jeanneney &
J. Julliard, Le Monde de Beuve-Mêry ou le métier d'Alceste,
1979, pp. 232-233, J.P. Rioux, stated mistakingly that the
paper favoured a negotiated solution and independence. See J.P.
Rioux, La France de la Quatriéme Rêpubligue (1952-1958)Vol. 2,
(1983), p. 137.
(113)
See also below, p. 20 ff.
(114)
This was organised by La Ligue de l'Enseignement and l'Isn-
stitut du Monde Arabe and took place 12-14 March 1992. See
below.
(115)
Of the articles written at the time one finds the following
count:
One letter to the Editor by Professor Marrou (April 1956)
covering five pages, 3 articles written in 1955: one of 7
pages, one (written by Penchenier) 2 pages, and one (by Minay)
8 pages.
For 1957 there were two articles, respectively one and two
pages. That is all there is for the whole of the Fourth Repu-
blic period covered by the present study: 25 pages out of 400,
or just over 6%.
For 1959 there were two articles covering 19 pages, 2 page
of an article of 1960 and 2 pages of an article written in
1961: a grand total of 10 articles covering 46 pages written
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before the cease-fire day, 19 March 1962 ( or 11.5 %). Most of
this history is not a journalist's history, that is a history
of the moment -but a history after the event. Arguably this
should find a place in history books rather than in a newspa-
per.
Moreover, 23 pages (370-393) written on "Traumas after the
War" were devoted to the October 1988 riots, events which had
nothing to do with the war, as most of the youngsters involved
in the riots were mostly born after the war. Ten pages (339-
349) dealt with the power struggles after the war and nineteen
pages (350-369) on the sequels in France were devoted to the
"war veterans", "graves in peril" as well as the memory of
pieds noirs, the immigrants and the reconciliation after the
war.
(116)
Not only Eveno, P. and Planchais, J., (1989), op. cit.,
discussed here, but also a commemorative issue of Le Monde -
Dossiers & Documents, No 146, July-August 1977, but also Rioux,
J.-P., La France de la Quatrieme Republique, Vol. II 1952-1958,
Seuil, Paris, 1983, p. 137, relying on an unsubstantiated
reference in Jeanneney J.-N. & Julliard, J., Le Monde de Beuve-
Mery ou le métier d'Alceste, Seuil, Paris, 1979, - pp. 232-233,
which stated that the paper favoured a negotiated solution and
independence.
(117)
See Actes du Colloque, La Ligue-IMA, Paris, 1993, pp. 110-
116.
Jean Planchais' reply (pp. 151-152) to my comments (pp.
149-151) seems to confirm, at least implicitely, the main
thrust of the present work.
(118)
Touili, M. ed., in Retentissement de la revolution algeri-
enne dans le monde (1954-1962), Algiers, ENAL-GAM, p. 17.
(119)
With Têmoignage-Chrêtien, France-Observateur, and L'Express.
(120)
Owned and managed by its own staff, using serious reporters
and acadmics to cover most topics reported.
(121)
Des sa fondation, <Le Monde>, par la volonte de
Beuve-Mery, s'est affirme comme le <journal de
references›; non sans humour, tel parlementaire
remarquait que seuls ses discours mentionnes par le
Monde avaient reellement ete prononces (...).
In Claude Julien, Les problemes du <Monde>, Debats, No 24,
March, 1983, p. 19.
(122)
ALBERT, Pierre, La Presse, P.U.F, Paris, 1982, p. 90.
(123)
See Kravetz, Marc, Journalists faiseurs d'histoire in Le
Magazine litteraire, No 164, September 1980, p. 42.
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(124)
In Claude Julien, Les problemes du <Monde>,  Debat, No 24,
March 1983, p. 1.
(125)
In L'Express Magazine 13/01/1979.
(126)
The review Sondages, published by IFOP, carried out a
mmaber of surveys at the time.
(127)
There are very notable exceptions exemplified in the work of
Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, Torture dans la Republique, Minuit,
Paris, 1972; Les crimes de l'armee frangaise, Maspero, Paris,
1975; L'Affaire Audin, Minuit, Paris, 1958 and 1989, Face a la
raison d'Etat, La Decouverte, Paris, 1989; Paillat, Claude,
Dossier secret de 1'Algerie,2 Vol., Presses de la Cite, 1962;
Tournoux, J.-R., Carnets secrets de la politigue, Plon, Paris,
1958; Secrets d'Etat, Plon, Paris, 1960.
(128)
See Stora, B., La Gangrene et l'oubli: la memoirs de la
guerre d'Algerie, La Decouverte, Paris, 1991 and Einaudi, J.L.,




For the media coverage of this episode see Ferro, Marc, Le
13 mai 1958, la Documentation francaise, Paris, 1985, (+ fac
simile of newspaper headlines) and Debaty, A., Le 13 Mai et la
Presse, Colin, Paris, 1960.
(131)
Williams, P.M., Crisis and Compromise, Politics in the 
Fourth Republic, Longmans, 1958 and 1964 is the main contribu-
tion, but there are others.
(132)
An analysis of de Gaulle and a list of articles written
about/against him has already been published by the late Direc-
tor and founder of Le Monde himself in 1958-1969: Onze ans de
rêgne, Flammarion, 1974. Sainderichin, Pierre, De Gaulle et Le




As pointed out earlier (end of Chapter 1), Pierre Albert
wrote about it:
Le Monde est le journal frangais de r6f6rence
par excellence. Le sêrieux et la varietê de ses
informations, la qualitê de ses enquétes et de ses
articles de commentaires, /a valeur surtout de
1 • 6quipe de ses redacteurs (...) en font de tout
point de vue une exception dans la presse frangaise.
In La Presse, P.U.F, Paris, 1982, p. 90.
(2)
See Chapter 1 and bibliography.
(3)
They were, therefore, resented by the Resistance and by
official circles at the Liberation.
(4)
It continued to be printed until 29 November 1942. It had
tremendous prestige and had been thought of, especially in
diplomatic circles, as the "unofficial" organ of the "Quai
d'Orsay" (French Ministry for Foreign Affairs), that is to say,
the official voice of France and the most reliable mouthpiece
of the French government. Its continued publication during the
years of German occupation had discredited it in circles close
to de Gaulle, whose views on the subject since June 1940 had
been only too clear.
(5)
It is often asserted that the cut-off date (26 November
1942) was chosen deliberately to include Le Temps and that some
papers, which continued to be published after the deadline,
re-emerged unscathed, whereas Le Temps was not forgiven for its
links with -indeed its subordination to- economic interests.
6
The first issue numbered 140,000 copies.
The newspaper comes out in the late afternoon and always
bears the following day's date. This tradition was firmly
established before the War in papers like Le Temps.
(7)
The format remained the same (500 by 665 mm ) until it was
changed on 16 January 1945 on account of paper rationing.
(8)
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The new paper, which resembled Le Temps, was installed in
the same premises in the Rue des Italiens which housed the
presses of its predecessor (99,000 copies in 1939); it started
with the same format, the same presentation (inheriting also
the same typography and even the gothic characters of the
title), but also the same signatures. Most of the articles were
written by the same journalists, as thirty of the thirty-one
journalists team were part of the pre-war team. In spite of
rumours of collaboration, most of the journalists involved in
Le Temps were innocent. Some had displayed as much patriotism
under the Germans as anybody else. For example, Remy Roure's
son was killed in battle and he himself was deported; George
Aymes died in deportation, while many others were active mem-
bers of the Resistance. Le Temps had even received a note from
Laval, head of the Vichy government, reproaching the paper for
it's opposition stance. See E. Sablier, op cit., pp. 44-45. See
also counter argument below.
(9)
Its philosophy was radically different in the sense that it
adhered to the prevailing ideology of the Postwar, exhibiting
respect and fidelity to the Resistance and a profound desire
for reforms. It also enjoyed the backing of General de Gaulle.
See Derieux, E. & Texier, J.C., La Presse Quotidienne Fran-
gaise, Colin, Paris, 1974, p. 99.
(10)
The shares were to be divided according to the following
formula: three people got forty shares each. They were H.
Beuve-Mery, a liberal Catholic who was to head the paper for 25
years (see also following pages), a Protestant professor of Law
at Montpellier University, Rene Courtin, who was a former head
and symbol of the Resistance there and another member of the
Resistance in Morocco, whose allegiance to de Gaulle was quite
open: Christian Charles Funck-Brentano. Son of famous historian
of medieval and eighteenth-century France, he had a distin-
guished career in the French Army during the First World war,
then later served in Morocco under Marshall Lyautey before
joining de Gaulle's government in exile in Algiers.
This made a total of 120 shares . The remaining shares (80)
were to be divided between important representatives (persona-
lites representatives) designated by the Minister of Informa-
tion, in other words by J. Dupraz himself. Courtin insisted
that two shareholders be designated by him: these were Pierre
Frorrent and Jean Vignol who were allocated five shares each.
Twenty-five shares were given to J.Schloesing and fifteen to
each of Gerard de Broisia, Andre Catrice and Suzanne Forfer who
represented more or less the views of the MRP. (It was revealed
much later by one of them that Dupraz had obtained from each
of them a "contre-lettre" giving him back the shares which, in
combination with any of the major shareholders, would have
given him absolute majority, in case of a serious crisis such
as the one later experienced by the paper in 1951. See E.Sabl-
ier, op. cit, p. 50. Although he constantly denied it, it was
suggested that his involvement in the setting up of the newspa-
per may have had something to do with conscious or sub-con-
scious desire to provide his party with an authoritative news-
paper. Bellanger, C., op. cit., p. 286.
(11)
Although the starting capital of 200.000 Fr was negligible,
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the paper was said to have benefited from vast credits, in the
form of tens of millions of francs worth of buildings, presses,
stocks, paper, journalists, suscribers, readers and the use of
Le Temps's facilities. But it has to be said the accusations
levelled against Le Monde of having stolen the readers of Le
Temps (the importance of suscribers and readers was said to
have removed the need to launch a publicity campaign and to
have provided the paper with a readily available readership)
cannot be sustained. It could easily be shown that their number
was around 50,000 whereas Le Monde within its first year was
printing three times that number of copies. Moreover, Le Monde
did not use the index of suscribers left by its predecessor. It
also refused symbolically to deliver papers to suscribers of Le
Temps whose suscriptions had not run out and who expected Le
Monde to continue supplying them.
Finally, Le Monde paid back what it owed. It settled the
indemnities of the workers of Le Temps as soon as the legal
framework for that was established (Confirmed in Letter of
recognition of Roger Fabre, Societe du journal Le Temps, 8 July
1959).
(12)
He was born in Paris, on 5 January 1902, the son of a jewel-
ler-watch maker and a cook-housekeeper from Brittany in a
background of extreme poverty. He was of very poor health and
was looked after by the Church for his schooling in the "Ecole
des Freres Laicisee" outside Paris. He returned to Paris in
1918 to take a job as a cart delivery man at a furniture re-
storer's. He then became a desk clerk for Paris-Lyon-Mediter-
rannee in the Gare de Lyon in 1920 before going into insurance
in 1921. He started studying again with the help of religious
organisations to gain his Baccalaureat, then studied Law and,
in order to earn a living, started his career as a journalist.
He later married Genevieve Deloye (1928), who was studying for
a doctorate at the same time.
(13)
After his supervisor, M Lefur, informed him that the French
Institute in Prague was looking for teachers, he went to Prague
in October 1928 at the age of 26 to start a career as a teacher
and a journalist. He taught both at the French Institute, where
he was Director of the Department of Law and Economics 1932-
1939, and at the Czechoslovakian Business High School.
During the time he spent in Czechoslovakia he mingled with
leading members of society, like Foreign Minister, then Presi-
dent of the Republic, E.Benes, and his successor in Foreign
Affairs, C.Krofka, as well as Benes' rival M.Hodza, President
of the Council.
(14)
The assassination of President Paul Doumer (7 May 1932) on
the eve of the French parliamentary elections by a man called
Gorgulof (who had allegedly spent the three previous years in
Czechoslovakia) led to a flood of enquiries and requests for
information on the assassin. After making enquiries about the
assassin, who, rumours claimed, was an active Communist mili-
tant, Beuve-Mery established that he was not a "red". However,
the newspaper, even after receiving Beuve-Mery's report, high-
lighted a Communist connection. An inspector was sent to in-
vestigate and was assisted by Beuve-Mery. Beuve-Mery warned him
that if Gorgulof were prosecuted on the basis of the Communist
384
link, he , H.Beuve-Mery, would publish what he knew to be true
on the front page of the newspapers. Hence, Beuve-Mery showed,
very early on in his journalist career, a commitment to the
truth and an unwilligness to cooperate with people bent on
tinckering with the facts.
(15)
It was in Lyon that Beuve-Mery met Monsignor Bruno de Sol-
ages, the Abbot of Nouvois, who, with a group of officers
(including Captain P. Dunoyer de Segonzac and E. d'Audemard
d'Alencon) had begun a school for "cadres" at Uriage to pro-
vide training courses which could be seen as collaborationists.
Beuve-Mery was invited to give a lecture and remained on the
staff of the School from March 1941.
The attitude of the School (Uriage) was equivocal to start
with as it treated the resistants as a group of exaltes. It has
at times been put into question and was often accused of Petai-
nisme. (See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 34-35 and also
Bernard Henry-Levy, L'Ideologie frangaise and Le Monde 16/1/81.
The counter-argument presented by P-H Chombart de Lauwe, Ce que
fut Uriage, Le Monde 24/1/81.)
The root of the problem in France's collapse, according to
the School's philosophy, was the failure of the ruling elite of
the country. The aim was then to create and regenerate the new
future elite which it did (a list of people who went through
the school can be found in Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 39)
but, to start with, without asking itself the basic question of
whether this would be for the service of the democratic order
or the order of 'Detain.
There were definite contacts with Vichy since Admiral Darlan
visited the school on 3 June 1941 and made an anti-British
speech outlining and defending the policy of collaboration. See
Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 43, citing Bernard Comte's L'ex-
perience d'Uriage, p. 258.
Beuve-Mery is said to have introduced a new ideological
and political dimension which was to lead Segonzac to evolve
from l'independance loyale au non-conformisme, puis en 1942 A
la dissidence de fait. Beuve-Mery remained director of studies
at the Ecole de l'Uriage in St Martin d'Uriage ( Isbre) until
that establishment was dissolved by Laval on 27 December 1942.
The educators joined the Resistance movement. Having done his
"maquis", Beuve-Mery was editor-in-chief for Temps Present
after the War until he was called upon to take charge of Le
Monde.
(16)
After studying law he completed a " licence de Lettres",
attending the School of reserve officers of St Cyr and complet-
ing his military service in Germany, he wrote his doctorate in
Law on Francisco de Vitoria, the theologian who defended the
Indians against Spanish colonisation. In his way he helped to
revive interest in one of the first critics of colonialism.
(17)
France was allied to Czechoslovakia at the time and Beuve-
Mery, worried about the pre-war situation there, went to see
C.Chautemp, President of the Council, E.Daladier, Minister for
Defence, and Rene Massigli, Director of Political Affairs.
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Unhappy with the result of his meetings, upon returning to
Czechoslovakia, he went to see Benes. Benes was so convinced
by his own propaganda campaign that he refused to heed H.Beuve-
Mery's warning about the uncertainty of French help in case of
trouble.
Austria was invaded by the German army and annexed to the
Third Reich by the so-called Anschluss of 11-13 March 1938.
This transformed Czechoslovakia into a front-line state con-
fronting Hitlerian aggression. On 12 April, H.Beuve-Mery's
fears were confirmed as J.Barthelemy proclaimed the Franco-
Czechoslovakian treaty void (caducite juridique). H.Beuve-Mery
sent a letter of protest to Barthelemy expressing his fears
that Czechoslovakia would be next to fall along the same lines
as Austria .
For a while Beuve-Mery had noticed that his articles to Le
Temps had been edited prior to printing with all his praise for
Czech democracy suppressed while all his criticisms were re-
tained. He protested to the paper, was recalled to Paris by
Chastenet, his director, who questioned this "minor personali-
ty's pretention to run the foreign policy of the paper".
Strongly disapproving his paper's policy, Beuve-Mery resigned
after Munich (September 1938) and returned to Czechoslovakia,
which had to cede the Sudetenland to Germany (10 October 1938)
and then suffered a total German occupation (15 March 1939).
Beuve-Mery then returned (around 20 July 1939) to France, where
he worked three to four days a week in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs before being mobilised on 1 September 1939, after
which he was transferred to the Intelligence Service (counter-
espionage) in Nancy. On the eve of the German invasion, he was
attached to a Czechoslovakian volunteer force. He was demobi-
lised following the invasion in July 1940 and went to Lyon to
print a sheet condemning nazism and communism, but also point-
ing out the negative features of capitalism and western demo-
cracy.
He wrote a chronicle of foreign policy in S.Fumet's Temps
Present, renamed Temps Nouveau, in which he signed as Sirius.
This was for him a way "of suggesting to what extent what he
was writing was different from what he would have liked to have
been able to say".
(18)
Thibau, J., op./ cit., p. 9, commented that:
Ces deux personnages clefs de la France con-
temporaine plongent dans le passé par leurs ori-
gines, leurs mentalites, les valeurs qui les inspir-
ent. Enracinês dans le sol de la tradition, us ont
eu pourtant la tAche, avec quelques autres, d'accou-
cher la France moderne, de 1940 a 1970.
The relation between Beuve-Mery and de Gaulle has also been
=glared to that between Chateaubriand and Napoleon.
(19)
See L'Express 13/4/56 and Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., pp.
100-101.
(20)
In Le Monde 23/12/69. See Texier, J.C., et al., op. cit., p.
101.
(21)
As outlined earlier, at the time of the launch, Le Monde was
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to be run by a board of three directors, H.Beuve-Mery,
R.Courtin and Funck-Brentano. The licence and responsibility
for publication were given to Beuve-Mery. On the first day of
publication a caption under the paper's heading read:
Director: HUBERT BEUVE-MERY
Board of directors :RENE COURTIN, FUNK-BRENTANO.
This annoyed Courtin who did not like Beuve-Mery setting
himself above the two directors and who would have preferred
the heading to read:
Board of directors:HUBERT BEUVE-MERY,director
RENE COURTIN,
FUNK-BRENTANO
From the very start there was going to be a rivalry which
later would develop into an open battle. The consensus built up
at the beginning of the paper was that Beuve-Mery would deal
with foreign policy and Courtin with economic and financial
affairs. The overlap and potentially dangerous area of possible
conflict was domestic policy.
(22)
The paper shortage was to lead to government limiting the
stock of paper that the newspapers could use and from 16 Jan-
uary 1945 all newspapers had to reduce their paper consumption
by half.
Le Monde, in common with other papers, first cut its size by
half to cope with the shortage, but deciding to put quality
before quantity or, in its own words, "preferring to reduce its
circulation" (the paper printed 140,000 on two pages on
19/12/1944, first day of publication.) "rather than its infor-
mation", it cut the number of copies by half while and doubled
the number of pages to four on the 22 January 1945. This
attracted hostile reactions from other newspapers which, com-
bined with the paper shortage, made its first year a difficult
one.
(23)
At the beginning of January 1945 Courtin gave Beuve-Mery an
article which he thought important, and whose printing Beuve-
Mery delayed, in which he was suggesting a pause in the post-
war reforms of the economic structures. Courtin waited and
then, tired of waiting, went and confronted Beuve-Mery who told
him that this article was in contradiction with the views that
Courtin held during the war (which Courtin denied) and that the
publication of the article would cause a scandal. Courtin,
seeing his article not published, tried to secure Funck-Brenta-
no's support and again confronted Beuve-Mery. Beuve-Mery re-
plied that he was in sole charge of the paper and in case of
disagreement it was up to him to decide.
When Courtin's attempt to enlist Teitgen's support failed,
he told the minister he was resigning. He typed up a letter of
resignation which he handed in to Beuve-Mery, who accepted the
publication of the said article with some modifications. How-
ever, Beuve-Mery did not agree to future arbitration (sug-
gested) by Funck-Brentano
There was also talk of a project of arbitration by Francois
de Menthon, garde des sceaux, which never materialised (see
Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., pp. 70-71).
This was thought to be by some (including Courtin) the vice
fondamental of the edifice which was at the origin of insur-
mountable difficulties and which made Le Monde the personal
newspaper of Beuve-Mery.
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Courtin withdrew his resignation on 6 February 1945. Funck-
Brentano, who did not have his own service to run, was comple-
tely put aside (écarte) and his visits to the paper grew short-
er and less frequent. Legend has it that he left a raincoat
which rotted away on a coatpeg. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit.,
p.73.
(24)
Courtin wrote hundreds of articles in his field which he
gave to Beuve-Mery who, each time as a rule, made modifications
(to strengthen his authority but) which Courtin himself found
judicious. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 73.
De Gaulle retired from power on the 20 January 1946. He was
hostile to the new constitution of the Fourth Republic adopted
by referendum in October 1946. In April 1947 he created the
Rassemblement du Peuple Francais (RPF) as a war machine against
the system, creating an open break between Gaullism and the
Christian Democratic Movement as for de Gaulle the MRP, the
party of fidelity, had become the party of treason.
Had Funck-Brentano not been such an evanescent character in
Le Monde, the paper would have had more problems to cope with
as this would have transferred the tearful struggle that was
beginning between the two political allies which emerged from
the Resistance right to the very heart of the paper. See Jean-
neney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 83.
(25)
On the Left, the Communists for its alleged subordination to
trusts, especially Cognot who saw it as Le Temps ressuscite
dans toute sa gloire (National Assembly debates 7 March 1945.);
and L'Humanite which saw it as copie fidele du Temps. On the
Right of the political spectrum, it was accused of being the
assassin who stole the dead man's clothes and of having stolen
from Le Temps son immeuble, son materiel et sa clientele
(Francois de Wendel). Attacks also came from Combat (Camus),
Franc-Tireur (Olivier and Pia were against Courtin's articles)
and L'Aube (through M. Schuman) which saw Courtin's articles as
an aggression against de Gaulle.
(26)
The print Union did not spare the paper either and its
president, A.Bayet, protested against the number of copies
printed. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., pp. 74-77.
(27)
It was in dire need of the economic help provided by the
Marshall plan and was becoming more and more involved in the
Indo-Chinese conflict.
(28)
Meaning a non aligned policy. The concept used then was that
of "neutrality" as the word non-alignment did not exist.
(29)
In 1941 he had expressed ideas showing his desire for the
construction of a United States of Europe and the rationalisa-
tion and the organisation of the continent (see Esprit, March
1941.), some of which he advocated in his seminars and teach-
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ings at Uriage, had little to do with Hitler's dream. Not
wanting to opt for "Soviet totalitarianism" or for "American
capitalism", he argued for the logic, the desirability of an
organisation similar to that of the two countries, but politic-
ally and economically in between the two.
HBM deeply believed that it was possible for Europe to take
most of the measures of the Pact without it, l'essentiel des
attitudes qu'i/s auraient du prendre sans lui. See Jeanneney,
J.-N., op.cit., p.87.
(30)
A professor of medieval history, expert on St Thomas Aqui-
nas and Member of the Academy.
(31)
Having accused the USA of sacrificing France during the
First World War and Great-Britain during the Second, he threw
doubt on the possible intervention of the US in the defence of
Europe.
(32)
Beuve-Mery held similar views and so did journalists like
M.Duverger and G.Penchenier.
(33)
He was also persuaded that Germany would be re-armed " Qu'on
en convienne ou non, le re-armement de l'Allemagne est contenu
dans le pacte de l'Atlantique come le germe dans l'oeuf". The
logic of this philosophy was the inevitability of War. And that
logic, pushed to its conclusion would lead to outlawing the
Communists, and accepting "to become the 49th star on the Star
and Stripes and sending two representatives to the American
Senate".
If the above logic was to be rejected, then the adoption of
a peace strategy, the refusal of the escalation of armament,
the establishment of détente were seen as essential. Hence the
defiance shown towards the US and the adoption of detente
themes so dear to de Gaulle at a later date.
(34)
Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 93.
(35)
The Left accused the paper of cowardice. As for the Atlant-
ist side, their indignation led to comparing neutralism with
neo-vichysme. The neutralist campaign had many limitations
because it was running against the tide and was limited to
very few papers (France-Observateur, Esprit, Quinzaine and Le
Monde).
(36)
Thibau, J., op. cit., p. 270.
(37)
The conflict between Courtin and Beuve-Mery was left in a
state of "unstable status quo" after January 1945. Courtin was
very active in his field. Although he only came to the paper in
the morning, he wrote about 400 articles between 1945 and 1949.
Peace was preserved only by the relative incompetence de chacun
des deux hommes dans le domaine de predilection de l'autre. See
Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 103.
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(38)
He thought that for Beuve-Mery the soul of France would be
lost under the domination of American "individualism, egoism
and mercantilism." On the other hand, Soviet totalitarian
oppression, in his view, would not corrupt the soul of France
which would struggle and strive to maintain itself under that
system.
(39)
Such as Duverger, Vaussard, Penchenier, Fontaine etc.
(40)
He wrote only two aticles from August 1949 to July 1950 as
opposed to his 38 between 1 January and the end of July 1949.
(41)
And even threaten his possible resignation. He sought
P.H.Teitgen's advice (25 October 1949), but the latter, ap-
pointed Minister of Information in G.Bidault's government, sent
him to see J.Dupraz.
An exchange of correspondence between Beuve-Mery and Courtin
and the visit to Dupraz did not solve anything. Although he was
also unhappy with the various journalists' writings and with
Beuve-Mery's position, Dupraz reminded Courtin that the paper's
position was Beuve-Mery's responsibility and that the paper's
success was largely due to him. This confirmed Courtin in his
decision to leave the paper, and he asked for his name to be
withdrawn from the newspaper's heading from the 1 January 1950.
The paper obliged, but not without also removing the name of
Funck-Brentano. The whole affair degenerated and an exchange of
spiteful letters followed. See contents in Jeanneney, J.-N.,
op. cit., pp. 111-112.
(42)
He retired from his French teaching post and accepted one
at the University of Toronto.
(43)
An open letter (by Valdemar Gurian, who allegedly held
conversations with him) highlighted his defeatist attitude,
implying that France was incapable of defending herself and
that it was at the mercy of the Soviet Union. He accused him of
sabotaging efforts to resist the Soviets and causing a disser-
vice to his country and to the U.S. This was published in the
Catholic weekly Commonweal at the end of January 1951.
Gurian admitted later that it was only hearsay, but word had
already got round in France and some papers had already pub-
lished the letter in question. Gilson never secured his chair
uhonoris causa", supposedly because of his neglect of the
College de France, but really because of his political stance,
as the Right and various newspapers talked of leaks, treason
etc.. In those days of the McCarthy era, people even asked for
him to be stripped of his membership of the Academy.
(44)
On the 16 March 1951, Courtin, Funck-Brentano and Fromont
sent a letter to Beuve-Mery proposing to submit a resolution to
the General Meeting of the Company (Association) calling for
the reconstitution of the Board of Directors which would be
390
given the power to decide the political orientation of the
paper and the opportunity to publish or reject articles by
majority vote .
After various meetings and dealings between Dupraz and
Beuve-Mery on the 23 March, Dupraz sent Funck-Brentano a coun-
ter-proposal by Beuve-Mery suggesting monthly meetings of the
associates to make a posteriori observations.
Beuve-Mery sent a memorandum to the associates (24 March)
proposing to call a general meeting for 7 April without putting
that question on the agenda. Funck-Brentano protested, but
Beuve-Mery maintained that the Association had nothing to do
with a question of that nature.
Dupraz intervened again and on 7 April raised the question
against Beuve-Mery's will. He put forward a proposal for a
resolution giving more powers to the Board to restrict Beuve-
Mery's dominance. Beuve-Mery managed to gain time by accepting
the adoption of a less restrictive measure agreeing to the
reconstitution of the Board. In this way he postponed the final
solution, but conceded that the Association be called upon to
decide by majority in case of a disagreement between the mem-
bers of the Board of Directors.
(45)
He did this through the Agence Parisienne d'Information and
a letter (18-7-51, note P. 124 in Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit.)
sent to all MP's and newspaper editors in Paris. He alleged
that Le Monde had failed to be faithful to its vocation,
which was strictly to serve national policy, and stated that
he was no longer responsible for the paper.
(46)
In the letter offering his resignation of 27 July 1951
addressed to the Associates, Beuve-Mery did not give details of
the affair:
Je ne peux en effet êtaler ces guerelles intes-
tines dans les colonnes du Monde, sans nuire & mon
tour aux interéts moraux et matóriels dont vous
m'avez chargé, faciliter le jeu de nos adversaires
communs, provoquer la deception et peut-être le
decouragement parmi ceux qui, en France et hors de
France, ont accordê leur estime a un journal qu'ils
croyaient sans histoire.
(Especially when the paper was about to experience difficul-
ties in terms of prices, paper, wages, services etc.)
The resignation was to take effect from 1 November. The
letter and the possible dissolution of the company sent out
shockwaves to the readership. It even surprised Courtin and
Dupraz. Two extraordinary general Assembly meetings were set up
for 2 and 7 August 1951. They decided, after expressing their
gratitude to Beuve-Mery, not to dissolve the firm. Instead they
sought to create a new structure which included A.Catrice as
manager to deal with all administrative problems and a manage-
ment committe (comite de gestion) grouping Schloesing, Vignal
and Broisia. The problem here was to find a suitable director.
The search was unsuccessful, despite numerous political man-
oeuvres and various people being approached, including Pierre
Brisson and Raymond Aron mainly because of the incapability of
Courtin to find a successor, or to succeed himself. See Jeanne-
ney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 134.
(47)
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This initiative was launched by Esprit and Têmoignage Chrê-
tien, following an anonymous article in the latter which al-
leged that the loss of independence of the paper would lead to
a reactionary policy and accused public opinion of being amor-
phous. This article's insertion led to numerous letters being
to be sent to Le Monde.
(48)
Some of the journalists were quite faithful but others, like
Remy Roure, actually felt glad that he was leaving. The inter-
vention of the journalists seemed to be due to a feeling of
being left out (of behind the scene dealings determining the
fate of the paper). They wanted to state that the sucess of the
newspaper was due to the efforts of the team of journalists
that contributed to it.
(49)
They included Andre Fontaine, Edouard Sablier and Maurice
Duverger.
When he received the memo of resignation from Beuve-Mery,
Duverger proposed legal expertise and services to Beuve-Mery in
order to reverse the decision. He offered to help and said he
would be prepared to come to Paris if called. He was called to
Paris and approached Jean Monnet (architect of French Planning
after the War, who was to become one of the Founding Fathers of
the European Community) to make the Director change his mind
(Monnet had already seen Beuve-Mery on 31 July).
A. Joly, specialist of public limited companies (SARL), was
approached for advice and he found that Beuve-Mery, with the
faithful support of Suzanne Forfer, had the legal minorite de
blocage (55 shares) sufficient to prevent him from being dis-
missed from his job as manager ( the legal requirement is 3/4)
before 27 July 1951.
Using his expertise, legal texts and a thorough search of
jurisprudence, he found that Beuve-Mery had received the au-
thorisation to publish personally on 30 November 1944. The
company was constituted afterwards by an act of 11 December
1944. His resignation and it's subsequent acceptance by the
assembly did not affect his right to publish. He could, if the
conditions did not satisfy him, prevent the publication of the
paper or veto anybody appointed as Director.
Moreover, he found that articles 7 and 8 of the 26 August
1944 decree obliged newspapers to be managed by one manager or
Director, and prohibited any collective management. So in fact
the decision of 7 August made by the assembly of the paper,
installing a comitê de direction with a president who was not
manager and who was not the only director, was illegal; and
this could result in fines and imprisonment.
(50)
On the first meeting there was a row in Beuve-Mery's office,
and the session was suspended until the next day.
(51)
A campaign of signatures was organised in Caen, Lyon, Bor-
deaux and Strasbourg. In Strasbourg 63 signatures were collec-
ted from university lecturers, five of whom were deans and a
declaration of support was obtained from 87 secondary school
teachers. In Lyon the signatures of 25 university professors,
61 secondary school teachers and 488 students were gathered.
Readers' committees were created as well as a federation of
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those committees was set up, whose secretary was Jacques Nar-
bonne, a well known and distinguished lecturer at the Sorbonne.
He sent a letter to the Director in the name of the federation
(2 December 51), claiming that the readers had a say and re-
fused to be treated like merchandise. Informal meetings and
gatherings were organised on 11 December 1951 in Paris which
expressed emotional support (See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p.
150). The letter from Narbonne was never published, but it
would have made a significant impact if Courtin had been in a




There are different versions on how this came into the hands
of the paper. The role played by the C.I.A. and the American
Ambassador against Le Monde has been stressed by some and it is
even alleged that it was a trap set by the Secret Services. See
Thibau, J., op. cit., p. 9.
(54)
It was preceded by some introductory lines by J. Bloch-
Morhange stating that the report had been written between 10
and 17 January 1952, then sent to James Seldon, secretary to
the National Security Council. It was alleged that it had been
intercepted by the British Military Documentary Services in the
United States and transmitted to the First Lord of the Admir-
alty on 24 January 1952. Bloch-Morhange added that he had made
a copy but left out technical and military detail.
The reports made several points:
- The war against the Soviet Union is inevitable between
then and 1960. 52 divisions would last three days in front of
112 Russian divisions, and 150.000 Russian paratroopers could
cut England from Scotland. The analysis throws doubts on the
political, economic and military steadfastedness of the regimes
against subversion and attack.
- The American counterattack would be difficult from the
North pole to the Atlantic but possible from the south, ie. the
Mediterranean, which would become the centre of operations and
this would leave Western Europe temporarily under Soviet domi-
nation.
- The alignments of the oil-producing states around the
Mediterranean were crucial and, because of the troubles caused
by British and French policies in the area, it was up to the
US to play the Arab card, to try and secure special agreements
and to reconcile them with Great Britain and France.
(55)
It had been written by Commander Antoni Talerico in an
American naval review, The US Naval Institute Proceedings, in
September 1950.
(56)
There was also talk of a conspiracy, of a plot against Le
Monde. Other reports, stating that it had also been proposed to
France-Soir and other newspapers, undermine the plot theory.
(57)
For some the newspaper had lost its reputation of serious-
393
ness and had taken a light if not tendentious approach to its
publications, and Fechteler was the proof.
After praising the quality of the paper, Edouard Helsey in
La France Independante ( 21 June) commented that:
On ne rencontre pas dans le journal de men-
songe formel-hormis peut-étre dans la rubrigue
financiere- mais tout est dispose de maniere a
egarer notre jugement. Avec de menus fragments
d'information partiellement exacts, on compose une
mosaigue fallacieuse bien faite pour tromper les
yeux mal exerces.
For Raymond Aron, Le Monde was playing the "Communist game."
There were many other comments. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit.,
p. 164.ff.
The affair remained a piece & conviction and a reproach to
the paper (to Viansson-Pontd) even in 1977. The error consisted
in not admitting the mistake. However, on 20 May Le Monde
admitted that the source of the report was unknown. There was
even talk of involvement of the British secret service and of
an attempt by the Gaullists to sabotage the paper.
(58)
Beuve-Mery said of him:




After this episode there were further squabbles within the
paper and Rend Courtin, Pierre Froment and Jean Vignal found
cause to express their disagreement with the policy of the
paper.
(60)
Rumours to that effect had circulated all around Paris.
Bonis-Charancle had written to Courtin (on 20 July) during
the crisis of 1951, after the publication of the communiqué
(see above) but before his resignation. According to the let-
ter, a group was being formed to set up a newspaper (by the
Algeriens les plus excites).
Robert Poulaine, journalist of Le Temps before the War,
tried to gather some funds for this purpose, which involved
North African, coal and milk interests. In April 1952, Claude
Bourdet of France-Observateur published an article stating that
Le Temps renait dans la houille et le lait . There was a link
also with Paul Marchandeau, former pre-war Radical minister.
P. Boegner, former director of Paris Match, received an
invitation through A. Fabreluce to see Antoine Pinay in
November 1954. Pinay wanted to know if it were possible and if
he was interested in launching a new newspaper based on "Chris-
tian Occidentalism". Boegner did not say no. Pinay put him in
touch with Robert Andre and Georges Morissot, who appeared to
be heading the project.
(61)
Jean Noel Jeanneney covered this episode in his Le Temps de
Paris, histoire d'un fiasco (1956), in L'Histoire, No 4, Sep-
tember, 1978, pp. 41-49.
(62)
The episode is well documented in references (given above
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and in Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 177ff) which give details
of the paper's backers and shareholders.
(63)
He learnt for instance that North Africa was in for 160
million, and that the project was blessed by A. Pinay.
(64)
He had been lured away from L'Aurore by P. Boegner, D.
Canavaggio (from Laval's entourage), La Peyronie (former head
of cabinet for Philippe Henriot), but also people like A.
011iver, Gaullist and famous resistant, M.Pol Fouchet, P.
Desgraupes, Joel le Tac (compagnon de la Liberation), Paris-
Match's special correspondent in Algeria ( a pro American who
worked with Vichy then the Resistance).
(65)
Le Temps c'est de l'argent (21/4/56).
(66)
They first of all wanted an anti-Monde, to lure away those
members of Le Monde who had come from Le Temps. The paper also
had to take away some of Le Monde's readers to survive. The
possibility of not being successful led some to think that it
might have to be a morning paper. Pinay's aim was to influence
the thinking in favour of an evening paper despite P. Boegner's
objections.
This strategy was launched on 10 December 1955. Discus-
sions took place with Paris-Presse of Franpar (Marcel Dassault-
Hachette). It was agreed that the best time to launch the paper
was February or March, early enough to enable the paper to
take off before the summer holiday. An agreement with L'Aurore
secured the printing in the premises of Boussac's paper, 100
Rue de Richelieu. On 15 March the first stage was initiated but
80% of the personnel were not installed until 6 April.
(67)
At the meeting of the board on 3 April 56, it was decided to
set aside 60 million from its total of 117 million francs to be
devoted to a publicity launch. See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit.,
pp. 185-6.
A deficit of 1575 million was taken into account up to
April 1957, after deduction of the first 175 m., around 115 m.
a month. All other daily newspapers, except Combat, refused to
advertise it on the eve of D Day.
(68)
The laboratory had not yet been installed when the paper
folded up. It had a tabloid format and the quality of the
writing was poor. Next to photographs one could find compact
editorials to compete with Le Monde. It gave the impression of
"improvisation, disorder and almost amateurism." See Jeanneney,
J.-N., op. cit., p. 187.
(69)
For six hours in Paris in its first edition it mistook a




See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 187.
(71)
From 350,000, on the first day to 285,000, on the second, to
251,000, on the third, 185,000 on the fifth and 142,000 at the
end of April. On 16 June the number of copies sold in the whole
of France was 107,385.
The average sales in Paris went down from 45,000 copies in
May to 38,000 copies on 5 June (20 pages), 31,000 copies on the
16 June (16 pages ).
( 72 )
See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 196.
(73)
These included France-Soir which put aside 700 million
francs to deal with the situation. That sum represented roughly
the same income as Le Temps de Paris's 800 million.
(74)
An important reporter of the paper, Jean Couvreur, was
approached in 1950 by another journalist, Roger Lutignaux.
Acting in the name of big financial groups attempting to end to
the "crypto-communist campaign", he suggested that Jean Couv-
reur should take part in an internal coup against Beuve-Mery,
telling him that there had already been inside contacts (See
Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., pp. 98-99). Couvreur asked for
some time to find out who the insiders were and then refused to
take part.
(75)
One of those journalists, E. Delaye, is said to have asked
ritually every morning on arrival, referring to Beuve-Mery:
Alors quelles nouvelles de l'affameur?
)(76
He was an important press baron, who approached him in
November 1951 and told him of the group's desire to work with
him or pension him off.
(77)
See Jeanneney, J.-N., op.cit., p. 95.
(78)
It is worth noting that G.Hostert, Une campagne neo-
colonialists du Monde: Indochine 1945-46, Les cies du monde,
1983, confirms this attitude in the paper. See p. 262 ff. by
comparison to twenty years later in 1966.
(79)
On 17 January 1948 in Une semaine dans le monde (weekly
publication which complemented the daily and subseqently stop-
ped publication).
(80)
A personal report on the military situation in Indochina
given by General Revers in 1947 to the Defence Minister, Pier-
re-Henri Teitgen, which was leaked and subsequently used by the
Viet Minh in their radio broadcast.
(81)
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Especially with reports from Charles Favrel, who is alleged
to have made the paper an organ of struggle against the war in
Indochina and to have suggested negotiations and disengagement.
(82)
This is dealt with in a forthcoming publication. "Le Monde
and the Algerian war: international perspectives".
(83)
The case put forward by the paper was the following.
From 1 November 1951 (1951 was also a year of paper ration-
ing: see Esprit, November 1951, pp. 659-661.) and for five suc-
cessive years, Le Monde was sold at 18 francs, that was 3
francs more than most other papers but 2 francs less than two
specialised newspapers, L'Equipe and Information, They had
sold at 20 francs for a long time. It was stated that Le Mon-
de's price was a little odd (some purchasers never waited for
the change thereby always leaving/and always left 2 francs). It
was fixed to suit (menager) certain categories of readers with
modest incomes, such as students and pensioners. The slightly
higher price on average was due to a long established tradi-
tion. A memorandum addressed later to the Prime Minister by
Beuve-mery highlighted the fact that Le Temps was sold at 15
centimes in 1914 whereas all other newspapers were sold at 5
centimes. Around the end of 1939 that gap had diminished (0.75
fr against 0.50 fr for the others). The authorisation of 30
November 1944 by the Minister of Information stipulated that
the price of the paper Le Monde was 3 francs compared with only
2 francs for the others. The higher price was also said to be
justified by its quality, by the numerous correspondents abroad
and by the fact that it never resorted to commercial practices
such as using photographs, competitions and cartoons.
(84)
Beuve-Mery informed the Government of the price increase
planned for 1 October on 27 September 1956. Ramadier was not
insensitive to the arguments presented, but on 19 July he had
already signed an "arréte" blocking any derogation to the rules
imposed on prices and commercial margins. (See Jeanneney, J.-
N., op. cit., p. 199.)
(85)
The Pinay government had previously established a mobile
scale between the price index and the SMIG introduced by the
law of 10 July 1952.
(86)
The argument on the side of Le Monde was that the 213 price
index was based on 1949, that it did not really reflect prices
as some paper products were not included in it nor were the
bonuses given to workers, that Le Monde had negotiated an
agreement with the Print Union, and that other papers would not
use the excuse of Le Monde to increase their own prices.
(87)
Outlining the specificity of a commodity like a newspaper,
which is of the same nature as the telephone or a television
licence, Le Monde questioned whether there was strict interpre-
tation of the law or abuse of powers in applying the price
freeze to newspapers.
In 1947, time of price freezes and even forced price de-
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creases, exceptions had been made for newspapers. Le Monde
asked A. de Lambad6re (Professor of Law at the University of
Paris) for advice. His interpretation was that freedom of the
press was being put at risk and that the government was using
its authority to maintain the price of a newspaper at a level
where it would not be possible for it to survive, without
resorting to means which might alienate its independence.
(88)
The opposition to Social-Molletisme was resented even more
when it came from moderate bourgeois circles. This was Beuve-
Mery's viewpoint, and he did not hesitate to compare Guy Mol-
let's methods to those of Colonel Peron who had attempted to
rid himself of the liberal Argentine newspaper, La Prensa. (In
Quand la France est gouvernee, 8/11/56, p. 1 ff., article dealt
with later.)
(89)
Appellez-le Le Monde de Paris et augmentez les prix. Sugges-
tion made to A. Fontaine, see Jeanneney, J.-N., op.cit., p.
202.
(90)
The accounts of the paper published in 1956 showed that Le
Monde still had a surplus of 500, 000 Fr on an income of more
than 1 milliard.
(91)
Many French newspapers criticised the government's position,
including Le Canard Enchainê, Temoignage Chrêtien, France-
Observateur, Juvenal, Rivarol.
There were also protests by the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme
(18 November 1956); and the The Economist wondered if the
government was going to succeed where money had failed (11
November 1956). See Jeanneney, J.-N., op. cit., p. 203.
(92)
Growing weary of the independence of the paper, and thinking
that that kind of support might be too high a price to pay in
terms of intellectual subjection (in a letter to Escarpit) and
would provide a very shaky foundation on which to rest the
financial stability of the paper, Beuve-Mery thanked the read-
ers for their concern but did not encourage them.
(93)
This is very important given the high degree of centralisa-
tion of a country like France and the fact that most of the
influential people, economically politically and in social and
cultural terms, reside in that part of France.
(94)
"Executives, businessmen, industrialists, people of private
or independent means, those retired and the professional clas-
ses".
(95)





(...) l'Universite, la Magistrature, l'Administration, l'




Thibau, J., op. cit., p. 8, estimated that one or two hours
a day were devoted to reading it to find out what to think of
current affairs.
(100)
There were 22,082 copies distributed for sale in North
Africa on top of the 1143 regular suscribers the paper had,
making a total of 23,225. Some 19,803 went to the French Union.
Le Monde sold about 19,803 abroad (about 1/10), 80% of which
was destined to Europe.
(101)




Mouvement de Liberation du Peuple: Les Maitres de la Presse,
1956, pp. 53-54.
(104)
In terms of importance. In terms of circulation, it was the
third of the evening papers and the seventh daily in 1956 in
Paris behind France-Soir (1,380,141), Le Parisien Libere
(793,014), Le Figaro (491,338), L'Aurore (441,684), L'Humanite
(204,513), Paris Presse 200,760, but ahead of La Croix, Liber-
ation, Franc-Tireur, Combat, L'Information, Les Echos and Le
Populaire.
(105)








On one occasion these views caused problems for the paper.
He was defended by the Director of the newspaper (see Chapter
12), but this could have more to do with Duverger's support for
Hubert Beuve-Mery during the 1951 crisis.
(110)
Le Monde had no records of Jaeger J.A., J. Marey and J.
Silvert, also occasional contributors who wrote for the paper
earlier on in the Fourth Republic.
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(111)
The allegiance of a paper can be political and not finan-
cial when this newspaper's aim is the defence of a particular
ideology or a clearly defined conception of a party, the coun-
try or the world. In this case any deviation is seen as a
betrayal of these accepted premises and tantamount to treason.
This obedience of the paper can be directed at a party or a
government or even a church.
(112)
But realistic about what is expected from its journalists,
since the paper is ready to tolerate their cultural heritage,
their moral values, their feelings and their passions.
(113)
Plaquette du Journal, Supplement aux Dossiers et Documents
du Monde, Dócembre 1977, p. 1.
(114)
The paper demands that its journalists free themselves of
any prejudice: s'emancipent de leurs prejuges, de leur aprior-
isme, non de l'heritage culturel....
(115)
Durieux, E., et. al., op. cit., p. 100.
(116)
J.Fauvet, Le Souci de l'Independence, Editorial, 27/3/77,










See Paul Balta, Vingt-trois siecles de rebellion, In Le
Nouvel Observateur, 1992, op. cit., pp. 26-27, and the standard
works spanning the whole colonial period, cited below.
(2)
Horne, A. covers this traumatic period of Algerian history
in A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, Macmillan, Lon-
don, 1977.
(3)
The Arab invasion having the most impact, See C.A., Julien,
Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord, de la conquete arabe A 1830,
Payot, 1952, (SNED, 1978), pp. 7 & 303, about the indelebile
Islamic cachet of North Africa.
(4)
Balta P., op. cit.
(5)
Even before modern interpretations of that concept, as we
are talking of a time when the territorial limits of major
European countries had not yet been defined.
This way of thinking is often questioned by French coloni-
sers. They thought they had created Algeria and were therefore
entitled to hold on to it, implementing what policies they saw
fit. See Prochaska's discussion of the various interpretative
trends of Algerian history in  The Making of French Algeria, 
Colonialism in Bone 1870-1920, CUP, Cambridge, 1990, Chapter
1., especially pp. 1-6.
(6)
Julien retraced the history of North Africa from the early
times to the Arab Conquest in Julien, C.A. op. cit.
(7)
It was integrated into Mediterranean civilisations for
centuries even before the Arab and Turkish domination. Richard
Brace, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Prentice Hall, Englewoods,
Cliffs New Jersey, 1964, pp. 20-21 & 32.
If we examined the history of the various indigenous dy-
nasties which run the Maghrib in C.A. Julien, (1952) we find
that on several occasions the three Maghrib countries came very
close to achieving the status of cultural, social and political
entities long before some of the modern nations of Europe, such
as Italy and Germany, were formed. It may be useful to recall
that France only emerged as a nation state in the 16th century,
whereas Italian and German unifications were achieved much
later in 1870-1871.
8)
Julien, C.A., Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord: des origines a
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la conquéte arabe, Payot, Paris, 1956, p. 31.
(9)
See Laroui, A., The History of the Maghrib. Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977, pp. 27-90, and Le
Tourneau, R., Evolution de l'Afrique du Nord musulmane, Colin,
Paris, 1962, p. 15.
(10)
Charles Andre Julien, academic, historian and author of a
number of books on the subject, was secretary general of "Haut
Comite mediterraneen et de l'Afrique du Nord". Ageron, C.-R.,
has also had many contributions in the field. See below.
(11)
Julien, C.-A., (1956), op. cit., p. 49. There is, I think,
a fundamental contradiction in this statement between the
"ineptitude for independence" on the one hand and the steadfast
"body and soul" and lack of impact of outside civilisations on
the other, which could be explained by the fact that it is
largely due to the resistance of this part of the world and its
contemporaneous civilisations to outside ones. This illustrates
its very desire, if not its capability for, independence.
(12)
Abun-Nasr, J., A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic per-
iod, C.U.P., Cambridge, 1987. See also Chapter 6, in C.A.Ju-
lien, (1952), op. cit., p. 151 ff.
(13)
Two associate family businesses, Bacri and Busnach, had
provided wheat for the Napoleonic armies but had not been paid
in full. These two families persuaded the Dey that they could
not pay their debts towards him because of the failure of the
French government to pay them and asked him in a way to connect
the two questions in his dealings with the French officials.
See Julien, C.A., Histoire de l'A1Orie contemporaine, PUF,
Paris 1964, p. 21, and W.G. Andrews, French politics and Alger-
ia, Appeton Century Crofts, New York, 1962, p. 1..
The French consul at that time was Deval, who was thought to
be corrupt ( the fact that he enjoyed a lower salary than other
consuls in other parts of the world might be part of the expla-
nation. See Contamine, H.,Diplomatie et Diplomates sous la
Restauration: 1814-1830, Hachette, Paris, 1970, pp. 258 and
281) and whose replacement the Dey had asked for, for the well-
being of the relations between the two countries. On 27 April
1827 the Dey asked Deval about the long-awaited reply he had
not received from the French government, to which Deval an-
swered (in the words of the Dey) by "des paroles outrageantes
pour la religion musulmane, attentatoires a l'honneur de Sa
Majestè protectrice du Monde". The Dey then (in the words of
Deval) "se levant de son siege, il me porta avec le manche de
son chasse-mouches trois coups violents sur le corps et me dit
de me retirer." See Julien, C.A.,(1964), op. cit., p. 27.
The Dey also declared that he would no longer tolerate the
presence of a single French cannon on Algerian soil, that the
French merchants would no longer benefit from any privileges
and that they could enjoy from then on only the same rights as
the other merchants. See Barbour, N., A survey of North West
Africa, OUP, Oxford, 1962, p. 42.
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(14)
Julien, C.A., Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord de la conquete
arabe a 1830, Payot, Paris, 1952, (and SNED Algiers, 1978), p.
298.
(15)
Lane-Poole, S., The Barbary Corsairs, Unwin , 1896, P. 301.
The Dey, strongly convinced of his own right and encouraged by
the discreet approbation of the British Consul, refused to make
official apologies to satisfy the French demands.
(16)
Serval, Pierre, La tenebreuse histoire de la prise d'Alger,
La Table Ronde, Paris, 1965 and 1980, provide a lengthy account
in his Chapters 9-11, pp. 183-285.
(17)
Ageron, C.R., Histoire de l'Algerie contemporaine, PUF,
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This only satisfied a small elite anyway and allowed the :
l'exercice des droits politiques des citoyens
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From 27,7 million quintals in 1939 down to 9,3 million in
1940 and to 11,2 million in 1942. It rose to 15,5 million
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pays. On s'en rendait mal compte du fait que les
Musulmans ne s'exprimaient guere d'abord parce qu'on
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d'action souterraine.
See Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 382.
(122)
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Barbour, N., op. cit., p. 206.
Relying on an argument developed by Dr Josue de Castro,
when the table is bare, the bed is fruitful", Barbour main-
tains that fecundity is no proof of prosperity and that the
fact that living standards of Algerian Muslims had been depres-
sed did not prevent the birth rate from raising even higher.
See Barbour, N., op. cit., p. 206.
(124)
In 1871 there were 5 cwt of cereals available to every
inhabitant of Algeria. The average figure in the middle of the
twentieth century was down to 2 cwt.
Ibid., p. 244.
However, there were great disparities in the income distri-
bution among the population. The situation benefited very few
and was to the disadvantage of the majority.
(125)
See Barbour, N., op. cit., p. 241, and also Nouschi,A., op.
cit., p. 124, who stated:
Le contraste entre les cultivateurs europeens
et les fellahs demeure aussi important en 1954 qu'en
1939, malgrê les efforts de l'administration pour
modifier les donnees de l'agriculture tradition-
nelle. L'augmentation de la population entre 1939
et 1954 a certes contribuê a rendre la crise plus
aigue mais, surtout, les solutions envisagóes sont
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(126)
Nouschi, A., op. cit., p. 114.
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Le Tourneau, R., op. cit., p. 381.
(128)
Commenting on that period in 1962, Le Tourneau, R., op.
cit., p. 382, wrote:
Personne ou presque ne consentait a prêter
l'oreille a l'une des revendications essentielles
des Musulmans, peut-étre leur revendication essen-
tielle: le respect de leur dignite d'hommes, la
reconnaissance en fait de l'egalite qu'on leur
reconnaissait [for less than ten years]  en droit.
(129)
Montagne, R., in Le Monde quoted by Martin, C., op. cit.,
pp. 359-362.
(130)
Usually seen as an early sociologist of the area who de-
scribed the inhabitants of the Central Maghrib (Algeria) as
<assabyyun al Akl> (having a difficult character). See Paul
Balta, op. cit., p. 26.
(131)
They were pushed onto poorer and poorer lands, having to eke
out a difficult living, and able to work only a matter of
months (if not days) in the year. Given the high birth rate and
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born was higer and the families were larger. However, the lack
of industrialisation, the paucity of jobs and increased mech-
anisation of the traditional agricultural sector, all led to a
very poor standard of living for the indigenous population.
This was aggravated by the Second World War and its aftermath.
See Aron, R., Les origines de la Guerre de l'Algerie,
Fayard, Paris, 1962.
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Ageron, C-R, Modern Algeria, A history from 1830 to the
Present, Translated by M. Brett, C. Hurst & Co, London, 1991,
p. 105 ff.
(133)
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n'ont jamais voulu admettre que, depuis les ori-
gines, l'Algerie a toujours ete une terre rebelle.
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teur, Numero special, op. cit., p. 27.
(134)
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Messali), a third force was created (CRUA) in Spring 1954 to
unite the party, with the agreement of 22 former OS members.
These included Boudiaf, Bitat and Didouche Mourad, members of
the MTLD in Cairo (as well as Khider, Ait Ahmed and Ben Bella)
and the Kabyle rebels led by Krim Belkacem.
See Opperman, T., Le Probleme algerien, donnees historiques,
politiques et juridiques, Maspero, Paris, 1959 & 1961, op.
cit., pp. 109-110.
(135)
Balta, P., op.cit., p. 27.
(136)
The first night of the war saw about 70 coordinated inci-
dents (bomb attacks, assaults on police stations and government
buildings as well as arson attacks and destruction across the
breadth of the whole country). See Paillat, C., "La liquida-
tion" 20 ans qui dechirerent la France, T. 2, Laf font, Paris,
1972, pp. 142-147, for the full list.
(137)
They announced that their forces amounted to 25.000 men,
though it is thought that this figure is excessive. See O'Bal-
lance, E., The Algerian Insurrection (1954-1962), Faber &
Faber, London, 1967, p. 109.
The FLN successfully divided its organisation to cover the 6
Willayas which made up the whole of the territory. Ibid. pp.
53-55.
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O'Ballance, E., op. cit., p. 39.
(140)
Ageron, C-R, (1991), op. cit., p. 108.
(141)
This did not mean that the Algerians were rejecting all
forms of dialogue, as, indeed, they remained open to any offer
coming from the French, as long as it was based on the accep-
tance of the principle of self-determination.
(142)
Indeed, thoughout all French governments, from P. Mend6s-
France, to Pierre Pflimlin through to Edgar Faure, Guy Mollet,
Bourges-Maunoury and Felix Gaillard, the uprising was consid-
ered by all of them to be an attack by French citizens (civil-
ians) against their own government, citizens who, by their very
rebellion, became outlaws. See Opperman, T., op. cit., p. 135
ff., and Ageron, C.-R., (1991), op. cit., pp. 108- 109.
(143)
Some were released after the appointment of Chevallier who
had become Minister of Defence.
The result of that repression was that some left the coun-
try, while the Centralists joined the FLN and the staunch
Messalists the MNA. See Ageron, C.-R., (1991), op. cit., p.
108-109.
(144)
See Opperman, T., op. cit., p. 136.
(145)
The figure for French troops are given by Opperman, T., op.
cit., pp. 136-137. He also stated that, when Ben boulaid was
captured by French troops in Tunisia, a report found on him
indicated that the insurgents were less than 359. Ibid.
(146)
It did not make up for the shortage of teachers but that was
a definite improvement. See O'Balance, op. cit., p. 53.
(147)
Soustelle's appointment was initially resented by the set-
tlers. However, by the time his appointment ended, he was one
of their most admired proponents.
(148)
These included the creation of Social centres to provide the
more impoverished Muslim communities with basic technical
assistance", and slightly wider access to junior administrative
jobs for Muslims.
Ageron, C-R, (1991), op. cit., p. 109.
(149)
Opperman, T., op. cit., p. 137.
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However, the military effort failed to put an end to the
activities of small "terrorist groups". Instead, it managed to
help swell their ranks, mainly through maltreatment of "sus-
pects".
Ageron, C.-R., (1991), op. cit., p.109.
(151)
Footnote 5 in Opperman, T, op. cit., p. 137
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See Opperman, T., op. cit., p. 138.
(153)
See Chapter 5 and the illuminating study made by SCHLESSIN-
GER, Philip, Media. State and Nation: Political Violence and
Collective Identities  , Sage Publications, London, 1991.
(154)
See Andoque, Nicolas d', 1955-1962, Guerre et Paix en
Algerie, 1'6popee silencieuse des SAS, S.P.L, Paris, 1977.
These were reminiscent of the Bureaux arabes and local
irregulars troops (Mobile Rural Police Groups GMPR) reminiscent






See O'Ballance, E., op. cit., p. 61.
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Ageron, C.-R., (1991), op. cit., p. 111.
(159)
O'Ballance, E., op. cit., p. 68.
(160)
The opposition between MNA and FLN culminated in the mas-
sacres of Melouza, which the French were able to exploit on two
fronts. Internationally, they were able to draw world attention
to the "horrendous crimes of the FLN"; and internally they were
able to gain rebels such as Bellounis to turn their arms
squarely against the FLN with the help and support of the
French army.
Bellounis managed to hold the Djelfa region against the FLN
for a short time. For this episode, see Montagnon, P., La
guerre d'Algêrie, Gênese et engrenage d'une trag6die, 1954-
1962, Pygmalion, Paris, 1984, pp. 239-245.
(161)
This is partly due to the FLN's insistence that other groups
had to disband prior to joining the movement (MTLD/MNA, PCA).
(162)
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Evidently, when difficult decisions had to be taken to
eliminate potential or actual collaborators, this was resorted
to by the Resistance without much of the blame being pinned on
it.
(164)
O'Ballance, T., op. cit., p. 62.
It is also stressed that ALN leaders were not interested in
putting their ideology over to the Muslim people in order to
enlist "their willing help" for the first 14 months ( Ibid.).
The plan was said to have been that there would first have to
be terror combined with a little persuasion and re-education
before that terror element would gradually be lessened.
The FLN was said to use preaching, persuading, threatening
and reasoning to influence the people. See O'Ballance, T., op.
cit., p. 63.
(165)
O'Ballance, T., op. cit., p 62.
(166)
O'Ballance, E., op. cit., pp. 62-3.
(167)




Opperman, T., Op. cit., p. 110.
(170)
Ibid., pp. 110-111.
If any further proof is needed, it could clearly be demon-
strated that the movement was basically unaffected by the
arrest of the top leaders in the hijacking operation of 22
October 1956. See below and Opperman, T., op. cit., p. 111.
(171)
See Harbi, M., La Guerre commence en Algerie, Editions
Complexes, Paris, 1984, p. 24.
(172)
He does in Courribre, Y., Les Fils de la Toussaint, Fayard,
Paris, 1968, p. 379. See Harbi, M., op. cit., p. 35.
Harbi argued that the FLN acquired a truly national dimen-
sion in relation to previous insurrectional movements.
Harbi, M., op. cit, pp. 20-21.
(173)
See Ageron, C-R, op. cit., p. 111.
(174)
In the motion of the "61" passed by the Muslim representa-
tives on 26 September 1955. Ibid.
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(175)




The number of dêpartements increased and there was a move
towards the integration of vast territories of the Sahara into
the governement of Algeria, despite plan being prepared for a
French Sahara.
(178)
The new statute of Algeria was also to be devised according
to initiatives taken by the army, playing upon ethnic divi-
sions.
(179)
Ageron, C-R, (1991), op. cit., p. 113.
(180)
It was said that a message was sent too late for the exter-
nal delegation to attend and that the external delegation of
the FLN was deliberately kept in ignorance of the time and





The name of these members were not made public. Ibid., p.
72.
(183)
Relating to the standardisation, ranks, distribution of
power at regional level with each colonel, head of willaya,
having an advisory council to help him. It also decided on
payment of salaries to soldiers, with women receiving the same
rate of pay as men. See O'Ballance, E., op. cit., pp. 72-74.
(184)
The combatants voted to retain collegial leadership and laid
down the aim of the armed struggle as being a single, demo-
cratic, socialist Algerian Republic.
(185)
It was mistakenly stated that the plane was flying over
Algeria, but this was not the case.
(186)
Another confusing element is that Monet is alleged to have
sent a representative to Tunis, for which the plane was bound,
to discuss with Ben Bella.
(187)
Later, at his trial, Colonel Gardes disclosed that while




O'Ballance, E., op. cit., pp. 76-77.
As a result of the arrest, the FLN announced on 25 October
1956 that Tewfik El Madani, Secretary General of the Ulêmas,
who joined the FLN in April 1956, was appointed leader of the
external delegation in replacement of Ben Bella.
Ibid., p. 76.
(189)
Ageron, C.-R., (1991), op. cit., p 114.
(190)
Ibid, p. 78 ff.
(191)
For instance, 105 insurgents on 27 September 1956 in a fight
with their troops [O'Ballance, op. cit., p. 78-79] near Fort Mc
Mahon and another 50 near Bou Saada on 18 November and 27
November, 23 killed near Tebessa and 70 killed and 56 taken
prisoner on 9 December on the edge of the Sahara, 47 more
killed on 22 December in Tebessa. The French casualties were
said to have been comparatively light in these actions.
Due to a lack of arms and ammunition, some of the FLN troops
began to surrender.
(192)
O'Ballance, E., op. cit., p. 79.
(193)
Droz, B. & Lever, E., Histoire de la guerre d'Algerie,
Seuil, Paris, 1982, op. cit., p. 129.
(194)
Amedee Froger was the symbol of French settlers'rule in
Algeria and the defence of their interests. He was the head of
the strong anti-reformist organisation of Algerian Mayors,
which resisted the implementation of any liberal policy in the
colony.
(195)
There was, for instance, a bomb left in a Muslim cinema in
the Casbah and a bazooka shot was fired at the offices of the
Commander-in-Chief, General Salan.
(196)
Ballance, E., op. cit., p. 80.
(197)
In June 1958, a copy of El Moujahid stated that he had died
of wounds the previous month while inspecting troops, whereas
he was deliberately eliminated by other members of the FLN
leadership. See O'Ballance, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
(198)




The purpose behind the law was to break up Algeria into
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autonomous territories and dêpartements, killing Algerian
nationalism by playing upon provincialism and ethnic loyalties
(divide et impere). But since it was based on a single college,
it angered the Europeans of Algeria and the French Right. It
was thrown out on 30 September by the French parliament, and
subsequently amended to enable the formation of a Conseil des
Communautós for each community alongside the future federal
institutions, which would function in parallel with the Con-




A previous study was carried out on Le Monde's coverage of
Algeria between 1944 and 1954 by T.Firchon, La Question algdri-
enne d'aprês Le Monde (dissertation supervised by PA Martel
(4H/26) and submitted to Montpellier University, 1970). Even if
useful, his work has been, nonetheless, problematic in many
respects. A critical assessment of his findings and methods
will be undertaken in the examination of Le Monde's coverage of
the period which follows below.
(2)
Naegelen is said to have progressively been given full
support by Le Monde, with the paper becoming more aware of the
problems of the indigenous population. Firchon claimed that the
change was verified by A.Chatelain's study (Chatelain, A.,
op.cit., p.90), which identified a more neutralist approach by
the paper around 1951 (a year in which the paper lived through
one of its more traumatic crises. See Chapter 2).
partisan três convaincu, sinon inconditionnel
de l'attitude des Europeens en AlOrie Le Monde
devient plus neutre
He actually confuses the issue here because he tries to
infer that the "neutralist" battle of Le Monde advocating an
increasingly more independent stance from the US could have had
as a result a more neutral attitude towards the Algerian pro-
blem, without advancing any proof. As illustrated earlier in
Chapter 2, the "neutralist battle" had nothing to do with
Algeria.
(3)
As Firchon pointed out, J.Silvert, Le Monde's reporter on
North Africa, had seen the inevitability of some long-term
developments in Algeria. The situation there was compared to
that of Egypt, which rid itself from all foreign influence and
any contact with France, and which had fuelled the fire of
nationalism. See for instance Le Monde (16/2/1945).
(4)
The paper was aware that, though they might have known of
the North African's aspirations, the Europeans did not always
think that these were desirable and inevitable. See Firchon,
T., op. cit., p. 2 and Le Monde 13/2/45.
(5)
However, the events of 16 May 1945 (see Chapter 3) led to
hundreds of victims blamed on fauteurs de trouble, the "PPA",
the "Anus du Manifeste". The number of victims in those events,
1500 according to the Ministry of Interior (Le Monde
20/7/1945), was the only substantial information given to the
readers. After that, no mention of Algeria was made except for
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the debates in the regular Consultative Assembly, of which
large extracts were provided by Le Monde.
(6)
See Le Monde 3/11/1954.
It should be pointed out that Edouard Sablier had only
recently been demobilised and been in France only for a few
weeks and started working for the paper only six months later
(15 November), when he was appointed as Middle East correspon-
dent (See Sablier, E., op. cit., p. 11). It is very surprising,
however, that in all those ten years he did not find the oppor-
tunity to write about Algeria.
(7)
Firchon pointed out that R.Pierron indicated later on
(August 1945) that there was a concern not to furnish arguments
to the agitators. What could be surmised as the main reason for
this stand is more historical: it relates to the general mood
at the Liberation, after the long years of defeat of France and
of German rule. There was a concern not to give way to anything
that might be conceived as a defeat that could undermine the
strength and the prestige of France even further. As Firchon
himself admitted, the paper was not insensitive to the poss-
ibility of internationalisation of the problem, and this led it
to emphasise the necessity of a new policy. See Firchon, T.,
op. cit., p. 31.
(8)
At the beginning, playing down the causes, Le Monde did not
see any "malaise" but simply a difficulty of osmosis between
the two peoples. Most journalists gave a combination of rea-
sons, including the nationalist rebels,
[us] qui ont voulu êlever le debat sur le plan
international et crêer un conf lit franco-arabe en
exploitant la famine...[ne trompent persone par
leur] escroquerie 6 l' humanisme. (J.Silvert)
We are not told, for instance, that the nationalists had
been encouraged by the Allies'High Command and had already
approached them for possible freedom of the country after the
War, and that the problem, therefore, had already acquired an
international dimension. The rebels in the view of the journal-
ists were exploiting the French malaise -weakening of the
French armature- and the indigenous malaise (blamed on an
increase in Arab nationalism), compounded by an economic
crisis .
Other reasons given included the military weakness of
France, the strength and affluence of the allied forces, the
political divisions of France, the exaltations of pan-arabism
and the economic crisis (Driand); economic factors were given
less emphasis by Pierron.
Silvert, Driand and Pierron blamed Arab nationalism. The
latter journalist absolved the majority of "Muslims" on the
grounds that they constituted a:
masse fidêle dêsorientee en proie aux intel-
lectuels que nous avons ins truits et mus par le
fanatisme religieux.
In Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 22 and Le Monde, 10/7/45, p.l.
The administration was also made responsible for the econo-
mic and social malaise which was now more apparent. Other
circumstances were: "population growth, decimated herds, the
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critical situation of the wine sector, trade and industry in a
free fall, increasing unemployment...leaving the masses idle,
badly clothed and undernourished." In Le Monde 2/3/46.
We are also told of the Muslim (city-dweller in particular)
"who once he has known the black market has got used to living
off it and no longer works".
(9)
J. Silvert made it clear what he thought of the national-
ists, and Driand followed suit:
La politique indigene se justif era, reussira
toujours si elle est menee d'une main qui ne tremble
pas.
For Pierron, who was keen to get it right,
Dans ce pays il n'y a plus de faute & com-
mettre,
it was imperative to:
conserver l'Union frangaise, rien de ce qui
peut diviser les Francais ne doit etre tolere.
See Firchon, op. cit.,p. 22 and Le Monde 10/7/45, p. 1.
(10)
When a "Muslim" viewpoint is expressed, requesting an equi-
table share, the statement of an indigenous inhabitant is
presented in quotes:
La presence frangaise ne se justifie clue dans
la mesure oil elle apporte & chaque heritier d'une
civilisation endormie la possibilite de retrouver
l'initiative dans l'existence ... dans le temps meme
ofi le gouvernement frangais fait son possible pour
encourager le developpement d'entreprises ... qui
s'opposent systematiquement a la liberation economi-
que et sociale du Musulman.
Le Monde, 12/3/46 and Firchon, T., op.cit., p. 31.
(11)
The journalist J.Guerif indicated the limits of that liber-
ation:
(...) liberer le Musulman d'une tutelle &
caractere plus ou moms colonialiste ne donnera
jamais le droit de mettre en inferiorite ou de
menacer d'asphyxie une population aussi vigoureuse
que la population algerienne ( the settlers). La
France metropolitaine reste responsable d'un mil-
lion de colons.
Ibid.
It could clearly be deduced from the above context that the
paper believed that the manifest aspirations of the "Muslims"
and their freedom could threaten one million settlers. There-
fore, limits had to be set to their aspirations.
(12)
The majority are Muslim (8 million arabophones and berbero-
phones) who increased at the rate of between 130,000 and
150,000 a year, and one million non-Muslims (80-90% Christians
and Jews). He refers to the latter as "Europeans but the major-
ity of whom were born in Algeria, half of whom are of French
origin (but) who all feel French."
(13)
His comments on their assimilation (their absorption into
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French civilisation) are particularly revealing: "this pacific
conquest of thousands of people" to be "... one of the mira-
cles of this country." See Le Monde, 13 and 27 August 1946.
It is obvious that he was only referring to the European
element of the population. His amazement did not extend to
include the fact that the Arab and Berber majority was not
integrated, quite the reverse.
Another puzzling question here would be to ask whether it
was not the European minority which ought to have integrated
into the life of the majority instead of the reverse.
(14)
What we are not told explicitly here is the factor prevent-
ing that integration: the impossible conditions imposed on the
Muslims in view of their religion. Giving up that religion was
the sine qua non for integration. As one might suspect, under-
lying that attitude was the inherent belief in the superiority
of the Judeo-Christian faith ( since the European community was
described as well integrated). The Muslim attachment to their
religion was very strong and had prevented them from qualifying
for integration and French "civilisation". However, that was a
mere pretext for preventing them from acquiring equality of
treatment -as even the few who renounced their Muslim status
saw no real improvement in their lot.
Fierron scratched the surface of the problem when looking at
the crux of the problem: the possibility of giving citizenship
to the Moslem inhabitants, without loss of their status
(statut personnel) was acceptable in theory, but unworkable in
practice. The example given is that of the absurd possibility
of a polygamous Muslim magistrate condemning a French man for




He stated that in most cases there had been no massive
expropriations of local inhabitants while numerous historians
would disagree (Bourdieu, P., et al., Le dêracinement: la crise
de l'Agriculture traditionnelle en AlOrie, Minuit, Paris,
1964) that the production of cereals had increased covering
2.8M hectares in 1901 to 3.1M in 1939; the area covered by
irrigated land to 20.000 hectares and that 20.000 fruit trees
had been planted where there had been none. Messud also pointed
out that the main wealth of the indigenous population came from
raising cattle ( in 1946 70% of the horses, 88% of the cattle
and 94% of the sheep) and that half of it had been decimated by
the drought in 1944-45. The Muslim production of cereals con-
stituted most of the production: 15 million quintals in 1934-
35, which had hardly changed. However, the European production
went up from 5 to 9.5 million quintals between 1920 and 1939.
That, stated the journalist, is what made it possible to feed
the increasing indigenous population (see Le Monde, 14/8/1946).
The wine sector which employed 100.000 workers and around
400,000 Muslims (the paper added no comment about the contra-
diction between wine growing, Islam and the fact that Muslims
had to produce a product which was proscribed by their reli-
gion) was described as the main element in the "prosperity" of
economic life in Algeria, accounting for 40% of the exports in




Some references were made to the impact of the War but very
few. It was repeated that the economy was "bouleversde" and
that the flow of capital from France stopped from 1942, that
supplies were affected, that prices rose, and that the circula-
tion of notes as a result of the inflationary measures of the
Provisionnal Government went up from 393 to 4212 and then to
4443 Milliards.
(18)
Firchon pointed out that Silvers, who showed "generosity"
(what generosity, exactly, we are not told) when writing for Le
Monde (and was not to write thereafter), adopted a firmer
stance when the issue of French "tutelle" was being called into
question.
(19)
As Firchon pointed out, even when Planeau criticised the
realities of colonial life in Algeria, producing alfalfa (a
material used in paper manufacture) while not having its own
paper industry, he still emphasised the need to ensure a degree
of moral unity. See Le Monde, 6/10/1945.
(20)
The reader at that time knew nothing about them and there
was a marked absence of comprehensive commentaries on Algerian
political life. See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 26.
(21)
See Le Monde, 15-16/8/1946.
(22)
See Le Monde, 20/8/1946. In fact, that was the first demand
put forward after the creation of its forerunner Etoile Nord
Africaine in the 1920s.
(23)
See Le Monde, 22/8/1946.
(24)
The two choices were summed up in the two phrases coined by
R.Roure:
- Se Maintenir ou renoncer (25 July 1946)
- Union ou separatisme (24 August 1946)
(25)
See Le Monde, 25/7/1946.
(26)
Of which the paper must have been aware, since it reported
Abbas's mise au point des revendications published in Combat,
at the top of which was the creation of an Algerian state. See
Le Monde, 27/7/1946.
The two nationalists leaders were a little freeer that year.
Abbas was released from prison with the Assembly vote on 16
March 1946 and Messali's liberation followed in August 1946.
(27)
The paper recommended reforms and firmness. But firmness for
the paper did not imply force:
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Qu'on nous entende bien ce n'est pas une ques-
tion de force, c'est une question d 'intelligence,
d'autorite, de comprehension des evolutions ndces-
saires et possibles.
(29)
See Le Monde, 24/8/1946.
(29)
Le separatisme ne peut etre traite autrement
que le separatisme nigois, catalan ou alsacien".
C'est un crime contre la sdrete de l'etat.
see Le Monde, 27/8/1946.
(30)
See Le Monde, 27/8/46, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 41.
(31)
See Firchon, T., p. 41 and Le Monde, 18/5/1946.
(32)
When Remy Roure asked the question, oU veut-on en venir?
(what's to be done?), Firchon reported that Le Monde was not in
favour of "assimilation" (because it saw the two communities as
irreductibles) but that it also rejected Articles 5 and 67 (of
the Constitution) which gave full political rights to the
indigenous population of overseas territories (See Le Monde,
29/8/1946 and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 42 ) and printed large
extracts of the debates in the Constituent Assembly rejecting
the two articles. See Le Monde, 23/8/1946. Accepting Emile
Herriot's premise that giving equal rights to dominions over-
seas would make France a colony of its colonies, Le Monde's
journalist, A. Landry, recommended rejection of the above
articles: the possibility of having 120 overseas deputies in
the Palais Bourbon was combatted vigorously. See Le Monde,
17/9/1946, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 42.
(33)
Even though Edouard Sablier stressed the necessity of the
Union frangaise (seules les grandes unites economiques et
politiques sont viables), he shared the colonial attitude that
was then widespread throughought the French Empire -an attitude
which was hostile to integration or to the granting of equal
rights to the indigenous populations.
(34)
When it wrote: L'Angleterre s'en va ... les Anglais restent.
See Le Monde, 23/9/1947, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 72.
(35)
According to Firchon, not a day passed in August 1947 with-
out Algeria being mentioned on the front or last page of Le
Monde. But it did not mention troubles when they occurred in
Kabylia and remained preoccupied by the reactions of the French
in Algeria. These were quoted at length, as opposed to those of
the indigenous population, which were just mentioned. See
Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 47 and 52. At no stage was French
sovereignty called into question.
(36)
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The Statutes Of 1947; see also Chapter 3.
(37)
Le Monde of 20/12/1946. Firchon fails to make any comments
on this important statement.
(38)
Tout plan de reformes doit etre souple, pru-
dent, progressif et ne pas s'imposer a la
hate...(See Le Monde, 17/7/1947).
La proclamation d'une pretendue independance ou
sa sujetion A quelque puissance nouvelle viendra
dans le monde qui se dessine sonner le glas de notre
propre existence.
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 46, and Le Monde, 19/7/1947.
(39)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 57.
(40)
This came when de Gaulle's change of policy was seen as
stepping back from his 1944 position, when he was proposing
full citizenship. In 1947, he was adamant that:
Nous ne devons laisser mettre en question sous
aucune forme le fait que l'Algerie est de notre
domaine.
See Le Monde, 20/8/1947, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 59.
Talking about French sovereignty but not mentioning Algeria,
he also pointed out:
A ceux qui s'egarent dans le reve de je ne sais
quelle secession, je dis aujourd'hui devant tous:
vous vous trompez et vous trompez les autres.
See Le Monde, 14/10/1947, p. 3, and Firchon, T., op. cit.,
p. 69.
(41)
The 1947 Statutes were adopted on 27 August 1947, by 319
votes for, 89 votes against and 186 abstentions, by the Assemb-
ly and accepted by the Council of the Republic (Senate) on 3
September 1947. They constituted a series of liberal reforms
which were designed to give more representation to the Muslims,
but they fell far short of what would have constituted a demo-
cratisation of the system. Many points are worthy of attention
such as the Executive power being left in the hands of the
Govenor General, who was also head of the Civil Service, and
who established the budget, the Assembly with its 120 delegates
(60 for each college) elected for six years, and the power of
the Assembly to extend or adopt metropolitan laws applicable to
Algeria or to decide on particular "r6glementation" which would
be "homologuee " by decree A simple majority only was required
for the adoption of decisions, except on request by the Govenor
General, the commission or one quarter of the members, when
decisions had to be adopted by a two-thirds majority and only
after 24 hours.
(42)
As Firchon pointed out, quoting Depreux and Rens, this
illustrated the inevitability of the equation: one million
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Europeans equals eight million Muslims:
Convenons loyalement que cela signifie que,
selon que l'on vote dans le Premier ou le Second
College l'influence sera huit fois plus grande ou
huit fois plus petite. La promotion d'un College &
l'autre, signifie donc mathematiquement le gain ou
la perte par l'interesse des 7/Berne de son influence
democratique et electorale.
Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 59 and RENS, I., L'Assemblee
Nationale, Pedone, p. 83.
During the discussion of the statutes, as Firchon reminded
us, the Muslim delegates left the Assembly after a statement by
M Benchenouf outlining the reason as being:
Afin de ne pas donner par notre participation
aux debats l'impression d'un acquiescement quelcon-
que au projet gouvernemental.
(43)
Firchon had decided to give considerable importance to the
elections because for him "The European was involved in poli-
tics only at the time of elections" and for that European "the
only criterion that mattered was to remain French." (Firchon,
T., op. cit., p. VI.) The criticisms that can be levelled
against this kind of approach, apart from the obvious contra-
dictions in the above statement, are that the European element
constituted numerically a very small minority (8 to 10% of the
population), which had disproportionate powers and whose influ-
ence on politics was disproportionately greater than that of
the indigenous population for which the choice was already made
by the authorities
It was well known, even by the paper, that these "fabricated
elections" were a matter of fact.
Regarding the elections, Firchon was critical enough to
state that the newspaper showed little concern for the colonial
question, paying hardly any attention to equal representation
of the two colleges. He noted, however, that space had been
devoted to elections, especially to highlight the defeat of the
nationalist PPA.
The French political authorities allowed some political
activity in the sense that they permitted the formation of
political parties. But as soon as these parties were involved
in any kind of activity that was thought to be against the
integrity of France, or showed any nationalistic ardour, they
were banned or outlawed and their leaders arrested.
The rejection in Algeria by 62% of the voters of the refer-
endum (when France accepted it by 53%) showed, Firchon noted,
the disapproval of Algeria of the fate that seemed to be re-
served to it by the new constitutional framework ( representa-
tion in the French parliament by 15 deputies from each college
and a future vote of Algerian Statutes).
When the indigenous population of Algeria abstained in great
numbers in the 1946 election, Le Monde merely remarked that the
new citizens were in no hurry to exercise their electoral duty.
(44)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 68.
(45)
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See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 39, 46 and 70.
The imagination has to be stretched very far to believe in
this biased portrayal and this attempt to try and make the
readers believe that "not to vote was actually to approve of 
the system".
But what was more surprising was that Firchon expected more
of it and he criticized the paper for not continuing its "a-
contrario" reasoning, implying that if people did not bother to
vote, it meant that they were consenting to France.
(46)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 46-7.
(47)
(Messali's party was for independence , Abbas's was for more
integration.)
But in 1952, Le Monde reproached the government for letting
Messali fight the elections against Abbas. The paper pointed
out that if the authorities in Algeria (the Governor General )
had freed Messali to counter-act Abbas' claims (Firchon finds
every reason for believing so), it soon appeared that it was a
miscalculation:
lancer Messali dans les jambes d'Abbas c'etait
lancer un proletariat analphabete contre un Tiers-
Etat evolue.
See Le Monde, 3/4/1952.
(48)
As Firchon himself makes clear, the Muslim side did not
really interest the paper. See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 71.
(49)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 74. For Naegelen, the natio-
nalists, especially the MTLD, were separatists who had to be
stopped.
(50)
Le Monde was not in the habit of giving substantial biogra-
phical details and did not have much information about him. The
paper started giving biographical details with the appointment
of the next Governor General, Mr R.Leonard (Le Monde,
12/4/1951).
(51)
The anti-separatist position of E.Naegelen, that Algeria
should remain French, is highlighted, as it seemed to please Le
Monde, for which French Algeria was important (see Firchon, T.,
op. cit., p. 76.). Hence the complimentary headlines: Naegelen
a conguis la sympathie de l'Algerie par ses premieres paroles.
Satisfaction that now Algeria had a governor of note was also
expressed by journalists like Messud.
(52)
See Le Monde, 23/8/1948.
(53)
Which, by then, had become more radical in its demands to
keep up with Messali's group.
(54)
Nevertheless, it firmly asserted that:
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Nous ne pouvons pas accepter de Rêpublique.
(55)
What appeared clearly from the election table drawn up by
the paper (Le Monde, 13/4/1948, p. 4.) was that only nine MTLD
and eight UDMA had been elected. This gave only 18 out of 120
seats to the nationalists. Messud was more interested in refer-
ring to the exactions of the nationalist parties on the people
"who had had enough".
(56)
See Le Monde, 7/3/1948 and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 71.
(57)
Le Monde, wanting authority within legality (see Firchon,
T., op. cit., p. 82 ff.), did not seem to want to listen to
those who remain unsatisfied.
(58)
It argued that there were two communities, which could coop-
erate and fraternise, and not one different by its "race, reli-
gion and civilisation".
(59)
La France n'a pas de legon êlectorale a recevoir de la Ligue
Arabe. See Le Monde, 10/4/1948.
Similarly, Le Monde found the accusations of electoral
fraud by some papers and some nationalist leaders inadmiss-
ibles. J.Guerif (Le Monde, 1/3/1948) insisted nevertheless on
the need for central authority to check the allegations, sug-
gesting complete disassociation if they were true. On the other
hand, he recommended the most severe sanctions against those
who initiated these accusations if they were false. See Fir-
chon, T., op. cit., p. 83, who thought that the paper was not
attempting to avoid a politique de l'autruche.
(60)
See Le Monde, 7/8/1948, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 82.
61)
RENS, I., op. cit., p. 98; FAVROD, C-H., op. cit., p. 80,
Julien, C.A., op. cit., p. 236 and Firchon, T., op. cit., p.
84.
(62)
What can clearly be inferred from the paper was that it was
justifiable to rig elections to prevent those nationalists from
getting into the Assembly. The pretext for that was that the
current system allowed people "who did not reflect the profound
aspirations of the masses" to be elected by means of physical
pressure.
(63)
Using this pretext, Le Monde also raised doubts as to whe-
ther the Algerian electorate could have what is generally
accepted to be an opinion which could be expressed through the
ballot box:
A moms	 n'obeisse & des contraintes et a
l'intimidation, l'electorat musulman a-t-il une
opinion au sens oU l'êlecteur frangais entend ce
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mot.
Frederix, P., in Le Monde, 3/4/52, and Firchon, T., op.
cit., p. 84.
(64)
One can imagine the outrage at a proclamation that the
French Revolution should be stopped because the French people
did not really know anything about public opinion or were not
mature enough to express an opinion. This was, indeed, a very
patronising and paternalist if not colonialist view. But then
again, maybe this is not really surprising as more than half
the adult male French population were disenfranchised by the
constitution of 1791; and arguably the French revolution was
"stopped" by Napoleon.
(65)
A convenient excuse was provided for accepting that the the
development of the Algerian Muslims had not reached so-called
electoral maturity. As opposed to the French system, where
every "citizen" was more or less more informed than in Algeria,
where
Ii êtait três facile d'obtenir des êlus qui ne
reflêtaient pas les d6sirs profonds de cette masse,
par les moyens les plus grossiers du fanatisme aux
pressions physiques.
Le Monde, 3/4/1952, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 84.
There was, however, no clear indication as to what parame-
ters were used to find out and measure these profound aspira-
tions of the masses. The paper was advocating on the one hand
that the public must express themselves, and on the other that
it was not mature enough to do so. Firchon did not resolve the
contradiction in the paper's discourse.
(66)
Except for outlining the state of the different parties (see
Le Monde, 26/10/48).
(67)
Si la loi s'intèresse aux affaires communes ,i1
ne faudrait pas oublier les problémes locaux, qui ne
sont pas resolus et qui ne le seront pas tant que
des gens auront faim ... seront malades de maladies
que l'on peut soigner ... qui veulent s'instruire et
ne le peuvent pas ... Si ces problêmes se trouvaient
dêlaissês ... renaitrait des cendres ce qu'il fal-
lait bien appeler voici deux trois ans le drame
algOrien.
See Le Monde, 23/10/1948 and also Firchon, T., op. cit., p.
86ff.
(68)
It was recognised that enormous efforts were needed in the
economic sphere. The necessity of financing investment, especi-
ally by state and private financiers, was highlighted. Invest-
ment needed was estimated to be around thirty to forty milliard
francs a year. The figure likely to be needed for 1948 was
given as being twelve milliard, that of 1949 as eighteen(see Le
Monde, 29/10/1945, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 88).
(69)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 88.
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Politically, the paper saw a decline in the nationalist
movements, and preferred Abbas's party's acceptance to work
within the Statutes:
qu'il est nOcessaire de servir les intèréts de
la communaute musulmane plutOt que de lui rêclamer
un drapeau.
Economically,	 "new affluence succeeds a period of
shortages... a will to work, some progress had been made, wheat
production reaching 18 million quintals (the average ten years
before the war), wine production at 12,6 million hectolitres
(just over 8 million in 1947)". But Firchon also pointed out
that exports were suffering from high costs (Firchon, T., op
cit, p. 91). He also stated that the views of Messud were con-
fused when he showed the pluses and minuses of this problem and
that of capital flow between the two communities... .
Socially, Le Monde discerned progress in standards of
nutrition, clothing and the general standard of living, but
more so in the north than in the south (see Le Monde 31/5/49
and Firchon, T, op cit, p. 92).
(70)
Mandouze will come to the limelight later on in the Algerian
war (see Chapter 13).
(71)
Mandouze argued that the south was under military rule and
that in the north peace was only kept by the security forces,
indicating explicitly that there was:
- an ongoing political war: "Life is organised around a
handful of privileged people and elections give rise to shoot-
ings and imprisonment",
- as well as a religious, economic and social war: "the wine
cartel can make prices double from one day to the next, strikes
are defeated (matêes) by imprisonment of strikers",
- and, finally, cultural war: "the refusal to give the
Arabic language equal rank with French ... the so called civil-
isers have not managed to school all Muslim children".
See Le Monde 1/6/49 and Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 92-93.
(72)
Ce que ne nous dit pas Mandouze dans son 6mou-
vante et fumeuse charitê de Chrètien progressiste,




The "proof" that things were not as Mandouze described them
was supposedly to be found in the smiling faces (which had not
been there three to four years previously) seen in towns and in
the countryside, in Kabylia and in the South. If there were
still some unhappy faces, he argued, this was not unique;
unhappy faces could be found anywhere else in the world, even
in Egypt, France and America.
Ibid.
(74)
When he asked if the journalist could be trusted (meaning
both Messud and the paper), Firchon contented himself with
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seeing the warm welcome received by President Auriol (and his
measure of clemency for those who repent) as the "serum of
truth".
Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 93, and Le Monde, 7/6/1949.
Firchon thought Le Monde to have been in favour of a con-
structive policy involving the implementation of the Statute
and to have been incapable of contemplating anything destruc-
tive.
(75)
This point is also made about the 1954-1958 coverage
throughout the following sections.
(76)
Firchon asked if there had not been Une volontê de minimiser
cesaffaires? The "pot was starting to boil slowly", with arms
smuggling, occasional kidnapping, killings, hundreds of ar-
rests and imprisonments, but it is true to say that, for the
readers,the full significance of the May events would only come
to light much later.
(77)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 95.
(78)
See Le Monde, 29/5/1949, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 97.
The paper also referred to promoting economic renewal. It
highlighted the progress achieved and the need for investment
and developments. It also paid attention to developments in the
field of oil and the importance of the oil route through the
Mediterranean (see Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 101).
(79)
Libya's independence was thought to be bad for France and
Europe. Le Monde argued that if it were too late to change
policy in Libya, this could still be a lesson for elsewhere:
L'octroi de l'indêpendance a des populations
arrierdes, misêrables, pulvêrisees ne peut qu'exa-
cerber les mouvements nationalistes africains.
See Le Monde, 27/12/51, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 119.
(EM)
Described as the poorest country in the world. Ibid.
(81)
Le Monde addressed that fear, which became "a real problem"
when there was talk of a UN debate on North Africa, by looking
for more realistic participation.
That was Firchon's conclusion on the basis of R. Letour-
neau's views in Le Monde, 6/10/1951.
(82)
As Firchon pointed out, Le Monde did not like Bourguiba's
statement that "American soldiers liberated North Africa to
give it a few months later to a handful of French nationalists
and the French Military". Firchon wrote, manifestly in an
attempt to smear the nationalist leader, that Bourguiba owed
his freedom to German troops in November 1942 and that German
archives revealed "dealings" between the leader of the Neo-




See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 120-121.
(84)
Events were beginning to become critical in the Maghreb.
There was even a crisis in Morocco. (See Firchon, T., op.
cit., pp. 102-3.) E. Sablier, the specialist of Middle Eastern
affairs, accompanied a delegation of Egyptian journalists to
investigate an alleged bombing of Fez by French artillery.
(85)
In Le Monde, 7 March 1951, and Firchon, T., op. cit., pp.
103-105.
(86)
Arguably the paper fared no better.
(87)
This was achieved by way of speeches, press campaigns and
congress resolutions, which threw a cloud over the legitimacy
of the French presence. The journalist expressed pride in the
balance sheet, while admitting that it could have been better,
and declaring that, no matter how much progress was achieved,
there would still be nationalist demands. Ibid.
(88)
Particularly as the Americans had their ear to the ground
when it came to "nationalist noises" and in view of the multi-
plication of the number of consuls in Algeria, whose behaviour
seemed strange enough for Sablier to question their "friend-
ship" with France. Ibid.
(89)
An argument which is not taken seriously by Firchon, who
pointed out that the Americans eliminated the North American
Indians. This argument, it has to be said, was developed in the
pages of Le Monde itself in the 1950/s and Firchon might be
using here an argument taken out of the paper against it.
Two more credible reasons are suggested, however, to explain
American attitudes: the pursuit of economic interests in
trying to substitue the U.S. for other powers, and the fight
against Communism.
(90)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 105. But evidence shows,
however, that of all French newspapers, Le Monde was the least
likely to have an extremely favourable attitude towards the US.
See the "neutralist" battle in Chapter 2.
(91)
Le Monde had continuously supported his policy of "firmness
within legality" and his departure surprised the paper since
his appointment had just been been prolonged for six months.
See Le Monde, 21/2/51, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 107.
This departure took place in a "cloak and dagger" atmo-
sphere, accusations of election rigging and transfer of offi-
cials refusing to implement directives, on which Le Monde chose
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not to throw any light. Indeed, the readers would not have been
aware of these events if their reading had been exclusively
confined to Le Monde.
(92)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 109.
In the circumstances, the political side was neglected in
favour of economic solutions, which were seen basically as an
urgent need for large-scale investment (p. 110).
(93)
See Le Monde, 31 March and 10 June 1951.
(94)
See Le Monde, 13/2/51, p. 4.
(95)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 112.
The fact that there was hardly any nationalist representa-
tion in the Assembly, that the MTLD lost five seats, that the
Communists lost two seats, that the UDMA (including its leader)
had failed, were seen as positive:
Ce rapprochement entre les deux communautes
algeriennes dont les liberaux se reclament partisans
dans le Premier College.
Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 113.
(96)
In L'organisation des elections en Algerie, Le Monde,
30/6/1951, p. 5.
(97)
This resulted in a situation where in certain areas candi-
dates whose influence could not be questioned received no
votes.
Vote rigging, the "Algerian fable", as it was known (Le
Monde, 3/4/52, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 113) could easily
be shown by some eloquent figures: in Algiers, where fraud was
difficult to achieve, the official list received 142 votes out
of 7,233. In a commune in Chelif, the official list received
10,285 votes out of 12,166 registered voters. In Djelfa there
were no votes for any of the MTLD, UDMA or the Communists, but
the official candidate obtained more votes than the total
number of registered voters (respectively 800 votes and 500
voters); quoted by Firchon T., from ARON R., Les Origines de la
Guerre d'Algerie. See also below.
(98)
However, the paper conceded that the problem should be dealt
with and exposed (but, despite realising the danger, only at a
local level):
11 faut avoir le courage de s'engager dans
cette voie, celle qui risque le moms de se trans-
former en impasse tragique.
Le Monde, 30/6/1951, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 114.
(99)
In his article about the elections cantonales in the Con-
stantine area (Journee dans le bled constantinois: d'un bureau
de vote a l'autre), Blanchet stated that there was no serious
irregularity anywhere. See Le Monde, 17/10/51, p. 5, and Fir-
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.4
chon, T., op. cit., p. 115.)
He went to great lengths to show that the country had to be
understood in its particular context. The "cartesian" mind
found it hardly surprising that a land-owner could get 434 of
the 439 registered votes. Although not excluding the possibil-
ity of electoral fraud, he found it quite logical that his
workers would vote for him. Using the example of latter-day-
Corsica, and not wanting to give that characteristic exclusive-
ly to Algeria, Firchon recommended using, following Blanchet's
argument, a correctif sociologique, a special magnifying glass
similar to the special spectacles given to people watching
three D films in order not to get too distorted a picture of
Algeria.
Firchon did not consider the fact that elections were pos-
sible with only 53-54% or, on the other hand, percentages of 98
to 100% as extraordinary, but pointed out the disadvantage of
these methods in that they lulled the Europeans into a false
sense of security ( seen as as the government's mistake).
This was also outlined by Oppermann, T., Le Probleme algêr-
ien, op. cit., pp. 96 and 116.
(100)
This assumes, of course, that they did not have access to
the facts, given the atmosphere of "peace" in Algeria described
above.
(101)
These two problems were complicated in Firchon's view by
religious factors and by the fact that one of the "religious
leaders" was close to the elite, the other close to the prole-
tariat or "lumpen-proletariat." See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp.
122-123.
(102)
And Firchon in his examination of Frederix's articles.
(103)
We are told that upon arriving in Algeria, the settlers
coming from the mainland changed from being liberal to being
conservative, adopting the "colonial complex". This, Firchon
explained, was a mixture of feelings: superiority and more or
less conscious fear, inversely proportional to social position.
(104)
Those who hide from reality ((pratiquant la politique de
l'autruche). See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 123.
This view was said to be quite widespread amongst settlers
who claimed that they knew better than anyone and who (when
this did not coincide with their point of view) thought that
nobody could possibly understand anything about Algeria unless
they lived there and had their experience of it (not unlike the
Afrikaaners).
(105)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 123, quoting Frederix but not
giving a precise reference.
It is amazing how self preservation (or the excuse for it)
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seems to justify anything, even the oppression of the majority.
One is entitled to ask how can the fear of a possible future of
ill-treatment of a minority, the European one (based on exam-
ples taken centuries before), be said to have justified the
current ill-treatment of a majority of Muslims on the land in
which they had been born by a minority whose parents or them-
selves had settled there in the not so distant past, although,
admittedly, some had been there for several generations and
their fears were not totally groundless.
But there was worse to come for this majority. In trying to
throw some light on the possible confusions and myths, on the
brave type who lived in the countryside and the mauvais meneur
who lived in the city and who had learnt French values in
French schools, Frederix gave arguments to Firchon, who used Le
Monde's views to back him up:
les massacreurs du Constantinois en 1945 n'ont
pas tuê parce nous leur avons enseigne la philoso-
phie des Lumiéres. us avaient l'estomac creux et
us etaient analphabetes, he wrote, leur credit
(that of those who had been to school) deviendrait-
ii 	 nocif s'ils n' avaient devant eux une masse
ignorante dont il est trop facile d'exciter les
instincts primitifs.
Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 124.
(106)
Referring to Jacques Servier's Adieu Djebels and accepting
the existence of famine, but stating that as far as the land
taken over by the French:
Une bonne partie des terres etaient des
terres gue les Algeriens ne cultivaient pas ...
l'exemple le plus connu etant la plaine de la Mitid-
ja, plaine jadis marêcageuse....
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 125.
(107)
Quoting Le Monde (5/4/1952) in approval, which stated that
Algeria was no longer capable of feeding its inhabitants,
Firchon also examined some palliative measures such as volun-
tary immigration of Algerians to France. This potentially
affected about 50,000 Algerians a year, which was constantly
denounced by Le Monde: Un peril national ... l'immigration
incontrol6e des travailleurs nord africains (the following
references were also given by T.Firchon: 7/12/1948, 7/6/1949,
16/9/1949, 12/12/1951, 16/7/1953, 21/7/1953 and 6/11/1953),
notwithstanding the double benefit of immigration- expatriating
an unemployed person and, most of the time, alleviating misery
in so far as the immigrant sent a large part of his earnings




But this argument was used not for but against independence
-because, it was claimed, given the state of its resources,
Algeria was not self-sufficient.
(110)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 124.
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(111)
25 milliards loaned by France to Algeria on her 130 milli-
ards budget. Wine exports represented 51 out of 113 milliards
in 1950 and 43 out of 135 milliards in 1951.
(112)
Le Monde was quoted but no reference was given.
(113)
The remedy, however, was not so much to find new land as to
increase the yield of the land belonging to the Muslims:
La, il y'a d'immenses progres a faire ...
c'est une extension limitee dans l'espace et dans le
temps au lieu que la multiplication des naissances
qui ne l'est pas ... le mal profond de l'Algerie ne
se situe pourtant pas ailleurs.
See Le Monde, 5/4/1952, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 126.
(114)
To use deposits of coal, iron, copper, manganese, oil; and
the need to exploit solar energy, to develop technology, to
inject fresh capital and for the State to continue subsidising
the means of communication (two railway lines) if the develop-
ment of that town were to continue. See Le Monde, 15/4/1953,
and 25/9/1953, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 129.
(115)
As Firchon pointed out:
Ce pays dóficitaire de 80 milliards de son
commerce extêrieur (doit] exporter autre chose que
des produits agricoles, ne peut se sauver que par un
vigoureux effort d'industrialisation.
See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 130-131 and Le Monde,
25/9/53.
But it is doubtful whether the suggestion that proper
industrialisation would not compete with metropolitan products
was a serious proposition, unless industrialisation was used to
mean only mineral exploitation, as seen above.
(116) .
A difference of mentality, of civilisation, highlighted by
Le Monde between the indigenous and the European populations,
as well as an inertia that "countered all the efforts made"
(Taillemagre).
Le Monde's Fabreluce had also attacked les feodaux de la
vigne who reinvested their profit in an already "plethoric"
production. It was because it felt that earlier opportunities
had been wasted that Le Monde invited changes. See Firchon, T.,
op. cit., pp. 133-134.
(117)
This was especially in the field of taxation, where no
special effort was made to make the economically strong pay
more. See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 141-42.
(118)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 135.
(119)
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This came in the form of request made by Maurice Duverger
for a dialogue to agree on the aims to be achieved and on the
stages of their implementation. See Firchon, T., op. cit., pp.
138-139.
(120)
(...) l'influence perturbatrice de l'Orient
la manoeuvre utilisee n'est pas sans analogie avec
celle que le communisme adopte a l'egard du capita-
lisme.
See Le Monde, 10/4/1954, and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 148.
(121)
See Le Monde, 13/3/54.
(122)
As Firchon pointed out, there was even opposition of views
between J.Taillemagre ( Le Monde, 22/1/54/, and Firchon, T.,
op. cit., p. 132.), recommending closing the gap in yield, and
R. Montagne, who advocated "a new Muslim colonisation of
vacant land." (Firchon, T., op. cit., pp. 148-49). He was
concerned with black spots like le proletariat miserable des
villes et des centres d'Algerie. See Le Monde, 15/3/54.
(123)
See Le Monde, 8/5/54, for a letter by J. Madaule, who went
on a fact-finding mission with a number of personalities,
including F.Mitterrand, criticising health care, the lack of
educational facilities and the inadequacy of efforts made
towards improving the well-being of the security forces, and
the baneful influence of economic interests on government
policies in Algeria. Firchon argued against J.Madaule, pointing
out that the proportion of Muslim children in schools went up
from 11.5% in 1945 to 18% in 1955, that there were 409 police-
men and 200 CRS for Mulhouse and only 210 policemen for the
Algerian town of Bone (similar in population size, 100.000).
Madaule's bias, Firchon tells us, coincided with a certain
movement in Le Monde which was to criticise police activity in
Morocco (not in Algeria because that was not the case yet), for
instance when Jaeger referred to its repressive role.
The paper also published letters by the nationalist leader,
Abbas, on the links between France and the Arab world (See Le
Monde, 1/8/54.), and on Arab solidarity. (See Le Monde, 15/8/54
and Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 155.)
It also reported the in-fighting inside the MTLD between
Messali and Lahouel and the possibility of these factions
internationalising the problem, but did not think the impact on
Algeria would be immediate.
(124)
See C. Julien, Le Monde, 20/7/54, and Firchon, T., op. cit.,
p. 154.
(125)
de croire qu'en reglant l'un on pouvait eliminer l'autre.
(126)
See end of Chapter 2.
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(127)
He did not focus, for instance, on the events that led to an
article or which were omitted, and the reasons for omission.
Similarly, he paid no attention to elements of assessment, to
the value of the information given, to the importance devoted
to it, or any evolution -and it is these considerations and the
theoretical principles from which they derive that should have
directed his research. He did, however, provide some answers to
these questions -but the work entirely lacks rigour.
(128)
This is quite untenable and unscientific given readers'dif-
ferent backgrounds, values, beliefs etc.
(129)
Nous n'avons pas le droit de ne pas comprendre
que tout se tient: Indochine, Madagascar, Algêrie,
Tunisie, toute L'Union Frangaise
Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 3, and Le Monde, 10/4/1947.
(130)
When he wrote, for instance, "if Algeria disappears (one
dares assume from the pages of the paper) it remains ever
present in the minds of the reader" - because of what is re-
ferred to as the "possible repercussions, rapprochements,
contrasts and allusions".
Here one cannot help wondering if Firchon remains true to
the basis on which he started his study. Either he is relying
on what the reader sees and reads, or he is relying on his
guesses or simply what the journalists tell him.
(131)
In concluding his description of the paper's evolution and
its 1951 U-turn, Firchon wrote that the paper was in favour of
the Statutes while attacking some of "landed interests"
(quelques coups de griffe aux fêodaux).
(132)
The proof he advances for showing the seriousness of the
paper was his statement that Le Monde had informed the readers
of the dangers of the nationalist developments.
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No evidence was produced here either.
(134)
And he claims to have verified it in other dissertations on
Morocco and Black Africa, but he did not make his case through
Le Monde.
(135)
See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 163. This also could be seen
as a contradiction in the thesis. How is that realisation to be
assessed if the reader does not clearly see it.
(136)
He had to admit that the real "U-turn" (virage) would take
place after the "tomato welcome" of Guy Mollet (6 February
1956), when the new Prime Minister was given a hostile recep-
tion in Algiers. His proof, even then, was not very tangible as
he merely quoted the paper stating, on 7 February, ne refuser-
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alt pas au president du conseil l'appui dd a la sincerite et au
courage. See Firchon, T., op. cit., p. 163.
(137)
He probably meant seven as the period covered went up to
1954 and the Statutes had been voted since 1947.
(138)
Firchon had to concede that when the Algerian Assembly was
dissolved in 1956 by Lacoste, it had not even started to tackle
the basic problem of social security. See Firchon, T., op.
cit., p. 162.
(139)
But it could be pointed out, as it will be later for other
personalities, that these were two opinions expressed which did
not involve the responsibility of the paper. Even if they did,
these were in fact the only two opinions over a period of
twenty years. So many opposing points of views were expressed





See Chapter 1 on objectivity and Chapter 2 on Le Monde, and
the many statements by Fauvet and others in the paper on the
subject.
(2)




These were subsequently read and discussed in political
circles. If the views and ideas expressed in these publications
did not have a direct bearing on policy, they did at least form
an integral part of the ongoing debate; and they would presum-
ably have had some impact on the thinking of the time.
(5)
A great deal of importance was given by Le Monde to the
writings of the Army and people associated with it, Marshalls
Juin and Ely, for instance.
Le Monde reported the publication of books by important
commanders of the French army and reviewed these books outlin-
ing the views of the different authors.
In its perception of the nature of the problem and its
solution, the Army insisted essentially on maintaining Algeria
under France and advocated methods for doing so. Some of these
utterances, of course, were not in conformity with the govern-
ment line.
(6)
Le Maghreb en feu, Plon, Paris, 1957, and Le Monde, 15/3/57,
p. 2.
(7)
The paper also noted his doubts about the wisdom of the
policies of the day when he thought the response of the govern-
ment inadequate and the promises of elections three months
after the restoration of order dangerous.
Nous finirons bien par tomber dans les pieges
grossiers qu'on volt deja se tendre derriere un
<<cessez le feu>> obtenu sans garanties prealables,
et bienteit suivi d'elections pretendues libres que
nos adversaires, dans le vide administratif qui
n'est pas encore comble, auraient toute la liberte
de prefabriquer.
Marshal Juin did not object to rigged elections as such but
resented the "possibility of the other side doing it". The
System of "One man one vote" (single College) was not accepted
as this would ensure the domination of the Europeans by the
"Muslims".
These ideas were in no way put to the test by the paper.
Indeed, the paper found comfort in that the colonial venture
was a "positive thing" and "in conformity with history".
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The negative side of colonialism was brushed aside:
Pouvait-on nous faire grief de la stagnation
des niveaux de vie alors qu'elle 6tait due essen-
tiellement A la surnatalitê provoquêe par notre
action economique et sociale...?
Independence was obviously out of the question as it was a
solution of "abandonment" which would lead to the demise and
the slow death of France:
(...) resigndte A la mort lente des peuples qui
ne savent plus reagir ni se dêfendre, ne rejoigne
sans plus attendre, le troupeau bêlant des neutra-
listes de l'Europe rOsiduelle.
(8)
The list included "innate taste for contradiction", for
fighting and barbarism, "forgetfulness of good deeds", the lack
of gratitude and the development of nationalist agitation.
(9)
The foreign factors included external conspiracy involving
panarab , panislamic movements, religious fanaticism, interven-
tion of the Asian nations, the US and the Soviet Union.
(10)
These views were in no way unique in the sense that it was
the predominant thinking accepted by the paper which recognised
in it and in others (Granval Ma mission au Maroc and Boyer de
la Tour's Veritds sur l'Afrique du Nord) Lyautey's traditional
thesis -rejecting any conception that the colonialist system
was the source of the problem.
The paper did point out, however, that in Tunisia demands
for independence preceded the emergence of the Soviets; that
the creation of the Arab League came after the birth of Moroc-
can nationalism and that French schools, universities and even
the army, with their revolutionary ideas, could have had a more
important role (no direct reference or mention of Algeria was
made here).
Le Monde wondered whether a large part in the troubles could
not be attributed to the disillusionment of a disinherited
"miserable" population to whom promises were made and never
kept rather than the colonialist system, and whether by pushing
systematically these nationalists towards Cairo, and Moscow,
there was not a risk of actually finding them there.
Le Monde did not question the distinction he made between
real and false nationalists, nor his severity towards the
French in metropolitan France who consolidated and extended the
agitators' hostile attitude to their country -this "strange
mixture of people of good faith, conscientious objectors,
defeatists and professionnal traitors".
(11)
Le Monde did not question either his belief that "Morocco
and Tunisia could be integrated into an Eurafrica" and that
"federalism was no panacea for Algeria."
Even more surprisingly, Le Monde never flinched at the sug-
gestion that "our" democracy was not for export, and that a
jurist may find an appropriate formula.
Juin declared that he was no jurist but he was legally
minded enough not to recommend a single college and to speak
about representation or the lack of it. And here, another
contradiction, between the majority not being allowed to vote
443
in a single college ("democracy not for export") and the state-
ment that these people "want France", is not explained.
(12)
With the added recommendation that the French military
presence should be accompanied by a political action which
would allow some indigenous participation.
Lyautey's book (see above) was said to be developing a
traditionnal thesis developed by Soustelle in Aimee et souf-
frante Algerie, also published by Plon (Paris) in 1956. This
theme was also developed by Marshal Juin.
(13)
On prendra connaissance avec fruit des reac-
tions d'un grand administrateur a la naissance d'un
nationalisme aujourdhui exacerbe.
See Le Monde, 20/6/57, p. 7.
(14)
This new kind of struggle, to which the Western World was
being confronted in the new atomic age, was repeatedly evoked
by the army when dealing with the enemy in "North Africa". See
Le Monde, 7/3/57, p. 4, and 15/3/57, p. 2.
One would have expected some discernment from the paper when
the mould did not fit snugly around a predominantly peasant-
based, illiterate and profoundly Islamic movement. The natio-
nalists were more likely to carry a copy of the Coran than
Mao's Red Book. See below.
(15)
The case of General Bollardiére is well-known , see below.
(16)
A chaque echelon le commandement doit avoir
defini nettement sa position... plus que
jamais ...doit repondre a une vocation essentielle
qui est de prendre a son compte les choix et les
responsabilites, d'en decharger ses subordonnes et
de leur donner des missions simples et sans equivo-
ques .
Le Monde, 20/6/57, p. 7.
(17) [Ils ne devraient pas etre] decontenances par
des aspects qui leur semblent relever plus du pou-
voir civil administratif ou judiciaire que du
pouvoir militaire... certains peuvent etre tentes de
se replier sur des errements anciens ou de donner le
change par de spectaculaires manifestations. Mais le
fait est la: la guerre s'est elargie en même temps
qu'elle s'est approfondie. La guerre revolutionnaire
necessite un changement d'optique et un changment de
style...
IDid •
(18) L'implacable jugement de l'histoire W] excu-
sera (l'armest) d'avoir connu un certain malaise et
certains scrupules avant de s'adapter. Ii ne l'ab-
soudrait pas d'avoir, quand le sort de /a civilisa-




Or any prior limit being established either:
(..) ii faut que le chef s'engage corps et âme,
arme de ces trois vertus militaires fondamentales:




For the fighter the task is a simple art of fighting and
obedience and for Chiefs of Staff to take over, define their
role and carry it out.
In Le general Ely definit le reile du chef dans la guerre
revolutionnaire, Le Monde, 20/6/57, p. 7.
(21)
When the paper reviewed, in its Bonnes Feuilles section, Les
vraies raisons de la demission du general de Bollardiere, R.
Barberot's book Malaventure en Alger-ie. In Le Monde, 7-8/7/57,
p. 3; see also Army malaise in the following pages.
(22)
He provided public opinion with the real reasons behind
Bollardiere's resignation.
(23)
Debates and letters of soldiers previously drafted to serve
in Algeria. Ceux d'Algórie was published in 1957. It was based
on a census which returned only 18 questionnaires expressing
reservations on the activity of the French army in Algeria out
of 3,200. The article was signed A.J. in Le Monde, 25/12/57, p.
3.
(24)
In order to counter the ever more frequent accusations of
torture and misbehaviour by the Army. This book and debates
were presented as being objective and as sincere as other
testimonies which recounted a completely different experience.
(25)
His statements expressed the view that the army was not
totally convinced that "pacification" had beeen properly
thought out and that it needed some form of political contin-
uity for the long term effort required. The need he felt to
appeal for a new Lincoln (seen in de Gaulle) as the solution,
not only for the Algerian problem but for the regime as a
whole, was also echoed, and quite positively, by the paper
which stated that his analyses and the conclusions he drew
could not be read without interest. But the paper did not share
his belief in the inevitability of his conclusions as to the
outcome. Michelet, E., Contre la guerre civile, Plon, Paris,
1957, and Le Monde, 25/12/57, p. 3.
(26)
Planchais, J., Le Malaise de l'Armee, Plon, 1957.
Though a civilian, Planchais was presented as quite know-
ledgeable about army matters. His book was seen as an attempt
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to understand the army before accusing it, or excusing it, in
an effort to bridge the gap which was developing between a
badly led nation and an army without directives, and to find
the reasons for that.
(27)
Le Monde regularly published communiqués of the most senior
appointments, news of draft and the various age groups con-
cerned, measures of exemption, details of temporary exemptions
and moratoria. See Le Monde, 11-12/8/57, p. 3.
There were also reports of Conferences of high-ranking
officers (Le Monde, 24/6/57, p. 5.), restructuring measures
(Le Monde, 23/4/57, p. 5.) etc.
(28)
Such as the reduction from 15 to 12 subdivisions, priorities
being decided and decisions taken (Le Monde, 12-13/5/57, p.
4.), official ceremonies (decoration of a 12-year-old girl for
bravery, in Le Monde, 12/7/57, p. 5).
The editorial team also found room in the paper for report-
ing various movements of troops (reinforcements) from France to
Algeria (Le Monde, 19/5/55, p. 1), from Morocco to Algeria (Le
Monde,7/8/57), and inside Algeria itself (out of Algiers, Le
Monde, 15/3/57, p. 2; back into Algiers Le Monde, 12/6/57, p.
2 ) .
(29)
For instance, the advantages given to some categories and
the financial bonuses offered, see Le Monde 10/5/57,p. 4, and
27-28/1/57, p. 3; low interest loans (1,5-3,5%) for those
opting to settle in Algeria providing thus a continuation of
the policy of l'epde et la charrue, the measures taken to
encourage individual draftees to settle in Algeria after demo-
bilisation (Le Monde, 8/8/57, p. 4) -these all found their way
into the paper.
(30)
There was also a regular flow of information concerning the
troops's budget and funds and military communiqués were common-
place. The example of the 1955/56 Army budget used here is but
an example of confusion for the readers.
The article on 19/5/55 read as follows:
Le budget militaire pourrait étre soumis au
parlement cette semaine... Le Gêneral Koenig s'ef-
force d'obtenir une nrallonge n de son budget en vue
de financer les operations militaires en Afrique du
Nord et la reorganisation de la defense nationale
(...) mais les credits sont limitês." In Le Monde,
5/5/55.
When the paper took the opportunity to report the adoption
of a military budget for the year. It pointed out that the
increase of 30 milliard from 970 in 1954 to 1,000 in 1955 was
to include all defence expenditure in France and outside it and
explained it in the following terms:
Une vingtaine de milliards ... relêvement de
soldes	 en! in quelques milliards ont êtê rêservês
pour le financement des operations militaires en
Afrique du Nord ... Comme les depenses en Indochine
iront en diminuant les sommes disponibles pour la
mètropole, l'Afrique du Nord et les autres T.O.M.
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progresseront.
See Le Monde 19/5/55, p. 4.
This apparently neutral report was trying to understate a
major fact: since France was no longer involved in Indochina,
as it had been, this would have meant that the increase in
military investment would have to be channelled elsewhere (not
in the near future, as the report stated, but there and then),
and the main, if not the only, area requiring particular funds
at the time was North Africa and Algeria in particular.
In that way, increased involvement and spending, represent-
ing a major shift in policy, were made to look inconspicuous in
the terms of that report. It resembled any piece of news item
that would be reported without requiring any particular com-
ment. A quick look at the opposite page, page 5, which was full
of military news and measures, would give the alert reader a
clearer view of things to come. Le Monde, 19/5/55, p. 5.
A month later, the figures appearing on page 12 were the
following: 996 milliard of military expenditure plus 35 milli-
ard of American aid for the "corps expeditionaire d'Indo-
chine", 937 milliard would be for metropolitan France, 44
milliard for the overseas territories (T.O.M.) and 15 milliard
in wage increases. In other words, the style and the position
of the article made sure that the information was still there
but hidden and confused -the increase was 61 milliard instead
of the 30 millliard previously announced. The paper still did
not account for the way 35 milliard would be spent. See Le
Monde, 12/6/55, p. 12.
(31)
Such as announcements concerning leave (Le Monde, 27-
28/1/57, p. 3, and 10-11/3/57) and liberation dates (Le Monde,
26/4/57, p. 5, and 30/8/57, p. 4).
(32)
See Le Monde's article by P.Herreman 11/7/57, pp. 2-3.
At times the paper even requested the opinion of army offi-
cers on particular issues. Premonitory statements about army
rebellion (as will be illustrated by the discussion in the
latter part of the chapter and as exemplified in the various
coups of the Army in Algeria in the Fourth and Fifth Republics
-May/June 1958 and February/April 1961-) could be found in Le
Monde's reports. For instance, when the paper indicated the
response of officers as to their possible attitude if it were
thought that Algeria was about to be abandoned, there was a
scent of revolt in the air.
Au point que lorsqu'on pose brutalement & des
off iciers /a question: <<Que feriez-vous si la
mêtropole adoptait en Algêrie une solution que vous
pourriez considetrer comme un abandon?>>. us rêpon-
dent:<<Nous serions pris dans un d6chirant dilemme:
ou bien accepter une nouvelle humiliation, ou bien
nous allier Cu nous compromettre avec ces colons
que nous dósavouons, parce qu'ils nous ont conduits
cette guerre>>. In Contre la propagande et les
pressions du FLN, des off iciers livrent bataille
pour /a <<conquéte des coeurs>>
by P.Herreman in Le Monde, 23/7/57, p. 3.
Declarations of high-ranking hardliners in the officer corps
who supported repression (Weygand salle Pleyel in Le Monde
31/5/57, p. 6) and various statements of policy, non-reduction
of men and indication of the army's intention (as well as the
447
use of the right of pursuit in Tunisia in Le Monde 3/8/57, p.
5) were also among the items included.
Le Monde did not omit from its pages the various motions of
active (St-Cyr, Le Monde, 17/4/57, p. 4) and reservist offi-
cers (Le Monde 29/5/57, p. 3) in praise and support for the
army and its role.
(33)
At times Le Monde would resort to taking its information
from interviews given to other newspapers (General Salan to La
Depéche Quotidienne on 20/3/57). These reports were used to
give a balance sheet of military affairs (Le Monde 23/3/57, p.
2) and paint a very rosy picture.
The paper also showed more willingness to accept the offi-
cial position on Algeria, especially when stating that partial
and discontinued successes could only be maintained with the
massive troops military presence which made these "successes"
possible. See Le Monde, 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.
(34)
From a mere 50,000 men on 1 November 1954, the number of
troops rose steadily to over half a million men. See Horne, A.
(1977), op cit. , pp. 96, 113, 124, 151.
Le Monde gave the figure of 450,000 men in each of Algeria
and France (25/7/57, p. 1), but it was commonly known that
that figure was a moderate estimate.
(35)
Le Monde, 20/5/55. Further prominent headings read 6 batail-
lons envoyes en renfort, gendarmerie (1,700 sent or about to
be), Rappel des disponibles.
In an article on the "recall of the reservists" (dispon-
ibles) published on the front page that day, Le Monde put the
number of security forces in Algeria at 100,000 men. It is not
clear whether this indicated a desire to reassure public opi-
nion that the government was putting in the necessary num-
bers, or whether the increase was considered to be important
enough to warrant headlines on the front page. There was even
confusion in the figures given within the articles ( 100,000,
40,000 and 20,000), which may have been an error or could be
construed as an attempt subsequently to play down the figures
involved. In any case, it was evident that the number of troops
in Algeria was on the increase despite the contradictory rein-
forcements figures given by the paper, 40,000 on 20/5/55 and
20,000 on 21/5/55.
(36)
When the army called for increased troops support, the
reports of Le Monde did not differ from the official viewpoint.
Indeed, it went deeper than that. For instance, in a section
on the "gendarmerie" (la gendarmerie et sa mission d'appaise-
ment), Le blonde's reports suggested that it was thought that
bringing in the "mainland gendarmes", although not productive
in the immediate future, would be very efficient in the long
term.
"La gendarmerie coopêre non seulement au main-
tien de l'ordre et & l'appaisement des esprits
(whose might one ask?), mais, dans la mesure od elle
«colle au pays>> et A la vie locale elle constitue
un rêseau de renseignements «bruts>> de grand
int6r6t.
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( In Le Monde, 21/5/55)
It is difficult to distinguish between the journalist's
thinking from that of the military strategist (or, indeed, from
the intelligence officer who would also argue that a larger
army deployed across the country would be useful in the long
run) in search of information gathering, or what is even more
appropriate, that of the paratroopers, involved in the war and
trying to find answers to the questions being asked at the
time: who are the troublemakers and how best to deal with them.
The paper was cautious though and indicated acclimatisation of
the troops would be a process runing over some long years. See
also various references above.
(37)
Even towards the end of 1957 it had referred to it as such
only indirectly and only on a few occasions. See Le Monde
19/1/55, 27/10/55, December 1956 and 12/7/57, p. 5. This was
symptomatic of many reporters and observers at the time and
even in later conflicts ("the troubles" in Northern Ireland,
for instance.)
A foreign observer of Algeria even used the "war without a
name" as a title of his book. Talbot, J., The War without a 
name, France in Algeria, 1954-1962, Alfred A.Knopf, New York,
1980.
The title, "a Savage War of Peace," chosen by A.Horne (1977)
is but another example of the ambivalance of the discourse.
(38)
les opêrations ont debute a sept heures ce
matin prècêdOes de bombardements et de mitraillages
de l'aviation et par les tirs de l'artillerie,
See Le Monde, 21/1/55, and also Le Monde, 23/4/55.
(39)
The expression is found in many of Le Monde's reports. See,
for instance, 19.1.55, 27.10.55 and 14/12/56, p. 5.
In tune with official ideology, it is significant that Jean
Planchais, who joined Le Monde's team at an early stage and who
became an army historian as well, travelled through Algeria
with the army and described the fighting as being against
terror, against the 250 salopards who were terrorising 700.000
inhabitants. See Le Monde 27 and 29/10/55 and subsequent re-
ports.
(40)
The reader could be forgiven for asking the question that if
the whole country had not taken up arms and a real war were not
taking place, then why was an action on that scale required.
Was it just 200 salopards, a few extremists as the official
terminology would have us believe? As it was to be revealed
later, operations of this kind were aimed at bombing civilian
villages. These were mostly inhabited by peaceful civilians,
possibly infiltrated by "rebels", that very same majority which
was supposed to be opposed to the "extremists," according to
the French propaganda machine.
(41)
Le Monde, 27 and 29/10/55.
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(42)
I1 apparut alors aux off iciers que la longue
negligence des pouvoirs publics, autant que le
comportement de certains colons ou "petits blancs",
suffisaient a expliquer la naissance d'une insur-
rection qu'on leur demandait soudain -apres cent
vingt-cinq ans de "presence frangaise"- de reprimer.
On concevra l'amertume qui s'empara des meil-
leurs d'entre eux devant cette thche ingrate.
In Le Monde, 14/12/56, p. 5.
In another article exploring the countryside, Mannoni had
previously explained that he had found a lack, an absence of
administration which could be accounted for by the large size
of 	 country since "civil servants disliked visiting the area
or... did not have the means to react" and by the ease of the
amtreile exerce par les animateurs de la rebellion. But he did
not explain the reasons of this contradiction between the
difficulty found by some (the French administration) and the
me found by others (the FLN) in administrating and control-
ling the territory -as that probably would have led him to
conclude that one was "natural" and the other somewhat less so.
On the contrary, he developed the idea still further by
stating that the army searching for fellagas ("bandits", see
Chapter 6) rencontra des administres en quite d'administra-
teurs. He also failed to explain the logic of his statements
describing the area he was visiting as being one of those
fitting the model. In Le Monde, 11/12/56, p. 5.
(43)
Les off iciers qui condamnent la fallacieuse
application de la «politique d'assimilation>>
-cause de la rebellion leur semble-t-il- ne voient
dans le <<nationalisme algórien>> qu'une tentative,
explicable mais injustifiable, de secession. Ils se
sont donc efforcds sans hesitation de la combattre.
Parfois, pour eux, pour les soldats dont us ont la
charge, c'etait aussi une question tres simple de
vie ou de mort.




insensibles au denuement de ceux qu'ils cei-
toyaient sans chercher a les connaitre et -incons-
ciemment souvent-... de les avoir humilies.
The other factor taken into account here, was the "surpris-
ing" misére of the Muslims that had been "discovered" by these
soldiers who were the first Frenchmen from France to find
themselves somewhere away from the main road in an "unknown
Algeria."
Here the reader was gratified by a quote from Soustelle's
bie:tet_s_p_ilarAnts_AlgArig, Plon, 1956.
En premier lieu j'avais ete frappe, attriste,
6mu par misere profonde de ce pays et de son peuple.
In Le Monde, 14/12/56, p. 5. See also Chapters 8 and 10.
(46)
Other Muslims were also blamed for the troubles. One of the
articles of the series stated:
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D'autres maisons construites par l'armee s'eri-
gent encore au Khroubs oü les hommes n'oublient pas
qu'un de leurs coreligionnaires policier -blame et
deplace- leur imprima sur la paume de la main ou sur
le front un cachet a encre pour pouvoir plus sure-
mement proceder a une operation de contrOle d'iden-
tite...
See Le Monde, 12/12/56, p. 5.
(47)
The picture of the army given by Le Monde illustrates the
desire to show that the army had integrated itself into Alger-
ian society and that it had become a fourth community in its
midst.
It is worth noting also that to add the army as a fourth
community to the Muslim, Jewish and Catholic ones within Alger-
ian society was equivalent to playing down the polarisation
between the people who saw themselves as being oppressed and
those whom they saw as being the oppressor and its backers. Le
Monde, 11/12/56.
Another idea conveyed through reports was that this army was
making a lot of sacrifices, taking the initiative "at a
price", and remaining present despite the danger, the "mines
being planted" and the "blood being shed".
(48)
About the towns and cities where their influence could not
(until later) be as important as it was in the douars (small
groups of countryside dwellings inhabited by related people),
and its contempt for some of the indigenous intelligentsia:
(..) villes (..) pleines de demi-intellectuels,
de licencies en droit, donc d'avocaillons et de
politicards qui ne seront jamais ni rebelles Iii
fideles.
The army's apprehension over the uncertainty of the boule-
versements gouvernementaux and their consequenses as well as
the warm welcome that its members had given to the idea that
the country should be placed in its hands for five years were
also highlighted in the reports of that day. See Le Monde,
14/12/56, p. 5.
(49)
The paper also admired the taking of 500.000 aerial photo-
graphs (the photographic section of Teghma (sic.) producing
between 80.000 and 100.000 photographs a day ) which would
enable the production of new maps, 	 both more up to date and
more appropriate, making knowledge of the terrain easier and
more readily accessible. In Le Monde, 29/10/55.
It requested that the army be adapted to the fighting in
Algeria. Some of its reports, suggested at times, especially at
the beginning, that the forces used were inadequate.
(...) Ii ne fait aucun doute que l'action des
forces de l'ordre s'est revelee assez peu efficace
(..) operations militaires menees avec des troupes
insuffisamment legeres pour la guerilla.
The report was by Blanchet in Le Monde, 8/6/55.
A year into the conflict, Planchais shared that view when he
thought that the means used were not suitable for the prevail-
ibganditions. He described the Fourth Motorised division, for
example, as an "atomic age unit thrown into the medieval atmo-
sphere of North Africa." He recounted what an officer had told
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him:
Nous sommes un marteau pilon envoye pour ecra-
ser une puce. Et bien entendu nous ne l'applatissons
pas. Elle a toujours largement le temps de sauter de
l'enclume.
Highlighting the need for American aid, Planchais stated
that more was needed in terms of aircraft and helicopters. See
Le Monde, 29/10/55.
(50)
That it was not just a question of terrain but also of the
nature of the fighting -as the troops's role was to fight as
well as protect a population scattered around a big and sparse-
ly populated country.
He also argued that:
"opposer la guerilla A la guerilla" suppose la
transformation complete des unites ou la reconstruc-
tion de cette armee d'Afrique dont le gouvernement
deplorait la disparition des novembre 1954.
In Le Monde, 5-6/2/56.
( 51 )
Reality proved otherwise; see Chapter 14.
(52)
There was an evident dismissal of the Indochinese parallel.
At the end of twenty-five months of "a struggle," which was
"for a long time undecisive" (only then the reader was told),
Eugene Mannoni asked if this was the end? Then referring to the
definite "Yes" of the Minister-Resident, he wrote:
Peut-être songera-t-on malgre soi, devant cette
assurance -a cause de cette assurance- A l'Indo-
chine, et aux promesses d'une victoire qui ne ces-
sera de reculer jusqu'A Dien-Bien-Phu?
The contents of this article and the title of this section
Des «mauvais souvenirs>> tended to suggest to other media and
public opinion (in case they thought Algeria was another Indo-
china and that France was on the verge of another Dien Bien
Phu) that that was not the case.
It would be wrong to think of Indochina and Dien Bien Phu,
he replied to "those who despite themselves expressed that
fear." He was also keen to state that the rebels did not con-
trol the field, that there was no area that was inaccessible
to the army and its helicopters, and that to look for any area
from which the rebels could launch any reconquest of Algeria
would be in vain.
One can clearly see the length to which Le Monde's journal-
ists went to promote that viewpoint as a mere glance at the map
for 1956 given on p. 143 in Opperman, T., Le Probleme algerien,
Maspero, 1961, based on Time Magazine and Deutsche Kommentare,
gives a very different picture with zones under total rebel
control, zones under partial control and zones exposed to rebel
attacks.
Le Monde dismissed as nonsense any analogy that could be
made between "pacification in Algeria" and "the war in Indo-
china" on the grounds of proximity to France, outside help and
the number of troops involved.
The paper stated that French troops had pushed back the
rebels and eliminated any possibility of incursion by them or
of any deferlement populaire. Then, describing the troops'other
victory, the paper went on to emphasise the "psychological
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results" achieved in certain areas through using the military
as administrators, doctors and teachers. In this instance, the
Indochinese model appeared to be useful for the journalist.
Although he stated in the opening section that any analogy in
this field was unfounded, he wrote:
L'experience indochinoise avait
enseigne .. . certains off iciers gu l au milieu du XXeme
siècle	 gu'on ne pouvait se borner a affronter
un adversaire aux moyens d'une action extremement
diversifies sur le seul terrain des armes.
Le Monde 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.
Despite the contradiction, and the failure to prove its case
in trying to differentiate between the two conflicts, Le Monde
did attempt to distinguish unjustifiably between the two very
similar situations of colonial domination which were being
eroded and progressively destroyed by a nationalist struggle.
The parallel with Indochina was used when it suited the paper
to attract the sympathy and support of the anti-communist
sections of public opinion in the conduct of the war. It was
rejected when the comparison could be seen to be detrimental as
tone possible solution of the conflict.
(53)
As illustrated above.
One of the most articulate exposition of the theory on the
Algerian episode was produced by Colonel Charles Lacheroy. See
Scenario-type de Guerre revolutionaire, Revue des Forces ter-
restres, October 1956, pp. 25-29, not applicable to Indochina,
and also Kelly, G.A., Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire
In crisis 1947-1962, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 1965, P. 107
ff.
(54)
General Zeller on the rapprochement between civilians and
soldiers. See Le Monde, 4/4/57, p. 4.
(55)
These and other reports indicated that the forces of order
should know that a Communist presence, alleged or otherwise,
was not essential for that kind of war to take place. The
military sources went on to reject poverty and economic depri-
vation as a secondary factor in the conflict. They even sug-
gested that reforms were unadvisable as they would be turned
down by the adversary because they would undermine the appeal
of the war. It was further argued that if concessions were
made, they would only increase opposition. Administrative,
political, economic and psychological action was recommended as
well as "intelligence gathering" and training. Democracy was
not on the agenda when the question was addressed, but rather
some "moral improvement" was thought to be desirable.
See Le Monde, 17/4/57, P. 5.
(56)
une des plus infestee d'Algerie. On ne circu-
lait plus sans risgues sur les routes, les fermes
brillaient toutes les nuits les attentats se multi-
pliaient dans certaines rues, les fellagas se prome-
naient en uniforme en plein jour.
Le Monde, 23/7/57, p. 3.
(57)
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Through the big "poster campaign" requesting the population
to rally to the French and asserting that France would never
abandon them.
Then describing the methods used, and deliberately forget-
ting other military means, Herreman stated that propaganda was
the main one ("even if some were reluctant to use it everybody
recognised its efficacy"). This propaganda was said to be in
written form -in newspapers, leaflets, posters. However, a
major obstacle was the illiteracy of the people: the best tool
remaining was to be oral propaganda -circulated through loud-
speakers, films and so forth, "telling the people the "fell-
agas want only their misery".
In Le Monde, 23/7/57, p. 3. Contre la propagande et les
pressions du FLN des off iciers livrent bataille pour la
«conquéte des coeurs>>, by P.Herreman.
Quoting a colonel, Herreman reported
If "we" convince the Algerian population that we are not
going to abandon them, "Algeria would fall at the drop of a
hat," (d'un seul coup va basculer de notre ceit6).
When the paratroopers came in February, he wrote, for one
and a half months they "gathered information," and now:
(...) the people in charge state that the
rebels' infrastructure had been destroyed, that the
rebels had been sent back to the caves and they only
came out every now and again to cut down a few
posts.
(58)
Postulating along the lines of Clausewitz that war was but
the continuation of politics by other means (and vice versa),
and using Lenin's and Mao's thoughts and theories on the
subject, Le Monde stated that the "rebels" had also learned
about revolutionary warfare. See Le Monde 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.
The paper alleged that the "rebels" were using various
strategies: ambushes, strikes, distribution of leaflets, bomb
attacks, "attentats", forbidding smoking, and "hiding" them-
selves amongst the Muslim mass to strike again when appropri-
ate.
Although some of the "rebels" might have known and read
about these theories, or might have been amongst French troops
involved in Indochina, there was hardly any evidence to suggest
that most of them could read -let alone have an understanding
of revolutionary combat. Although the journalist knew that the
only way for the nationalist to fight was to come out and
organise ambushes (as none of the traditional rules of warfare
applied in the sense that they could not afford to attack well-
defended settlements, although they did on many occasions), he
interpreted the confinement of the adversary to this kind of
activity as a triumph for the French troops. Ibid.
(59)
See Le Monde 21/5/55.
Outlining the success of the psychological warfare, Herreman
stated that the army was leading it, giving the best of itself
(once it had understood that there could not be a military
solution to the problem, and that the conquest of the popula-
tion was at stake). The journalist stated that he had met a
team of young officers who had spent several years as prisoners
of the Viets, who learnt their methods. they had told him:
LA oil les Viets ont rêussi nous ne pouvons pas
êchouer.
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In Le Monde, 23/7/57, p. 3.
(60)
Le Monde, 24/5/55, p. 9. There there were even reports of
congratulatory telegrames being sent. See Le Monde, 19/1/55.
On a number of occasions, there was a certain pride expres-
sed in reporting the activities of the military: Les operations
dont nous nous sommes faits l'echo ont ammene l'arrestation de
plusieurs individus. See Le Monde, 20-21/3/55.
(61)




But if the FLN or their activities were said to have been
audacious in some way, and this rarely happened, an amendment
was put in to remove any positive connotations. See Le Monde,
10/5/57, p. 1, and the corrections entered at the request of




The news took up very little space in the paper. As an
illustration the news occupied only a quarter of two columns on
page 7 in Le Monde of 23/4/55.
(66)
En Algerie reprise des attentats in Le Monde 19/3/57, p. 1.
In Le Monde, 7/2/56, the army was described as doing its best,
playing its role fully but was inadequate to deal with this
kind of war. There were fears that the "officiers des Affaires
Musulmanes", said to be doing a great deal of good work, ne
soient emportes dans une debacle generalisee comme la ligne
Maginot en 1940.
(67)
On this occasion the paper depicted the military situation
as critical with Algeria being unsafe apart from cities like
Algiers or Oran (not that the regions were being constantly
occupied by the "rebels" but "under pressure" only), the set-
tlers were feeling insecure, under constant threat and leaving
their land. See Le Monde, 7/2/56.
(68)
Le Monde, 15/12/56, pp. 1-7, under the title of Le dernier
quart-d'heure, which was a theme developed by official authori-
ties and successive Governor-Generals implying that victory was
almost complete.
(69)
The veterans described as being as French as the others
sipping "Anis" at lunch time and wine at all hours of the day.
In Le Monde, 13/12/56, p. 4. This denotes an attempt by the
paper, in conformity with most of the official propaganda, to
emphasise that Islam and the FLN were not as influential and





More thorough journalists included Jean-Jacques Servan-
Schreiber (see below), Bromberger, S., (Quarante ans de report-
age, Plon, Paris, 1986), Barrat, R., (Les maquis de la libertê,
Edition du Temoignage Chretien, Paris, 1987, -written during
the war) went and interviewed the "rebels". See Chapter 13.
Reports of that type were only printed in reviews like
Temps Modernes and confirmed in books and memoirs written by
Army officers and soldiers recounting their experiences, which
were published during the war (see Servan-Schreiber, J.-J.,
Lieutenant en Algórie, Julliard, Paris, 1957, Bonnaud, G., La
Paix des Nêmentchas, Esprit, 1957 and Chapter 10) and also
after Algerian independence (when the main actors as well as
less significant personalities who took part published in book
form memoirs of their own experience and novels relating their
accounts of the war, which bore no resemblance whatsover to the
mild, sanitised and very often erroneous descriptions provided
by patriotic newspapers including Le Monde).
(72)
It described army operations as having a double objective
(disloquer les noyaux de rósistance et rassurer les populations
autochtones) which, as one would expect, was "fully achieved"
(See Le Monde 20/1/55).
This enterprise of the army and the efforts made in their
operations were not presented by the paper as being done with
the aim of maintaining French domination, but as something
desired and even expected by the majority of the population.
Ibid.
The aim of this policy, which consisted in sending the
troops to stop the troubles, and of the measures taken were
said to be:
[les dispositions ] doivent permettre d'at-
teindre non seulement le renforcement des structures 
civiles et militaires  mais le plein effet des
mesures politiques 6conomiques et sociales  c'est
opportunèment rappeler que d'indispensables mesures
d'ordre ne peuvent étre pleinement efficaces qu'en
s'inscrivant dans une politique d'ensemble de nature
& restaurer la confiance (my emphasis).
See Le Monde 19/5/55, p. 1.
(73)
Le Monde, 29/3/57, p. 6 reported that "13 rebels" who admit-
ted that they had put mines, one of which had blown up a mili-
tary vehicle, were found amongst the nomads in Beni Bandel
area. They were then "requested to indicate the position of
these mines and while discharging this duty" (effectuant cette
operation) eleven were blown to pieces by one of the mines.
One could legitimately ask how could these people be blown up
if they knew where they had put the mines. The more likely
story is that they were used to open the way up for a convoy.
(74)
See the cases of:
- Four supects killed in
- Three muslims suspects
Le Monde, 10/4/57, p. 5:
killed in le Monde 18/4/57, p. 3;
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- (...) suspect qui ne repondait pas aux sommations d'usage
in Le Monde, 24/4/57, p. 4;
- And the report by AFP stating that two runaways (fuyards)
were shot in the area of Guelma, in Le Monde, 30/3/57, p. 6.
(75)
See reports such as:
- Patrools which accidentally injured four passers-by, all
Muslims when shooting at somebody running away, in Le Monde,
25/5/57, p. 3.
- Street battles which leave thirteen people dead three of
whom were soldiers on one side and two children on the other
side (previous day report stated that the latter were hit by
rebels' bullets), in Le Monde, 5/6/57, p. 3
These leave the informed reader a bit weary as to the accur-
acy of the events being reported.
(76)
See Le Monde, 23/5/57, p. 6 for the following report.
A Tlemcen un militaire europeen a ete tile de 3
balles de pistolet. Les temoins n'ayant pas voulu 
(my emphasis) fournir les renseignements que leur
demandaient les enqueteurs ont ete condamnes a une
amende collective de 1 million de francs, payables
dans les 24 heures.
(77)
Le Monde, 30/4/57, p. 4.
(78)
In Algiers 217 persons were arrested when only about twenty
of them were under suspicion. In Le Monde, 2/8/57, p. 4.
(79)
The work carried out by these officers , who distinguished
between the salopards and the bons bledards, who had stepped up
the contacts with the local population and who were learning
their administrative skills in very particular circumstances,
was outlined. So was the fact that some of them se sont tou-
jours consideres en «zone d'insecurite>> et non en «terri-
toire ennemi>>. See Le Monde 14/12/56, p. 5.
(80)
In order to destroy violence, in Le Monde, 27/10/55 (Pour
les habitants tu dois etre le soldat qui protege le droit) and
in Le Monde, 29/10/55 ( la bombe n'est pas l'instrument de la
pacification).
(81)
In his fourth article of the series, devoted to life amidst
the off iciers d'active (14/12/56), Mannoni insisted on the
affinities between the Army and the Muslims. He evoked the
battles that French officers had led in Europe with the people
(who were then most reliable and fought bravely in their ranks)
against whom they were now fighting (ten years later). He
expressed his amazement at the attitude of some of these people
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who fought on the side of France and dwelt on their bravery and
citations (eg. the military medal won by Ben Bella). The jour-
nalist must have been oblivious to the conditions of discrimi-
nation that existed within the army against the indigenous
members who had sacrificed themselves on the French frontlines
all over the world. (See below and also Rahmani, A., L'Affaire
des Off iciers algeriens, Le Seuil, Paris, 1959.
The paper tried to convey the idea that the army and,
especially, the officers were at pains to fight them. Mannoni
even quoted a general to illustrate the point that that was
causing pain and that the French troops had not gone to war
against their former soldiers for the hell of it, nor with any
kind of enjoyment «pour le plaisir>>. See Le Monde 14/12/56,
p. 5. The footnote of the article referred to previous articles
of 11, 12, 13 December 1956, but those references do not seem
to relate to anything the paper was now writing about.
The officers "d'active", according to the journalist, did
not have any of the racists sentiments found in the civil-
ians. He even cast some doubt on their hatred of the people
they were fighting against. There was even talk of an acquired
deep physical sympathy for l'adversaire inconnu, autre soi-même
qui lui aussi risque sa vie. In Le Monde, 14/12/56.
(82)
The way the soldiers set about the "reconquest of Algeria"
was described by Mannoni as taking the initiatives instead of
waiting for trouble to hit them. The journalist did not forget
to mention that "scruples did not weaken their determination."
He described the soldier's resolve (a phrase of Marshal
JUIN) not to be the generation which would abandon Algeria;
their belief was that Algeria [was] French or, more precisely,
that it [had] to become French to remain so. See Le Monde
14/12/56, p. 5.
(83)
It is worth noting that even when brutalities were mentioned
they had nothing to do with the soldiers that the paper was
visiting or talking to:
Dans la brutalitê des rencontres les plus
habiles d'entre eux, qui sont aussi les plus hu-
mains, se sont efforcês de garder leur sang-froid
et d'obliger leurs hommes a le garder aussi. Ceux-la
ont Ovite de se livrer a certaines represailles
qui «souillent, nous disait un capitaine, les yeux
des jeunes soldats>> et rendent plus solidaires
encore des fellagas les populations sur lesquelles
elles s'abattent.
Le Monde, 19/3/57, p. 1. See also, for instance, previous
references above when it was hinted at that the soldiers re-
ferred to were not the ones involved in harsh repression.
See also Le Monde, 13/12/56, p. 4, referred to below, when
Le Monde gave an indication that coercive measures had been
used, it revealed only part of the story and the account made
it apparently innocuous. While at the same time conceding that
some innocent people had suffered from the army's indiscrimi-
nate use of violence, the paper quickly pointed out that that
happened elsewhere, not there, while the same report disguised
a number of clues as to the nature of the suffering.
(84)
It is significant that most of the articles of Le Monde,
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even towards the end of the Fourth Republic and even after the
bombing of Sakiet, did not really blame the army. See M.Duver-
ger L'armee, la nation et le regime in Le Monde, 26/02/58, pp.
1-2.
(85)
See also Chapters 10, 11 and 13.
(86)
See also Freund, op. cit.
(87)
Keramane, H., La Pacification, La Cite, Lausanne, 1960,
provided a description of these operations seen from the Alger-
ian side.
(88)
The bias in favour of the army could be illustrated in other
ways. A careful reader could, with hindsight, detect the hidden
truth in the reports. In one of them, dated 13 December 1956,
we learn that the ralliement had taken place because the inha-
bitants of the villages were tired of their rough living condi-
tions.
(...) las de dormir avec femmes et enfants a la
belle etoile,	 d'avoir faim, d'affronter un
troisieme hiver dans des grottes, de subir aussi les
exigences de certains chefs de groupes.
What were they running from, might one ask? Certainly not
from the rebels because they too would be in the caves. The
journalist conceded also that:
(...) les patrouilles qui ne quittaient les
villages deserts qua pour y revenir les auraient
contraints sans treve a des exodes harassants.
Les hommes de Bou-Hatem, the journalist conti-
nued, n'ont regagne leurs foyers que pour retrouver
leurs femmes, emmenees et gardees par les chasseurs
(Chasseurs alpins = soldiers of a special mountain
regiment).
Apparently, an old women had been left in the village to
inform the husbands that:
(...) que leurs compagnes leur seraient rendues
s'ils venaient les reclamer, qu'ils ne couraient,
ce-faisant, aucun risque. us vinrent, repartirent
avec leurs femmes -qui avaient ete respectees .
See Le Monde, 13/12/56, p. 4.
The procedure was undertaken, one might guess, to get the
men back to remedy the <<under administration>> in official and
Le Monde's terminology, but it would have also meant (for any
sensible observer, especially with hindsight) to record and
establish a census of the faces, the names and the houses, so
that the movements of these inhabitants and their future ab-
sences could be noticed.
The journalist was keen to add that the inhabitants of the
villages who rallied to the troops could obtain
sans difficulte des laissez-passer qui tien-
nent malgre tout lieu de cartes d'alimentation.
One or two further inferences may be drawn from this article
(although they were not explicitly stated by the paper and
could only be gleaned by a thorough knowledge of the procedures
used) of what exactly had been going on, despite the deliberate
disguise by the official phraseology. One is the fact that
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these people had been deprived of their land and hence of their
livelihood and that is why they needed food supplies. The other
was the reason why they were running away: the indiscriminate
reprisals to which most Algerians were subjected. Since the
outbreak of the war, many inhabitants of the countryside had
been fleeing from the troops, sometimes with their families
sometimes on their own, to escape the indiscriminate reprisals
that were operated by the troops on the entire population.
French opinion was becoming increasingly aware of this (men-
tioned by left wing press, returning soldiers, etc..) but it
could not be found in the articles that the journalists of Le
Monde prepared for their readers.
What followed gives credence to these conclusions. We learn
in the penultimate paragraph that the mot d'ordre was to dis-
tinguish between
(...) les	 terroristes et les terror-
ises»	 Cette distinction on ne l'a pas toujours
sauvegardee ailleurs(...) lorsque sous le meme
vocable de <<suspects», notion intermediaire sou-
vent imprecise, toujours dangereuse, on a confondu
les <<bons musulmans >> et les <<autres».
It is worth noting that in articles of this kind which give
an inkling of what really went on, it is always stated that if
anything untoward occurred, it took place elswhere, never where
Le Monde's reporters were with one exception to-date: that of
Penchenier. See Chapter 12.
Here, the journalist was adamant when he stated that:
ici-même, on s'est efforce d'eviter toute
confusion.
He conceded, nevertheless, that:
Ii n'est point pourtant de <<pacification»
sans coercition, Si contrdlee soit-elle -comme
l'illustre l'histoire des mans de Bou-hatem- sans
surveillance, sans mefiance non plus. Bien qu'on ne
la sente guere dans les rapports quotidiens que les
militaires entretiennent avec les villageois, elle
subsiste pourtant.
See Le Monde, 13/12/56, p. 4.
(89)
These are examined later in Chapters 11 and 12.
(90)
City dwellers were also moved through measures of assigna-
tion en residence surveillee.
(91)
Very often it was alleged that these people had been moved
because they had been taken advantage of and deceived (abuse)
by their brothers in faith. Le Monde did not explicitly state
that these people had been moved, according to the official
policy, in order to deprive the "fish" (the terrorists) from
the "water" (the population) in which it could thrive and
prosper (see theory of revolutionary warfare and above).
The paper stated that divisions ran accross families, that
there was a fear of returning to the fields. But the paper
omitted to mention that they were forced out of those fields,
which were their only source of income and survival. The fields
were, in the words of the paper "delaisses", but the paper
itself announced news of the various regions declared "zOnes
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interdites" in which nobody but the army could venture and
where anybody seen was liable to be shot on sight (see below
and Chapters 11 and 12).
(92)
us sont rassemblês -on les a rassembles- wrote Le Monde
It was the euphemism, used on that and on many occasions,
for population being moved from their land and ressettled
around the rudimentary villages being created.
What seemed important to the journalist reporting was that
they enjoyed, according to him, a relative security now that
they were in a village which "will become prosperous." See Le
Monde, 11/12/56 1 p. 5. See also 13/12/56, P. 5.
(93)
An illustration of this double aspect can be found when the
paper referred to pacification .. as a notion malaisement
definissable ... describing its double aspect as being:
(...) les militaires qui ont detruit ailleurs
des mechtas mauvaises (ou pourries ... [qui] ser-
vaient de relais aux rebelles	 construisent pour
des musulmans misdrables des maisons decentes,
sêduisantes	 une eco/e dont on n l apercoit que la
base.
Then came the gift of water, brought to these old
musulmans incrêdules, ou ignorant tout simple-
ment le principe des vases communicants
The paper added that medicine and a more organised civilian
life were introduced to them. See Le Monde, 11/12/56, p. 5.
The newspaper also stated that these peasants had abandoned
their lands with their mechtas and that the Army was going to
distribute "enclaves" of land belonging to the Compagnie al-
gerienne. The help of the Army was described as being reminis-
cent of the soldiers clearing the land (defricher) for cultiva-
tion in the previous century, when the policy of pacification
was known as consisting of the use of the sword and the plough





Reprisals and similar activities by the Army were only
revealed much later in most cases. This is one example. The
example of Edouard Sablier about the 1945 repression is also a
case in point. See Chapter 4.
(96)
Robert Escarpit, who admitted he was not a Mendesist but
nevertheless an admirer of his courage, in a sarcastic daily
note (Au jour le jour) recommended using pacification methods
in parliament (and then retracted for fear of being taken too
literally). These methods seemed to have a specific meaning to
him since he wrote that they were methods
qui ont fait leurs preuves pour obtenir la
pacification de la France et la purger de quelques
6nergumenes qui empoisonnent son atmosphere politi-
que.
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Pacification by R. Escarpit, Le Monde, 13-14/1/57, p. 1.
(97)
Little, if anything at all, was said of any economic and
social interventions despite the claims.
The army's role was said to go beyond its traditional func-
tion and articles explained the need to build new roads, point-
ing out the economic benefits of such developments. It is easy
to see, however, that the immediate concern for that could have
been only increased access for army trucks to improve the hold
over, and better control of, the Muslim population. Instead, it
was the social benefits that were highlighted
Ii est certain que ces travaux presentent en
méme temps un intêrét 6conomique et surtout social
pour l'emploi de la main-d'oeuvre locale flottante.
Dans les milieux militaires, on souligne d'ailleurs
que des credits sont nêcessaires pour mener cette
tAche A bonne fin .
See Le Monde 21/5/55.
(98)
Le Monde, 11/12/56, p. 5.
(99)
Section Administrative Specialisee created in November 1955.
The work of this special group was dealt with by Nicolas
D'Andoque in 1955-1962, Guerre et Paix en Algerie, l'epopee
silencieuse des SAS, Societe de Production Litteraire, Paris,
1977.
(100)
Et us sont nombreux les anciens off iciers des
affaires indigênes, les jeunes lieutenants SAS, a
s'attacher a leur mission avec un enthousiasme et
une abnêgation qui forcent l'admiration.
In various articles by P.Herreman, Contre la propagande et
les pressions du FLN, 23/7/57, p.3, 24/7/57, p. 3, and
following dates, it was emphasised that to rally the heart of
the Algerian people (ralliement des coeurs) the main instru-
ments were mairie, bloc sanitaire, 6cole (trois outils majeurs
de la pacification), as well as the building of roads and the
construction of houses and villages. All these ammounted to a
very peaceful rebuilding of the country with the SAS, the KApis
bleux, and the commando noir heading up this task. The officer
was the tuteur, helping the locals to get things organised, so
as to get them out of their state of misery, and being so much
in their confidence that these officers were said to be often
guided out of danger by their protégés. The "brilliant work of
these Samaritans" whose "patience and dedication were their
glorious titles" was given a high profile by the paper through-
out.
(101)
Two comments come to mind when treating this particular
aspect of the war. The true nature of the conflict and the
conditions under which it took place constitued an essential
part of the propaganda campaign, which Le Monde could not
possibly have not known about. Secondly, the optimism which
radiated from some of the articles (this was also part of the
propaganda campaign) could only have had the impact of provi-
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ding further encouragment to a flagging and increasingly disil-
lusioned public opinion. See also Chapter 9.
(102)
Their work was described as consisting of:
Irriguer des terres alterees, donner a ceux
qui s'accroupissent devant leur maison, non «par
paresse>>, mais parce qu'ils sont reduits a un etat
de cheimage endemique, un travail remunerateur, les
arracher a leurs gourbis pour les faire penêtrer
dans des maisons decentes, construire des ecoles
plus modestes mais plus disseminees, leur confier le
soin de gerer eux-mémes leurs villages, negliges par
certains maires du premier college, trop soucieux
d'ameliorer les centres europeens oCi residaient
«come par hasard >> leurs electeurs, plus simple-
ment faire que les musulmans du <<bled>> deviennent
<<semblables, malgre leurs codtumes et leur reli-
gion, aux paysans de France >>, tels sont les
objectifs que se sont assignes ces off iciers. Ils
ont ainsi oblige certains colons a payer leurs
ouvriers les salaires etablis par les conventions
syndicales, les menacant de ne plus proteger leurs
fermes s'ils n'observaient pas cette prescription. A
la realisation de ces taches, ils apportent le plus
souvent une passion de jeunes scouts.
In Le Monde, 14/12/56, p. 5.
"Perhaps, after all, that is what they are, he continued,in
this community which is being built, to the defense of which
they will contribute".
(103)
But more was to come. The aim of this action for these
officers, according to the paper, was that they were thinking
of creating the conditions for the day when a group of these
Muslims could vote in the municipal elections, qualifying the
statement, however, with the condescending comment that they
were less interested in political than economic and social
measures:
se preoccupant moms de «grande politique»
-il est admis que les idees n'interessent pas les
fellahs- que de «reformes economiques et so-
ciales».
Voting as well as full and equal political participation
were seen as a distant aim, and the work being done as laying
the groundwork for it.
Echoing the official propaganda machine, the journalist
wrote that Vive la nouvelle Algerie frangaise seemed, according
to him, the new motto where new was as important as French for
rallying these rural communities. See Le Monde 14/12/56, p. 5.
On this occasion, the paper went as far as to suggest that
they could even help set up a Muslim Party of the Military in
the countryside through a new relationship:
«parti musulman de militaires » gui echapper-
ait A la fois	 a l'influence d'un caidat
vereux, d'un grand colonnat discredite et des natio-
nalistes.
In Le Monde, 14/12/56, p. 5.
(104)
This attitude was indeed meant to be reminiscent of the
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policies of the "Bureaux arabes" followed by Bugeaud and that
of the "Arab Empire" on which Napoleon III was so keen. But
these efforts were not exactly philanthropic. They were very
often just what they appeared, a propaganda campaign which, at
the same time, helped provide intelligence on the movements of
the nationalists, and helped cut the nationalists off from the
population which was supposed to provide them with logistic
support.
(105)
In an article of 26/1/57 from its special correspondent,
which explained that the black commandos would disappear in
thin air, would live with and become part of the inhabitants of
a mechta, and carry on a variety of work with the local popu-
lation. Le Monde suggested that because of the success of these
new methods, which were exactly adapted to the notion of
"pacification", the Minister for Defence had created a whole
batallion of them.
The article explained that Servan-Schreiber (see also Chap-
ters 10 and 13), former director of L'Express, one of the
officers recalled was one of the promoters with the lieutenant-
colonel Barbereau (sic.) of these "black commandos."
Using a statement Servan-Schreiber had made to the Journal
d'Alger on his experience of the "black commandos," Le Monde
wrote that Jean-Jacques Servan- Schreiber avait tire un
«reconfort» et «beaucoup plus d'optimisme>> qu'i/ n'avait
ose esperer and quoted him talking about the "thaw," the confi-
dence created and stating that no gesture was wasted, that the
mur de la mefiance was less "thick" and looked like being
"holed" everytime the indigenous inhabitant "becomes a man in
your eyes and in his."
(106)
et l'on se prend alors a rever de tout ce qui
pourrait etre ici sauve, reconstruit, creel pour
l'avenir, Si tous les hommes de ce pays etaient
consideres comme des hommes sur tous les plans, non
pas dans des textes juridiques, mais dans le compor-
tement quotidien... Oui, sincerement, je suis plus
optimiste qu'avant sur les chances qui existent.
Seulement ces chances ne sont pas /A of/ les slogans
les situent.
In De l'expórience des «commandos noirs>>, from the special
correspondent, Le Monde, 26/1/57.
.(107)
Servan-Schreiber, J.-J., Lieutenant en Algerie, collection
of articles in L'Express and the book of the same name transla-
ted by Ronald Matthews, Hutchinson, 1958. See also Chapters 10
and 13.
(108)
See also Chapters 10 to 14.
(109)
There were clear cases of disrespect, if not outright dis-
obedience vis-à-vis governmental policy, as epitomised by sev-
eral cases, including Marshall Juin, Generals Salan, Faure and
Bollardiere. See also Planchais, J., Une Histoire politique de
l'Armde 1940-1967, Seuil, Paris, 1967, pp. 245-253.
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(110)
When an attempt was made to kill General Salan (16 January
1957) by the European "ultras" resulting in the death of com-
mandant Rodier, Le Monde keenly pursued its own enquiries to
find out who was involved, provided a substantial amount of
information and made interesting conjectures about the links
with Faure. See Le Monde, 2/3/57, p. 4.
These were subsequently confirmed (see below), as was the
hostility of some army elements to Salan as a result of the
Indochinese war. Very quickly after the arrest of those impli-
cated, the paper came out with their code names (29/1/57, p.1)
and then the real names of those involved in the attempt
[(Kovacs (31/1/57), Mr and Mrs Ortiz, Scire who tried to commit
suicide (Le Monde 1/2/57) and the remainder of the names when
charges were brought (9/2/57, p. 2)].
Le Monde revealed that there was an interrelation between
the various aspects of the affair, the plot to kill Salan, the
Faure plot, and the attempt to overthrow the authorities in
Algiers by Knecht, Sauvage and Griotteray (Le Monde 2/3/57, p.
4). These three were cleared of the charges relating to the
incident above, more commonly known as the "bazooka affair."
(111)
While in the case of Salan the attack against the Army came
from outside and from the right of the political spectrum, in
the case of General Faure's "plot" (end of 1956) the problem
came from the same shade of political opinion but from within
the corps itself, in the shape of a serving general, Faure.
Faure committed an indiscretion by telling a civil servant,
Teitgen, brother of the ex minister, of the possibility of a
revolt being organised by army staff and right-wing extremists.
(112)
Robert Gauthier, covering the case, gave the rank and posi-
tion of the general as second in command of the Algiers divi-
sion and stated that he was mis aux arrets for thirty days
about ten days previously by Defence Minister, Bourgés-Mau-
noury.
(113)
Which treated the matter very seriously. Le Figaro's Gabriel
Robinet had asked three questions (Was it true that Army
"elements" had thought of susbstituting themselves for "la
legalite republicaine"? Was it true that a general with a high
rank and a brilliant record was reprimanded? Was he in contact
with the extremist group who were issuing orders?) when he
wrote:
On peut affirmer, sans risquer d'être dementi,
que l'armee, dans son immense majorite, se serait
refuse a collaborer a une operation dont le resultat
edt ete de jeter de facon peut-étre irreparable des
Francais les uns contre les autres, et de rendre
infranchissable le fosse entre la metropole et
l'Algerie. Sans vouloir exagerer la portee de cette
affaire, on aurait tort d'en sous-estimer l'impor-
tance. De pareils mouvements peuvent, helasl s'ex-
pliquer par la colere, la revolte, contre d'even-
tuelles positions d'abandon.
As reported by Le Monde, 7/1/57.
(114)
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The official communiqué stated that the general had commit-
certaines imprudences verbales ayant ete ex-
ploitees dans un climat particulierement delicat, le
minis tre a ete amene A prononcer une sanction et A
adresser diverses observations en vue d'arréter
toute interpretation particulierement dommageable au
moral de l'armee.
In Le Monde, 8/1/57, p. 1.
(115)
Ii est toutefois etablir que le general Faure
avait cherche a recruter des adherents en vue d'un
pro jet qui tendait A rien de moms gu'A substituer
en Algörie un pouvoir militaire A la legalite repu-
blicaine(sic.) Ibid.
Because there was either a superfluous "r" to etablir or a
missing "a" in front of it.
Because of the official silence surrounding the affair, Le
Monde itself found it difficult to assess it but quoted Le
Figaro's statements that the general had held des conversa-
tions qualifiees d'imprudentes.
Gauthier found it imprudent to speculate whether calls for
action had emanated from a high-ranking reservist officer but
thought Faure's attempt symptomatic. He wrote that it was
revealed by an "indiscretion a few days after demonstrations
following Froger's funeral when shouts of l'armee au pouvoir
were uttered." For Faure, a tragedy had been unfolding for the
last two years in Algeria. The indecision characterising
government and country alike was said to have led to bitterness
which incited sometimes some "less balanced minds" to envisage
"desperate measures which were primarily harmful to the Eur-
opeans themselves".
(116)
Although it thought that it would be regrettable (fAcheux)
if its delicate mission in Algeria were made even more diffi-
cult by some initiatives aberrantes, if the Army and its inter-
est were "used as opposed to served", the paper found it under-
standable that, following on the defeat in Indochina, and the
humiliation of Egypt, the Army might be forced to ask questions
about itself, its future, and about France herself.
When confirming the contacts, Le Monde drew the attention of
its readers to his frankness ("franc-parler"), writing that he
had never hidden his feelings about what he called "deficien-
cies of the institutions," that he had openly expressed dissent
and campaigned against the then Defense Minister during the
debates on the European Defence Community, which subsequently
resulted in his transfer to Vienna.
Le Monde described his brilliant career and sporting succes-
ses and his dispatches to North Africa, the fact that he was
reluctantly resigned to "our" departure from Morocco and that
he arrived in Algeria with the firm intention of opposing any
"abandonment". It stated that he had made his views on the
subject well known, and that provoked the minister's "displea-
sure".
(117)
Peut-on pour autant parler de complot, asked the paper ?
Backing its reports with similar views, Le Monde wrote that
General Maricourt, whom it had not until then mentioned, had
ted
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conceded that "he had held conversations thought to be incom-
patible with military discipline" but that nothing indicated
that he "had participated in any plot" and that in any case he
had not been "sanctioned" but "simply warned".
(118)
Contradicting itself about the lack of information, Le Monde
revealed that the news had been widely commented in military
circles (as soon as it reached Algiers through the Parisian
press), who were unhappy about the loss of some powers in
certain areas (L'armee a regrette que dans certaines zones - en
Kabylie par exemple- des prerogatives qui lui avaient ete un
moment confiees aient ete restituees a l'autoritd civile. De
nombreux off iciers estiment au contraire que la proclamation de
l'etat de siege, qui transfererait automatiquement les pouvoirs
l'autoritê militaire, serait dans les circonstances presentes
la meilleure formule.) and concluded that the military had
reacted favourably to the General adding that some of the
military, who met in La Maison du Combattant, even thought
that the army was being made a scapegoat for the failures of
the government.
See Le Monde 9/1/57, p. 2.
(119)
In his explanatory articles on L'Armee s'inquiéte, Jean
Planchais looked at the state of mind of the Army. He found
anxiety in the institution. Some of its members were even
talking of juntas and pronunciamentos (as seen above) and
finding sympathetic support for their ideas.
His views of the Army and its role in Algeria did not differ
from those of the officers recommending a strong but paterna-
listic posture. He described the Army as being experienced in
battle and in the handling of the type of conflicts in which it
was involved. As far as North Africa was concerned, the views
of the Army were said to be: la force commande le respect. Ce
qui n'empéche pas qu'elle doive etre temperee par un «paterna-
lism» bien intentionne. See Le Monde, 18/1/57.
(120)
Even though he accepted that a number of Frenchmen from
North Africa had found former comrades in the army and the
links developed between civilian and military had resulted in
an attitude which was not favourable to the implementation of a
liberal policy in Algeria. Ibid.
(121)
He stated that the role of the army was not felt to be ap-
propriate by some. Pacifying the countryside, hunting rebels,
protecting the means of communication were within its compe-
tence, he wrote, but urban terrorism was a role for the police,
the army was not made for it:
Les soldats ne sont pas faits pour briser les
greves ou vider les poubelles. L'armee n'est pas une
«bonne A tout faire>>. Et de rappeler le vieux
dicton «Bon A tout, bon & rien».
This was especially seen to be the case here with this
"Atomic army" being transformed into a "bad infantry", with
the conscripts being inadequately trained, with several re-
signations of high-ranking officers, and with certain failures
making bitterness more prevalent:i'echec exclusivement politi-
que de l'attaque contre Nasser... n'etait pas fait pour de-
467
terdre l'atmosphere. In Le Monde, 18/1/57, p. 5.
(122)
(...)de faire les frais d'une politique ou
d'une absence de politique. Surtout us decouvraient
en face d'eux un ideal dont les fins etaient discut-
ables mais incontestablement generatrices de courage
et de sacrifices. Ibid.
Although he accepted that the Army did not obey under Vichy,
Planchais maintained that the Army had been very proud of its
role as the instrument of political power indicating, however,
that its suspicion of politicians had been on the increase.
Apres la Liberation, les critiques suscitees
par une conception excessive de la <<grandeur>>,
les attaques dirigees contre les gaspillages ainsi
qu'un certain antimilitarisme qui suit en general
les conflits armes /'ont amenee peu a peu A se
retirer dans sa tour d'ivoire.
Ibid.
(123)
Of late, the discussions of the C.E.D. gave many, he went on
to say:
l'impression qu'une partie de l'opinion etait
prete a leur arracher la derniere raison qu'ils
avaient de subsister: l'uniforme et le drapeau.
Ibid.
(124)
He recalled General's Chassin statement:
LI est temps que l'armee cesse d'être la grande
muette. Le moment est venu pour le monde libre, s'il
ne veut pas mourir de mort violente, d'appliquer
certaines methodes de l'adversaire. Or l'une de ces
methodes -et sans doute la plus importante- reside
dans le role ideologique, qui est derriere le rideau
de fer devolu aux forces militaires. From 10/10/54
in Revue militaire d'information under the heading
"pour ranimer la foi. n Ibid.
(125)
He quoted various sources in his examination of the Army's
unease in its role and stated that its difficulties were illu-
strated by its ill-feeling, its effort to seek better under-
standing with various other groups and to educate tomorrow's
generation. Ibid.
(126)
Sans doute, mais il est a craindre que dans sa
lassitude l'armee, Si elle n'eprouve nulle envie de
renverser elle-méme le regime, ne fasse rien non
plus pour l'empecher de disparaitre brutalement s'il
est attaque.
In Le Monde, 19/1/57, pp. 1-8.
(127)
Especially by the paratroopers, in their dealings with
Algerian nationalists (some of whom were not even involved in
the troubles). See section four, Chapters 10, 11, 12 and 13.
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This came to the attention of left-wing circles as well as
large sections of public opinion and caused an enormous amount
of unease.
(128)
See also Chapters 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.
(129)
Bollardi6re, who was concerned about the intensive use of
repressive methods, including torture, refused to implement a
decision to intensify the struggle against the terrorists and
asked to be relieved of his duties. He returned the command of
his area to his superiors and went back to France. Le Monde
reported the news, giving biographic details (at the foot of
the article in small print) of this holder of the Legion d'hon-
neur, who had been companion of de Gaulle in the Liberation,
veteran of Indochina, where he commanded all airborne troops,
and, at that point, commander of a region in Algeria, outlining
the reasons for his request. The paper also echoed the debate
surrounding his resignation. See Le Monde 29/3/57 to 2/4/57, p.
3.
(130)
Although "S" ( which stands for Sirius, a pen name that
H.Beuve-Mery used prior to founding Le Monde and occasionally
subsequently since.) did not think it was possible for Boller-
diere to have made his decision without weighing the full
implications of his gesture, and saw in that gesture the proof
that "one could be a war leader and still refuse to sacrifice
the moral values of a civilisation to the concerns of immediate
efficiency and expediency" (Responsable du secteur est blideen
le general de Bollardiêre demande a etre releve de son comman-
dement. L'ancien chef des troupes aêroport6es d'Indochine
entend protester contre l'emploi de methodes qu'il estime
contraires aux traditions de l'armee, in Le Monde, 29/3/57, p.
1).
The paper was quite reserved in its comments.
In a carefully worded article, Beuve-Mery stated that for a
while, and "out of good faith", public opinion might be a
"little puzzled" by some revelations that had been presented to
it officially as a «campaign to demoralise the army».
Beaucoup de Fran gais ont pu de tras bonne foi
s'etonner ou s'indigner de revelations qui leur
etaient presentees off iciellement come une campagne
d'intellectuels desincarnes ou de chretiens emotifs,
quand ce n'etait pas comme une machination commu-
niste. Dans tous les cas le resultat etait le même
demoralisation de l'armee et de la nation au profit
des entreprises criminelles du FLN.
In Le Monde, 29/3/57, p. 1.
(131)
It reported that the Minister of Defence had denied that it
was for those reasons, and through rumours in the corridors of
the Assembly implied that the general had wanted to come and
see his ailing sister. The minister's statement was not
considered by Le Monde as plausible, especially in view of the
publication by L'Express of the text of a letter of support
sent by the general to J.-J. Servan-Schreiber (see also Chap-
ters 10, 11, 12 and 13).
For Le Monde, the meaning of the letter had no ambiguity
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whatsoever, and through his support of J.J. Servan-Schreiber
the general was outlining to public opinion the "dramatic
aspect of the revolutionary warfare that the army faces in
Algeria" and stressing his concern "not to lose sight, under
the fallacious pretext of immediate efficacy, of moral values
which alone have made the greatness of our civilisation and our
army." See Le Monde, 29/3/57, p. 1.
At the same time as it was devoting coverage to the letter
to Servan-Schreiber, Le Monde continued to publish official
denials by the Ministry of Defence tending to play down the
affair (stressing that Bollardiere's command was, in any case,
reduced to a minimum), to undermine his position or even to put
the blame back on the general for not having spoken out pre-
viously and not having taken action while he was in command.
See Le Monde, 30/3/57, p. 6.
The implication was that he had tolerated the incidents he
was complaining about and that he had not done anything about
them while he could have done. (What Le Monde did not tell its
unaware readers was that in the Army even a general had to obey
orders.)
The paper even echoed a debate that was starting between
Colonel Bourgoin and Clavel in Combat, and quoted a letter from
Bourgoin to that paper in which Bourgoin expressed confidence
in Bollardiere as a man, but nevertheless reproached him for
being taken in by a journalist (JJSS) "whose intentions were
less to inform than create a movement of political opinion." In
Le cas du genêral Bollardiêre, Le Monde, 2/4/57, p. 3.
(132)
The paper reported on the discusion of the Bollardiere's
case by the government, linking it to Professor Capitant (see
Le Monde, 4/4/57, p. 1), to the Boumendjel episode ( Chapters
12 and 13 ), and to General Faure and Dean Peyrega (see Le
Monde, 5/4/57, p. 1 and Chapters 10 and 13).
Even though it discussed the question of the two generals
(Faure and Bollardiëre) and the nature of their offences, it
contented itself, in the end, by stating in conclusion (using
statements made by the governmental team) that if there had
been repressive actions that were more harmful to France than
the uprising itself, then they should have been avoided, and
that human rights and the dignity of man should be observed in
future. See Le Monde, 5/4/57, p. 1.
(133)
Although Fauvet, in defence of those denouncing army exces-
ses, rejected the accusations of treason since the 700,000
soldiers who served that year in Algeria were not presented as
"700,000 torturers," stating that in fact it was thanks to
those voices, which expressed their feeling, "feelings which
the government understands", that the investigative commission
(Commission de sauvegarde -see Chapter 13) had been set up.
J.Fauvet in Le Monde, 7-8/4/57, p. 1.
He treated the sanctions against Bollardiere very lightly.
He stated that a middle of the road solution had been chosen to
deal with Bollardiere and that, because the administrative
procedure had not been completed, sanctions had not yet been
taken. Missing the point completely and confusing a systematic
policy with individual acts and isolated incidents, he outlined
that the breach of discipline levelled against Bollardiere
related probably to the letter he had sent without his super-
iors consent, but also his failure to make the facts known in
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due time.
He even thought (although it was clearly not possible in the
circumstances) that the enquiry would elucidate the various
points. Adding to the confusion, Fauvet also pointed out that
the communiqué published at the end of the Council of Mini-
sters, which unusually constituted a sort of proclamation, had
been interpreted differently by various groups. Some were said
to have retained only the wish that: que soit dêce16 et chati6
tout manquement individuel, others the protest against "the
campaign organised by the enemies of France" (Le Monde, 7-
8/4/57, p. 1).
(134)
The only matter that seemed to worry the paper was whether
the general could be heard by the Commission of Enquiry. Le
Monde, 17/4/57. See also Chapter 13.
It then reported that the sixty days were for the letter he
had sent approving the publication of his testimony in Têmoign-
apChrêtien. The paper added that, according to the Defence
Minister, the letter had become a "piece of evidence in the
J.-J. Servan-Schreiber's demoralisation of the army charge,"
and that those members of the government who approved his
action on moral ground had condemned it on disciplinary
grounds.
The general was subsequently posted to Equatorial Africa
(banished by the government). When reminding the readers of the
reasons for this measure, Le Monde now stated that he had
protested against some methods of pacification and that he had
in a letter signified his approval of the publication of his
article in L'Express. In Le igêneral de Bo1lardiêre est affectê
en Afrique 6quatoriale a compter du 15 juin, in Le Monde,
27/4/57, p. 4.
The whole truth of the matter was not given to the readers
until it was available in the form of a book published by
Barberot (See also Chapter 10).
(135)
Algerians did serve in the French army, but not many of them
reached officer rank. Le Monde (9/3/57, p. 2) gave the figure
of about 250 Algerian officers out of a total of about 300
"North Africans", most of whom were posted in Germany. Le Monde
8/3/57, p. 2 gave news of a draft of 3,500 "young Muslims" and
stated that they were to join troops on the mainland. The five-
year lower age limit on maximum age was presented as one of the
many advantages given to them.
Rahmani A. gave a dramatic account (in L'Affaire des off ic-
iers algOriens, La Cite, Lausanne, 1960) of his own experience
as an officer and painted a very different picture, in which he
listed (pp. 10-20) the disadvantages and the discrimination
encountered within the ranks. His version of the whole episode
about to be examined was totally different from Le Monde's.
Despite the discrimation of the system and their inability
to get redress within the disciplinary framework of the army
some did succeed in reaching a relatively high rank. No doubt
those officers and soldiers alike, with their experience of
French wars, saw the writing on the wall when the "troubles"
began in Algeria. Two years of "pacification," the accession of
a Socialist Premier with the promise of peace, only to be
followed by more repression and the arrest of Ben Bella (see
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Chapter 6), and news from their relatives and what they saw
during their own involvement -all this must have confirmed
their worst fears.
(136)
In their letter, published by the paper, they stated that
they did not wish "to break with their loyalty as soldiers or
sever their links of friendship, camaraderie and traditions..."
Yet they expressed their
hostility to a policy [they] would not be able
to approve without transforming their attachement to
France into treason towards the Algerian people.
They stated that they "had never failed France nor spoke
against it but today, torn by the terrible dilemma that if
French policy were not directed towards a more equitable solu-
tion, [they] would not find the means, nor would they have any
valid reasons, for justifying [their] presence in the French
army."
Le Monde wrote that the signatories of the letter included
high-ranking officers, two of whom were colonels, and that most
of them had been highly decorated.
Au nombre des signataires de cette lettre
figurent plusieurs off iciers supêrieurs dont deux
colonels. La plupart sont titulaires de decorations:
Legion d'honneur ou croix de guerre.
In Des off iciers algêriens exposent leur cas de conscience a
M. Rene Coty, Le Monde, 7/3/57, p. 4.
(137)
This supposedly had nothing to do with the letter they had
written to President Coty. This was totally erroneous in that
the measure was a deliberate infringment of those officers'
right in an attempt to silence them. The paper also pointed out
that there might be further prosecution of these officers over
a matter relating to demoralisation of the Army. It denied that
there were any official reports stating that any high (two)
ranking off iciers had been heard by a court on this matter, let
alone been interrogated.
Le Monde mentioned that the number of the signatories of the
letter to Coty was fifty-two, and that five of those were
sanctioned. It stated that the publication of the letter and
the announcement of sanctions had confused the two issues:
Les <<punitions>> infligees a cinq off iciers
musulmans sanctionneraient un <<refus de deplace-
ment>> et non la demarche faite auprês de M.Coty.
In Le Monde, 9/3/57, p. 2.
But there was only one affair, that which the paper was
trying to deny. After many contacts with politicians and numer-
ous attempts to see the Prime Minister, the officers had ar-
ranged for their letter to be given to, and then published by,
newspapers in case they were arrested. See the full account in
Rahmani, A., op. cit.
(138)
It also stated that Lieutenant Rahmani, the officer in
question, had chosen Me F. Sarda for his defence. In fact,
Rahmani was prevented from seing anybody. The paper mistakingly
reported that Rahmani was one of forty-two officers who were
co-signatories of the letter to Coty. It sated that he was
considered as the main instigator (the official line trying to
find a scapegoat) and that he had been put under house arrest,
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and under arrest since the beginning of March along with other
officers.
Un des off iciers algeriens signataires de la
lettre a M. Rene Coty est inculpe et interne a
Fresnes.
In Le Monde, 4/4/57, p. 4.
The arrest had taken place on 3 February (see Rahmani, A.,
op. cit., p. 86) and Rahmani explains in his book that it was
an agreed decision expressed through one single letter.
(139)
This time, Le Monde, dated 23/4/57, p. 2, indicated that the
charge was "demoralisation of the army".
It tried to recall the facts and this time stated that he
was one of fifty-two Algerian officers who wrote a letter to
President Coty to protest about "the conduct of operations in
Algeria".
(140)
Le lieutenant Rahmani en liberte provisoire, Le Monde
18/5/57, p. 5.
He was to read this article in prison -and in fact his bail
was not on the cards. When he was eventually bailed, he was
only given time (three quarters of an hour) to take the train
and travel to his new posting in Castres (near Toulouse), where
he was under constant surveillance and forbidden from communi-
cating with anybody from outside the army.
(141)
Le Monde stated that it had received the letter which ex-
plained the <cas de conscience> of his "comrades", currently
serving in Algeria. Le Monde, 12/7/57, p. 5.
(142)
And that troops, unlike officers could not refuse to go on
assignement, that they were not allowed to speak out (under the
pretext that they were "backward". Le Monde did seem in favour
of extending that decree, but not necessarily for the sake of
those protesting. It argued that the precedent set by the
decree provided a strong case for the troops and thought the
sending of these troops was a grosse erreur psychologique as it
presented the soldiers with a painful alternative.
celle d'accepter de tuer leurs freres, de
ratisser leur sol natal et de cautionner la politi-
que de la repression, ce qui est inhumain, donc
inadmissible, ou celle de "prendre conge" avec armes
et bagages lorsqu'ils seront en face de l'horreur de
cette guerre.
In Le cas des tirailleurs algeriens servant en Algerie.
(between 1/4 and 1/2 a column) Le Monde, 12/7/57, p. 5.
(143)
In his description of the town of Algiers as very peaceful
thanks to the presence of the paratroopers, most visible
section of the army, Le blonde's Herreman revealed the real
concern for extending the decree - to avoid temptation. He
wrote that the tirailleurs algeriens, thought to be in France
or Germany "away from temptation...".
Le Monde did not explain why they should fall victim to
temptation seeing that the rebels were never presented as
attracting anyone but terrorising everybody. Implicitly, it was
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showing that the appeal of nationalism was far greater than the
paper was willing to admit. Their presence, as part of the
troops maintaining order in Algiers, was nevertheless presented
as a symbol, a desire by a confident high command to prove that
there was faith in these loyal Muslims to fight against the
rebels, giving thereby a climate of bubbling confidence in the
10th Military region.
See Les progres de la pacification exigent de plus en plus
de troupes estime l'Etat-Major d'Alger, Philippe Herreman in Le
Monde, 11/7/57, p. 2.
(144)
These took different forms: either in the form of refusal of
conscription and enduring jail sentences for it, or, symbolic-
ally or physically, in preventing draftee trains and those
carrying military material or personnel from leaving railway
stations.
(145)
Article 76 of the Code penal, completed by the Law of 11
March 1950, stating that in time of peace (...) sera puni de la
reclusion tout Ftan9als... qui se sera rendu coupable... d'en-
trave violente a la circulation de materiel destine a la de-
fense nationale ou utilise pour elle, was used in the prosecu-
tion, but sometimes common criminal law was substituted. Le
Monde, 9/2/57, p. 2. Others were charged with inciting soldiers
to disobedience. Le Monde, 29/5/57, p. 3.
(146)
While not explicitly condemning those being tried, it did
not speak out against their trial, or make comments to the
effect that those activities should or should not be
praised/condemned. This reporting of the trials and sentences
without comments could be said to illustrate the fact that Le
Monde's first objective in this respect was to inform the
public, and not to take a stand for or against.
(147)
At the trial of the Mourmelon draftees, Le Monde's version
went as follows:
voulant manifester contre les affectations par
bataillon qui les separaient de leurs camarades et
contre les off iciers qui refusaient de leur donner
des permissions,... enfoncerent les portes des
locaux disciplinaires. Au cours de l'echauffouree
qui s'ensuivit des off iciers superieurs du camp
furent molestes.
The paper named the people sentenced and the one acquitted
for outrages A superieurs.
A small article dealt with Apres la mutinerie de Mourmelon
deux rappeles sont condamnes avec sursis, un autre est ac-
quitte, from the tribunal des forces armees de Metz in Le
Monde, 9/2/57, p. 2.
There were some reports, although limited, of leaflets being
distributed amongst the "contingent " which had been called up,
inciting them to disobey, which were discovered on a ship in
Marseille.
It also reported that the search of the Communist Party (PC)
section in the Boulevard des Dames led to the recovery of




Le Monde (without precise reference apart from a statement
that the journalist had been assured) tried to reassure public
opinion. Discussing the conscripts' case in its articles, the
paper stated that their morale was high (un excellent etat
&esprit) and their desire to go home was the same as everybody
else's who wanted to see the family after a while. The article
even gave the recruits a sense of purpose and commitment to the
cause and an understanding "exceeding all expectations".
Ils commencent a s'interesser, a reflechir
us comprennent fort bien l'importance de l'Algerie
dans la balance francaise et que l'ordre doit etre
rêtabli et maintenu.
Admittedly not to keep things as they were but to achieve
future progress, in Le Monde, 27/10/55.
(149)
Worries were also expressed subsequently on the state of
health and food supplies:
le ravitaillement des troupes est souvent tres
mauvais. Les accidents se multiplient chez les
parachutistes en raison, parait-il, d'une decalcifi-
cation imputable a l'insuffisance de la nourriture.
Faites une enquête et apportez les ameliorations
necessaires.
In Le Monde, 9/2/57, p. 2.
As the need for the army in Algeria far outsretched the
availability of troops and especially conscripts (Le Monde was
aware that Algeria absorbed almost all the French army's re-
ssources as far as land troops were concerned). For Air and Sea
forces only those with special exemptions or special qualifica-
tions for NATO or training duties would remain in Europe. It
was also reported by Le Monde that the organisation of a rota
system could not be implemented because it would lead to a
reduction of personnel or an increase of time served (amenuise-
nzent des effectifs, soit a l'augmentation de la dur6e, soit de
nouveaux appeles). In "Les besoins de l'Afrique du Nord absor-
bent la quasi-totantê du contingent", Le Monde, 9/2/57, p.2),
revealed that the Ministry of Defence kept conscripts beyond
the two-year prescribed length of time which they were supposed
to serve.
In an "encadre" (24 mois) the paper stated that up to twelve
extra months could be added to the 18 months legal limit spent
by draftees in Algeria. From a report based on M.Laforest,
Secretary of State for Air as a reply to M.Bichet (MRP). Le
Monde stated that all those called up did 30 months (9/2/57, p.
2 ).
(150)
A couple of months later, it announced that the Prime Mini-
ster had confirmed that there would effectively be a return to
2 years maximum conscription from 1st July, given that some
were maintained six, nine, and even twelve months after the
legal length of service of 18 months. In future it stated no
more than 6 months over the legal limit would be possible and
the Council of Ministers meeting would ratify the decision. See
Le Monde, 17/4/57, p. 5.
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(151)
A few months later still, Le Monde requested fixing a defi-
nite date and a rapidly taken decision to remove the uncertain-
ty which did not help the troops/morale. J.P. in Le Monde,
12/7/57, p. 4.
(152)
Normally, war is only fought against another country. Alger-
ia, being part of France "legally", there could not be talk of
a war for the authorities as they would thereby acknowledge the










See also Chapter 13.
(2)
A fuller account can be found in Duchemin, J.C., Histoire
du FLN, Paris, La Table Ronde, 1962, and especially his illu-
stration on p. 10.
(3)
Despite the popularity of the movement when it became ob-
vious that ordinary people were involved the combination fell-





Writing that the severe blows received seemed to have hard-
ened the fanatics (equated with leaders) in their intransi-
gence, P.Herreman wondered if the mass would no be discouraged
by a fight, the end of which it could see itself winning. See
Philippe Herreman, Face aux positions du gouvernement le FLN
maintient la reconnaissance du droit a l'independance comme
condition prêalable a une negociation. In Le Monde, 8/3/57, p.
2.
Only on a couple of occasions did Le Monde use the word
"moujahedines". The use of this term was more to do with the
desire of the journalist, Jean Francois, to show that he was
acquainted with Arabic denominations like "Moujahedine" and
IIroumis" than a desire to call them by their name. It did,
nevertheless, combine these terms with other more current
appellations of rebels and fellagas. See Le Monde, 23/4/57, p.
1. Serge Adour spelled it "moujadin" in Le Monde, 31/10/57, p.
3.
(6)
See Le Monde, 21/1/57, p. 3, 5/6/57, p. 3, 11/6/57, p. 1,
9/8/57, p. 4, 30/8/57, p. 4.
The "rebels" lacked any positive association.
This attempt to demonize the "rebels" occurred not only when
it was perhaps justifiable, as in "terrorist" cases involving
civilians, such as the case of Melouza when 300 people were
massacred [see Le Monde's report of the incident (1/6/57, p.3
ff & 2-3/6/57), and the outspoken attacks by Duverger (5/6/57,
pp. 1-2), Chenebenoit and HBM (2-3/6/57, p. 1)], but also in
numerous instances when evil characteristics were attributed to
them.
This lack of positive association also happened even when
their actions seemed to warrant some kind of praise for their
humanity - as when they released prisoners.
When Sub-lieutenant Prax was released by the "rebels", the
paper's report stated that the "rebels" did not have the time
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to kill their prisoners but could only flee as the soldiers
patrol was approaching (Le Monde, 8-9/1/56). It is hard to ima-
gine that, if that had really been their aim, they could not
have found the time or an "appropriate" way of "disposing" of
their prisoners.
(7)
Le Monde reported "terrorist" acts in and around the cities
when they came to its knowledge, identifying locations, giving r_.
the place where the incidents occurred, the number and, when-
ever possible the names and ages of the victims.
See for instance 16/1/57, p. 5. and 27-28/1/57, p. 3.
Le Monde reported the activity of the nationalists as con-
sisting of attacks on the settlers, strategic positions and
farms (4/4/57, p. 4), assassinations of Europeans (4 Europdens
assassines 7/8/57, p. 4), teachers (11/5/57, p. 3 & 17/5/57, p.
4) and "collaborators" with the French authorities, kidnapping
(kidnapping of families 15/5/57, P. 4), sabotage activity,
arson (incendie de gourbis, musulmane et enfant 18 mois braids
vifs, 24/4/57, p. 4 & 15/5/57, p. 4 ), attacks and harrassment
of troops (harcelements 11/1/56), criminal derailments, attack
of coaches (28/1/56), convoys (7-8/4/57, p. 3), gendarmerie
(24/4/57, p. 4); a large part of their activity was reported as
including acts of indiscriminate terrorism killing Muslim
civilians (27/4/57, p. 4), notables (31/5/57, p. 6), placing
bombs (27/4/57, p. 4 & 17/5/57, P. 4, attentats individuels),
sometimes resulting in the death of important people (ambush
leading to the killing of a senators'son, Captain Portman,
3/8/57, p. 4; killing of reserve lieutenant-colonel 15/5/57, p.
4) to give but a few examples.
(8)
In L'assassinat de neuf «delegues>> musulmans confirme la
volonte du FLN de faire echouer par tous les moyens la reforme
onlicipale. Le Monde, 25/4/57, p. 4.
If they did not resort to intimidation or assassination, the
paper stated it was for selfish reasons, for instance, that
they were letting Muslims work with the administration so that
they could be trained whenever they wanted to use them as
cadres at a later date, or because they did not want to draw
particular attention to such and such a person who was already
working with them.
(8)
Described as being from the area (du pays), not likely to go
away (not staying in the villages but not too far away), black-
maling the inhabitants, forcing the "fellahs" into paying
contributions or sawing posts (scier des poteaux). In Le
Monde, 23/7/57, p. 3 (Herremann).
(10)
Trying to obtain money by force from Algerians and Europeans
alike. In Un pharmacien algerien (gui ne payait plus le FLN)
tue par une bombe, Le Monde, 21-22/4/57, p. 2. The rebels were
described as taxing people for crop and cattle in 23/4/57, p. 1
28-29/4/57, p. 2, and 24/4/57, p. 4, when the paper reported
Deux colons arretes dans l'Oranais pour avoir verse de l'argent
aux rebelles.
For this description, Le Monde relied very often on reports
by the army, government and official sources, as well as
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material from news agencies, especially government and official
ones (AFP).
(11)
And to be causing them weariness (lassitude), in Le FLN
impaserait lourdement les populations musulmanes, in Le
Monde, 14/8/57, p. 4.
Their excessive demands were said to be much resented:
Quelques exigences rigoristes, comme l'inter-
diction de turner (observee dans la rue, mais non
dans les demeures), ou aberrantes, comme le mot
d'ordre de desertion des ecoles, sont depuis long-
temps mal supportees(..).
See Eugene Mannoni, Le Monde, 2/3/57, pp. 1-5.
(12)
Which the paper reproduced stating that it did not have the
time to check them. See Le Monde, 23/7/57, p. 3.
(13)
See Le Monde, 3/8/57, p. 4.
(14)
Independence or the renunciation of French Algeria by France
would have amounted to the suppression of Article 1 of the loi-
cadre, which was the most liberal statute adopted by France for
Algeria over the period studied here.
(15)
The thesis advanced by the FLN (no negotiation without the
recognition of the right of independence) was presented as
having been maximalist. The journalist stated that even the
"cercles officieux" who did not have this rigueur d'expresion
did not open the way for useful talks as they insisted that
the first step to be taken by the French government should have
been to have renounced the idea of Algeria as an integral part
of France. So the journalist concluded that an outcome was very
far off and even those speaking in those terms were under no
illusion on the chances of negotiations at present.
(16)
Not keen on, or fearful of, cease fire proposals, Herreman
wrote that, from what he could glean from them, the offer was a
proposal for surrender (amman) with safeguards of life and
property and would put a stronger imbalance between the 20,000
odd on the one side and the 400,000 well equipped and ubiqui-
tous administration on the other. Furthermore, he stated that
"our adversaries" add that all the strength of the "resis-
tance", which is inherent to a clandestine movement, would col-
lapse because the leaders will become known and this will
decrease the weight of the "ALN" in the conflict.
(17)
This possibility was presented as a real one merely because:
certains hommes politiques l'ont presentee
comme un risque grave qu'ils se refusent quant a eux
d'assurer.
The paper wondered then why :
On peut alors se demander pourqoi le FLN, au
risque d'être incompris, voire desaprouve par les
nations les plus favorables A sa cause, refuse de
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s'engager dans cette voie et maintient obstinement
une condition prealable contre laquelle viennent se
briser tous les efforts de reglement que peuvent
tenter même les hommes les plus liberaux.
(18)
Journalists often referred to a hardening of the FLN's
attitude 26/12/57, 2/1/58 and in Apres l'echec des bons offices
et la deception de l'ONU: La tendance intransigeante se re-
rfforce au sein du FLN, Le Monde, 4/1/58, p. 1.
(19)
Such as Kiouane and Abbas who, for instance, on one occasion
declared that if the French authorities wanted to negotiate
they knew who they had to talk to: the Conseil National de la
Revolution (CNR). See En reponse au memo du FLN les offres de
cessez-le-feu ont ete rejetees declare-t-on de source offi-
cieuse. In Le Monde, 17/8/57, p. 4.
(20)
A vrai dire, les theses exposees par le dr
Debaghine, si elles n'avaient pas ete reaffirmees
publiquement depuis quelque temps, constituent
depuis fort longtemps la plate-forme politique du
Front de liberation. Proclamees «officiellement»
par le FLN, au lendemain de son congres du 20 aotit
1956, elles ont ete confirmées depuis lors a plu-
sieurs reprises -notamment par les emissaires natio-
nalistes dans diverses capitales d'Europe et d'Amer-
ique- et se retrouvent dans les memoires deposes A
l'ONU, par le Front A la veille des debats de fevr-
ier.
Le Monde, 24-25/3/57.
The paper was constantly reminded of their aim as when it
reported (in quotes) Lamine Debaghine's statements at press
conferences arguing that independence was a prerequisite (Dr
Debaghine: Le peuple algerien voit chaque jour augmenter sa
determination de se liberer de l'oppression, in Le Monde,
23/3/57, p.2), and that there was nothing wrong in restituer le
bien d'autrui.
(21)
Ferhat Abbas's statements were also echoed, but national-
ists' response to the government proposals of cease fire were
quoted extensively to highlight their intransigeance and obsti-
nacy. Debaghine's statements were described the next day in
terms of:
(...) son ton, son acharnement a fermer toutes
les issues... leve les doutes que l'on entretenait
ici ou la sur l'intransigeance du FLN.
In Aprés la declaration du Dr Debaghine la «delegation
exterieure» du FLN s'est ralliee a l'extremisme des combat-
tants, Le Monde, 24-25/3/57, p. 3.
(22)
(...) repousse aussi brutalement non seulement
le <<cessez le feu», mais encore les elections






Debaghine was said to have repeated what was not acceptable
for France (and to have even been rejected by the liberals of
Algeria) that the French would have to chose between the sta-
tute of foreigners and Algerian citizenship. The paper drew
attention to his credentials and stressed how observers re-
marked on the lack of flexibility, subtlety and nuance charac-
teristic of somebody like Abbas, for instance, had. P.Herreman
in Apres la declaration du Dr Debaghine la <<delegation exter-
ieure>> du FLN s'est ralliee a l'extremisme des combattants. Le
Monde, 24-25/3/57, p. 3.
(25)
Bourguiba was said to be flabbergasted by their attitude (Le
Monde, 19/4/57), not accepting a referendum unless it included
not only autonomy but also independence. In P.Herreman Le FLN
n'accepterait de referendum que Si les Algeriens etaient en
mesure de se prononcer ouvertement sur l'independance. Le
Monde, 10/4/57, p. 5.
(26)
It won the support of Jeanson but not of Mauriac and Barrat.
See also below.
(27)
But Le Monde warned not to expect the FLN to offer a refer-
endum because it described it as being disunited, and or as
achieving unity only with a lot of difficulty:
Ii ne faut pas s'attendre toutefois A voir le
FLN prendre l'initiative de proposer um referendum.
Ii faudrait d'abord qu'un accord se realise entre
ses dirigeants, sinon au sein d'orgamismes direc-
teurs qu'il est difficile de reunir.
Even if it were achievable, could they be capable of an
opening which will be perceived as a concession in the maquis,
the paper argued? This concession was seen as a major opening
as it would have led to making independence an electoral issue,





According to Le Monde, the FLN saw the authorities' insis-
tence on elections only as a confirmation of previous rigging
and one more reason to be wary of them. They did not believe
that the representatives of nations, called as observers, would
be able to control every aspect of those elections in a very
large country like Algeria.
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(30)
Their insistence on elections without preconditions to an
Algerian Assembly, which would be the only body competent to
speak in the name of the Algerian population and, which, with-
out preconditions, would be able to decide freely the future
fate of Algeria.
In this respect, the paper reported that the nationalists
had pointed out the contradictions between the commitment of
the French government to negotiate with those freely elected
and the unilateral setting by the French government of the main
lines of this statute.
A ce propos les porte parole du Front n'ont pas
manqué de relever la contradiction entre l'engage-
ment de negocier le futur statut de l'Algêrie avec
des representants librement êlus et /a determination
unilaterale par le gouvernement des grandes lignes
de ce statut.
(31)
certains de leurs Ocrits laissent entendre ( without indica-
ting which ones).
(32)
The FLN was also described as having been cornered (because
they could not possibly win) and as caught up and forced,
against any common sense, to prolong the struggle (for fear of
losing members to Messali). Philippe Herreman, Face aux posi-
tions du gouvernement le FLN maintient la reconnaissance du
droit a l'indêpendance comme condition prêalable a une negocia-
tion. In Le Monde, 8/3/57, p. 2.
(33)
See Aprês l'echec des bons offices et la deception de l'ONU,
la tendence intransigeante se renforce au sein du FLN, in Le
Monde, 4/1/58, p. 1.
(34)
Only Francis Jeanson was seen to be siding with them.
Basing its articles on France-Observateur and El Moudjahid,
Le Monde presented the FLN as not willing to accept the views
of French democrats as it considered them to be on the side of
the "colonialists". See Le Monde, 2/1/58, p. 3•
(35)
See Chapters 10, 12, and 13.
(36)
When he got wind of the news that the MNA was presenting a
dossier of atrocities to the US President, he wrote and pro-
tested that the examen de conscience by the French would in-
evitably be used by their adversaries -and this he was not pre-
pared to permit.
Still convinced that he was right to speak out for France's
honour, "as others did", he claimed that that gave him the
right to protest when foreign propaganda was trying to use them
to deform the meaning of their testimony. For him the refusal
of certain methods in no way justified the terrorism of the
FLN, as the latter's action was not compatible with humanity.




Arguing for a moderate emancipation, he stated that it was
certainly not to give the FLN leaders the opportunity to conti-
nue "using the same means to demand an absolute right which was
not justified by history or the complexity of the present
situation." It was not to enable them to opt for virulent
nationalism but for a realistic policy instead.
He stated that neither side could win the war, and that if
the movement of protest was gaining momentum, it was to show a
will by a number of Frenchmen to recognise what is "valid in
the desire for emancipation of Algerian Muslims and what is
obsolete in structures handed down from the 19th century and
the need to rethink the conditions of French presence in the
Maghrib".
(38)
The right of self determination was in no way recognised -as
it would have resulted in substituting one alienation by an-
other, and the replacement of an inequity by another:
...le devoir de ne pas laisser se substituer
une alienation a une autre et une violence a une
autre. Les iniquites d'hier doivent 'etre balayees;
les droits des communautes et des races doivent être
equilibres et garantis dans une synthese neuve. Mais
qu'il soit bien entendu pie la protestation contre
la cruautê et l'injustice n'implique nullement
l'adhesion aux plans d'un racisme arabe ou berbere,
qui ne ferait que les dêplacer en les accentuant.




When it explained the relationship between the FLN and the
Communist party, Le Monde did specify that the members of the
Communist Party had joined the FLN as individuals, and not as a
group, and that the Communist party had not succeeded in making
the FLN a red maquis.
Because, unlike other movements such as the UDMA and Ulemas
whose leaders can be seen at top jobs within the FLN, the
latter accepted the rank and file and refused the leaders.
The FLN was said to have known that the Communists were not
without arriere-pens6e but not to have considered them as
dangerous.




The community which was the raison d'être of the party - 81%
of its members were Muslims.
Le Monde recalled that the CGT had been dissolved since its
members were as involved as the Right in booing M.G.Mollet and
the two component groups had fought each other ever since that
event.
The split was said to be have been so significant that, at
the end of the strike of 28 January 1957, the French workers
themselves were requesting sanctions to be taken against the
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Muslim strikers (and threatening to strike themselves if their
demands were not met).
The paper provided a brief account of its most recent his-
tory, which it described as too close to the French model.
Ibid.
(43)
And fears were expressed when the activities of the USTA
were extended to the field of agriculture. Le Monde, on this
occasion, was keen to recall the remarks made by Europeans of
Algeria that its platform (unification of the Maghreb) was
similar to that of the FLN, and the paper's conclusion was
that:
L'USTA est l'expression syndicale de ce front.
On craint que l'engouement probable des travailleurs
musulmans agricoles pour la nouvelle formation ne
donne a cette derniere une puissance considerable
qui s'emploiera & mettre en difficulte l'agriculture
algerienne et que cette action completera dans la
legalite l'action terroriste des hors la loi. Le
Monde, 22/2/56.
(44)
Le Monde, 4/1/58, p. 3.
(45)
According to the journalists, these were the objectives of
the FLN as set out to him: "a curefew in Paris would make the
French think".
(46)
The paper reported that they estimated that there would be
other battles, that terrorism was more "rewarding" (payant)
than ambushes or troops engagements and that Algiers will be
"our Dien Bien Phu". In Le Monde, 4/1/58.
(47)
Their rejection of a liberal formula limiting independence
institutionally such as autonomy or federalism with France





And very critical of them, judging them very severely (semi-
colonial status), although they distinguished between the
people and the Palace.
(50)
Loin d'utiliser les divisions politiques dans
la metropole, ou de justifier les partisans de la
negociation en assouplissant leurs methodes, us ne
veulent parler ni de droite ni de gauche: us af-
frontent en bloc la <<puissance coloniale>>. Plus
encore que la franche hostilite 6 /a droite, la
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«trahison>> des socialistes, la «pasivite» des
communistes, provoque leur meprisante amertume.
(51)
us n'acceptent le dialogue qu'avec la gauche
non communiste, mais c'est pour lui demander de
renoncer a ses <<restrictions>>, a ses «etapes»,
ses «compromis» et de soutenir <<sans reserves»
la lutte du peuple algerien pour son independance.
(52)
But, according to the journalist, no serious revision of
policy was envisaged. These were only manoeuvres to alarm the
Americans and convince them to put pressure on France.
(53)
One might have suggested from earlier reports by the paper
on the thinking and activities of the Army (see Chapter 5) that
the Cold War was already there from the paper's writings on
psychological warfare, and with the fight against subversion
coming from the South.
But if the FLN were to embark on this path, it would get
closer to Egypt and would isolate itself in North Africa -that
was why, it was suggested, they would hesitate to venture in
that direction. See Philippe Herreman, Le Monde, 4/1/58, p. 3.
(54)
P. Herreman wrote that the thought that they could not fail
where Morocco and Tunisia had succeded led them to follow the
reasoning that if the US and USSR refused to extend the Cold
War to North Africa, they would force/push them to do so (One
would have thought that Communism was already there according
to some of Le Monde's reports and the reasons and the methods
of the fighting]. Pushing one against the other would have led,
in their view, to a rapid solution of conflict. If the FLN were
to go on this path, he remarked, it would get closer to Cairo
and would isolate itself in North Africa and that move was
doubtful in his view. In Le Monde, 9/1/58, p. 3.
(55)
See Le Monde 8-9/1/56.
There were no signs of any abatement of the rebels'activity,
which sometimes inflicted serious casualties (tens of deaths,
many more injured) to French troops near Tebessa with organised
"gangs" of 300 men who found it easy to take refuge in neigh-
bouring countries, Le Monde, 30/11/56, p. 1.
Some of the attacks by these "rebels" were quite daring:
they even went inside prisons to free other prisoners, and some
of these remarkable attempts even succeeded. Le Monde,
20/12/56, p. 7.
The FLN were described as continuing the fight despite the
severe reverses they suffered at the hands of the French troops
and the failure of their insurrectional strike.
They were also described as having moved south and as having
engaged in murderous "accrochages", acting in groups of some
200, and showing renewed aggressiveness. The journalist Jean
Francois stated that the map of the rebellion had modified
considerably in a year. Their number had doubled. He pointed
out, nevertheless, that it was never a question of numbers but
of arms. From official figures on the number of weapons seized,
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he gave an approximation that about a 1000 were received every
month in the last six. See Le Monde, 23/4/57, p. 1.
Even at the beginning of 1958 some of the reports saw them
as very active and threatening (petite vine de Saida harcelee
pendant 45 minutes, see Le Monde, 3/1/58, p. 2).
(56)
See Le Monde, 3/1/56. In this instance, it was Libya and
Egypt that were said to have done the pushing.
The journalist Jean Francois even declared that a number of
Moroccans were involved with the rebels in the border fight-
ing, or in propaganda, and urging for the departure of the
roumis. He stated that these were positively identified amongst
the dead after battles. See Le Monde, 23/4/57, p. 1.
(57)
The Algerian nationalists needed arms for their struggle.
They tried to aquire them by different means. The most common
way for arms procurement was from stocks left over from the
Second World War and from arms brought in from abroad (either
by land through Morocco, Tunisia, the Saharian borders or by
sea).
Le Monde presented the FLN as having benefitted from sub-
stantial help from abroad and stated that it believed that the
French government was compiling a "voluminous file" for the
allies on the help provided by the Arab countries to the
"rebels" of North Africa. It listed evidence of that help and
emphasised less the arms traffic, quite important in itself,
than the military training provided in camps in Arab countries.
Le Monde echoed ministerial concerns (Pineau) about new
types of armaments obtained by the "rebels" which replaced the
traditional acquisitions through contraband on the Tunisian and
Moroccan borders, and through attacks of arms and ammunition
depots in Algeria. This, it was argued, was revealed through
the kind of targets hit, the nature of the damage caused, and
the intensity of the fighting, as well as the aggressiveness of
the "rebels." The latter were described, on that occasion, as
no longer avoiding the fighting, or saving cartridges and
ammunition, by the "sustained fire" (feu nourri) of their
automatic weapons. The paper found it difficult to estimate the
number of arms, but conceded occasionally that French ammuni-
tion depots seemed to have provided the bulk of these arm-
aments. It reported that more and more war weapons were used by
the rebels in the place of hunting rifles and that there was
more concentration of automatic weapons to give them greater
fire power - as well as the use of arms known, but not used,




Usually when the "rebels" surrendered or were caught, they
were described as having had a hard year or to have been
working in extremely difficult conditions. See Le Monde,
17/1/56.
(60)
When the victims of "terrorists" fall the paper usually
pointed out that the victim had a wife and a number of child-
ren. But this was obviously not the case when the nationalists
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were affected. It was as though these people had no family or
relatives to speak of. See Le Monde, 17/1/56.
(61)
For the FLN animators, he stated, can find satisfaction in
their year's balance sheet (February 1956- February 1957):
Et c'est alors, assurement, que les animateurs
du FLN peuvent trouver dans le bilan d'une annee de
serieux motifs de satisfaction.
(62)
He listed the mountain and the sea as being forbidden areas
so that in a sense "aucune region ne merite desormais l'appel-
hticm de <<zone calme>>...La rebellion a tisse un <<quadril-
lage>> a sa maniere. Le Monde, 2/3/57, pp. 1-5.
Le Monde occasionnally established a map of the area where
the "rebels" were active and that showed large areas at times
which were declared unsafe. In an article on the climate of
insecurity in the country, Le Monde drew a map showing small
areas where the "rebels" were in total control, areas where
occasional attacks occurred and other areas where the situation
changed from day to day or from hour to hour. See Le Monde
21/2/56.
(63)
He did not say whom.
(64)
Apart from the general reporting indicating that the FLN was
not winning, there was no delay for the paper in indentifying
the weaknesses (faiblesses)of the movement.
(...) portee de son action militaire demeure
reduite. Partout dissemines d'Oran A Constantine,
les bandes de l'Armee de liberation [his italics]
n'ont pu arracher en effet, flit-ce aux con! ins de la
Regence et de l'empire chez-Men, la moindre zOne,
la plus petite ville, aux troupes frangaises.
In Force et faiblesses du FLN, by Eugene Mannoni, Le Monde,
2/3/57, pp. 1-5
(65)
Un seul fait suffirait a manifester cette
emprise : si M.R. Lacoste a maintenu gue/gues rela-
tions avec des notables ou d'anciens elus ii n'a pu
trouver parmi eux aucun homme de quelque credit qui
consentirait a faire sien le programme gouverne-
mental.
The paper accepted here that that might be because no other
means of democratic expression were available.
(66)
Eugene Mannoni presented the fact that "Ii parait que les
rebellesbeneficient de l'appui, spontane ou non, d'une grande
Netiede la population" as a strength (puissance) of the FLN.
In Force et faiblesses du FLN, Le Monde 2/3/57, pp. 1-5.
(67)
Queue s'exerce par la terreur - moms que ne
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l'affirment les autorites, plus que ne le disent
certains <<liberaux»- ou par la persuasion, leur
influence s'est accrue de maniere plus evidente
encore que ne s'est ramifie leur
«quadrillage>>(...).
(...) Apres l'adhesion de diverses persona-
lites, dont certaines appartenaient au propre parti
du Ministre resident, et l'absorption «a titre
individuel>> des membres du parti communiste alger-
ien, le «Front» a pu exercer une autorite que les
<<Messalistes>> ne sauraient contester, du moms en
Algerie.
(68)
Au siècle de Bandoung, le mot <<independance»
a un pouvoir de seduction que ne possedent certaine-
ment pas l'expose quelque peu rebarbatif de <<re-
formes» qui paraissent mesquines aux foules et que
le terrorisme et la repression empechent au demeur-
ant d'appliquer. La force des dirigeants du FLN
c'est d'avoir hurle ce mot-la.
The errors of the administration ( the example of more
severe sanctions taken against the Muslim strikers than the
European looters -see chapter 7) were also said to have been a
contributory factor in the strength of the FLN. In Force et
faib/esses du FLN, Eugene Mannoni, Le Monde, 2/3/57, pp. 1-5.
(69)
(...) leur faiblesse, de n'avoir pas su con-
vaincre l'opinion internationale qu'ils etaient
capables d'assurer le sort d'un pays aussi complexe
que l'Algerie <<sous-developpee» oiz vivent plus
d'un million d'Europeens.
In Le Monde, 2/3/57, p. 1.
But the paper took no census of international opinion on
this matter and presented its own belief as a parameter.
(70)
As far as the rivalry between the two branches of the natio-
nalist movement was concerned, the paper accurately described
the nationalists as a movement divided between two groups, FLN
and MNA, fighting each other. The nationalist movement was
never presented as a united front and this portrayal continued
until the end of the Fourth Republic. This will be illustrated
by the coverage of the immigrant community in France in Chapter
7.
Le Monde, which had never been in favour of the MNA, seemed
to express then a preference for it by echoing the views of the
socialist Demain, which stated that talking to the MNA in-
stead of giving a de facto recognition to the FLN might save
the fate of France.
See Demain: on a eu tort d'ignorer le MNA. In Le Monde,
7/6/57, p. 4.
In fact, there were reports of real battles taking place
with a considerable number of victims well into 1957 (see Selon
un rebelle rallie a Trezel Line sanglante bataille a mis au
prises des bandes FLN et messalistes dans le Djebel Nador, Le
Monde, 28-29/4/57, p. 2) when it was nevertheless clear that
the FLN was really in total control and there remained only
small pockets of MNA forces.
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Le Monde also echoed most of the mutual accusations by the
two movements. e.g. Le MNA accuse les leaders du FLN d'être
«des agents de l'administration>> in January 1957.
(71)
Although on this occasion it advised caution, as it reported
the news on the basis of a leaflet, the source of which could
not be checked. See Des tracts opposant le FLN et l'Armee de
liberation circulent A Alger (from its special correspondent in
Algiers), Le Monde, 13/3/57, p. 2.
72
Explosion au <<Club des Alger-dens» a Tunis le <<Colonel»
FLU Ouamrane estime qu'il êtait personnellement vise. In Le
Monde, 30/3/57, p. 1.
(73)
On this occasion rumour had it that Krim, because of his
old rivalry with Ouamrane, had been deprived of his command and
put under house arrest by the latter. Le bruit court A Alger
que Krim Belkacem aurait ete prive de son commandement. In Le
Monde, 1/8/57, p. 4.
(74)
These distinctions between hardliners and softliners were
always highlighted.
The most influential person in the Algerian movement was
said to be Abane Ramdane: he was "l'homme fort" who mapped out
the road ahead to collective leadership. The reason given for
that was that he had always supported only one method of
achieving Algerian independence - that was total war. Today
again, wrote the journalist, the politiques "had to bow to
him" as the steps hitherto taken (presumably the attempt to
renounce the precondition of independence and the acceptance of
the good offices of Morocco and Tunisia, suggested by the
others) in an attempt to adopt a conciliatory attitude, by
preferring a "Franco-Maghrebine dialogue to internationalisa-
tion, clearly did not pay." The paper explained the national-
ists' view that the French government, not having replied and
even having pretended to have ignored them in December 1957, in
the same way it had been doing since 1954, as it had in 1956
after the failure of the contacts and the subsequent arrest of
Ben Bella (see below), enabled the hard liners (tendance dure)
to win the day over the softliners, the "military" over the
politiques.
Ramdane was also said to have thought that the war was going
to be long and that he could sustain it; his entourage asserted
that there was no lack of men or arms and that the blows re-
ceived would not affect their combativity. 4/1/58, p. 3.
(75)
Between Krim and Ouamrane, for instance, whereas they were
both Kabyles. Ethnic conflict and differences amongst the
various groups were highlited for the readers. This insistence
on conflict and differences obviously hid from the readership
the realities of a common situation and the community of
feeling and undermined in the eyes of this readership any
notion of unity amongst the population. It seemed unlikely at
times to conclude from Le Monde'reports that these groups had
anything in common. See Le Monde, 10/8/57, p. 4.
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(76)
On the demotion of Krim see Belkacem conserverait ses fonc-
tions au FLN, in Le Monde, 8/8/57, p. 4. Two days later Le
Monde stated that one ought not to give too much credence to
denials, and even if these denials were to be believed, the
paper insisted that they were far from providing any convincing
proof that harmony existed within the FLN ranks. 10/8/57, p.
4.
(77)
The tryptic, as conceived by the French authorities, was
cease-fire, free elections then negotiations. It could be
argued here that the independence prerequisite was established
from day one of the war and the proposals put forward by the
government were so formulated as to make their acceptance
impossible. The report referred to here can be found in Le
Monde, 26/4/57, p. 5.
(78)
An example was given of 250 men sent with their leader
finding it difficult to establish his authority.
It is worth noting that most leaders were presented as being
a product of the French army, soldiers and non commissionned
officers who had their training and who fought within its
ranks. See Le Monde, 10/8/57, p. 4.
(79)
This obviously was not true since the French authorities
kept Ben Bella as well as other leaders in jail. See below.
The paper wrote that by instinct they had made Ben Bella the
leader and now he was under arrest (see below) in the same way
as most of the hardened fighters, and those abroad not having
had the expected success, they were left with only low ranking
leaders torn or compromised without any real influence.
In Force et faiblesses du FLN, by Eugene Mannoni, 2/3/57,
pp. 1-5.
(80)
Minor and fundamental dissenssions and rivalries were seen
as an inherent feature of a movement that was characterised by
a collective leadership. In Le Monde 10/8/57, p. 4.
(81)
"Somewhere in the maquis, the paper stated, there was a five
man committe (comite de coordination et d'execution), which in
spite of the absence or the arrest of its animators managed to
lead an efficacious action.... which remains beneath the
surface throughout Algeria ( d'un bout a l'autre de l'AlOrie,
a ras de quartier, & ras de douar).
(82)
Le Monde was to make that known a few days after the arrest.
(83)
As reported by Le Monde, 27/10/56, p. 1 and 29/10/56.
(84)
Henri Pierre Le Monde, 27/10/57, p. 1.
(85)
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N'ont pas abouti, in Le Monde, 28-29/10/56.
(86)
Le Monde followed this with a declaration by the PM that no
guarantees were given (30/10/56).
(87)
Ligue des droits de l'homme, Conscience Frangaise, the
Republicans, Radical and Radical Socialists, the Independents,
the Liberals, Amities Marocaines, Club des jacobins, the group
CERES, Jeunes Republicains etc..
(88)
It was pointed out that talks between the Moroccans and the
Algerian nationalist leaders did not lead to any disturbance or
demonstration, and noted that:
Le desaveu brutal et imprevisible de l'initia-
tive de sa Majeste le Sultan, la veille encore
encouragee, sape le credit de la France et remet en
question la politique d uamitie et de cooperation
franco-marocaine (...).
Worries were also expressed about:
(...) immediates reactions de l'opinion publi-
que et de /eur consequences eventuelles sur la
securite de tous les habitants du Maroc; adjurent
le gouvernement frangais de reconsiderer sa position
et de saisir l'occasion off erte par les deux etats
amis de trouver une solution pacifique.
See Le Monde, 24/10/56.
(89)
The protests of the liberal groups in Morocco were to a
certain extent justified, as riots followed the same day in
which a number of Europeans were killed in the main Moroccan
towns. This was reported by Le Monde, 25/10/56.
(90)
Apart from the wave of violent demonstrations, the arrests
also led to the protest resignation of French officials in
charge of North African affairs; A Savary, French Secretary of
State for Moroccan and Tunisian affairs, resigned on the
grounds that he had not been informed. He thought, therefore,
that he did not enjoy the necessary confidence to continue
representing the government in the two newly independent coun-
tries. See Le Monde, 24/10/56.
Le Monde's comments on the resignations of the two other
French representatives in Tunis, M. Leusse and M.Dubois were
merely factual. The paper reported that L'offre de demission de
M. Leusse suscite une vive emotion a Tunis and that of M.Dubois
(in small print) laisse toute la responsabilite A M. Lalouette,
ndnistre plenipotentiaire et au general Cogny.
(91)
"It is not the capture of FLN leaders", wrote the paper,
"but circumstances, and, to a certain extent, the consequences
that explain the resignation of M. Savary and M. Leusse"
(Dubois was not mentioned in this article). "They were informed
by the Sultan of the <dealings> between Algiers and the plane
following the decision to divert the latter, but could not get
any confirmation from M. Lacoste until later that evening". Le
Monde told its readers that the Council of Ministers received
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from M. Leusse a letter of resignation, in which the Ambassador
was said to have strongly criticised the "reversal of policy"
and "deplored the situation in which he [had been] placed".
What this clearly amounted to was a condemnation of the ar-
rests: the act itself, and not the circumstances nor the
consequences that the paper referred to. The paper did not
explain the evident contradiction.
As for M. Savary, Le Monde was to add that the latter felt
that he did not have the authority nor the confidence required
to fulfil his duties; and that he had stated that he could no
longer: "guarantee the safety of the colonies, the status of
the army and the fate of the civil service." See Le Monde, 28-
29/10/56.
(92)
Le Monde reported, for instance, Pineau l s statement to the
press denying that the operation was directed against the
Sultan or Bourguiba and describing the arrest of the national-
ists as a mere police operation:
Ii s'agit d'une action de police et non d'une
action dirigee contre le Sultan et contre M. Bour-
guiba.
(93)
See Le Monde, 25/10/56, 28-29/10/56.
(94)
On the Algerian side the comments reported were that "France
has dared.... reborn hope in Algeria.... shows audacity, ener-
gy, French will..., purifies the future (tomorrow) for the two
communities" (La Depéche Quotidienne d'Alger). There were also
reactions which considered the event as "the most important
operation since the Cicero affair, which fooled the Germans
before the allies'landing in Normandy" (Journal D'Alger).
On the other side of the Mediterranean the reports were no
less jubilant.
Most of the attitude of the mainland papers reported by Le
Monde ranged from L'Aurore's "clean sweep which decapitated the
H.Q. of the rebellion.... let French justice be implemented"
(24/10/56), through Le Parisien Libere's request for a "de-
served punishment" (chAtiment qu'ils meritent) (24/10/56) to Le
Figaro's incomprehension of Bourguiba who was "indignant that
France arrests its ennemis acharnes but found it perfectly
normal to consider/treat the fellagas leaders as hosts of the
Sultan and guests of the Tunisian government..., public opinion
will decide" (24/10/56). The latter thought the reaction sal-
utaire... ne doit pas etre contrariee par les intrigues du
defaitisme (25/10/56). The same day L'Aurore was said to be
full of praise when it commented that: ..opêration, Si bril-
lanunent conduite... pleinement satisfait l'opinion publique
frangaise and warned the two former protectorates: de ne point
nous contraindre A etendre sa portde. La France peut encore
faire beaucoup pour eux, elle ne leur demande que d'être
loyaux. Ce n'est pas une exigence excessive.
(95)
Two papers seemed slightly unhappy. Whereas Franc-Tireur
wanted to get out of the "police climate" and attacked both
colonialist and anti-colonialist nationalism, warning that war
was not a solution: la guerre ne resout rien, Liberation was
quite worried: OU nous menez-vous M. Monet? Vos paroles sont
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de paix, mais vos actes sont de guerre. Et la France n'en a
déjà que trop saigne. It even went a step further and wondered
how negotiations could be possible if possible negotiators "are
being thrown in prison". See Le Monde, 25/10/56, p. 4.
(96)
Only L'Humanitê appeared severe in its judgement describing
the operation as "an act of extreme gravity which could exacer-  droll
bate matters", which demonstrates "the opposition of G. Mol-
let's government to any peaceful solution of the conflict as
these leaders, as socialist journalists have pointed out, were
going to Tunis to propose a negotiated settlement". In Le
colonialisme en vieillisant se pourrit. See Le Monde, 24/10/56
& 25/10/56.
(97)
Two Indian newspapers'opposition was noted by Le Monde,
which reported that The Hindustani Standard had requested an
immediate and satisfactory solution and stated that assurances
given by the French government were no longer to be trusted. On
the same line , drawing a parallel with broken assurances given
in 1942 by British authorities in India and the consequences
that ensued, The Indian Express was reported to have stated
that this kidnapping (enlevement) was the most deplorable
mistake made by the French in North Africa. (26/10/56)
Le Monde also told its readers that the AFL-CIO considered
the operation to be an act of sabotage of a conference designed
to find a Franco-Algerian agreement, which had caused worldwide
indignation and had asked for the UN to play a more "positive
role" on: la saisie rêcente par les Fran9ais d'un avion...
(27/10/56, p. 7).
(98)
The position of The Times was highlighted (Le Monde,
25/10/56 and 26/10/56). The paper wondered whether the decision
had been wise as it "had insulted Arab hospitality which is
unforgivable" and thought that the cost of the arrest would be
dear. But The Times was said to have maintained that the
French were within their rights, as these leaders were convic-
ted by French justice.
Ces hommes êtaient les instigateurs d'une
guerre contre le gouvernement frangais en territoire
fran9ais. De plus , c'est avec une irritation crois-
sante que l'opinion fran9aise entendaient les deux
voix dont parlaient les dirigeants marocains et
tunisiens. Ceux-ci font d'un ccit6 profession de
desirer des relations êtroites et amicales avec la
France, en donnant d'un autre ceitê aide et encoura-
gement A ses pires ennemis. (25/10/56)
The Times was reported to have thought France's moral posi-
tion to be strong. It also stated that the French had strongly
protested against these talks and that G. Mollet had personally
warned the Sultan. For the paper the operation was justified
and the capture of the nationalists would repress the uprising
as:
"a show of force is likely to be efficient as it satisfies
French public opinion and nothing is as much respected as force
in the Arab world". (26/10/56)
(99)
The paper found the issue slightly complicated by the fact
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that these people were considered to be "authentic spokesmen"
by the governments of Tunisia and Morocco. This was thought to
have been due to the insensivity of the two governments and
their inability to understand the reasons which conditioned the
French government's action.
Accepting their key moderating role in relation to some
extremists, acharnes a attaquer la France et souhaiter son
eviction totale..., Le Monde argued that the two leaders knew
that if they did not show some sort of understanding as to the
reasons that motivated French activities in Algeria, they would
be jeopardizing their own country's interests and willy-nilly
the de facto solidarity which existed between France and the
Maghreb. Le Monde, 24/10/56.
(100)
The former's definition in the Larousse is "examiner l'etat
sanitaire d'un navire, l'identite de son personnel, sa destina-
tion, sa provenance , la nature de sa cargaison" (all these
were known before the flight took off). This obviously indica-
ted that, (to a certain degree), that action was a legitimate
one. The paper tried, however, to refine the analysis by ask-
ing: "bearing French identification numbers could the plane be
legally forced to land by the French authorities"?
(101)
Assuming the authorities did not know to whom it belonged,
could not a simple radio or telephone call have clarified the
matter? But the authorities did know (the government in France
was unaware) and stopped the plane for the very reason that it
was carrying the leaders of the FLN, and the use of the word
arraisonnement in this context was deliberate and biased.
(102)
See Le Monde, 24/10/56.
(103)
Having stated the sensitivity of the matter and pointed out
that, in international law, no government could divert (detour-
ner) a foreign aeroplane, the paper argued that even if the
plane could not be considered French, it did nevertheless bear
French identification numbers. Stating that it was basing
itself on "expert opinion" (but not indicating whose), the
paper argued that although it belonged to a Moroccan company,
with regard to third parties and the authorities, with whom an
appeal might be lodged, it was in fact within the right of the
French authorities to divert the plane, as the Moroccan govern-
ment failed to register it ( it is worth remembering here, that
the country had been independent for a few months only (2March
1956), and that the logo of Moroccan airline did not have any
importance or any legal signification (as the logo -sign- is
even painted on chartered planes).
(104)
Le Monde's J. Fauvet justified the position. Even if the
government had not been informed, he explained, the secret and
swiftness of the capture of the "fellagua" leaders did not make
it possible to inform members of the government or the Presi-
dent of the Republic in time. In Le Monde, 25/10/56.
(105)
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See Le Monde, 25/10/56. Jean Planchais informed me that he
was present at a civic reception and that the expression on
G.Mollet's face upon on hearing the news was more akin to anger
and embarrassment than anything else. By contrast his defence
minister, Bourges-Maunoury, was delighted.
(106)
Deliberations on the matter would not have changed anything,
he wrote, but if immediate repercussions could have been soft-
ened (mitigated), what government, he asked, would have taken
the responsibility of letting the two main leaders of the
rebellion escape? In Le Monde, 26/10/56.
(107)
The paper stated that the mistake made by the Sultan, in
having publicly received the five emissaries of the FLN, was
not questioned by any member of the government.
Fauvet accepted that the events might have tragic conse-
quences; he seemed to object to the publicity that was given to
the talks. For him to make secret contacts through accredited
intermediaries was one thing, but to accept that they were
given a "dazzling reception" (avec éclat), that they partici-
pate in a conference with representatives of two friendly
countries whose mediation the French government had refused in
advance, was another. He thought that a misunderstanding had




He wrote that the "calm of 1955" had been broken that year
by revolts, violence and massacres, but only to play down the
significance of Algerian nationalism in favour of the events in
Hungary.
He stated that nationalism was the common denominator for
the major events, from the dramatic tension of North Africa to
the Middle-East, and the Far-East, including the symbol of
anticolonialism, Bandung. But, for him, all these events had no
common measure with what was going on in Hungary where thou-
sands of people had been cut down by Red Army bullets, or
hanged on the lamp posts of the capital, and where, he thought,
the situation was ripe for a UN intervention.
Tous les arguments sont donc rOunis pour lêgi-
timer une demarche A l'ONU. Les arguments moraux
sont d'encore plus de poids. L'Occident ne peut pas,
en dêpit de tous les griefs qu'il mêrite pour lui-
meme, assister sans rien faire au massacre
d'hommes qui se rêclament des idêaux de la libertè
auxquels ils s'affirment si passionement attaches.
(110)
He finished his article on a note of warning to the Soviet
Union.
Mais que les Sovietiques ne s'avisent pas de
venir denoncer notre colonialisme. Les evênements de
ces derniers jours fournissent A /a France une arme
A employer sans hesitation le jour oU l'URSS se
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hasarderait a lui demander des comptes.
Editorial of H.Beuve-Mery: recours aux Nations Unies, Le
Monde, 28-29/10/56.
(111)
See Le Monde, 27/10/56, p. 5.
(112)
The operation had one spectacular side which gave satisfac-
tion to the French:
"Why should the French always cry while the others always
laugh, why should the soldiers always be fooled... To receive
with pomp and circumstance leaders of the Algerian insurrec-
tion... to send them... over Algeria in a situation of war (in
actual fact around but morally over) is to go beyond prelimi-
nary contacts and to scoff at (narguer) the French before the
negotiations." This is why, he thought: Et l'on congoit que ce
ceremonial et cette promenade aient ete ressenties comme une
provocation par les autorites frangaises.
(113)
Domenach was ashamed of the other side of the operation.
Pointing out that the operation was: au point de la jonction de
la legalite et de la mauvaise foi, and speaking on behalf of
others (nous sommes un certain nombre) he wrote that he was not
exactly proud. Domenach was, of course, delighted to see the
secret services working as they should do; the operation was
considered by him as being technically impeccable, faultless,
but the result as a political failure accompanied (assortie)
by ridicule -which would not solve anything.
On y retrouve la marque de cet esprit irrefle-
chi qui pousse a des fantaisies dangereuses des
hommes qui, détenant une puissance militaire ou
politique, ne comprennent pas qu'on /es empéche de
s'en servir pour la bonne cause.
(114)
Domenach found that the operation which seduced, charmed
keen readers of adventure books and distracted (diverti) big
babies (les grands enfants) led to political void. He objected
to the fact that this operation, organised by specialists
without (a l'insu ) the government's consent, was done without
regard to the possible political consequences.
(115)
On aurait tort de presenter comme victoire
politique un coup de main pudril, manigance en
dehors des autorites responsables. Une fois de plus,
le gouvernement est oblige de couvrir  les initia-
tives de ses services et de se laisser imposer par
eux une ligne de conduite. Nouvelle etape dans la
degradation de l'Etat, qu'on fait acclamer un peu
vite comme preuve de son autorite.
This show of strength would not solve anything, according to
him, apart from increasing the unnecessary atrocities and lack
of safety of French residents of Morocco and Tunisia.
Mais le manquement de parole qui vient d'être
sollicite, execute et glorifid par les autorites
frangaises est plus grave et s'oubliera difficile-
ment.
Depuis dix ans les coups de force finissent en
496
echecs retentissants parce qu'ils sont le masque de
la faiblesse et la consolation de l'impuissance.
La vraie force consiste a subordonner les
moyens a la fin et non se distraire de la fin par
des interventions brutales et desordonnees.
La vraie force serait de regarder en face la
situation de l'Algerie, de l'expliquer a l'opinion
et de choisir /a voie d'une solution.
See Le Monde, 27/10/56, p. 5.
(116)
"Un guepier dont il importe de sortir", written by A.Philip,
University professor, delegate to the UN, member of the Secre-
tariat (Comite Directeur) of the SFIO, who pointed out the
seriousness and the gravity of the legal and moral problem
involved. First, the leaders were on a plane belonging to an
independent country. Secondly, because in Algeria, the govern-
ment had declared that there was no war but "pacification,"
this deprived the people arrested of the status of "belliger-
ents". He argued that the Chicago Convention (1944) regarding
free aircraft trafic forbade "us" from compelling a foreign
aircraft to land on "our" soil, and this whatever the human or
material nature of its cargo. Thirdly, the Franco-Moroccan Con-
vention meant that staff of French nationality who remained in
Morocco were responsible to the Moroccan government. Fourthly,
the nationalists were guests of the Sultan; their arrest, in
those conditions, subjected him to a loss of face in so far as
his guests were lured into a trap <attires dams un traquenard>
which violated fundamentals and traditions of Islamic hospital-
ity. Fifthly, morally, the ruse used could not be legitimised
whatever the motives, even if the Sultan had broken a moral
code.
(117)
Cela justifierait, de la part de la France, ni
une rupture de ses engagements internationaux, ni un
acte de tromperie. Une attitude morale ne se juge
pas essentiellement par rapport a l'attitude d'au-
trui, mais d'abord par rapport aux valeurs que l'on
professe soi-même publiquement et auxquelles on se
doit de demeurer fidele.	 .
Que Maurras justifie le faux patriotisme, ou
Lenine le mensonge de classe, c'est normal. Qu'un
reactionnaire nationaliste proclame un realisme
immoraliste et ne se preoccupe que du resultat, en
ridiculisant les preocupations juridiques ou ethi-
ques, c'est encore comprehensible, mais un socia-
liste ne peut pas s'abaisser<TRUNCATED> 
(118)
Since for him, it was impossible politically to admit one's
wrongs, the prisoners must be kept but, because of the irregu-
larities of their capture, they should not be prosecuted. Some
action ought also to be taken, it was thought, to implement
more autonomy and decentralisation in order to avoid military
action against the neighbouring countries (28-29/10/56).
(119)
Who wrote less than a fortnight after the arrest which had
become "old news" that it was not too late to re-examine the
event and its moral, legal and "honour " implications :
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n'est cependant pas trop tard pour examiner,
revenir en arriêre car une campagne commence qui
voudrait nous faire croire que cette action sera't
moralement injustifi6e, juridiquement discutable et
que la France s'honorerait en reconnaissant qu'elle
n'a pas le droit de juger ses prisonniers.
See Le Monde, 4-5/11/56.
(120)
Morality, for him, did not preclude revolt, but demanded
that revolt and changes of regime should lead to better
things. This was not the case in Algeria according to him. If
Algeria were to be in the hands of the "rebels," that is a
country of divided communities, then the French community of
European descent would have to leave since their existence
there would be imperilled because "these fellagas leaders...
adventurers ... on taking over power, will only sell out to
any other power... will become so tyrannical and will reign
on a country divided and dominated by xenophobia, anti-semitism
and anarchy".
(121)
Turning his attention to legal matters, Debre argued that
interference by other states in the internal affairs of Algeria
was an interference in the internal matters of France. Seeing
that there was no war in Algeria, the meeting organised was
tantamount, in his view, to an act of aggression as it contri-
buted to the multiplication of the number of murders.
(122)
He asked in this respect why should France (when attacks are
permitted for other nations) not defend her work (oeuvre
colonisatrice), her strategic and economic interests, while
other countries were helping "trouble makers and fanatics"?
(123)
"It is France that keeps these countries' public services
and maintains their prosperity: they must keep to the agreement
signed with France; no morality could excuse their conduct."
"Morality, honour, and the legal concept of interdependence,
he wrote, dictated a condemnation of their behaviour".
Amongst those attacked were Arab countries, Spain, ARAMCO
(paying rebels to assassinate the French). He saw "no reason
for France to always abdicate its authority and prestige, the
life and freedom of its citizens and the Muslims that put
their trust in it". "Shame, he scorned, on ideologies that see
honour only in abdication."
(124)
In Le Monde, 4-5/11/56. P. Craingue, in a letter addressed
to the editor a week later, examined the arguments offered by
Debre only to conclude that what he really meant was: "the end
justifie[d] the means" and hoped that the shame that some
Frenchmen felt might still save their honour in the words of
Bernanos: Cette honte est peut-étre seule capable de sauver
«l'honneur de l'honneur>>. Le Monde, 13/11/56.
(125)
The word "war" in French was not used although an equiva-
lent expression in French A la guerre comme a /a guerre exists.
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(126)
See Le Monde, 25/10/56.
(127)
Une commission internationale de juristes examinera le
«deroutement>> de l'avion de Ben Bella in Le Monde,
6/4/57/p5. The lawyers in question were: Abdellatif Fillali
(Morocco), M. De Vischer, professor of International Law
(Belgium), M.Arno (Italy), M.Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan), and a
Frenchmen whose name had not yet been communicated.
The paper reported its various meetings and adjournment see
Le Monde, 18/7/57, p. 5, La <<commission de l'avion» ajourne
ses travaux.
(128)
See Le Monde, 14/8/57, p. 4, Ben Bella et ses collegues
refusent toujours de repondre aux questions du magistrat in-
structeur.
This article reported that:
Commandant Giraud s'est transporte au quartier
politique de /a prison de la Sante pour y proceder
un nouvel interrogatoire des leaders du FLN , Moham-
med Ben bella, Mohammed Khider, Mohammed Boudiaf,
Hocine Mt Ali et Mustapha Lacheraf, qu'assistaient
Maitres Pierre et Renee Stibbe, du barreau de Paris,
Cherif Mohammed el Hachimi, AEK El Katib et Abderah-
mane Abdennebi, des barreaux de Tanger, Casa et
Tunis... inculpes	 adopte meme attitude que lors
du precedent interrogatoire ( 26 dec)	 soutenant
l'illegalite de leur arrestation... ils ont refuse
de repondre aux questions du magistrat
instructeur... .
Le Monde reported that when coming out of prison the lawyers
had made a declaration to the Press which it quoted.
(...) objectant conditions illegales de leur
arrestation qui 6quivaut a leurs yeux, a une seque-
stration arbitraire et faisant observer que le
gouvernement francais a lui meme accepte de sou-
mettre ce probleme a l'examen d'une commission









This would be best done through particular key episodes of
the conflict involving either the Muslim majority or the Chris-
tian minority when coverage seemed more abundant than at other
times.
We will look fist at the general coverage of the Europeans,
with special attention being devoted to the Church, the set-
tlers and the students community at the time of the UNEF con-
gress.
We will then look at the Algerian community in general at
the time of the general strike in February 1957. Our examina-
tion of the Algerian community's coverage would not be complete
without a special look at that part of the community which,









See Chapters 3 and 4.
(6)
See Serigny's statement in Le Monde, 16/12/54.
(7)
These included demands for banning the Algerian Communist
Party (PCA), for the arrest and punishment of the "rebels", for
maintaining the sentences pronounced by tribunals and for
inviting parliamentarians to refuse to lend their confidence to
the government if these measures were not implemented.
From the start, parliamentarians who took a firm stand
against the rebellion were given more space. More of their
statements (which obviously condemned "terrorism") dominated
the pages of Le Monde. Several examples could be given.
M Quilici (Independent): Mendês-France [qui] a proclam6 la
souverainet6 de la Tunisie a demontrê que le terrorisme payait,
Mr Colonna (Democratic Left): etouffer a sa naissance le ter-
rorisme alqêrien, in Le Monde, 3/11/54.
Mr Rene Mayer: Je n'accepte pas le dilemme de l'autonomie
qui engendrerait la republique algerienne ou de l'assimilation
a laquelle je ne crois pas. In Le Monde, 11/12/54 and Mr J.
Chevallier: Evenements . .plan concert6...vient de l'exterieur,
in Le Monde, 4/11/54.
(8)
They consisted essentially of a few Communists such as Mme
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Sportisse and left-wing progressive members of the First Col-
lege who sympathised with Algerian "Muslim" representatives
(Second College).
Le Monde began progressively to include their protests
against the policy of repression in its reports, but the main
outlet for their views, protests and manifestos was L'Humanite
and other sympathetic newspapers, not Le Monde.
(9)
With the Communist and Muslim delegates requesting the
transformation of the system and condemning the inequities and
differences at the economic, social and political levels, while
the liberal European elected officials were making less press-
ing demands. But none of these, however, seemed to be calling
into question the indivisibility of the Republic (France in-
cluding the three departments of Algeria) or challenging the
sovereignty of France.
(10)
The reforms proposed by Soustelle, including the College
unique (Single College or one man one vote), were said by the
newspaper not to lead to a more sincere implementation of the
1947 Statute which it seemed to favour. The paper further
stated that it would be met by scepticism and resistance: the
scepticism of the "Muslims" and the resistance amongst the
European population, the administration, the police and the
Assembly. See Le Monde, 8/6/55. When caught between two trends,
Soustelle received no special treatment from the paper. He was
said to be described as weak for some and extreme in his ef-
forts at repression by others:
taxe de faiblesse par les uns, il est apparu
aux autres comme l'homme d'une repression a out-
rance... Les premiers griefs sont assurement les
plus frequemment et les plus ouvertement formules.
See PA. Martel, Le Monde, 8/6/55.
The latter point of view was that of the European minority
and was being presented here as the one worthy of attention.
Now if the readers were to ask questions they would need to
guess or know who adresses this "most common and most open"
reproaches and criticism to the Governor General. The subtle
answer was not in the paper. It is clear that an implicit
advantage in the text had been given to the European community.
Although it could be argued that it was the most articulate in
terms of expressing a viewpoint, it was still outnumbered by a
ratio of one to ten. This illustrates once more the idea that
making sweeping statements and not finding, or rather not
telling the readers, who says what, who was making these "grie-
vances" and how representative these views were, was an indi-
cation of serious bias. As explained earlier, the number of
people who had the ability and the means to express themselves
or, in other words, public opinion in general, was limited to
the one group.
The views of the European circles and their hostility to the
new Governor General's programme in 1955 found a favourable
echo in the paper.
The settlers criticisms of the government's policies (and
Soustelle's in particular) were voiced throughout the pages of
the paper. The impression given was that his policies were not
ruthless enough. Le Monde reported that the settlers milieux
were accusing him of lack of firmness (manque de fermete) and
that some of the Europeans would be campaigning against him,
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while others were even demanding his recall.
Cette campagne se fait d'autant plus vive
qu'approchent les elections senatoriales qui ris-
quent fort de se faire pour ou contre le Gouverneur
General dont certains milieux demandent déjà le
rappel. In Le Monde, 14/5/55.
Soustelle turned out to be one of the most fervent suppor-
ters of a French Algeria and amongst the staunchest advocates
of European settlers' interests.
Other expressions of concern and worry of the settlers and
their elected officials can be found when Le Monde revealed the
hostility towards Soustelle's plans and demands that even more
severe measures be taken.
(...) altere le principe meme de la presence
francaise en Alger-ie.. l'heure est venue de passer
aux actes adaptes... demandent instamment que
<l'Etat de siege> soit proclamd et la loi mar-
tiale	 appliquee aux criminels. In Le Monde,
21/6/55.
(11)
Apart from a small number of Muslim leaders who, by virtue
of their being supporters of the system and its benefactors,
favoured the status quo with the implementation of the moderate
programme of reforms, most of Algerian Muslim opinion did not
find a way of expressing itself.
(12)
The desire of the Constantinois region's settlers to orga-
nise themselves in "auto-defence groups" in order to defend
both their property and their crops was highlighted in Le
Monde, 27/4/55.
Reinforcing their views, Le Monde wrote that the measures
taken by the authorities were not enough to reassure that
community: Les dispositions prises par les autorites ne sem-
blent guere rassurer les Frangais d'origine metropolitaine
when the Chambres de l'Agriculture met in an ordinary session
and declared that they could not carry out their work in the
present situation. In Le Monde, 13/5/55.
(13)
When the State of Emergency was adopted (see Chapter 11) in
a country where the Muslim majority hardly had any protection
against the excesses of the "forces of order", Le Monde was
still questioning the capability of these most ruthless powers
to protect the European community.
(...) toutes ces mesures parviendront-elles
appaiser les inquietudes et parfois les paniques que
la situation a pu susciter dans certains milieux
europeens9 	
Le Monde, 14/5/55.
On the release of some former members of the MTLD, charged
with national security offences as part of the measures that
Soustelle wanted to see implemented, Le Monde admitted that no
doubt these measures would lead to a regain d'espoir dans les
milieux musulmans qui y reconnaitront un acte de justice, but
highlighted the negative aspects of even this just measure in
the eyes of the settlesrs minority: On craindra cependant,
the paper went on to say,
(...) qu'elles ne soient mal accueillies dans
les milieux francais de l'agriculture surtout qui ne
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cessent d'exprimer leur inquietude en meme temps
que leur ressentiment a l'egard des autorites.
(14)
The opinions and protests of powerful European farmers'
interests (such as those of the Association interdepartementale
desChambres de l'Agriculture of Constantine) were expressed by
the paper in headlines (devant la vague de terrorisme qui
s'abat,	 contre l'insuffisance des mesures prises pour
assurer la securite and through the publication of their
statements in full (...constatent eux aussi que les departe-
mnts ... se trouvent dans une situation inquietante et que
l'emeute organisee[contradiction in words, besides a veritable
piece of propaganda was being published here at no cost to the
organisation], gagnant chaque jour du terrain, met en danger la
vie et les biens des honnetes populations agricoles de toutes
ariOnes (Chambre de l'Agriculture of Algiers and Oran), as
well as their appeal:
(...) un ferme et solonnel appel aux pouvoirs
publics pour qu'ils	 revisent particulierement
l'echelon gouvernemental leur politique décevante
d'atermoiements inefficaces en raison des errements
suivis... pour le maintien de l'ordre et qui donnent
aux populations l'impression d'abandon et... fait
douter d'une ferme volonte de ramener le calme en
Algerie in Le Monde 15-16/5/55.
The paper had a constant concern to reassure this European
community. When new troop re-inforcements were sent, Le Monde
thought it would calm down the anxiety of the European settlers
"recently under new threats":
L'arrivee de nouveaux renforts contribuera
sans doute A calmer la nervosite de la population
europeenne des nouveaux secteurs menaces par l'ac-
tion des hors la loi
See Le Monde, 25/5/55.
The paper did side with the requests for protection expres-
sed by the settlers and their protests against the "inneffi-
ciency of the measures" taken under the Law on the State of
Emergency (see Chapter 11):
(...) Ii reste que les agriculteurs
d'Algerie	 ont le droit d'exiger une protection
But this was seen by the paper as the attribution and the
role of the State. Thus Le Monde's support did not extend to
the organisation of local militias for the purpose of the
defense of the settlers'interests because the paper thought
that it would be dangerous to substitute local and private
initiative for public authority.
(...) c'est a celle-ci de contrOler les agisse-
ments des individus et des groupements. L'inverse ne
saurait etre tolere
P. A. Martel in Le Monde, 27/4/55.
(15)
See also Chapter 8.
(16)
During and after the events of 6 February "Muslims" were
included in the reports by journalist who found maturity,
responsibility and commitment to the idea of national identity
and independence. (There was also concern expressed by Pignault
for the increased tension in the Muslim population where the
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word independence was on the lips of personalities who had not
contemplated uttering it three days previously" (Le Monde,
9/2/56).
The news of that community was reported similarly to the
period preceding the events. But despite the strength of feel-
ing and its unanimity and maturity, it was given less emphasis.
Minay wrote of the events of 6 February 1956, that the Muslim
population observed these events in silence. This was broken
only
(...) -et encore tres faiblement - que par les
<<61» gui ont exprime leur reprobation des inci-
dents de la journee , reaffirment leur attachement
au <<fait national>> (...), rappele qu'ils n'etaient
pas des <<interlocuteurs» et indiquaient qu'ils
consideraient leur mission terminee pour le moment.
Le Monde, 8/2/56.
As far as this Muslim community was concerned, Minay was
astonished by the expressed concern that the Muslim element
seemed to be totally ignored in these demonstrations (Le Monde,
14/2/56), whereas C.Pignault, on the other hand, discerned some
reservations in that community and from the explanations given
by the 11 61" concluded that the Muslim community demonstrated
that it was sufficiently mature by showing its determination to
remain calm:
(...) la population musulmane a montre sa prise
de conscience des realites et prouve que /a maturite
politique n'êtait pas un leurre.
Throughout various sectors of that Muslim community he said
he had found the same language, from the masses to the more
cultivated (le meme langage tenu partout...couches
populaires ....milieux cultives). He concluded that these
demonstrations had a great deal to do with reinforcing the
unity of the community.
Nier que le sens de la communaute et de
l'aspiration collective ne se soit renforce ces
derniers jours, a la faveur precisemment des manife-
stations de rue d'Alger serait nier l'evidence. Plus
peut-étre que ne l'auraient fait des propagandistes
methodiques, les manifestants ont aide a faire
progresser ce qu'ils contestent ou qu'ils combat-
tent.
In Le Monde, 15/2/56.
(17)
For instance, amongst a coverage which included a speech by
Mollet, declarations of Europeans and reports of Europeans'
views, one notices that only the following two lines were
devoted to nationalist aspirations:
"all this is fragile in front of the opposition
of the majority of the Muslim delegates who are
asking for national recognition". See Le Monde,
11/2/56.
(18)
Which Le Monde thought was an evitable rumeur injuste et
ingrate before it highlighted it and went into the important
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reasons behind it.
De plus, au moment oil son destin se joue, elle
se voit sans representation parlementaire et s l es-
time ainsi desarmee pour apporter la reponse A
maints propos tenus au Palais Bourbon qu'elle con-
sidere comme inspires par une malveillance system-
atique A son encontre.
Seethe series of articles published by the paper, and
Vggerie dans l'attente, I.Esquisse d'un desarroi general,
in Le Monde, 7/2/56, and also above.
(19)
See Le Monde, 7/2/56.
Pipault emphasised the concern (even if not openly admit-
ted) for some aspects of the resolution of Mayors and the
Comite de Salut Public which had been formed by war veterans to
oppose
(...) vigoureusement au principe du college
unique et même a faire de cette opposition leur
cheval de bataille.
He reported the PM's reassurance
(...) qu'il y avait de nombreuses manieres,
dans le cadre de cette unicite, d'assurer une repre-
sentation equitable des deux collectivites et peut
etre même d'obtenir une parite de representation.
Pipault in Le Monde, 9/2/56.
(20)
All these views, here, were given the same coverage as a
maim passed by a single group of "war veterans", which,
without wanting to exclude some form of social progress, came
out heavily in favour of a rejection of the single college, a
strengthening (reinforcing) of the army's powers and effi-
ciency, updating it so as to fight against egorgeurs, bandits
hgnmds chemins diriges de l'êtranger, for maintaining French
sovereignty as the "only policy to be implemented" and even




Pignault saw that, according to some reports, there was a
divorce between the two communities since the Europeans"events
of Monday" ( or, to put it more precisely, he stated that such
a feeling was not rare).
(23)
See Le Monde, 9/2/56 & 15/2/56.
(24)
As observed above, Le Monde accurately remarked that the
urgin of manoeuvre was becoming very narrow for the government
and described the latter as caught up by pressures on both
sides.
(25)
The expression used was <acharnes a revendiquer>.
505
This is one of the rare occasions of admission of national-
istaspirations, but it is still at the request stage.
On this occasion Minay also reported the conflicting demands
of the Comite d'entente representing the Europeans and those of
the <<61>> requesting moves in the opposite direction. Le
Wide, 8/2/56.
(26)
Because of the various antagonist slogans. In Le Monde,
14/2/56.
(27)
Fauvet, expressing approval of a government ban on future
demonstrations, was ready to acknowledge the influence of the
streets on Algerian politics, perceiving the threat of fascism
as real (Le Monde, 11/2/56). Minay thought the appeasement
superficial and did not exclude problems for the future (Le
Monde, 14/2/56). But upon the PM's return to France, Fauvet was
quick to note that his trip did not seem to have pacified the
Europeans in Algeria nor to have reduced tension there (Le
Monde, 14/2/56).
(28)
Chénebenoit described the circumstances of Mollet's arrival
asa "scandal" and an "outrage" and put a certain amount of
Marmon the demonstraters, describing them in the words of St
Mathew as "blind leading the blind", who had made the gratui-
tous and serious mistake of insulting the Republic:
profere envers /a Republique francaise une
injure gratuite .. commis eux mêmes	 une lourde
faute
Although a powerful indignation, this position was dwarfed
by 	 accusations of European settlers'blackmail found in
papers such as L'Express, for instance, which condemned le
nouveau chantage des feodaux and the calls for Socialists and
Radicals' unity against those wanting to "insult the Republic"
(bafouer la Republique) or Le Populaire's stand against the
ultimatum given to the Prime Minister (known to the paper




See also Chapter 8.
(31)
Seethe second article of the series: L'Algerie dans l'at-
tente: II. les principes et les realites. In Le Monde, 8/2/56.
(32)
(..) debordee par une lame de fond spontanee,
soit par l'action d'elements mal determines(..).
Ibid.
(33)
In front of an "Army which remained impassible," the demon-
strations, in which mottes de terre, branches arrachees, pro-
jectiles were thrown (lances) were the work of twenty-year-old
assailants (ceux qui menaient l'assaut avaient en moyenne 20
ans &Age et pour la plupart, des visages hilares de gamins
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rossant le commissaire). In Le Monde, 8/2/56.
34
See "Correspondence" section in Le Monde, 15/2/56.
(35
Le Monde, 21-22/4/57, p. 3 gave the increase as being from
29,377 in 1900 to 156,803 in 1955.
(36)
It reported that the struggle, latent for two years, over
the links to be maintained with the UGEMA (Algerian Muslims
Students Organisation) had resurfaced when the office of the
Union published a communique. In this communiqué, it was stated
that the conscripts gave evidence which threw serious doubts on
the "means" used in Algeria and on whether there was a poss-
ibility of ending the "war" if "such methods" were to be conti-
nued. It was further stated that a letter of protest would be
written to the French President.
(37)
Menaces de scission A l'union des etudiants in Le Monde,
10/4/57, p. 5.
(38)
After all the student community was also concerned, as most
of its members were (if they had not been already) being regu-
larly drafted and ordered to don soldiers uniforms and fight
for France on the other side of the Mediterranean.
Le Monde provided a regular flow of information on this
subject by publishing news of draft and liberation measures.
See for instance Mesures en faveur des êtudiants de la classe
54/2, 30/4/57, p. 4. See also Chapter 5.
(39)
Even if they had no power to dictate how Algerian policy
should have been conducted, it should be pointed out, neverthe-
less, that they were in the forefront of the war and were used
as cannon fodder. The UNEF was not some corporate concern or
peaceful trade union that should have kept its nose out of
politics.
(40)
On the side of the Union and not opposing its decisions, no
matter what they were, the paper listed the support of the
Paris University authorities who did not mind these students
meeting and taking decisions which they saw fit in their con-
gresses. The paper pointed out that in contrast to the Presi-
dent of the Municipal Council (See below M Ruais'attitude), the
University authorities did not object to the Union's communiqué
on the "methods of pacification" and that some quarters had
even made encouraging noises. Le Monde, 25/4/57, p. 5.
(41)
From the start, the Mayor of Paris, M Ruais, was reported as
having resented the statement made by the UNEF and as having
declared that he would not meet the students during their Paris
congress. Le Monde reported that it was informed by the deci-
sion and the reasons behind it. (The decision was said to have
been motivated by a desire not to to give support to the posi-
tion hasard6e" ... which implied that
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(...) l'armee frangaise se livre a une action
sauvage et brutale pluttit que d'être le bouclier
d'une population terrorisee, Le Monde, 21-22/4/57,
p. 3.
Le Monde did, however, publish the Union's communiqué,
issued in reply to the Mayor's statement, regretting that the
decision taken by the Mayor "had thrown a shadow over the
traditional hospitality of the people of Paris", expressing the
Union's astonishment over this "outside interference" by him,
and leaving it up to the delegates to appreciate
(...) A sa juste valeur le chaleureux accueil
que leur a reserve M. Pierre Ruais. (Ibid.)
But three days later another communique of M.Ruais was
published (in an encadre) by Le Monde, in which he explained
that he had no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of
the organisation and that he did not visit the congress because
of
(...) legérete coupable avec laquelle le bureau
de l'Unef a mis en cause l'armee.
He further stated that an assurance that the words of the
Association's communiqué had been overstated (que ses paroles
avaient depasse sa pensee) would have sufficed for him to have
gladly revised his decison. The backing of the UNEF statement
by L'Humanite was for him the best proof, if needed, of l'ou-
trance prejudiciable de ce texte (in Au congres des Etudiants
de France La scission semble inevitable, Le Monde, 25/4/57, p.
5).
Then Le Monde reported (in an encadre) that M.Ruais had
received the "Algerian students" (these were settlers of Eur-
opean origin) and, recalling the conditions of his refusal to
meet UNEF delegates, gave the text of his declarations, justi-
fying this discrepancy of attitudes:
J'ai l'habitude, depuis que j'occupe la presi-
dence du conseil de recevoir tous les Algeriens qui
viennent a Paris pour leur manifester notre affec-
tueuse sollicitude. Mon geste n'a donc rien A voir
avec les debats qui se deroulent... et ne doit pas
etre interprete comme une prise de position du
Conseil municipal dans les affaires de cette organi-
sation.
Le Monde, 27/4/57, p. 16.
(42)
Le Monde also reported that the MP, Le Pen, ancien militant
de l'UNEF, came to back the Algiers group, declaring in the
corridors of the congress:
Si vous voulez denoncez les "exactions" prétees
A l'armee, allez sur place et rapportez des preuves,
lancait-il en substance aux majoritaires actuels
mais si vous avez decide d'aider les rebelles, il
serait plus franc et plus courageux de prendre le
maguisl.
The paper accepted, however, that the views of the paratroo-
per lieutenant were not shared by other opponents of the
"letter to the French President who only wanted to avoid such a
move being interpreted as being in favour of a political cam-
paign whatever its aim. Le Monde, 27/4/57, p. 16.
(43)
The paper regretted (malheureusement) the absence of some




For Le Monde, the congress of the UNEF was the time when the
Union would ask itself about the limits of <<apolitisme».
(45)
Leading to antagonism amongst the "children" when it commen-
ted: Ii n'est pire que les brouilles de famille pour opposer
les enfants. In Pour le congrês de son cinquantenaire, l'union
des êtudiants de France va s'interroger une Lois de plus sur
les limites de son <<apolitisme>>, Le Monde, 21-22/4/57, p. 3.
(46)
Le Monde's Bertrand Poirot-Delpech wrote that the split
which developed within the UNEF started as far back as 1950
between the partisans of an apolitisme rigoureux and those for
whom there could not be a trade-union student movement divorced
from the problems of the time. The "Algerian tragedy did the
rest," with the former stating that no comments should be made
on the draft of October 1955 and requesting that the Union
break away from the Union Gênárale des Etudiants Musulmans
AlgdTiens (UGEMA), which held an "openly nationalist view" and
"supported the FLN and independence."
(47)
(...) la majoritê changeait de camp au profit




Bertrand Poirot-Delpech, Le Monde, 21-22/4/57, p. 3.
(49)
Le Monde 25/4/57, p. 5.
Le Monde saw the split within the Union as inevitable. It
stated that some faculties of mainland France and the Algiers
section would leave the main body of the Union. In actual fact,
the Algiers section had left the Union the summer before and
the paper was aware of that. See footnote 53 below.
(50)
Le congrés des êtudiants s'achêvera vendredi
aprés deux jours de discussion sur l'orientation du
mouvement.
Le Monde, 26/4/57, p. 4.
(51)
Le Monde 27/4/57, p. 16. The expression was la personne hu-
maine.
(52)
Even after the paper stated that a majority of members,
confirmed by a 2/3 vote on Monday, intended to maintain the
terms of the Union's protest against the exactions of the
security forces and to send a new message to President Coty.
Ibid., Le Monde, 25/4/57, p. 5.
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(53)
A considerable effort was made by Le Monde to put the case
for the minority of Europeans from Algeria ( ...De l'autre,
l'association des ótudiants d'Algerie, bien qu'elle ait quitte
l'Union nationale depuis i'ète dernier, s'oppose avec l'6nergie
du desespoir a ce qu'elle considére comme une des prises de
position partisanes et l'effort d'une campagne politique
-Ibid.), outlining how these young students from Algiers "ex-
plained" that they could not accept (admettre) que l'on denonce
des sOvices qui sont l'exception et que l'on garde le silence
mu-les exactions systêmatiques des rebelles.
Le Monde also stressed the determination of the Algiers
group and the reality of their threats to carry out more or
less legal methods of pressure.
Les dêlêgues d'Alger sont préts aux dámonstra-
tions les moms rêguliéres. La greve dêcidêe A la
suite du geste de M.Peyrega en est la preuve de méme
que l'affichage de tracts, aux abords du Palais-
Bourbon qui a valu a certains de passer le nuit de
lundi au poste.
Le Monde, 25/4/57, p. 5.
The paper outlined the Algiers group resolution to exert
pressure (in fact it was blackmail and threat of resignation)
on sympathetic university associations of mainland France
(Montpellier, Bordeaux, and the Paris law faculty were all said
to have been in their favour). This would have led to the
creation of a new union distinct from the UNEF.
Using hearsay, Le Monde stated that other associations might
follow suit:
D'autres pourraient suivre, dit-on, et /a lutte
s'amplifierait irrêmêdiablement au sein de la col-
lectivitd etudiante 6cartel6e. Telle est en dêfini-
tive l'enjeu du congrês. (25/4/57, p. 5.)
Then the paper wondered if they would succeed in getting the
majority of the Union to take account of the understandable (Le
Monde's judgement) demands and dilute its commitments on the
humanitarian aspects of the Algerian tragedy, but thought
nothing was less certain.
(54)
The next day the paper wrote that the coming hours were
going to determine whether the delegates of some of the asso-
ciations would leave with their Algiers comrades, in protest
against the positions taken by the Bureau of the UNEF against
the exactions of the security forces and in support of the
gesture of Dean Peyrega (see Chapter 13). Now the paper stated
that the delegates hostile to the position taken by l'UNEF (in
this field seen as too political) were in fact less determined
to leave the movement than expected (le laissait supposer hier
en coulisse l'Association d'Alger). Here we learn that the
basis on which Le Monde had announced that a split would occur
(and that numerous associations would leave the Union causing a
split) was a behind-the-scenes hint from a group that did not
even belong to the Union. And that for these delegations to
leave, the Union would need to issue more radical comments on
"human aspects of the Algerian affair". The slight modification
brought to the text was said to be proof of moderation.
Le Monde was then admitting that, apart from the initiative
to contact the president (to which some delegations received
instructions not to associate themselves and which they would
like to have seen replaced by an apolitical stance of the
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movement), none of the text adopted on the previous night
seemed to be likely to provoke the resignations that were
annonced.
(55)
Putting the problem in terms of a choice between "Politics
or Patriotism", Le Monde explained that M.Gautrot saw the
Algerian problem "simply as a demographic one", that the
"rebels" were "criminals in search of power" and that for the
students of Algiers the "scruples" of Peyrega and the UNEF
were "unfounded and tantamount to treason, in that they favour
the psychological activities of the rebellion".
The paper also gave the main lines of a press conference
given by the president of the Algiers section, in which he
stated that:
nous ne demandons pas a l'Union nationale de
prendre position sur une solution politique, nous
voulons qu'elle renonce a justifier le doyen Peyre-
ga, a salir l'armee et, plus generalement, a favori-
ser de quelque fagon que ce soit la cause des fell-
agas.
He also stated that :
Nous ne sommes pas des excites. Nous aussi nous
avons notre conscience. On nous accusera peut-etre
de faire de la politique, mais quand le sort de
douze departements frangais est en jeu, nous appe-
ions cela du patriotisme.
(56)
See above. And it was on the ground of patriotism that they
justified support for general conscription and opposition to
the Single college and the dispatch of the Radical Commission.
(see Chapter 12).
(57)
When it later accepted that the demands of the Algiers group
could hardly make any organisation leave the UNEF, and that the
Algiers group had only just come to prominence. It also admit-
ted that it was there more to air its views to the public (to
whom they distributed leaflets) than to convince a congress
which most of them thought was lost for them anyway.
(58)
The paper in the end was writing that the "serious and
disciplined" debates of the congress, which showed a "high
level of consciousness in the varied fields", were not entirely
devoted to these burning issues. Even if they had been relega-
ted to the background by the possible repercusions of the Alge-
rian affair in the student world, "proper trade union activi-
ties" were the main reason for the movement and "would contri-
bute, when the time comes, to the discord being forgotten."
Si ces travaux proprement <<syndicaux>> ont ête
que/que peu eclipses par les repercussions dans le
monde etudiant de l'affaire algerienne, us n'en
demeurent pas moms la raison d'être du mouvement et




The rank and file members of the Student body were portrayed
as being uncertain.
At the end of the month, Le Monde wrote that the rank and
file of the student body returning from their Easter break were
still hesitant and did do not realise the full implications of
the split. The paper reported that it had asked a few of them,
who were said to have replied that <apolitisme> was unachiev-
able on questions of national interests. Then the paper conclu-
ded that the split was serious and could end up weakening the
student movement. According to the paper, this was feared even
by Law students whose delegates opted to split up.
But the only quote the paper had was from a future doctor
(medical students were said to be hesitant), who declared that:
Ii n'y a que les extremistes qui font de la
politique. Nous les moderes, ce qui nous interesse
c'est que notre association defende nos repas a 75
fr et arrive en! in a obtenir l'agrandissement de la
bibliotheque, qui a actuellement 70 places pour 3000
etudiants; le reste ne regarde pas les etudiants, le
gouvernement est /a pour ca. See Apres la scission
de l'Unef hesitation des etudiants <de base>, in Le
Monde, 30/4/57, p. 5.
The following week, Le Monde reported further statements by
students keeping the controversy going, but also giving a
statement of the UNEF putting unity before anything else. In Le
Monde, 7/5/57, p. 7.
The bias in favour of the minority views continued when the
voices of veteran organisations seemed to gain easy access to
the paper at that particular time. These were combined with
the minority students views (5/6/57, p. 3, from AFP).
A further statement by M.Gautrot who, "in the name of the
people of Algiers" (this way of presenting him as speaking in
the name of several students and veteran organisations could
only be seen as an attempt to give him more credibility than
his status allowed him in the circumstances), was reported to
have demanded that France should wage war in the full sense of
the term, stand against any "progressiveness", decree a state
of siege, execute all those sentenced, ban the Communist Party
in both Algeria and France, reinforce the security forces,
refuse American interference in the Sahara and put pressure on
Tunisia. See Representant des etudiants d'Alger M.Jean Gautrot
demande a la metropole de <<faire la guerre>> dans toute l'ac-
ception du terme, in Le Monde, 15/6/57, p. 2.
(60)
In Au jour le jour : Question de confiance, Le Monde,
11/7/57, p. 1. In the topical "comment of the day" which is
usually written with sarcastic undertones. It was drafted on
this occasion by a lecturer, who while expressing the hope, at
the beginning of the summer holiday for thousands of students,
that it would be a happy one, reminded the readers of the the
less serene holiday that a few hundred students, "French by
their culture by their hearts", were about to take. But while
asking these students for their confidence, the note stigma-
tised the Algerian students in imprudent call" for a strike.
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(61)
See Le Monde 17/4/57, p. 4.
eg. example of a registered student who refused to attend
classes in Strasbourg (Benhassine, now lecturer in Algiers) for
carrying leaflets. Ibid.
Other news of arrests of students (Toulouse) can be found in
Le Monde, 9/5/57, p. 6, 10/5/57, pp. 5-16.
(62)
However, the news of these arrests and the harassment that
students were subjected to hit the headlines only when the
mainland press (including Le Monde itself), as well as various
religious and political leaders, received letters from (one of)
those students, Tellidgi Mohammed Habib, who went into hiding
after accusing the police of torture and giving a detailed
account in the letter (bathtub, electricity). In this instance,
the paper reported that the authorities considered it to be
their duty to denounce what they considered to be an "odious
calomny" and that everybody feared "deception" (l'imposture).
The paper thought that the aim of the letter was to instill
doubt in the country.
When it received its copy of the letter, Le Monde saw a
choice between three possibilities: ignoring it, mentioning it
without being concerned about its value, or investigating it,
a course which it stated that it had taken with some justifica-
tion.
Au regu d'une lettre comme celle de Telidji
trois attitudes etaient possibles pour un journal:
ne tenir aucun compte du document, en faire êtat
sans se soucier de sa valeur ou aller recueillir sur
place les multiples tómoignages gu'il appelle.
L'accueil reserve & notre collaborateur par les
autorites comme par les accusateurs atteste gue
l'enguéte privee sur un sujet aussi grave et aussi
difficile it elucider mdrite d'être tent6e, même Si
elle doit se heurter & des obstacles insurmontables.
But on the day of the trial B. Poirot-Delpech thought he had
various reasons not to give credence to the letter, reasons
which were set out in a whole section:Des raisons d'en douter,
in the main article, Denegations off icielles (11/5/57, p. 3).
Le Monde informed its readers of the case against the students
and the denials by the "commissaire" and the prosecutor (Juge
d'instruction) that any force had been used. The conclusion was
that these people must be members of the nationalist organisa-
tions, although they denied it (this conflicted with the re-
quest of the defence (5 lawyers) that these people (Le Monde
wrote that this concerned the less heavily compromised) should
be simply released. See Le Monde, 11/5/57, p. 3.
The verdict sentencing the students from 20 days to 18
months hardly corresponds to the the tone of what Le Monde was
trying to make the readers believe earlier on. See Le Monde,
12-13/5/57, p. 3.
When the police issued a warrant for the arrest (mandat
d l amener) of Tellidgi, Le Monde stated that this was only in
order to clear up matters provoked by his disappearance and the
accusations he had made against the police- the inexactitude
and the contradictions of which, the paper proudly stated, it
had indicated (Le Monde 22/5/57, p. 11). It was obvious to most
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of the left-wing press at the time that if the security forces
were looking for an Algerian who made that type of accusation
it would certainly not be in order to clear his name.
(63)
Apart from when Le Monde reported the odd communiqué:
-eg the UGEMA's on the persecution of the groups studying in
the CFA.
The heading of an article indicated that 10 students who had
resigned from the CFA were interned in Algeria whereas the
UGEMA's communiqué revealed that at least 20 of its members had
been arrested, kidnapped or "imprisoned" in the last weeks. (9
from Toulon arrested for leaflet distribution; a maitre d'in-
ternat in the Lycêe Bugeaud <enlevê>, and recently, a law
student in Algiers, aurait Ote <seguestre>. As for the 10
referred to in the headline, they were in custody in a deten-
tion centre and attempts were made to force them to go back on
their resignations and to sit their exams. See Dix eleves
musulmans demissionnaires du CFA seraient internês en Algerie,
Le Monde, 22/2/57, p. 4.
-or during the trial of some of them in Toulouse. See Le
proces des 6tudiants musulmans de Toulouse. Un appel de l'UGE-
MA, Le Monde, 10/5/57, p. 5.
Expressions of concern for that group of students were very
scarce.
(64)
See Le Monde, 2/12/54.
(65)
The education of Hubert Beuve- Mery, founder and director of
the paper, was completed thanks to the help of the Church and
religion played a part in his upbringing. He even chose the
life and works of a religious figurehead as the theme of his
doctoral thesis. See Chapter 2.
The journalists of the paper were interested in the life of
the Church and that of political organisations with religious
leanings . See, for instance, Jacques Fauvet, who wondered
about the future of Christian Democracy, in Aprés le Congres
des Nouvelles Eguipes internationales oU va la democratie
chrêtienne, report from special correspondent J.Fauvet,
30/4/57, p. 5.
(66)
Four articles in Le Monde spread over the period 30/4/57, p.
1 to 7/5/57, p. 4.
(67)
In connection with Algeria, Le Monde published a number of
appeals by religious organisations. It reported that the French
Protestant Church's national synod had mentioned the problems
of Algeria and the recent reforms in the Overseas territories.
In Le synode national de l'Eglise rêformee óvoque les problemes
algóriens et les rêcentes rêformes d6cidees dans les terri-
toires d'outre-mer, Le Monde, 14/5/57, p. 7.
Messages such as the one addressed to the Protestants of
Algeria on the "fraternity between the Christians of France and
those of Algeria", expressing concern over youth, giving spir-
itual help to cas de conscience of young draftees (jeunes
appelês), thanking the F6d6ration protestante de France for its
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declaration on the Algerian tragedy, and recommending it to the
attention of its parishes, were echoed by the paper. See Le
Monde, 15/5/57, p. 4.
Le Monde also reported appeals by religious groups or com-
mittees to protest peacefully against the War. The appeal for a
fast for peace in Algeria by the Comite d'Entente France-Islam
in response to the request by Les amis de Ghandi was a case in
point. See Le comite chretien d'entente France-Islam, repondant
a l'appel des amis de Ghandi <<pour une paix sereine en Alger-
ie» demande a tous ses sympathysants de jedner en prive le 28
fevrier, Le Monde, 28/2/58, p. 2.
(68)
This stated that legal proceedings must exclude torture and
that the instruction of cases must "exclude physical, psycholo-
gical torture and the use of drugs ( because they "undermine
the natural right of the accused, even if guilty," and also
because they very often lead to the "wrong results" and to
"confessions that the courts want" - "not because the accused
is guilty but because of the exhaustion of his soul and his
body, he is bound to prefer prison to physical torture." See
Mannoni, Au 30eme mois de la lutte. L'Action Judiciaire doit
exclure la torture declarait Pie XII, in Le Monde, 13/4/57, p.
4.
Le Monde, on that occasion also reminded the readers of a
similar address to Interpol on 15 October 1954 when he asked
(Lia justice aujourd'hui n'est-elle pas retour-
née, en maints endroits et sous des apparences
peine deguisees, a une veritable torture, parfois
beaucoup plus violente gue les epreuves d'autrefois?
Notre temps ne court-il pas le risque de voir s'el-
ever un jour contre lui le reproche d'avoir, sans
frein ni scrupule, poursuivi dans l'interrogatoire
des fins utilitaires? (Ibid.)
(69)
Le Monde echoed the news of a letter of appeal to the Pope,
couched in strong language, sent by Abbas and reported by the
Tunisian papers, Le Petit Matin and Al Amal.
The letter denounced "the extermination methods" used
against the Algerian people, ...atteinte aux droits les plus
sacres de la personne humaine.. sevices .. armee transformee en
appareil policier... , accused the French administration of
genocide, and called on the Pope to help put an end to the
epreuve de force. While accepting that France had interests in
Algeria, the letter maintained that the Algerian people had
rights which can be safegarded by "independence and free coop-
eration with Republican France" (M.F.Abbas: Le Christianisme et
l'Islam peuvent 	 cooperer pacifiguement au progres de la maple
communaute humaine, in Le Monde, 28-29/4/57, p. 2.
(70)
The Church's responsibility in the emancipation of the
colonial people was one of main features portrayed in Le Monde.
The paper reported that Monsignor Chapoulie had insisted on the
international responsibilities of Christians towards the eman-
cipation movements of the colonies and the rejection of any
judgement involving social superiority towards people of other
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continents and other races. Le Monde also reported that he had
asked for moderation and for the rejection of a certain form of
N'ayons pas un tel orgueil de notre patrie, Si
grande soit-e/le, que nous soyons plus capables
d'imaginer chez des peuples conquis autrefois par
les armes, le reve d'une patrie, la leur, et pour
eux, naturellement, plus belle que la France.
In Le Monde, 27/12/56, p. 5.
The paper also reported the Papal message to Catholic mis-
sions in Africa to help people aspiring to freedom. See Dans un
cycdique sur les missions d'Afrique la vie internationale n'a
pas permis aux hommes les plus sages de menager les etapes
necessaires au vrai bien des populations declare Pie XII. In Le
Monde, 28-29/4/57, p. 2.
(71)
See statements above and the declaration of the symbolic
group of Souk Ahras, for instance, on 29 January 1956 in
Noziere, Andre, Algerie: Les Chretiens dans la guerre, ed du
Cana, Paris, 1979, p. 206.
(72)
The position of a priest like Beringuer, Curate for Montag-
nac (near Tlemcen), whose views were even expressed in Oran
Republicain and clearly sided with the Algerian nationalists in
the name of his faith, is a famous example. See Noziére, op.
cit., pp. 216 ff.
Many churchmen and women, devout faithful or even secular
French people, took unequivocal positions in favour of the
Algerians despite their belonging to a different creed. See
Chapter 11
(73)
From the reports of Le Monde, one could observe that the
Church did not want to get involved in politics but it did have
sympathy for the suffering of the Algerians. The newspaper
reported (the very day P.-H. Simon was making his stand against
torture -see Chapter 10) the statement issued by the Church
Secretariat at the congress of Cardinals and Archbishops,
expressing sympathy towards those suffering or bereaved, those
deprived or anguished but no desire to get involved in the
politics of Algeria.
The declaration restated the principles outlined in its
previous letter (of Autumn 1955) on the principles "which must
guide the judgment, and inspire conduct (in practise) of
Christians". The Priests'declaration condemned terrorism and
counter-terrorism and indicated that they had intervened with
the authorities. Their appeal called on:
"all those whose mission is to protect people and property
have the duty to respect human dignity and rigourously avoid
excesses contrary to natural law and the law of God, sanctioned
several times by the authorities. In the present crisis one and
all must remember that it is never allowed to use for the
service of cause, even a good one, means which are intrinsical-
ly bad".
This was an explicit condemnation of torture. But it was not
given the weight it deserved at the time. See Ii n'est jamais
permis de mettre au service d'une cause, même bonne, des moyens
intrinsequement mauvais, Le Monde, 16/3/57, p. 2.
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(74)
The team of Souk Ahras referred to above for instance in
Noziere,A., op. cit., p. 210.
See also Le Monde, 27/4/57, p. 4, when the Church was often
described as refusing to get involved in politics. Le Monde's
Mannoni reported that Mgr Duval had, in order to keep the peace
and not to get absorbed in political squabbles (ne pas etre lie
aincquerelles politiques), refused to give audience to the com-
mission of enquiry (see Chapter 12). In Les catholiques alger-
lens acteurs et temoins d'un drame qui les divise.
(75)
See for instance Noziere, A., op. cit., p. 198.
(76)
See Noziere, A., op. cit., p. 207.
(77)
One of the most significant episodes of the Algerian peo-
ple's involvement in the war occurred with this general strike
organised at the time when the UN was due to discuss the Alger-
ian question. The aim was to highlight the problem in the
international arena, but also to try and establish publicly
before international opinion the depth of the support for the
Algerian cause and demonstrate to the UN and the world the
legitimacy of its claim and the support of the general popula-
tion for the independence movement in Algeria.
(78)
For Le Monde, the military's decision merely caused "an
increase in tension" (15/1/57, p. 1).
(79)
It was futile (vain) to look for reasons in Le Monde's view.
Sometimes, the paper just dismissed the concern for reasons
behind the strike and declared it fruitless (vain) to determine
whether the strikers acted out of fear or conviction (31/1/57,
p. 1).
(80)
Although one of the headlines indicated that the strike was
largely followed in Algiers (less so in France) and that, "as
expected", shops were opened "by force", Le Monde presented it
as une epreuve de force not only against the French government
but also against the "Muslims" who "had refused to rally the
propaganda and the policy of the nationalist groups" (29/1/57).
(81)
For the paper, these events (mouvement) were inopportune,
"untimely" 2 days after particularly bloody "attacks" -atten-
tats- which, <<undoubtedly» for the paper, were aimed at
provoking outbursts by the European population which would then
be exploited by the UN.
In linking incidents, the general strike and the possibility
of explosions de colere aveugle before any incident occurred,
Le Monde was obviously trying to present the general strike as
a provocation likely to anger the Europeans, to make them
explode in "violent actions which then would be exploited
before the UN." (29/1/57, p. 1.)
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(82)
The strike in France was fairly widespread according to
inside page articles, but the front page asserted the opposite.
Also, the inside page contained a different title covering the
strike in France itself: it was, l'ordre de greve est assez
largement suivi dans la metropole, while the first page had
stated, moms largement suivi. See Le Monde, 29/1/57, p. 2.
The proportion of strikers in France was reported to have
been between 35 and 45%. but a close look at the figures given
could easily have told the alert reader a different story, as
the average seemed to have ranged between 46% and 81% (29/1/57,
p. 2).
The paper reported the number of departements not being
affected by the strike (23) as opposed to those affected
(29/1/57, p. 2).
The strike was reported to be occurring under duress
(30/1/57, p. 1).
Official figures (including those of the Ministry of Inter-
ior) were used to give the number of strikers. See Le Monde,
31/1/57, p. 1, 2/2/57, p. 2, 6/2/57, p. 2.
(83)
Though admitting at the same time that these cases were
rare, the paper claimed that, every now and then, there was a
ftmbyte's shop half closed, whose owner was ready to make
peace with the FLN and the Army (31/1/57).
(84)
Au troisleme jour de /a greve en Algerie:
Spontanement ou sur injonctions, des ouvriers et des
employes se rendent a leur travail. In Le Monde,
31/1/57, p. 1.
The paper was still stating that it was without spontaneity
("perhaps because they don't want to appear to be breaking the
strike or because this strike is difficult") that the workers
and shopkeepers obeyed the soldiers's requests. But all those
requisitioned, the paper conceded, did not always go to their
place of work: some of them spent the day "in the sun", some
were subjected to checks, or followed soldiers to the docks in
groups of two.
(85)
For the paper's journalist this gave an impression of nor-
malcy and reassurance in a town, which despite the absence of
the
nuees de petits cireurs qui guettent d'ordi-
naire avec vivacite les souliers ternes, had an
aspect factice sans doute, mais rassurant de ville
oU ii n'y aurait rien a signaler. See Le Monde,
31/1/57, p. 2.
(86)
The paper reported that civil servants and employees were
continuing the strike and the threat of legal sanctions, which
could go as far as sackings, seemed to have shaken the resolve
of a minority only (see sanctions below). It is unclear,
though, from this content, how the paper could conclude that
the strike was weakening.
(87)
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It reported that Massu had managed to avoid a <<penible et
fAcheux>> clash between the "Muslims" and the military (whereas
the FLN had recommended that no violence should take place in
this form of protest, and it is very unclear here what happened
to the "angry Europeans") and that he had also managed to
prevent "irresponsible Europeans from poisoning the event".
See Le Monde, 1/2/57.
(88)
Totale (sic.) le premier jour, le mouvement a
perdu des mardi soir l'aspect de quasi-unanime
protestation qu'il revétait au debut de la semaine.




It merely indicated that some of the reasons were: the
injunctions of the patrols, prison sentences for some workers,
some teachers, some civil servants, and what transpired in the
confessions (confidences) of some youths of Belcourt (1/2/57,
p. 1).
(90)
By presenting the strike in this way, the paper gave the
impression that the return to work which was taking place had
not always been spontaneous, instead of stating that it rarely
was the case. With this method the paper described the event as
an exception rather than the rule when the reality was other-
wise, as it itself admitted:
Et le nombre des grevistes demeure nettement
superieur, malgre les mesures prises, a celui des
musulmans qui se trouvent au travail.
(91)
Its description of the "tirailleurs senegalais" checking
everybody's papers and searching every one without discrimina-
tion gave an aura of fairness and impartiality which was not
there, as Europeans were hardly bothered by these checks. In Le
Monde, 1/2/57, p. 1.
(92)
No indication was given, however, as to how these views were
obtained. Nor was this statement derived logically from what
had been previously stated. The concern here seemed to be how
the events were perceived by the UN. The paper was not con-
cerned by the events themselves but whether the coercive mea-
sures would be denounced.
(93)
"And would have had a brilliant success if they had conten-
ted themselves with a 24 hour strike".
(94)
Why the paper seemed keen to put forward the authorities'
version seems quite evident if one wants to play down the
impact of the strike.
(95)
Le Monde, 3-4/2/57, p. 1.
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(96)
"That Massu found before him on Monday." Second admission of
the unanimity of the strike which means that previous reports
of that day (Monday) must be have been inaccurate.
(97)
Obstinate strikers, constrained/forced workers, satisfied
employees happy to get back to work, which of course gave the
reader the impression that there was a lack of unanimity and a
division of the population into several groups.
(98)
No mention of them being taken there by force.
(99)
Not a single jury reported on duty that day.
(100)
The reports remained confusing because they stated that the
strike was over while indicating at the same time that a number
of people were still on strike. See E.Mannoni, Le Monde,
5/2/57, p. 1.
(101)
Le Monde commented that the strike started on 28 January
and that it seemed to have finished the same day (6/2/57, p. 2)
while some of its other factual articles were still giving the
previous day's strike figures as being 50% in the trade/com-
merce, 80% in the railways and 100% (total) for the personnel
in the hotel and catering (cafés) sector of Algiers region.
(102)
An assessment of the strike was made by Le Monde according
to two sources: one official, through AFP, according to which
the strike was a defeat for the FLN, and the other by the
liberals of Algeria referring to the multiple authoritarian
measures used by the security forces. This information was
combined with other more "comical items, " like distribution of
sweets, early alarm calls as well as music and cinema sessions.
(103)
Superficially, it looked as if the paper was using two
sources to give a fair and balanced view, but this was not the
case as the contents of the two articles were not necessarily
reporting two conflicting version of the same event. See, for
instance, Le Monde, 7/2/57, p. 2.
(104)
Although it was unsure of the starting date and thought 19
January likely (as la veille , jour de priere, les musulmans
affluent dams les mosquêes, oU il est aise de diffuser les mots
d'ordre -Le Monde, 15/1/57, p. 1), Le Monde was aware that the
strike was not a decisive issue for the FLN, when it reported
that they did not seek salvation from the UN, but were only
motivated by the feeling that it would be wrong to seem indif-
ferent when "our" fate was being discussed. (1/1/57, p. 4.) It
was only later that the special envoy, Mannoni, considered
that, in the mind of the initiators, the movement was intended
to influence the UN debate which was then postponed in favour
of a discussion of the Middle East. But even then, when turning
to the specific objectives of the strikes for the FLN, the
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paper thought it less a matter of depriving the capital of
water, gas, electricity and transport than, more simply and
importantly, demonstrating the hold they had on the Muslim
population of Algeria:
leur objectif etait a la fois plus simple et
plus important: demontrer qu'ils exercent sans
conteste une influence determinante sur la popula-
tion musulmane de l'Algerie.
The paper wrote that the FLN wanted to concentrate on
Algiers but was not sure whether the nationalists would suc-
ceed, conceding (incontestable) however, that they had managed
to attract the attention of the UN:
Les observateurs etrangers ont constate cette
adhesion que les autorites attribuent & la terreur
exercees par les cellules du FLN.
In Le Monde, 30/1/57, p. 1.
(105)
The paper conceded that the "European" population was pleas-
antly surprised (the paper itself noted that fact as though it
was not expecting it) by the lack of "attentats" (Le Monde,
31/1/57, pp. 1-2). It seems somewhat surprising that the
strike, which consisted of the assertion of the right to pro-
test peacefully, to refuse to work or open up shop and accept
the loss of income incurred, and which represented one of the
few peaceful initiatives of the FLN to make a political state-
ment without using force, was not seen in a favourable light.
Even France of the 1950s was far remote from the anti-union
legislation of the Le Chapelier laws, and the right to strike
had for a long time been recognised as a basic right in any
civilised society. It seems odd, therefore, that Le Monde
should resent that political statement being made, and miss a
rare chance of recognising a non violent initiative by the FLN,
and of giving support to a peaceful form of protest against an
unjust order.
(106)
Le Monde wrote that it had learned (not indicating any
source) that there were important gatherings of "rebels" at the
border (29/1/57, p. 1).
(107)
In full knowledge that it was initiated for a week, Le Monde
described the strike as a show of strength (epreuve de force)
and made the time factor essential (une epreuve de dux-6e).
Having made the time factor look essential, the paper started
to wonder how long it would last and whether it would progress-
ively lose its "testimony" aspect. See Le Monde, 30/1/57, p.
1, 31/1/57, p. 2.
(108)
"On whose deaf ears, the calls of the army loudspeakers, in
French and Arabic, to rejoin the place of work" fell, it was
conceded in this article (sourde hier matin aux appels lances
en frangais et en arabe par les hauts-parleurs de l'armee).
In Le Monde, 30/1/57, p. 1.
(109)
Le Monde, 2/2/57, p. 2, see also above.
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(110)
Although the streets, shops and workplaces were deserted
(there were few workers about) and, despite the fact that some
workers started the strike the day before, Le Monde felt unable
to determine precisely the number of the strikers. It only
reported some defections here and there (29/1/57, p. 2).
Although it was stated that the overall activity was "arti-
ficial and precarious", and meaningful examples were cited
[where for instance buyers and sellers stayed away with only a
small group of 5 or 6 (instead of the usual 200) had gone when
"invited" by the military (30/1/57, p. 1)], the paper did not
feel sufficiently confident to give any prognosis (because it
was using AFP releases); and it expected figures to vary from
region to region, from day to day, or even hour to hour.
(Ibid.)
The journalist, Eugene Mannoni, even managed to find an
"amusing" side to the events when he saw a notice on a shop
door stating that the owner/trader had died and that "he had
his shop closed until further notice": (Une inscription rele-
vee sur une boutique: <<Moustapha Abdelkader, decèdê, ferme sa
boutique jusqu'a nouvel ordre>>), which he described as the
only funny event of the day.
(111)
The "European" population was said to be unaffected in terml
of supplies and transport as that had been remedied by the
army. The paper gave the impression that the impact of the
strike had not been very important, reminding the readers,
according to the Resident-Minister's circles, that most of the
services had been carried out especially by the soldiers who
"remembered what they had been before: workers". See Le Monde
30/1/57, p. 1. The military role in breaking the strike was
also very much played down by the paper.
(112)
First, when Le Monde reported statements like those of
Prffet Lambert declaring that the strike had been a failure
(31/1/57, p. 2), then on 2 February, the paper was already
stating that the FLN had not managed to succeed in making the
Muslims strike for eight days.
(113)
See Le Monde, 2/2/57, p. 1.
(114)
These revealed that some nineteen people appeared before
magistrates (flagrants delits) for the offence of stealing
goods from shops. Some of these people were well-to-do, and one
even owned a hotel in the town centre. But their case was
adjourned to the next day (Le Monde, 31/1/57, p. 2) when the
number fell unexplicably to only six people on trial: a woman
who was discharged, and the remaining people who were convicted
of theft and receiving stolen property (vol et recel) and
sentenced to between 10,000 fr to a fortnight in jail. Le
Monde, 1/2/57, p. 1 (about a dozen lines).
Later, Le Monde also reported that one "recidivist" (he
must have done it at least twice to deserve the label, perhaps
warned but did it again), Fiorelli Nicoles, received a 10-day
prison sentence; 5 people received suspended sentences with
fines of between 10 and 50,000 fr;, a woman shopkeeper, 2
months suspended and 50,000 fr fine, and two more people were
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acquitted. [Des pillards condamnes a Alger. Le Monde, 3-4/2/57,
p. 3.]
(115)
The journalist reporting stated that he was impressed by the
correct attitude of the Europeans before the spectacle of
opened shops exhibiting all their goods to the passers-by.
Rien n'est plus impressionnant dans cette ville
frappee de torpeur que la vision de boutiques ou-
vertes de force et abandonnees au bon plaisir des
passants.
Ici les tissus multicolores s'entassent. Ail-
leurs des boites de conserves, des sacs de pois
chiches, des corbeilles d'osier remplies de semoule
sont delaissees...
Mannoni knew that the nationalists had given orders not to
loot and that an official notice had warned that there would be
no protection of merchandise from looting. When he reported
that some looting had taken place, he implied that it was done
by Algerian since he had stated that the attitude of Europeans
"had been exceptionally correct".
(116)
Quite the reverse, Le Monde included a comment in favour of
the "Europeans" tried for looting. The paper published an
ewadre with the title Nuances ( middle pages) outlining the
distribution in Algiers of a leaflet of protest against a
"denial of (deni de) justice" from an underground group (one of
many), objecting to the fact that:
On a, est-il precise, traine sur le banc de
l'infamie des Francais dont le seul crime est de
s'étre ravitaille dans leur magasin habituel ferme
ce jour-la dans un but de provocation antifrancaise.
Ce qui ne justifie evidemment aucune poursuite
judiciaire....
(117)
The exceptional measures of surveillance and control (5,000
people were checked in Sidi Bel Abes and more in other areas),
the road blocks were seen as a necessity.
(118)
Le Monde, 29/1/57, p. 2.
In the same way, Le Monde stated that General Massu "had to
forcibly open the shops only on the first day (there was no
need to do so the second day if the doors had been pulled down)
and send (deleguer) the soldiers to the strikers since Monday"
(1/2/57, p. 1).
Stating that no incident against the "Europeans" had taken
place, Le Monde was not sure whether it was because of the FLN
instructions or whether it was due to army efforts which
through exceptional surveillance measures had managed to pre-
vent such actions.
(119)
Le Monde, 3-4/2/57, p. 1.
(120)
To diminish the impact of the measures, Le Monde reported
that "Muslims" had been warned by cars driving around the city
with loudhailers that shops would be opened. It did also point
523
out that "Europeans and Israelites" did not participate in the
strike.
(121)
Read chisels and hammers, shutters being pulled torn by army
trucks etc.. see below.
(122)
Horne, A., op. cit., pp. 191-193.
(123)
Le Monde used expressions such as fonctionnaires ont êtê
l'objet de requisitions, and stated that loudhailers and pa-
trols were "inviting people to go to work" (garages, worksites
and docks). In Le Monde, 30/1/57, p. 1.
It conjured up images of soldiers making efforts to persuade
strikers by knocking on doors, inviting people to go to work or
hnme their home and driving them there (31/1/57, p. 2).
The communiqué of Massu was said to have "requested" people
not to join the movement. "Leaflets inciting people to go to
work" were also reported as having been distributed. See Le
Monde, 29/1/57, P. 2.
(124)
Horne, A., op. cit., pp. 191-193.
(125)
Le Monde, 30/1/57, p. 1.
(126)
In the appeals to the UN and to French public opinion, like
that of the Liberals Federation, which offered a more realistic
picture. In Le Monde, 30/1/57, p. 2.
(127)
When it pointed out that more than the distribution of
sweets to the kids of the Casbah, the arrest of one or two
European looters (trouble makers), "demonstrated" the desire of
the authorities to restore détente.
(128)
Le Monde offered advice to the authorities when it wrote
that nothing could be gained if the shops remained abandoned by
their owners or if force was the only means used to reopen
them. This is why, the paper added, after the show of strength
by the army, General Massu was trying to "re-establish confi-
dence, without which it would be in vain to believe in the
success of an enterprise that the world observes". Ibid.
(129)
Le Monde 30/1/57, p. 1.
Two days later, Mannoni confirmed the impression that no
violence had been used and that people were even ready to obey
the "injunctions" of the Army and had even prepared themselves
(washed and shaved ) before they were taken by lorries. Le
Monde wrote that these scenes would be repeated until Satur-
day, the last day of the strike. Le Monde, 1/2/57, p. 1.
(130)
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These were known mainly through admissions, like those of
the Prefet Lambert, who admitted that he personally ordered the
forced opening of the shops against the wishes of their owners
and the arrest of a number of civil servants "because they had
no reason to go on strike since they owed their jobs to
France". It was also clear to Le Monde, through the press
releases published (AFP stating that 125 shopkeepers or employ-
ees, a number of whom described as FLN local leaders, had been
arrested), that the sanctions went far beyond M.Lambert's
statements. See Le Monde, 31/1/57, p. 2.
On 1 February, the injunctions and prison sentences against
some teachers, railwaymen and civil servants (1/2/57, p. 1),
them 53 civil servants were reported (AFP press release) as
appearing before the courts for refusing to obey requisition
orders in Algiers, and five in Medea. See Le Monde, 2/2/57, p.
2.
Le Monde then gave details of sanctions which now were said
to be administrative and legal (administratives et judiciaires)
affecting 13 tramway workers and hospital employees. Five were
sentenced to betweem 15 days to 2 months in prison, one fined
20,000 Fr and 7 others had their cases adjourned. Seven hospi-
tal employees were arrested in Oran, taxi and driving licences
were withdrawn from 34 taxi drivers and six shopkeepers were
sentenced to between 3 and 6 months' jail and fines of over
100,000 Fr. In Le Monde, 3-4/2/57, p. 3. One can see clearly
the discrepancy of sanctions between strikers and the looters
(above).
(131)
Le Monde reported, however, that trade unions had author-
ised the bosses to sack strikers, but to soften the blow,
pointed out that several would not resort to that measure in
order not "to poison the situation" and that unless calls for
strike were renewed, things should be back to normal the next
day. E. Mannoni, in Le Monde, 5/2/57, p. 1.
Then the paper reported that the strike should be over that
day but informed its readers that, paradoxically, the sanctions
taken against the strikers were slowing down the return to
work, stating now that the number of sanctions was important
but that some workers had been warned by letter.
(132)
It further reported that shops were closed by decision of
the administration for up to a month and extremely rigourous
measures had been taken against some strikers. At the Hospital,
240 staff were suspended, 64 sacked, 30 moved and 63 taken to
court. Not to mention the fact that the conditions to which the
Algerians were subjected were to be even tougher as police
powers were being devolved (7 January 1957) to General Massu,
who was reported as intending to destroy the FLN cells. Le
Monde, 6/2/57, p. 2.
The picture was as harsh for the strikers on the other side
of the Mediterranean. Le Monde reported that a plant in Moselle
had sacked all its workers striking for the last four days,
stating that they came to see the bosses after receiving a
letter, but in vain. In Une usine de la Moselle licencie tous
ses grêvistes, the paper stated that 160 workers of the Sociêtê
mirdere Terres Rouges, still on strike during the last four
days, came to see their bosses after they had received their
notice, but in vain. Le Monde, 6/2/57, p. 2.
Most of the harsh measures taken against Algerian strikers
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were fully implemented and those sentenced remained in prison,
despite appeals made in their favour. In Amnistie pour les
grevistes du 2 janvier, Le Monde, 12-13/5/57, p. 3.
Some of the shopkeepers were made to sign and put up posters
indicating that they had acted under pressure and had been
forced (Le Monde used amenes) to go on strike by the FLN. Le
Monde, 10-11/2/57, p. 3.
(133)
This was an unfair coverage compared to that of the Spanish
strike (predominant in the transport sector reported in a very
different way by J.Grignon-Dumoulin).
In the Spanish case, the movement was described as spontan-
eous, despite various references to a multitude of groups cam-
paigning. The nationalist strike in Algeria and France by
contrast was seen as being ordered, and the strikers were seen
as pressurised, under threat, willing to open but scared of the
FLN. The paper seemed more in sympathy with the strikers in
Spain. The parameters that made the strike so significant were
reported to be the refusal by the Catalans, who were following
instructions, to go to the theatre and to renounce their <God-
football>.
The fact that a whole community shut down every shop did not
seem to be significant. The movement in Spain was described as
unanimous. The contrasts are stark.
The paper stated that it was not a general strike in both
the Spanish and Algerian cases, that there was popular non
participation in the strike in both (from the start) Spain and
(later) Algeria. In the latter case it was because they wanted
to, because they obeyed the injunctions of the army and because
of "lassitude." In the Spanish case more sympathetic reasons
were given: Mais l'appel par certains & la greve generale n'a
manifestement pas ete entendu des milieux ouvriers et cela pour
plusieurs raisons... manque de reserves, rigueurs de l'hiver,
crainte d'utilisation d'un decret (allowing dismissal of work-
ers which would break any attempt of general strike)... . Not
so in the Algeria despite the same factors and even more severe
repression.
This could be illustrated further when the paper went into
the political and economic ramifications of the strike. In
the Algerian case it was conceived as a threat and as provoca-
tion to provoke some of the irate Europeans to do something
that could be "exploited against France before the UN." The
Spanish strike was motivated, according to the paper, by social
and political demands. When the motives of the Algerian strike
were reported in quotes from "FLN sources," these were analysed
as provocations and a test of strength (30/1/57, p. 4).
When noting the end of the boycott of the transport system
in Spain (Apres la fin du boycottage des transports, un calme
comp/et est revenu a Madrid), the journalist stated that tube,
trams and buses seemed bulging in the rush hour but, from the
few controllers that he spoke to, he did not seem convinced
that everything was normal. In the Algerian case, things were
reported as normal virtually from the start of the strike.
Dumoulin found it difficult to give an idea of the success
of the movement but stated that the strike was nearly total in
Barcelona, if not in Madrid. There were nuances in the Spanish
case, but not in the Algerian one. In the Spanish case, the
journalist did not rush into making a judgment and thought it
better to wait to know what would happen in the future.
See Le Monde, 12/2/57, p. 2.
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(134)
It was nearly a fortnight later that the paper published an
article on the disapproval expressed by some of its readers of
European origin of some of the excesses committed during the
general strike. In Des temoins europeens desapprouvent les abus
commis pendant la greve generale, Le Monde, 21/2/57, p. 4.
The paper stated that it had received several letters
"during the last weeks" from European residents in various
t(AMS of Algeria, who had witnessed la greve generale ordonnee
par le FLN, et des mesures decidees par les autorites pour la
Miser, puis pour la sanctionner.
(135)
Admitting self self-censorship rather than a lack of aware-
mss, the paper stated that a sense of national discipline had
prevented it from making the facts known while the UN debate
was taking place.
Un sentiment de discipline nationale nous a
amenes a ne pas faire etat pendant le debat aux
Nations-unies de faits qui aurait pu servir la
propagande de nos adversaires. Cette discretion,
aujourd'hui, ne s'impose pas, et il nous parait im-
possible de continuer a garder le silence sur des
recits de temoins dont nous avons pu contrOler
l'identite, me-me lorsque pour des raisons de pru-
dence elementaire us nous ont demande de ne pas la
reveler. Alors que dans tous les discours off iciels
ii n'est question que de cooperation franco-musul-
mane, les abus rapportes nous eloignent A coup sár
du but recherché.
(136)
The paper stated that, from what was recounted to it, scenes
de pillage followed ouverture de force des magasins musulmans,
which had remained closed, with the Army and the police not
intervening to protect the property of those striking, or at
least during the first days, as in B6ne, where shops,
êventres ... par ... soldats et policiers armes de pioches et
de Owes carriers, ended up being ransacked and with every
item being taken away:
En quelques heures, produits alimentaires,
cigarettes, montres, bijoux, postes de radio, velos
et même ... scooters ont disparu.
The owners were said to have very often watched without a
iove (blémes de rage). One shopkeeper, who had remained closed,
was victim of pillage; another opened his shop which had the
same fate.
In Oran a report was said to have even pointed the finger at
the territorials who, themselves, incited passers by to take
part in looting. And in Algiers, Relizane, "rideaux de fer
arraches par half tracks" and "vitrines brisees" were reported
as conmon occurrences.
Most of the people were said not to have wanted to be asso-
ciated with the pillage, and some were said to have even asked
the army to intervene without success. A professor was accused
WE being a fellagha when he defended a Muslim's shop.
Other letters were said to report sanctions, brimades,
trials, fines and prison sentences. Hundreds were held in Oran
for two days with a bit of bread and a sardine to eat; stri-
kes, including teachers, were forced to sweep the streets and
to replace dock workers.
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Ce n'est pas par ces mesures humiliantes
qui atteignent les elements les plus conscients et
les plus valables de la population musulmane que
l l on arrivera a concilier les deux communautes
algeriennes.
Other people, who wrote to the paper, were said by Le Monde
to have drawn a parallel between this strike and that decided
for 6 February 1956, which greeted the arrival of Guy Mollet
in Algeria, and to have remarked that no sanctions were taken
against the strikers then. The paper was asked whether this was
egalite complete de tous les Algeriens dont la
France faisait êtat dernierement a la tribune des
Nations unies
In Le Monde, 21/2/57, p. 4.
(137)
The subsequent report of these repressive measures further
illustrates the humanist side and the concern for the severity
of sanctions, which, earlier, did not carry much weight, as,
according to the paper, reporting them would have resulted in
damaging the national interest of France in the UN.
Other strike movements took place but Le Monde's coverage
did not improve with time. See Le Monde, 6/7/57, p. 5.
(138)
This dichotomy European/North African and European/Muslim
served to mask another distinction: French/Algerian in the
minds of the readers between the status of the two communities.
The use of the vague concept of North African, or that of the
religious label, denied any national legitimacy in the written
word of Le Monde and that of the press of the time.
(139)
Many of the rights and economic and social conditions did
not apply to them in the same way as did their duties. Le Monde
also widely used this term, which in fact was a misnomer.
This is confirmed by the fact that Le Monde, echoing a
report by Jean-Jacques Roger of the Governor General's office,
estimated the number to be near 300,000 at the end of 1956
compared to only 16,000 Moroccans and 3,000 Tunisians. On
average this constituted one in seven adults in Algeria. See
Un adulte musulman sur sept travaille dans la metropole, Le
Monde, 25/12/56, p. 4. In this article the paper discussed a
new study (Rapport documentaire) of Algerian immigration in
France by Jean-jacques Roger, a civil servant in the Governor
General's office.
(140)
Poor conditions and increased pauperization throughgout led
to that immigration. A number of Algerians were called up to
fight in the two World Wars, in particular, and French wars in
general. Some of them remained in France afterwards. A number
of Algerians were also encouraged to replace Frenchmen in the
factories during the wars. The major economic development on
which France embarked after the Second World War required an
important supply of cheap labour, which the deteriorating
economic conditions in Algeria helped provide for mainland
France. The life of immigrants in general, and of Algerians in
particlar, in France was characterised by poor housing and low
wages. One could add to these problems the alien culture and
language, poor education as well as the lack of family life.
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(141)
Higher wages and the social security system were also put
forward. See Le Monde, 25/12/56.
More importantly, Algerians in Algeria lived off the pro-
ducts of immigration. Le Monde itself admitted that about a
quarter of the "Algerian Muslims" lived off the wages sent by
immigrants from France. The paper had even pointed out that in
certain areas, the funds sent/sums transferred to Algeria,
which in total were estimated between 11 to 13 billion fr in
1950, increasing to 37 billion fr in 1955, were the only source
of family income. See Le Monde, 25/12/56, p. 4.
At other times, the endemic unemployment and sometimes the
urge to seek a peaceful atmosphere which had disappeared from
Algeria, were given as causes for departure to France. See Le
Monde, 24/5/57, p. 3.
(142)
When some merchants established themselves and were followed
by steel workers, then by the contingent of war veterans after
1914, "seduced by the resources of France". The Liberation and
the trafficking which went on after the War were added as
reasons for the increase in numbers. See Le Monde, 21/6/57, p.
7.
The paper reported that the average stay for those immi-
grants was about two to four years, and rarely exceeded five
years. This article reviewed the geographical origin and the
distribution by employment sector of this work force.
(25/12/56)
Six months later, the paper noted the lower proportion of
landworkers and gave areas of origin, distribution and settle-
ment of those arriving. In Les travailleurs algeriens repren-
nent le chemin de la metropole, Le Monde, 24/5/57, p. 3.
(143)
The general pattern used to report immigrant affairs was
clearly illustrated when the paper reported on the Paris com-
munity. Occasionally, the paper thought it opportune to examine
the state of mind of the immigrants of the Goutte d'Or, nick-
named "The Medina of Paris", one of the areas where the immi-
grant community was highly concentrated. See Le Monde, 21/6/57,
p. 7.
(144)
The paper remarked, though, that not all the North Africans
lived in the Goutte d'Or but that they were spread "in douars",
over Argenteuil, Boulogne, Grenelle, St Severin, with most of
them settled around a square formed by the rues Barbes (chef-
lieu) with 6,000 residents and 25,000 on Sunday, when the area
became a market, a meeting place where "bloody taxations" took
place, a real town in the town with all the looks of a state
within the state. In Le Monde, 21/6/57, p. 7.
Describing the living conditions of the Muslims in Paris, Le
Monde estimated that 500 lived in houses or apartments (loge-
ments), others lived in groups of four and five in a hotel room
for 3,000 fr a month in about a hundred hotels, two-thirds 2/3
of which belonged to other Muslims.
They were said to have instinctively grouped themselves by
region of origin, affinity or race. Those who had been estab-
lished for a long time, the paper wrote, had a way of life in
workshops and in the factories comparable to their European
comrades. Some had brought their wifes, others married Eur-
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opeans, 300 to 400 women were said to have some sort of house-
hold life (qui ménent clans le quartier une maniére de ménage).
The journalist, Bertrand Poirot-Delpech, wrote that there
were no signs of misery in the Goutte d'or and stated that 90%
of them had more or less fixed jobs. In Le Monde, 21/6/57, p.
7.
(145)
Although the description generalised above applied to some,
it no doubt excluded many as in fact they were left to take the
poorest housing. Sometimes not being able to afford the rent,
they resorted to living in insalubrious buildings which were
often destroyed without alternative housing being made avail-
able to them. Le Monde had given the news of the destruction by
bulldozers of a building in the Montparnasse area of Paris
where the Algerians had sought shelter from the cold (7/1/55).
On this occasion, the paper wrote that the search for causes
of unemployment and the lack of housing should be looked into
but, because of the relative low priority given to this item of
news, the last edition of the day squeezed that piece of infor-
mation out of the newspaper altogether.
(146)
Even if they were said to be similar in income and not
living miserably, for the journalist, there were no signs of
life resembling that of the Europeans. At times of rest,
streets and pavements were said to be animated with concilia-
bules and trafic indiscernable (the German Occupation and the
Liberation, which increased the trafficking, were said, though,
not to have created any special worry then -implying that there
was one now), with packets of <kif> circulating. As if these
derogatory images were not enough, a touch of the exotic was
combined with unconscious criminality to describe them. "Trou-
sers or coat in hand, a vendor who ignores the meaning of
handling stolen property (recel) satisfies his passion for slow
bargaining." In Le Monde, 21/6/57, p. 7.
The paper wrote that in the cafés the smell of mint and the
melancholy aigrelette evoked the country of birth for "diners
happy to have a meal for 100 Fr and for fanatics of dominos
playing despite the prohibition of the game by the nationalists
(who were said to have banned games and betting as well as
alcohol). This implied that the immigrants were ignoring the
nationalists' "orders".
(147)
Moreover, the three hundred prostitutes (most of them, Eur-
opean), who offered their services for less than 500 francs,
were said to be protected by North Africans.
The fact that they stayed indoors, in places reserved for
them to "prevent huge gatherings" in the streets, in clear
violation (entorse) of the law of 1946, was said to represent
very little compared to the repliement sur eux which "had to be
tolerated in other fields". See Le Monde, 21/6/57, p. 7.
(148)
Algerian immigrants were described as sheltering behind a
language that almost no European understands, drawn towards
each other (pousses les uns vers les autres par le desaroi de
l'exil), standing with their backs against the wall, or invad-
ing the streets. The paper commented that they did not need
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nationalist propaganda to discover nationalist aspirations that
"nobody around them will ever share". In Le Monde, 21/6/57, p.
7.
There was already an idea of "them and us" and that a civil-
ised French way of life could not take place. The paper com-
mented: "How can the rule of French law impose itself where our
language, our customs and the French themselves have lost right
of abode"?
(149)
See Le Monde, 21/6/57, p. 7, Heures chaudes dans la Medina
de Paris. I. Une ville dans la ville by Bertrand Poirot-Del-
pedh.
(150)
The increase of their number was perceived as a worrying
aspect, especially at night and at the weekends when the popu-
lation of the area was multiplied by 4 or 5, as people from the
suburbs descended on the place and when others used it as a
stopover, "to see the cousin, to do their shopping, buy commo-
dities, get news or simply go to the Arab cinema".
(151)
The reports conveyed the idea that "North Africans" were
taking over everything. Le Monde wrote that, although there
were 45,000 Parisians (de souche) as opposed to 6,000 North
African in the area, the former had seen their rights eroded,
and restrained progressively.
For the paper the square formed by the streets of Doudeau-
%Tulle and Max Dormoy and the Boulevards Barbes and La Chapelle
belonged as much to the Muslims as the Casbah of Algiers and
would "solely be inhabited" by them if the housing crisis "had
not forced the Europeans to put up (supporter) with the Mus-
lims and with "a cohabitation that frightens them". Every time
they can, the paper stated, the Europeans flee to other areas
with shopkeepers more inclined to sell their shops as the
population of origin "was getting weary" (clientelle d'autre-
fois se lasse).
More than 100 cafés were reported as having been sold in the
last year to North Africans, 30 grocery shops, tens of hair
salons, several butcheries, and a bakery, not to mention
clothes shops (confection). See Le Monde, 21/6/57, p. 7.
(152)
The Messalist organisation with its changing names and
fortunes, from ENA and PPA to MTLD and MNA (see Chapters 3 and
5), had had a stronghold on the immigrants there since the
emergence of the movement in the early 1920's. But since 1954
the FLN, which created the Federation de France du FLN as a
seventh Military region to carry on the struggle, was gaining
grounds and slowly displacing the Messalist organisation. These
nationalists were said to travel from area to area, to have
cars, to be well organised and well equipped with arms. See Le
Monde, 20/3/57, p. 4.
There were struggles of influence between the two organisa-
tions over the observance of Islamic rule , obedience to one or




The activities of the nationalists took place in various
regions in France where the Algerian community was established,
but they also affected the Algerian community living in Belgi-
um. See, for instance, Le Monde, 23-24/6/57, p. 6, 7/8/57, p.
1.
(154)
For the paper the 30 months of fighting in Algeria was
echoed on the other side of the Mediterranean, where the propa-
ganda campaign was followed by reglements de comptes.
The "terrorist activities" in France did not take the form
of attacks on French civilians (reports of deliberate attacks
on civilians, such as trois Europeens ont 6t6 fortuitement at-
-t(ints par balles -see Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 4- were very rare)
but on members of the police force (policemen and inspectors).
Despite that, the paper commented that some have attributed
(a ete pi-6 .W to the HQ of the rebellion the temptation of
talking of "mainland terrorism".
Given the disproportion in numbers, Le Monde could only see
their activities being carried out in "suicide operations",
which were made easy by the concentration of North Africans in
the capital but which would result in "repression which could
largely be exploited before world opinion". See Le Monde,
21/6/57, p. 7.
(155)
Le Monde also gave regular information about the victims of
the attacks (see Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 4, 21-22/4/57, p. 2, for
instance), providing sometimes graphs to help the reader obtain
abetter picture.
From January 1956 to February 1957, for instance, it found
that there was a "worrying increase". There were as many dead
in two and half months as there had been in the previous
twelve, with an ephemeral decrease, which it stated, "according
to some" (certains attribuent), was due to the "disarray"
(desarroi) caused by the capture of the five FLN leaders. See
Depuis le premier janvier 1957 dans la metropole 436 musulmans
ont ete blesses par des co-religionnaires adversaires politi-
ques, in Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 4.
(156)
And members of the police force.
(157)
On this occasion Le Monde did not see these attacks, and
thought it would be erroneous to perceive them as reglements de
comptes. See Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 4.
(158)
It carried on treating them and headlining them as such: Des
reglements de comptes entre Nord Africains. See Le Monde,
13/3/57, p. 2 (also describing them as killers and racketeers),
9/4/57, p. 4, 17/4/57, p. 4, 23/4/57, p. 2, 15/5/57, p. 4
(implying they were acting as gangsters), 24/5/57, p. 3, 9-
10/6/57, p. 3, 13/6/57, p. 2, 7/8/57, p. 1 -(desribing them as






Since very often licencees of the premises where the attacks
took place did not call the police and searches of the "assai-
lants"'s premises did not reveal anything.
(161)
The reasons given here must be doubted, when the attacks
continued after the fast and the victims were still unwilling
to help provide them. See Le Monde 18/5/55. On this occasion




Only in March 1957 Le Monde had explained that the deaths
and injuries of Algerians in France were due to the two rival
political organisations fighting one another without mercy (qui
se livrent une lutte sans merci) [ the paper also gave 16-
17/10/56 as a further reference]. The number of assaults was
enough for Le Monde to indicate the vigour of the Messalist
movement (que le FLN a, sans conteste, supplante en Algerie)
in mainland France.
In Depuis le premier janvier 1957 dans la metropole 436
imismlmans ont ete blesses et 63 tues par des co-religionnaires
adversaires politiques, Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 4.
(164)
Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 4.
It is a little surprising to see such reasons put forward
without explanation as to how the information was obtained
-because, as stated previously, the Algerians did not involve
the French authorities in what was going on and hardly com-
plained to the police. The paper would have had no idea unless
it had been able to ask the dead.
(165)
Most of the Algerians in France were peaceful and no more
involved in crime than any other section of the population. It
is probable that, in some cases, deprivation might have led to
theft or similar crime to satisfy the survival needs of indi-
viduals. But mostly, the Algerians were not particularly noted
for any criminal activities except for attacks (for political
reasons) on members of their own community (on each other),
and the police.
(166)
Le Monde reported (giving, for instance, the official ver-
sion from the Prefet's Bulletin municipal) that surveillance
measures had been decided and undertaken, giving the readers
the feeling that the community was made up of criminals with
its members at the throat of one another with the police watch-
ing over them, trying to contain the troubles, and MPs asking
questions about these killers and racketeers. See La surveil-
lance des Nord-Africains dans la region parisienne, Le Monde
13/3/57, p. 2.
(167)
Though accepting that most of it remained unseen since with
the closure of Charbonnerie Market in 1955, the immigrants were
said to be less and less likely to solve their conflicts in the
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streets. See Le Monde, 22/6/57, p. 6.
(168)
It seemed to the paper that a great number of Algerians
wanted independence and that even older immigrants felt be-
trayed, humiliated and did not hide it to the few Europeans
with whom they kept links. After the independence of Morocco
and Tunisia, they were described as obsessed with <istiglal>
(independence in Arabic) which, in their mind, by "some sort
of magical powers", would improve their fate.
B.Poirot-Delpech wrote that because this fight was for
independence and because it was being conducted in their name,
as a cousin or a brother was involved and as these immigrants
contributed willingly or not, they were said to see it as
being theirs. Some sympathy for the rebel cause was said to
have been shown by the most francophile of them.
The fighting (still called reglements de comptes) was said
to prove the opposition of some of them to the contributions
imposed, if not to the ideal for which they were taxed.
They were said to have no sympathy for the present French
policy and a general feeling of living in the margins, under
the influence of news and rumours (true or false) which were a
source for passion and nationalist fervour. See Le Monde,
22/6/57, p. 6.
(169)
The MNA-FLN rivalry was thought to dominate everything as
the MNA, which used to control everything, was now being ri-
valled by the FLN who wanted to play an equal role. Le Monde
(BPD) thought it probable that, at that time, a show of force
by the FLN would certainly be successful, like the MNA's before
because of "the terror that a minority can cause in the circum-
stances." See Le Monde, 22/6/57, p. 6.
(170)
The journalist wrote that a handful of collectors came at
regular intervals and used two methods of collection: one
directly from the workers, the other from their landlords.
Contributions were put at about 2,000 Fr to each organisation.
This, he thought, made a big dent in the budget of a "man-
oeuvre". Shopkeepers were said to be asked to contribute more,
between 30,000 and 40,000 fr, depending on turnover. The me-
thods were said to be the same for both organisations, starting
with a warning, escalating to beatings and ending with the use
of bullet rounds. Le Monde, 22/6/57, p. 6.
The traders were said to be grateful to French policemen for
their protection, yet to ask them at the same time not to speak
to them in public. Ibid.
Despite these categorical statements, the paper was willing
to concede that threats on their own were not enough to explain
the worrying evolution noticed lately in the whole of the
population. The atmosphere had never been as tense, wrote
B.Poirot-Delpech, and people kept quiet when Europeans went
past, while their looks became arrogant. Ibid.
(171)
The action of the "rebels" was said to be trying, through
these "repeated attacks" (attentats), to provoke the repression
of the armed forces which would then be used in international
propaganda by the nationalists. See Heures chaudes dans la
mêdina de Paris. II. De grê ou de force tous les Algóriens
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"contribuent" a la "lutte pour l'independance" by B. Poirot-
Delpech , in Le Monde 22/6/57, p. 6.
(172)
See Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 4.
(173)
See Les reqlements de comptes entre Nord Africains se multi-
plient en province in Le Monde, 17/4/57, p. 4.
(174)




They were invariably said to be collecting the money for a
"rebel" organisation. See for instance Le Monde, 27/5/55.
(177)
See Le Monde, 22/1/57, p. 4, 13/8/57, p. 7.
(178)
See Le Monde, 17/1/57, p. 6.
(179)
Vaste operation de contrOle dans le quartier de la Goutte
d'Or a Paris. 23 Algeriens arretes, armes and tracts saisis, in
Le Monde, 21-22/4/57, p. 1.
(180)
See Le Monde, 23/4/57, p. 2, 13/8/57, p. 7.
(181)
News of arrests of Algerians in Belgium were also reported
by the paper. See Le Monde, 23-24/6/57, p. 6.
(182)
Several hundreds, if not thousands, of people were stopped
and searched merely because of their appearance. Their hotels
were invaded by the security forces and searched at the most
awkward times. These operations led to a small number of
people being actually taken to the police station, but an even
smaller number of arrests being maintained because of lack of
evidence.
Similarly to operations inside Algeria, Le Monde did not
make a case against the extreme form of harassment to which the
Algerians were subjected in France.
The activities of the police forces in France usually in-
volved an inordinate number of checks where thousands of people
could be woken up at night and their premises searched, their
cafés closed down, and other similar indiscriminate repressive
measures used against them.
Algerians were also stopped and searched in the streets in
their hundreds and their thousands, although the number of
people thought to be warranting arrest was relatively small.
One can clearly see that the number of people affected (thou-
sands) by these checks was considerable in relation to the
number of those arrested (sometimes less than a dozen). See Le
Monde, 8/2/57, p. 2, 23/4/57., p. 2, 27/4/57, p. 5, 30/4/57, p.
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4, 20/6/57, p. 6.
(183)
This was not the case when the European community in Algeria
(examined earlier when reporting the settlers' views) seemed to
be threatened. The paper, in this case, went to great lengths
to express their fears and worries, prompting the authorities
to be concerned and to take action.
When it reported arrests and control measures it did so only
with small title and in a very few lines.
See, for example, A la suite d'une agression" more than 500
"North Africans" were checked (interpelês), 60 of them taken to
police stations for further examination of their situation, and
17 landlords were "done" for not registering their lodgers. In
Le Monde, 17/1/57, p. 6.
(184)
Twenty-six other cafés were reported as having been closed
down (after the 26 closed on 24 June), the owners of which were
accused of having allowed their establishments to have been
used for propaganda and anti-colonial activities.
On that occasion, Le Monde stated that enquiries showed that
they had been used as such and revealed that about 1,500 cafés
were owned by "North Africans", 700 of which were in Paris. See
Le Monde, 12/7/57, p. 4. The publication of that communiqué,
though informative of sanctions taken by the security forces,
could not but be seen as a warning to others if they were
tempted to allow their establishments be used for "propaganda"
and "anti-colonial" actions.
The measures taken in the Place Maubert in Paris, for in-
stance, following the assassination of Chekkal at the end of
May 1957, provide a good illustration of the case. See Aprés
l'assassinat de M.Chekkal Vaste operation de police autour de
la place Maubert. Treize suspects retenus (30/5/57, p. 2).
The vast police operations concerned 30 commissaires and
involved extensive searches of 60 hotels, stop and search
activities, and resulted in 1,300 North Africans being checked
(interpeles) and 80 taken to the centre of Goujon for the
"habitual verifications".
500 were apprehended in Lille, although they might have had
nothing to do with the incident.
(185)
The meetings of their unions were banned and the workers
themselves dispersed by force as soon as they gathered. In
Paris, the police arrested 246 people for having resisted their
attempt to disperse them, holding 4 of them. Le Monde, ( 3/5/57,
p. 4). Outside Paris, the figures were much higher: it was 250
in Lyon, 500 in Lille where no transport ran on that day, 2000
in Roubaix. Le Monde, 3/5/57, p. 4. This was only the subject
of factual reports of the paper, sometimes with the most mis-
leading descriptions. Despite reporting those events of Paris,
the tone of the article was that this was a peaceful May Day.
Le ler Mai a pris l'aspect d'un paisible dimanche printanier
(...) calme absolu (...).
(186)
It is significant that Gilbert-Jules, Interior Minister,
was seen as having shared public anxiety about increasing
criminality/crime and justified in taking new measures to deal
with it, as the measures that had been taken hitherto were
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thought to have been insufficient.
The four kinds of measures were aimed at intensifying pre-
ventive initiatives, giving priority to information gathering
for the whole of police services, reinforcing services dealing
with repression of banditism in the most sensitive centres
(giving centres affected), and developing the means of identi-
fying the weapons used in attacks (establishing a central
filegichier).
It is clear that, although the measures were thought to be
efficient against general crime and hold-ups, they were intro-
duced mainly to deal with political crimes (A caractere politi-
que).
(...) ii n'est pas douteux que les tragiques
reglements de compte qui se deroulent dans les
milieux nord africains de la metropole ont decide
le ministre a edicter ces importantes instructions.
On ne saurait flier en effet, que ces agressions
sent infiniment plus nombreuses que les divers actes
criminels vises par les instructions du ministre de
la defense.
Pour lutter contre is criminalite de caractere
politique, Le Ministre de l'Interieur a pris une
serie d'importantes mesures. (Le Monde 21-22/4/57,
p. 2).
For Le Monde these measures were not exclusively directed
against the Algerians, but against other extremist groups
(UDCA, PC, hold-ups, attacks of tax collectors, and the like),
though it seems to have hardly been the case.
The measures used were also described as not having been
without efficacy. In the Goutte d'or area alone, Le Monde
stated that 4 killers had been arrested as well as "money col-
lectors who, no doubt, had no less than 15 reglements de compte
under their belt" (& leur actif).
House and personal searches were said to hamper the leaders,
and the carrying of arms. The silence, "connivence if not
complicity of the masses", were said to have been such that the
action undertaken could not be relaxed (se relacher) for one
moment (22/6/57, p. 6).
Sometimes, it was claimed that the police, despite reinfor-
cements and reorganisation, was not having much success in view
of their mediocre results (20/3/57, p. 4) and that more men
were needed.
Preventive measures (essentially surveillance) were said to
be notoriously inefficient and the paper stated that it was
about time that people in charge of the safety of citizens
(Muslims or otherwise) and of maintaining order fully under-
stood the gravity of the situation. See Les reglements de
comptes entre Nord Africains se multiplient en province, in Le
Monde, 17/4/57, p. 4.
(187)
The measures were described as instructions given by the
official authorities, Gilbert Jules, Minister of the Interior,
to put a stop to "political crimes" and to the settlement of
accounts (reglements de comptes), racketeering. See Vaste
operation de contreile dans le quartier de is Goutte d'Or A
Paris. 23 Algeriens arretes, armes and tracts saisis, Le
Monde, 21-22/4/57, p. 1.
Nationalist activities seem inevitably to have been followed
by vast measures of repression, added to the special powers
used (1/8/57, p. 4).
537
(188)
Le Monde highlighted the fact that the police thought that
the sentences were too lenient. February 1957 saw 75 sentences
for a month in prison and "only two sentences for over two
years". See Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 4.
(189)
Very occasionally, the paper judged the increased number of
searches as having exasperated some, without reassuring the
others. See Le Monde, 22/6/57, p. 6. The rare protests occa-
sionally heard in the National Assembly were echoed by the
paper.
The indignant protest of M.Dronne (Social Republican, Le
Mans) in a Parliamentary question to the Interior Minister was
echoed by the paper (8/2/57, p. 2). But the paper did not see
itself either as an exponent of the immigrants' aspirations nor
as the champion of their cause. It did not see fit to air views
condemning the treatement to which this community was being
subjected.
(190)
It was only in May 1957, fourteen months after their imposi-
tion (22 March 1956), that restrictions on the return of
immigrants to Algeria were mentioned. Le Monde stated that this
measure had been taken to prevent massive numbers of people
leaving (as all immigrants were receiving "suspect" telegrams
asking them to return to their sick mothers). The paper also
admitted that the fear that normal relations and travel would
be interrupted between France and Algeria, and the fear of
being separated from their relatives for a long time, were said
to have played a role in hastening the numbers of departures to
Algeria and prevented some from coming to France. Now the trend
was said to have been reversed. See Le Monde, 24/5/57, p. 3.
Whereas the readers were hardly informed of the reluctance
of Algerians to go to France in 1956, their return was being
hailed as an important event. Le Monde reported that Algerian
immigrants were now returning to France and gave the numbers of
those arriving in the different stations and airports and the
groups in charge of helping them.
Now that the Algerians were said to be convinced that the
transport links would not be cut off between the two countries,
they no longer hesitated to come to France. Ibid.
Most of the departures to France were described as a return,
with a few going to France for the first time to see relatives.
The paper noticed the presence of fewer landworkers and that of
a small, but not insignificant, number of wives and children.
In Les travailleurs alOriens reprennent le chemin de la
mftropole, Le Monde, 24/5/57, p. 3.
(191)
See Le Monde, 25/12/56, p. 4.
(192)
The way that this statement was formulated was more likely
to instill a sense of pride and complacency about what was




See Chapter 2 and Jeanneney, J.-N., op cit., p. 198.
(2)
Jean Planchais was categorical in an interview with the
author (29/12/89). J.Fauvet is also convinced that the paper
held the most advanced views and claims that it was at the
forefront of the battle against colonialism. See earlier refer-
ences in Chapter 2 and Debat a propos d'un monopole, Le Monde A
coeur ouvert, in Revue Politique et Parlementaire, No 866,




A large part of Le Monde's coverage dealt specifically with
the views on the French mainland, and most of the paper's
columns were devoted to its social and economic life and, of
course, to its politics. This included the rise and fall of
different governments, the debates in the National Assembly,
and the subsequent motions of censure or confidence and invest-
iture speeches which accompanied them.
(5)
The major problems in the colonies seemed to arise not from
Algeria but from the situation in the two protectorates of
Morocco and Tunisia, which were going through a very turbulent
period, and especially Indochina, in which a complete reversal
of the situation occurred with the debacle of the French troops
at Dien Bien Phu (May 1954).
(6)
It did so when an earthquake shook the town of El Asnam
(then Orldanville) in early September 1954. A number of arti-
cles were devoted throughout that month to the situation in
that area, regarding the number of deaths, casualties, destruc-
tion of property and sending of help, medicines, blankets,
tents, etc, and the visit of Mitterrand there from 11 to 17
October 1954.
(7)
Different requests, especially by "Muslim" deputies for
administrative reforms and the implementation of the recommen-
dations of the 1947 Statutes in that field and in that of
religious and educational matters, could be found in the pages
of the paper.
News of financial matters and budget debates 27/2/54 was
also brought to the attention of the reader. See also Le Monde,
3-4/1/54, p. 4.
(8)
Which emphasised the will of the Governor-General to solve
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the vital problems in Algeria (See Le Monde, 12/5/54, p. 11),
his desire to avoid serious problems in the colony and never
permit that ne s'ouvre en Algerie le jeu de sêrieuses reprè-




They were thought to be very important because they ensured
the representation of the colony to its own legislative cham-
ber, the Assemblee algerienne, and in the French Assembly
where a number of parliamentarians from the colonies were to
sit. The Algerian Assembly was made up of two colleges, the
First College representing under a million inhabitants of
European extraction, and the Second College, representing the
approximately eight million Algerians of Muslim confession.
(11)
The paper, for instance, found a 62% abstention rate in the
election very high, if "inexplicable", in the First College but
the fact that abstention in the Second College was recommended
by the MTLD did not necessitate for the paper any further
analysis or explanation as to, for instance, why such a measure
was recommended and why it proved succesful. See Le Monde
2/2/54, p. 1. The changes in the party structure of the two
colleges were, however, noted in terms of their respective
composition.
(12)
News of the State Council's decision to reinforce the shared
authority of the Algerian Assembly (with the French parliament)
to modify legislative texts introduced by the decrees in Alger-
ia did not lead to any comment by the journalist on the compo-
sition and effective powers of the Assembly nor on the way in
which these decrees might be changed, thus failing to put that
power (or the lack of it) into perspective. See Le Monde, 23-
24/5/54, p. 5.
(13)
It is worth noting that as Le Monde is printed in the after-
noon (and early evening) and bears next day's date, it would
not have been possible to find news of the uprising that day.
(14)
This early part of Le Monde's coverage of the Algerian war
has also been dealt with by Chentouf, Taieb, Le journal Le
Monde et le premier novembre, in Retentissement de la r6volu-
tion algerienne, ENAL/GAM, Algiers, 1985, pp. 59-64.
(15)
The economic measures were, to start with, not to be imple-
mented until order had been restored, since the official dis-
course saw no relation between the deeds of the terrorists and
the economic measures that would be taken; then later on, when
order proved difficult to restore, and was not likely to be,
these reforms were to be applied simultaneously.
(16)
The reader could get a good idea for this period by glancing




See, for instance, Le Monde, 20/11/54, 5-6/12/54 and
11/12/54.
(18)
These sources would be that of the Government, Governor-
General's office, military sources and the Agence France-
Rwse, the latter being a French government press agency.
(19)
See Le Monde, 17/11/54.
(20)
See reports in Le Monde, 4/11/54 (I1 faudra beaucoup
d'hornmes et de temps pour debarasser la region des bandes
armees) or the statements by the Minister of Interior in Le
Monde (11/11/54) :la situation evolue vite et favorablement en
Aigerie, je suis optimiste.
(21)
Then Minister of Interior.
(22)
Pas de negociations avec les ennemis de la patrie... La
seule negociation c'est la guerre, Le Monde 6/11/54, p. 1.
L'Algerie c'est la France et la France ne reconnaitra chez
elle pas d'autre autorite que la sienne, Mitterrand in Le
Monde, 9/11/54.
Les departements d'Algerie font partie de la Republique. us
sont frangais depuis longtemps, leur population jouit de la
citoyennete frangaise et est representee au Parlement, ... a
donne assez de preuves de son attachement & la France pour que
la France ne laisse pas mettre en cause son unite. Entre elle
et la metropole ii n'est pas de secession concevable. Cela doit
etre clair pour toujours et pour tout le monde en A1gerie,
dans la metropole et a l'êtranger....Jamais la France, jamais
aumin Parlement, jamais aucun gouvernement ne cédera sur ce
principe fondamental (National Assembly speech by Mitterrand in
Le Monde, 14-15/11/54).
Si trop d'A1geriens ont connu la tentation de se separer et
de combattre, c'est trop souvent certes parce que des conseil-
lers etrangers et lointains les y invitaient, parce qu'une
passion absurde les eloignait de la France, mais c'est aussi
parce qu'ils n' avaient pas le sentiment que leur esperance de
citoyens pouvait s'identifier a une esperance frangaise (see
also Mitterrand, in Le Monde, 9/12/54.
(23)
Denying, for instance, that reports from Radio Cairo could
have any relation with reality. Le Monde, 6/11/54.
(24)
When the Governor-General appealed to the inhabitants of the
border between Algeria and Tunisia, where he was inspecting the
frontier, he declared (see Le Monde, 21/12/54):
Nous avons besoin de vous pour retablir la paix
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qui vous permettra de travailler. Nous avons besoin
de renseignements qui permettront a l'armee et a nos
forces de police d'agir efficacement. Je vous donne
ici l'assurance que vous serez protégés contre
d'eventuelles represailles. Des mesures ont ete
prises pour que ne soient pas inquietes par les
hors-la-loi les amis de la France.
(25)
Le Monde's P.A. Martel recommended that: les animateurs de
cette oeuvre de destruction doivent étre combattus; ses exec-
utants doivent être poursuivis et chaties. See Le Monde,
3/11/54.
But he soon (by the end of the year) came to realise that
force alone would not solve the problem.
(26)
It had to be lucide et loyale Si l'on ne veut pas pousser
les populations dans les rangs des hors-la-loi. Ii faut refuser
de se laisser engager dans un cycle infernal oil les ennemis de
la France algerienne eux-memes voudraient nous enfermer.
See Le Monde, 3/11/54.
A year later, remembering the victims of the 1945 massacres,
E. Sablier stated: La repression ne fut en aucun cas plus
raisonnee. Implying that repression should be selective, Sabl-
ier gave 120 Europens and a possible 1,200 dead on the "Mus-
lims" side which was quite a modest estimate.
(27)
The paper followed along these lines by publishing the
opinions expressed by the Feddration de la Seine de l'Union
Progressiste (Douloureusement emue par les dramatiques evene-
ments d'Afrique du Nord, adjure le gouvernement de ne pas
s'engager dans /a voie de la repression qui entrainerait des
reactions en chaine sans retour en arriere possible -in Le
Monde, 9-10/11/54, p. 5) and those of the Bachagha of Khenche-
la, who thought that persuasion and forgiveness (indulgence)
could lead to the rebels' surrender, and added that his ac-
tions had led to the surrender of six of them of their own
free will. In Le Monde 18/11/54, p. 1.
(28)
A.Leveuf had categorically stated that the army's repressive
action was very selective. See Le Monde, 16/11/54, p. 1.
(29)
The paper seemed to convey the view that part of public
opinion was asking for reforms and a vigourous social and
economic policy. See Le Monde, 6/10/54, 9/11/54 and 19/11/54.
(30)
The various groups included trades unions, the Church and
elected European and Muslim officials: Augarde (Centre Republi-
cain Constantine), Muscatelli (ARS,Algiers), Fonlupt-Esperaber
(MRP), Naegelen (Socialist, former Governor-General), Mostefai
(Independant, Constantine ), Sportisse and Giraud (Communists),
Benhabilles and Tamzali, etc. See Le Monde 24/11/54, 26/11/54,
28-29/11/54 and 12-13/12/54.
(31)
The only article of that kind in this early period is a
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general one about the colonies by A.Blanchet in Le Monde,
24/12/54.
(32)
Mitterrand was Minister of the Interior. The Statutes adop-
ted by the Assembly in 1947 proposed to give equal rights to
the indigenous population. They were never enacted because of
the opposition at official and parliamentary levels as a result
of pressure from the settlers.
(33)
In the rich agricultural regions, and areas of big land
ownership, the paper sated that people were very pessimistic
and when contacted they declared La France perdra en quelques
annees la partie en AlOrie.
(34)
The measures that raised more protests were the merger of
police forces on the two sides of the Mediterranean and the
modification of the communes mixtes (overdue since 1947). The
first one was considered to be for the settlers: un desaveu
l'êtat-major policier... telle est l'opinion que nous avons
enregistree a plusieurs reprises, and the second: une mise en
minoritê des colons.
(35)
See Le Monde, 7/1/55.
(36)
As no other paper had "published any comment".
(37)
The predominant views were those of the officials, rich
settlers, politicians and the newspapers owned predominantly by
the same interests. These included, for the most part, people
of European origin but also some people (officials and politi-
cians) of Muslim origin. It is clear from the above analysis
that the newspapers reserved more space to the reactions of an
infinitely small number of people which could express them-
selves. See also Chapter 7.
(38)
Here it is worth noting that the use of expressions such as
beaucoup in the above quote would lead the reader to believe
that the opinion of the majority was expressed when it was
clearly not. Henceforth one finds a deliberate attempt (in
spite of a superficial appearence of neutrality) by the paper
to convince its readers that what it perceived was fact, thus
blurring the distinction between fact and reality. See Le
Monde, 7/1/55.
(39)
See Le Monde, 7 and 9-10/1/55, and also above.
(40)
See Le Monde, 7/1/55.
(41)
After the weekend the tone changed. Leveuf started wondering
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whether it was too late for the Muslims leaders: " It is not
known, he went on to write, what the reactions of the rank and
file militants, towards whom several promises have not been
kept, would be".
(42)
One can conclude from this part that the only opinion worth
the consideration of the newspaper was that of the establish-
ment. This assumed, therefore, that the colony, with its econo-
mic problems, high degree of illiteracy, non-involvement in
political matters, was as politically developed and articulate
as France.
A total disregard of the "Muslims" (who constituted the
majority of the population) and their views leads to a somewhat




See Le Monde, 3/2/55, p. 1.
(45)
(..) et le conduirait necessairement A la
reprise d'une politique de force qui aboutirait a
long terme a la perte de ces territoires essentiels
a notre rayonnement dans le monde".
Ibid.
(46)
The motive seemed to be fear of what he might do and not a
search for justice.
(47)
Le Monde was shrewd enough to point out (in February 1955),
that the Assembly was not opposed to the realisation rapide et
complete de l'egalite des droits et des devoirs, et de l'ur-
gente necessite d'appliquer toutes les dispositions du Statut,
but to the implementation of that policy by the Mend6s-France
government. See Le Monde, 4/2/55.
Often the bone of contention in much of Fourth Republic
politics was a problem of personalities not a problem of po-
licy. And this was a fairly typical illustration of politics
under the Fourth Republic where, at times, actual policies were
not really as much the substance of the debate as were rhetoric
and personalities. And in this case Le Monde was giving a
fairly accurate description of parliamentary debate in the
"House without windows" during the Fourth Republic.
NB. On this occasion, the stance adopted by Le Monde also
seemed to be opposed to the attitudes of the Radicals, with
Martinaud-Deplat and others who were also against Mend6s-
France.
(48)
Early 1955 brought political changes in France, where Pierre
Mendes-France was succeeded by Edgard Faure, and in Algeria,
where on 1 February Jacques Soustelle replaced Roger Leonard,
Governor-General there since April 1951. See also Chapter 3 on
historical developments in Algeria and Chapter 4 on Algerian
reports. It is worth noting that changes in the governmental




From the nomination of Soustelle arose some controversy in
France as to whether he should keep his seat as a local coun-
cillor in the departement of the RhOne (Lyon). Le Monde echoed
much of the controversy, reporting news of a letter written by
Pierre Montel, former minister, leader of the Independants, to
the Prefect of the RhOne asking for the resignation of Soustel-
le from his position as local councillor but also publishing a
reply by Roger Frey, Councillor of the Union Frangaise and
Municipal Councillor in Lyon, which referred to the wrong
interpretation of Art. 34 of the Law of 1884 and emphasised
that there was no incompatibility between the functions of
Governor-General of Algiers and a mandate as a local council-
lor. See Le Monde, 12/3/55 and 9/5/55.
After the ruling by the Conseil d'Etat, Le Monde wrote that
MrSoustelle n'a pas A se demettre de ses fonctions de conseil-
ler municipal (title ) and that according to Art. 34 of the Law
of 5 April 1954, the functions of Governor-General were not
included in the list of functions incompatible with the role of
Municipal Councillor.
(50)
See Le Monde, 27/1/55.
(51)
See Le Monde, 28/1/55.
(52)
See Le Monde, 16/2/55, p. 3.
(53)
(...) ne traverse qu'une crise de croissance, in Le Monde,
17/2/55.
(54)
See Le Monde 25/2/55.
(55)
([se] fêlicite de la nomination de Soustelle). See Le Monde,
23/2/55.
(56)
See Le Monde , 25-26/2/55, 17/3/55, 8/6/55, etc.
(57)
See Le Monde , 17/3/55.
(58)
Le Monde 23/3/55, 2/4/55. See also below.
(59)
See Le Monde, 7/5/57. See also below the views expressed by
journalists as to the solutions.
(60)
Les six mois de contradiction et d'hesitation
n'auront pas etê tout a fait perdus, s'il s'en est
degagó comme on l'espére une conception ferme de la
pacification a mener dans l'Aures, inquiOtant foyer
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de contamination. In Le Monde, 11/5/55.
(61)
Which always seem to appear with some delay. See Le Monde,
8/6/55, about counter-productivity of repression.
(62)
S'il est pour l'Aurês une politique en laquelle
on puisse raisonnablement croire, encore que cer-
tains l'estiment déjà depass6e, c'est bien celle
qui, en êveillant les populations a la conscience de
leur force et de leurs intêrêts vOritables, rompra
leur solidaritO avec les hors la loi, in Le Monde,
11/5/55.
(63)
It was not a desire identified amongst the population to
maintain the system, or any evidence of its acceptance and
legitimacy, it was the fact that he found that criticism of the
administration by the "Muslim" population excepted this or that
administrator as a justification for the continuity of French
presence.
J'ai toujours relevê une exception faite sur le
nom de tel ou tel administrateur favorablement connu
d'eux. Le mêcontentement n'êtant pas 126 de l'excès
de son poids mais au contraire de son trop
d'êloignement et des abus tolêrês de ce fait.
Ibid.
(64)
See for instance Le Monde, 7/1/55 & 26/1/55.
(65)
It looked a bit lukewarm though, since the paper indicated
that the time-table might be too full, or that it was not yet
clear to say whether Mendes-France's programme would be imple-
mented or not by the incoming administration.
(66)
Leading to an incremental implementation of the 1947 Sta-
tutes without delay. In Le Monde, 1/3/55.
(67)
Through the provision of help to families and the accession
to the rights deriving from French citizenship. See Le Monde,
19/2/55.
Le Monde gave extensive coverage to the official discourse.
It echoed all the statements made by Soustelle, as well as the
declarations of the Prime Minister and those of Parliamentar-
ians on the subject. Further examples could be found; for
instance, Soustelle's requests for funds to subsidise particu-
lar products in order to provide them free of charge for the
needy in Le Monde, 4/6/55, Prime Minister Faure's (decede
30/3/88) intentions de ne pas subordonner les róformes au
retablissement de l'ordre, Le Monde, 23/6/55, parliamentarian
support for reforms in Algeria and for ending "shocking inequa-
lities" as well as statements and moves by political groupings,
such as the constitution of a liberal left to combat inequality
in Algerian society. In Le Monde, 11/6/55.
(68)
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Such as the the statement by Henri Jouy (President of the
Conseil general of the Seine) who after his fact finding trip
to Algeria attacked "immobilism" stating: L'ennemi en Algerie
cen'est pas le maquisard, c'est l'immobilisme. In Le Monde,
2/5/55.
See also other reports, 7/1/55 and 26/1/55.
(69)
See Le Monde, 2/4/55.
(70)
(...) Construction de routes, amenagement des
points d'eau, edification d'ecoles dans les cam-
pagnes, creations de nouveaux Secteurs d'Ameliora-
tion Rurale, modernisation des regions surpeupldes
et des regions desertiques.
(71)
This was also pointed out by a subsequent Libres Opinions
(letter to the Editor).
(72)
(seront affectes a la construction de locaux administratifs
et de logements pour la gendarmerie) which bore no relation
with the first part of the statement.
(73)
See Le Monde, 2/4/55.
(74)
This version, for instance, was reported unchallenged by the
paper until over a month later when, insisting on the need for
real reforms ( Et l'on est assure de l'effet benefique d'aucune
rdforme qui ne s'attaque rêso/ument  a un mal  tres profond),
when some of its criticism was made pertinent (Les reformes
economiques et sociales ne se retrouvent-elles pas releguees a
l'arriere plan lorsqu'il faut prevoir 6 milliards de francs de
travaux pour heberger les gendarmes envoyes de la metropole).
See Le Monde, 16/5/55.
(75)
Hence the reformist discourse constituted much of the cover-
age of the paper.
(76)
When the measures were criticised, the paper helped air that
criticism, it did not take it up. In this case, the measures
were opposed by the Algerians, who thought they did not go far
enough, and by the Europeans, who thought they went too far.
This kind of critical assessment in the reports could be found
more frequently in the reports a year into the governorship.
(77)
See Le Monde, 13/1/56.
(78)
They included the suppression of the Governor-General post
and of the Algerian Assembly, the creation of three groups of
"ddpartements" and the suppression of "communes mixtes" with
the establishment of some sort of parity between the represen-
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tation of the two populations in some of the "communes" when a
certain percentage was reached.
(79)
In Le Monde, 13/1/56. In the following day's report P.
Albin-Martel stated that integration was no longer acceptable
for the "Muslims" in Le Monde, 14/1/56, p. 1.
(80)
See, for instance, Le Monde, 15-16/1/56. One of them took
the form of an interview of a minister, General Billotte, by
R.Gauthier, who pointed out that people who criticised the
reforms did not even know them and that only extremists on both
sides would oppose them, to which was added the minister's
statement that the army in Algeria was not involved in a war
but in the "protection of civilians". To that effect, the
number of soldiers involved was judged satisfactory, whereas
material was thought to be needed. In Le Monde, 18/1/56.
(81)
Stating that his appointment had in fact been renewed by
that date (Le Monde, 15-16/1/56).
(82)
Si la conviction absolue que la France restera
en Algórie n'est pas inculquee a chacun, aucun
musulman, si proche de nous soit-il, par le coeur ou
par l'interêt, ne restera a nos cotes. Ii redoutera
de payer de sa vie et des vies de sa famille apres
notre depart, auquel nos hesitations le font certai-
nement penser. Tout geste politique, toute declara-
tion, tout article de presse donnant a croire que
nous traiterons avec le terrorisme, autrement dit
que les terroristes seront un jour en mesure de
demander des comptes, détache de nous les musulmans
algeriens.
In Le Monde, 22-23/1/56.
(83)
- La France me quittera pas plus l'Algerie que la Provence
ou /a Bretagne ... Quoiqu'il arrive le destin de l'Algerie est
francais (Soustelle in Le Monde, 25/2/55),
- ...repression impitoyable des responsables d'actes de
terrorisme... au nom du gouvernement je dois dire qu'il n'y a
pas et qu'il ne peut être question d'interlocuteurs ni a l'in-
terieur ni a l'exterieur de l'Algerie (Bourges-Maunoury in Le
Monde, 15-16/5/55),
- Pas question de chercher des interlocuteurs valables
(Bourges-Maunoury, Minister for Interior in Le Monde, 28/5/55,
- Rigueur impitoyable	 ceux qui defient la loi et se
dressent contre notre autoritê, in Le Monde, 22-23/5/55.
(84)
When he declared in a speech to the Federation des Radicaux,
in the Alpes-Maritimes: Nous ne pouvons pas nous laisser faire
en Algerie, in Le Monde, 24/5/55.
(85)
La France doit rester en Afrique du Nord envers et contre
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tous (Mitterrand in Le Monde, 24/5/55).
Le gouvernement manifeste ainsi une nouvelle fois sa vo-
lonte de mettre ... le plus possible de moyens pour lutter
contre la rebellion et traduit J'engagement de la nation.
(Minister of the Interior in Le Monde, 4/6/55, and also
W55).
(86)
Such as the former Governor-General of Algeria, R.Naegelen,
who declared: Seule une omnipresence de nos troupes peut
rendre la confiance aux populations (published in the Nouvelle
Republique of Bordeaux and reported in Le Monde, 27/5/55).
(87)
La separation de l nAlgerie et de /a France serait la pire
des catastrophes (This was an article's headline in Le Monde,
14/1/56).
La separation de l'Algerie de la France serait pour l'Alger-
ie et specialement pour le peuple musulman de ce pays la pire
des catastrophes. La secession c'est la ruine
Cela signifie que doit être solonnellement reconnue et
garantie au sein de la Republique Francaise, la personalite
originale de cette province dans le respect de sa tradition, de
sa religion, de sa culture
With this emphasis on equality between all Frenchmen (Vega-
lite des droits et des devoirs, des avantages et des sacri-
fices, depuis Dunkerque jusqu'a Tamanraset) came the insistence
that the rebels could not win (le dechainement de la violence
ne peut donner a la rebellion une victoire impossible). See Le
Monde, 14/1/56.
(88)
It was not, however for him, the territory that was impor-
tant but the people. For him the Algerians were French in the
same way as the Savoyards, and "if they are not, then is it not
because while proclaiming that they were, through our deeds, we
did not want -we could not or we did not know how- to make them
so French that they themselves would not doubt it?"
(89)
In Le Monde, 16/10/55, p. 5.
(90)
Le drame a/gêrien vous prend a la gorge, l'Etat se decom-
pose, un citoyen sur trois vote contre le regime (...). In Le
Monde, 31/1/56.
(91)
The paper saw in the majority obtained by Mollet (420 votes
against 71) Une maniere d'hommage rendu a la personne du
secretaire general de la SFIO. Mais elle s'explique surtout par
la gravite et l'urgence des affaires d'Algerie.
(92)
Politiquement le probleme de l'Algerie reste au
coeur du debat. Le President du Conseil etant resolu
a l'affronter tant sur place qu'a l'Assemblee.
In Le Monde, 1/2/56, p. 1.
(93)
Duverger, outlining the problems facing the new Assembly,
549
listed them in the following order: Algeria, economic expan-
sion, international detente and the clerical issue in schools.
Le Monde, 1/2/56, pp. 1-2.
(94)
He wrote that it was to be Algerian and not Muslim, differ-
ent from integration, would exclude federalism and, above all,
a national Algerian state, since, according to General Catroux,
l'histoire n'offre aucune base solide puisque l'Algêrie n'a
jamais constitue un etat unifiö. He stated that, because the
French settled in Algeria feel that they belong to both the
Algerian and French community, it would be then a Franco-Muslim
personality. He also felt that Algeria's fate would not be
determined unilaterally, would involve the implementation of
equality of rights and duties, but by a different method from
Soustelle's, and would confirm a particularisme accepted by the
1947 Statutes, maintaining the post of Governor-General and the
Assembly with wider powers and also representation in the
French National Assembly.
(95)
College unique that would be equivalent to a system of one
person one vote.
(96)
See Le Monde, 2/2/56.
(97)
Des interlocuteurs suffisamment valables.
(98)




See Le Monde, 4/2/56.
(101)
Amongst the variety of the reactions to the replacement of
Soustelle by Catroux reported, those of the Europeans in Alger-
ia were predominant through the voices of their various repre-
sentatives present in the French capital. The paper also gave
room for the declarations of Laquiere about not being in a real
hurry to go and meet the new Resident Minister (The appella-
tion changed from Governor General to Resident Minister).
Reports included the Europeans' concern about the planned
release of political prisoners as well as the institution of a
Single College. However, a statement from the European delega-
tion from Oran about this state of affairs was somewhat differ-
ent. See Le Monde, 3/2/56.
While mentioning the MRP's request for confidence in the
"new man who, as a military man or a diplomat, had always
worked for the greatness of his country", most of Le Monde's
reports told the reader of the European settlers opposition in
Algeria (Le Monde, 2/2/56).
The paper also reported the "numerous telegrammes" sent by
"patriotic associations", stating that according to the views
of their members they were intending to demonstrate upon the
arrival of the General (and that the "Muslims" would organise a
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counter-demonstration). It also quoted a telegramme from the
rich settlers, Froger, Borgeaud, Schiaffino and Laquiere influ-
ential European representatives in Algeria: Les maires du
departement d'Alger, indignes par la possibilite de voir le
General Catroux, specialiste de l'abandon de l'Empire d'Outre-
Mer, devenir chef de l'Algerie, vous demandent d'insister pour
relever le defi (Le Monde, 2/2/56) before reporting a few days
later their detailed objections, their statements and their
requests. In Le Monde, 5-6/2/56.
(102)
See Le Monde, 1/2/56.
(103)
See Le Monde, 4/2/56.
(104)
Author of the sharp daily comment "billet" au jour le jour.
(105)
After expressing his sympathies for the departing Governor-
General, he hoped that he would be able to distinguish in:
cet enthousiasme delirant qui a marque son depart... ce qui
s'adresse & ce qu'il est de ce qui s'adresse & ce qu'il n'est
pas, ce qui est confiance de ce qui est peur. In Le Monde, 5-
6/2/56.
(106)
Chénebenoit in Le Monde, 8/2/56.
(107)
See Le Monde, 11/2/56. Lacoste had spent ten years in Trade
and Industry.
(108)
Mais tout cela est bien fragile devant I'oppo-
sition de /a plupart des delegues musulmans, qui
reclament une reconnaissance nationale refusee lors
de l'investiture et celle du Comite de Salut Public
qui crie 6 /a trahison (...).
The government gave the paper the impression of
(...) de precher dans le desert. Aucune
position n'a ete amendee et l'avenir demeure gros de
menaces. M. Lacoste n'aura ni trop d'habilete, ni
trop d'energie, pour assumer sa tache.
See Le Monde, 11/2/56.
(109)
Stating that he had anounced "appeasement" measures, which
would distinguish between terrorists and political prisoners,
the paper concluded that: En marquant sa volonte d'ameliorer le
sort de la population musulmane et de mettre fin 6 des discri-
minations, le gouvernement espere ramener la paix et faire
vivre en bon accord deux communautes dont aucune ne dictera ses
conceptions ou n'imposera par la force ses solutions. In Le
Monde, 2/2/56.
(110)
See Droz, B. & Lever E, Histoire de /a guerre d'Algerie,




On ne refusera pas a G.Mollet l'appui dd A la
sincêrit6 et au courage... valeurs qui permettent
encore de retourner une situation (A cette heure
le destin est en equilibre.
Le Monde, 8/2/56.
(112)
Since the future was at stake: [ill balance entre la raison
et la dêmence. M.G.Mollet est allê & Alger pour faire prêvaloir
la raison. Avec lui nous sommes pour la raison. La situation
est telle qu'il taut lui faire confiance. Le Monde, 8/2/56.
The previous day the paper was confident that extremist
movements (Poujadists etc..) would not alter the resolution of
the PM: Sa bonne volonte, peut étre son idêalisme, est dans la
tradition socialiste. Mais sans doute ne pourra-t-il obtenir
sule champ de rOsultats spectaculaires. L'appaisement des
esprits qu'il recherchera en premier lieu constituerait déjà un




Here and above in Gauthier, Le Monde, 2/2/56, confirming,
for instance, that he was discerning between the "criminals"
who would be executed and the "suspect," because:
On ne peut garder en prison de simples suspects
qui ont eu seulement un jour le malheur de dêplaire
et qui ne sont ni des bandits, ni des bandits en
puissance.
(115)
In Le Monde, 11/2/56. Besides his optimistic statements (in
Annaba before his return to Paris) indicating that there was no
need for army reinforcements and expressing confidence in the
future, he was reported as stating:
Je quitte l'AlOrie avec la conviction pro-
fonde que la communautó franco-musulmane deviendra
une rêalitd vivante, fraternelle et indestructible.
Je suis venu avec un message de paix. Je pars avec
la conviction qu'il a ete entendu et compris. (my
emphasis)  La route sera longue et dure avant que 
soit arrétó le statut futur definitif de l'Algerie.
Je la parcourrai avec vous. Mon premier voyage sera
suivi d'autres dans les diverses parties de l'Algêr-
ie.
In Le Monde, 12-13/2/56.
(116)
When it stated that Lacoste, for instance, would need all
the skill and energy available to face the situation (Le Monde,
11/2/56), well before the publication of the official decree of
his appointment as Governor-General in the Journal Off iciel of
16 February and that of a number of other decrees completing






This obviously was to lead to favourable, and very often
uncritical, reports as far as the government was concerned.
(119)
Le dernier quart d'heure. This gave the impression that the
army and the government in Algeria were adopting a very conci-
liatory attitude, trying to forgive and burry the hatchet. In
his series of articles Le dernier quart d'heure ( last of the
series 15/12/56, pp. 1-7), Mannoni described how an aircraft
was circling around dropping leaflets inviting those who took
up arms first, to lay them down, at the request of G.Mollet and
R.Lacoste. He also mentioned that the generals were signing
vouchers of rally/surrender (bons de ralliement) to be handed
in by the rebels surrendering to the soldiers.
(120)
In Le Monde, 26-27/2/56. The reports of official statements
continued in earnest including council of ministers statements
and decisions revolving around the necessity of organising
elections and the equitable representatation of ethnic groups.
The emphasis was on the sui generis case of Algeria, the need
to "pacify" without exclusive reliance on a military solution,
and the better use of military forces. There was also some
insistence on the implementation of "French serene (sereine)
justice" and going ahead with the planned executions. In Le
Monde, 24/2/56.
(121)
The birth and the development of "urban terrorism", which
"no police force in the world could annihilate" (aneantir), a
"conflict internal to nationalism which threw some doubts on
the precise relationship between the maquis and the FLN", and
the "recently increasing influence of the Communist Party on
the nationalist movement", were all listed as the reasons for
the inability of the government to act. J.Fauvet writing in Le
Monde, 16/11/56, p. 1.
It should be born in mind that in actual fact it was the
opposition of the European settlers and their representatives
to any reforms which had led to the government's failure, and
J.Fauvet was merely providing excuses for the government and
doing so better than any of its own officials.
(122)
He further stated, in defence of the government, that the
government had made long studies and that, as a result, it did
not think that it was under any obligation to take any immedi-
ate decision as it doubted that the liberal measures advocated
would have any effect on the "Muslim" population. He did not
think either that redefining an Algerian Statute, which its
opponents would find difficult and would oppose anyway, would
be enough to disarm the FLN.
An examination of Le Monde's coverage of Algeria and the
international arena (USA, UN, Arab world etc.) has been made
and will be the subject of a forthcoming publication. It was
not possible to include it here.
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(123)
There was a report to that effect about a year later in Le
Wnde, 12-13/5/57, p. 3.
(124)
Pignault reporting on Goeau Brissonniere's temoignage d'un
meolecin fran9ais: l'avenir economique et social de l'Algerie,
in Le Monde, 14/2/56; or P. Minay's articles in Le Monde, 24 &
25/11/55.
(125)
See Le Monde, 12/11/56, p. 5.
(126)
Le Monde, 16/11/56, p. 1.
(127)
When a mild form of criticism or suggestions were put for-
ward, they were not always disinterested. For instance, when
nnmet was trying to persuade the government to fix a date for
the elections, no matter how remote, or to settle their practi-
cal details, the motives were not so pure: it was in order to
keep the UN out of Algeria and put pressure on countries not to
take positions which could be detrimental to France. Le Monde,
30-31/12/56, p. 1.
(128)
The reassurances about the situation in Algeria that Le
Monde gave its readers did not totally obscure the political
question: Seule une decision de caractere politique peut
mgder un <<vide>> que des off iciers ont essaye ici et lä de
colmater. There was also a need to bridge the communication gap
with the "Muslims" (no longer interested in compromise).
If there were genuinely free elections, asked Mannoni,
"would we not meet under a different name those very people who
were with FLN, MTLD or UDMA?" If it were not a question of
dealing with forces which could not achieve important military
success, then, he concluded: il faudra bien composer avec elles
sur un autre plan, celui de la vie politique.
(129)
Especially when talking about what institution would give
the full expression to this Algerian identity (Un fres haut
fonctionnaire, evoquant apres G.Mollet, l'institution gui
donnerait «A la personalitó algerienne sa pleine
expression>>), there were fears that this might lead to another
Jeu de Paume. In Le Monde, 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.
(130)
Paul Reynaud, Faites l'Europe, Pierre Mendes-France, faites
/Nlfrique, and M Schuman and R.Pleven, Faites l'Eurafrique.
(131)
(..) toutes exigent aussi un reglement de
l'affaire d'Algerie. Ce sera tOt ou tard la tAche
d'un autre gouvernement, si l'actuel n'y satisfait
pas.
L'Assemblee l'attend encore de M. Guy Mollet,
mais elle mesure déjà sa patience et sa confiance.
In J.Fauvet, De l'echec de Suez A la construction de l'Eur-
ope, M.G.Mollet tire la conclusion du debat de l'Assemblee
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nationa/e, Le Monde, 21/12/56, p. 1.
(132)
See also Chatelain, A., op. cit., p. 177.
(133)
He stated that the decision, or rather that the lack of
decision, of the French government over Algeria, was deplored
by "many" for whom "it was not a minor tragedy", and the more
people were convinced of the necessity of "finding a way out"
(s'en sortir), the more the hesitation of the French government
was seen as "torturante". This need for evolution was perceived
with an acute awareness combined with an understanding of the
contradictions facing the government:
Sentiment patriotique qui se revolte devant
«l'abandon>> d'une population frangaise et d'une
terre qui l'est devenue, souci d'une position stra-
tegique, volonte de ne pas renier l'entreprise
poursuivie depuis plus d'un siècle, desir de l'adap-
ter A l'evolution des populations et des idees,
autant d'elêments contradictoires qui se debattent
entre le coeur et l'esprit.
See Le Monde, 20/12/56, pp. 1-7.
(134)
The previous month, after two years of insurrection, only
Robert Gauthier clearly expressed his frustration at (what he
saw but did not explicitly call) the delaying tactics of the
government. He was one of the more audacious journalists ( such
as Minay), who levelled the blame squarely at the door of the
government for not arriving at a decision that could be adhered
to and implemented.
For the two years or more of fighting in Algeria, the advice
given by the most enlightened (<<lucides>>, not necessarily
left-wing) minds ought to have led to something in his view.
But, despite numerous official promises, meetings, colloquia,
and deadlines, nothing practical had been achieved.
What "exasperated" Gauthier, however, was that:
Or voici qu'aujourd'hui encore, a la veille
d'un nouveau debat devant l'Assemblee generale des
Nations Unies, on se borne a nous annoncer qu'un
nouveau conseil des minis tres va proceder a un
nouvel examen de la situation.
He found no lack of pretexts in the previous Moroccan and
Tunisian questions, but thought that they abounded in that of
Algeria. Without leaning too hard on the government, he accep-
ted "the desire not to appear to give in to force, the weaken-
ing of the adversaries, the unfavourable international con-
texts" as being true. But could one reasonably expect that
there would be an ideal day, when all the circumstances would
be favourable, he asked?
Time, he continued, was running against "us". And although
he accepted that the "weakening rebels" were in no position to
enforce their will, he did not think that the Muslim mass would
be content with promises or partial reforms. Gauthier, in Le
Monde, 21/11/56, pp. 1-3.
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And that the struggle was continuing, despite the fact that
people hoped he would put an end to the "war to end all wars".
In fact: La France ... poursuit en Algêrie une lutte intermin-
able, qui menace & tous moments... de degênèrer en guerre de
Editorial in Le Monde, 1/1/57, p. 1.
(138)
Le Monde was only now beginning to put things into perspec-
tive, but if one looked at other articles, especially those
soon to deal with the debates in the UN, it would be easy to
see that this was a more ephemeral stance, as the main themes
were to put a good case for France and the incumbent govern-
mt.
(139)
See Le Monde, 1/1/57, p. 1.
(140)
With the arrival of reinforcements and with security main-
tained in the cities to "stabilise relations with Morocco and
Tunisia", Le Monde, 8/1/57, p. 1.
The same observation of failure was made by Gauthier, keener
than ever to explain the actions of some Europeans:
Depuis deux ans se dèveloppe en Algêrie un
drame devenu le plus angoissant des drames natio-
naux. Devant l'irrêsolution, les altermolements et
l'incapacit6 de choisir des gouvernements et des
parlements, du pays lui-mame, des aigreurs, des
rancunes se torment, qui amênent parfois A des
esprits mal equilibrês, & des solutions de dêse-
spoir, qui seraient au premier chef nêlastes pour
les Europêens d'Algerie eux-mémes.
R. Gauthier in Le Monde, 8/1/57.
(141)
We have already seen one or two journalists such as Fauvet
show signs of irritation at the delay taken in defining a new
policy for Algeria.
(142)
The declaration of intentions was being prepared in Paris
for the attention of the UN where the debate of the Algerian
question was about to resume.
The French government came out with its declaration of
intentions which, in actual fact, brought nothing new to the
scene that had not been stated before. It announced its deci-
sion to abolish thirty communes mixtes and replace them with
1,120 communes de plein exercice, and also to organise elec-
tions three months after the cessation of hostilities.
(143)
In Algeria a general strike was called for, inviting all
Algerians to show through their protest their desire to back
the FLN's case at the UN.
(144)
But the settlers'opposition ever since meant that it had not
556
been implemented and that it was not likely to be either.
(145)
The measures taken did not significantly change Algerian
realities and were merely taken to please the UN and help
France diplomatically rather than the people on the ground, let
alone solve the Algerian problem as a whole. They amounted to
nothing more significant than a rejigging of the structure of
regional authorities. The paper accepted that they had long
lost their appeal and that the nationalists did not even see
fit to denounce them. But despite this awareness of the issues,
the paper did not show many more signs of being frustrated or
disappointed by the French government.
(146)
They were really insignificant in terms of solving the
problems. The programme to be introduced included, for in-
stance, measures such as the accession of 1,000 "Muslim" candi-
dates (official sources) to positions within the civil service
(little more than clerical and very petty bureaucratic jobs)
according to the 17 March 1956 decree and subsequent decisions
seen as being in the implementation stage. See Le Monde,
23/1/57, p. 5.
Similarly, the paper gave extensive coverage to the crea-
tion of new administrative subdivisions and installing people
to run them. In actual fact (and that was not coherently stated
by the paper at all) the special delegations were being estab-
lished and formed with appointees chosen by the Governor-
General's Office. See Le Monde, 29/1/57, p. 3.
This was done because, on the one hand, the government was
unwilling to implement the single college system and, on the
other, most "Muslim" representatives, or rather those who
traditionally collaborated with the authorities and represented
the Algerians, were now unwilling to stand for election anyway,
or to continue to legitimise the policies of the government, by
continuing to play a role in the system. Even the most "faith-
ful Muslims" were in no real hurry to join the special delega-
tions. See Le Monde, 12/1/57.
(147)
Stating that no government worth its salt could possibly
contemplate independence. In Le Monde, 11/1/57.
(148)
The paper's coverage of the story looked objective enough on
the surface describing the government statement (declaration)
as having no effect on either community. It pointed out the
objections made to the declaration and the perceived contradic-
tions between the elections promised and the new statutes. The
views of the two communities were highlighted: Muslims and
Europeans were reported as sceptical (in Le Monde, 11/1/57, p.
6). There was a "malaise" within the European community caused
by their disappointment; those "Muslim delegates", who could be
approached (they had stopped coming to the Assembly), had
remained with unfulfilled expectations (in Le Monde, 12/1/57)
and saw no hope in a statute which was already set by Paris
since they thought that by posing pre-condtions to the cease-
fire, Paris was putting the freedom of elections itself into
question.
Le Monde reported that even people who used to be for the
reforms and elections (like Khidder and Abbas) were now think-
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ing that no candidate would stand in the elections (planned
three months after the cease-fire) without the confidence and
backing of the FLN. To ignore that was, according to them, a
sign of naivety and even duplicity. Their criticism stated
that the imprecision of the text over the subject of the cease-
fire made it appear like a capitulation, a surrender without
condition; that the equality advocated was an equality of
community, not an equality of individuals (despite the 1 to 9
imbalance); that there was no point saying free elections would
determine a future statute when the people possibly invited to
oversee the elections would be "favourable to the French case";
and, more importantly, there was no point saying that free
elections would determine who the French government will talk
to, when the declaration of intention defined one-sidedly the
line to be followed in details. This, of course, meant for
most liberal Algerian personalities (and this included A.Fares)
that nothing had changed (Le Monde, 16/1/57, p. 5).
(149)
When reporting further criticism by the Algerian national-
ists who were stating that the FLN was the only representative,
Le Monde stated that it was reporting their statements for
information purposes only.
(150)
See Le Monde, 16/1/57, p. 5.
(151)
A full paragraph with the main theme as a heading. The
heading on settlers views was in heavy print and had no quota-
tion marks.
(152)
See Le Monde, 13-14/1/57, pp. 1-4.
(153)
The paper also questioned whether all the previous PMs had
been mailed (Felix Gouin, Andre Marie and General de Gaulle-
29/1/57). It then explained that Marie's error had been correc-
ted, that de Gaulle had been head of a Provisional government,
not Prime minister and but that Felix Gouin still had not
received the letter (30/1/57).
(154)
Le Monde reported the approvals (29/1/57), the reservations
(30/1/57) as well a the oppositions and their motives.
(155)
Le Monde, 26/1/57, p. 1.
(156)
Le Monde, 31/1/57, p. 2.
(157)
Le Monde, for instance, reported P. Mendbs-France as having
stated that the situation would have been different if his
recommendations had been implemented. He was also reported as
scathing in his criticism of the government and the press when
he declared:
Ceux que nous aurions dd soutenir continuent
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d'être brimes chaque jour par une administration,
des municipalites, une presse, trop souvent animas
d'un esprit qui nous cause un terrible prejudice.
The paper put into question, however, according to obser-
vers, whether the recommendations were applicable today and
whether they would reverse the course of events even if ap-
plied. See Le Monde, 9/3/57, p. 1.
(158)
This was being done despite an awareness of the unlikely
success of the reforms and the delegations speciales. Indeed,
Le Monde was aware that the delegations speciales and the
communes' reforms had very little chance of succeeding. Dis-
cussing Soustelle's ideas, it was accepted that it was diffi-
cult to find any Muslim representatives to participate. See Le
Monde, 21/2/57, p. 4, 25/2/57, p. 4, and 10-11/3/57, p. 2.
The financial difficulties of the government were very
rarely evoked in connection with Algeria except in rare in-
stances like 22/2/57 when a sarcastic comment was made about
the government battling hard to get a few billions from the
European neighbours when the "Algerian tragedy" was absorbing
ten times more or when Soustelle's reply to a related question
(23/3/57, p. 1) indicated that it represented 4% of National
Revenue and could be considered as an investment if the riches
of the Sahara were taken into account.
(159)
Monet had proved that the government was not willing to
accept the UN interference and had given evidence of wanting
the FLN to understand that there would be no change of French
policy. In Le Monde, 3-4/2/57, p. 1.
(160)
Presenting him as increasing the pace of reforms, as not
withdrawing the offer of a cease-fire (Le Monde, 8/3/57, p. 1)
even without the cease-fire conditions being met (Le Monde, 10-
11/3/57) and as wanting to increase real participation in local
affairs (Le Monde, 8/3/57).
(161)
As it was persuaded that the solution ne peut comporter en
aucmn cas la poursuite pure et simple d'une politique qui au
bout d'un an est A bout de souffle.
(162)
See Le Monde, 15/2/57.
However, a big deal was made out of 2 billion fr given to
the new communes (2,214M) created by the 26/6/56 decree (250
communes so 9 million fr each), in order to enable the provi-
sional institutions created to prepare the infrastructure





A discerning reader would have spotted in the paper two days
previously a different report from Mannoni on the Kabyle
region, the overall deliberately reassuring tone of which
revealed some of the methods used to implement those reforms.
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In it one could read that areas had been deprived of supplies
(zones d'isolement), where people accused of helping the re-
bels, or "worst still", not opposing them, were excluded from
the "French community" and deprived of the "privileges of our
administration." Mannoni, in Le Monde, 21/2/57.
(165)
Although the abolition of the communes mixtes constitued a
step forward, their replacement by yet another form of appoin-
ted body did not necessarily constitute a great advance. No
journalist questionned the way that this so called democratisa-
tion was implemented, nor put in doubt the "democratic direc-
tion" in which it was heading, least of all Mannoni, who,
questioning the seductive power of reforms, because of the
measures used "to compel thousands of people to learn about
free elections," went as far as to suggest that after being
late in coming, given the circumstances, the measures might now
be premature prior to peace being restored (and to state that
the conditions of their implementation had made them unatrac-
tive). See Le Monde, 25/2/57, p. 4.
(166)
& condition gue notre politique algerienne ne
se borne plus A claironner tous les quinze jours
l'annonce d'un <<dernier quart d'heure>> qui est en
passe de rejoindre <<la route du fer>> dans le
Pantheon des mots historiques.




Le Monde, 30/3/57, pp. 4-5.
Though acknowledging that it was not the first time that the
end of the troubles had been promised by a government, the
paper argued that members of the government and political
leaders can "only bow when a Minister is so affirmative." Le
Monde, 10-11/3/57, p. 1.
(169)
Which it survived with 221 votes against 188 and 110 absten-
tions. See Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 3, 22/3/57, p. 3, 23/3/57, p.
land 25/3/57, p. 6.
(170)
On that occasion, Duverger still thought it better in the
long run if the government had survived. See Le Monde, 21/5/57,
p. 1.
(171)
G.Mollet's promise to end the war in Algeria had been made
on the eve of his election (L'Express, 19 December 1955, pro-
mising no more bloodshed).
(172)





In two editorial articles: Ambitions et realitês in Le
Monde, 23/5/57, p. 1, and 15 mois et 21 jours in Le Monde,
23/5/57, p. 4.
(175)
The paper thought that, in order to have any chance of
succeding, the next government would have to define an Algerian
policy and gain the approval of the two Common Market and
Euratom treaties as well as the support of the Socialists.
In Le Monde, 23/5/57, p. 1.
(176)
The paper saw frictions between its desired orthodox Atlan-
ticist reputation and its rapprochement with the neutralists
and the USSR. In Des ambitions aux rdalites. Le Monde, 23/5/57,
p. 1.
(177)
Still highlighting the worries of the Europeans at the
expense of the "Muslim" community, the paper that day, insisted
that they were more apprehensive about the possible departure
of Lacoste than they were about that of Mollet. (Le Monde,
23/5/57, p. 1).
(178)
This will be confirmed further by the fact (see below)
that, very early on, the paper did not use kid gloves with the
new man (Maurice Bourges-Maunoury) at Matignon.
(179)
Le Monde, of course, reported the various efforts to form a
new government (23,26,28,29,30 and 31/5/57), with the failure
of Pflimlin, Pinay and Pleven (end of May beginning of June),
before announcing the successful attempt of Bourges-Maunoury in
gathering enough support around a government committed to
Europe and the continuation of Lacoste's policies in Algeria.
See also J.Fauvet in Le Monde, 12/6/57, p. 1.
(180)
Ii est tout neuf, un peu raide aux entournures,
mais encore presque intact. Ii n'a rien d'archaique,
ni de demodè. Bien au contraire. L'X qui marque son
certificat d'origine montre qu'il a ête fabrique en
s6rie, mais par une maison serieuse.
En bref, nous etrennons un prOsident du con-
seil. On devrait en principe esp6rer qu'il dure un
peu plus longtemps que les autres. Non que je tienne
voir celui-ci s'eterniser au pouvoir. Mais je
voudrais qu'il puisse resservir par la suite. Songez
aux pantins informes que sont devenus les autres
aprês quelques mois de service: peinture êlectorale
dêteinte, crane vide, bedaine de paille ouverte
tous les vents.
Le Monde, 12/6/57, p. 1.
(181)




Le Monde, 14/6/57 p. 1.
(183)
La crise continue by Andre' Chenebenoit i in Le Monde,
14/6/57, p. 1.
(184)
Le Monde, 14/6/57, p. 1.
(185)
Participation sans soutien, in Le Monde, 14/6/57, p. 1.
(186)






The only reproach the paper hazarded was that he did not use
the assets at his disposal to go further in every field, to get
to the truth. See Fauvet in Le Monde, 1/1/58, p. 1.
(190)
R. Lacoste: si des difficultês nous menacent encore, nous
avons parcouru la plus grande et la plus penible partie du
chemin. See Le Monde, 2/1/58, p. 4.
(191)
Creation de nouvelles communes, in Le Monde, 4/1/58, p. 3,
the prefects themselves were asking for political measures to
be speeded up in Le Monde, 5-6/1/58, p. 4.
(192)
The favourable coverage extended to Lacoste being hailed as
a saviour in the streets and being triumphantly applauded by
the "people" of Algiers. See Le Monde, 3/1/58, p. 2.
(193)
By R. Gauthier see Le Monde, 15/6/57.
(194)
Andre Morice: nous casserions tout gouvernement prét a une
politique d'abandon. In Le Monde, 7/1/58, p. 5.
(195)
L'Echo d'Alger, for instance, une reduction d'effectifs
serait criminelle. Ibid.
(196)
See Mesures de détente a Alger. 325 mesures d'assignation a
residence report6es du 13 au 30 decembre. About 20 lines in Le
Monde, 1/1/58, p. 4, while the news of imprisonment and house
arrests had been given negligible coverage, when it was not
omitted or even justified by the paper.
(197)






L'entente doit regner entre Francais et musul-
mans restes dans la grande majorite fideles A la
France. In Le Monde, 1/1/55.
Pierre Mendes-France's emphasis on the importance of the
number of Europeans in Algeria was outlined as well as the
concern to: dissiper les inguietudes ... [et de montrer l']
attachement A la France des populations musulmanes. See Le
Monde, 1/2/55.
(2)
Le terrorisme et la rebellion posent un probleme serieux
dont la gravit6 ne doit pas etre exageree ..., despite the
fact that it was admitted by the paper that: observateurs ont
soulign6 <<un glissement>> de la population, it was still
stating categorically, nearly one year into the uprising, that
the country had not slipped into generalised insurrection: Le
pays n'est pas en etat d'insurrection. See Pierre Albin-Martel,
in Le Monde, 8/6/55.
(3)
See Le Monde, 1/1/55.
(4)
See Le Monde, 4/1/55.
(5)
With very few exceptions such as Chenebenoit who, although
he did not see himself as an alarmist, feared the worst, pos-
sibly to justify recommending primarily a military effort. Le
Monde 28/2/56.
Le dernier quart d'heure in Le Monde, 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.
(7)
This theme could clearly be identified in this series of
articles written at the end of 1956 by one of Le Monde's spe-
cial correspondents, Eugene Mannoni. The latter wrote a series
of articles under the title, A travers l'Algerie en etat d'ur-
gence, the first of which dealt with D' Alger A Constantine.
Mannoni travelled to near Constantine by train and reported
from an army perspective. He brushed aside the troubles of the
area and a derailed goods train which preceded the convoy was
for him a "banale misadventure"; finishing the journey by road
with two hours delay was tantamount to nos ennemis sont legers.
A few lines later, he revealed that that was the only daily
train which used this "threatened track", whereas what he





major city had been severed. Le Monde, 11/12/56, pp. 1 & 5.
(8)
As in the following passage, for instance: les hies ont ete
coupes, les defections n'ont pas empeche les vendanges (...)
quelques trains deraillent mais /a plupart roule (...) si
toutes les routes ne sont pas sdres (...) aucune n'est inter-
dite (...).
Previously he had stated that: la vie s'ecoule, normale,
dans un cadre qui ne l'est plus. La foule oil les "communautes"
se ceitoient sans se fondre, apparaissait, placide ce dimanche-
la.
Le Monde, 11/12/56, p 1 & 5.
(9)
See relevant section in Chapter 12.
(10)
Le Monde was now admitting that severe repression took place
then bouleverses par d'atroces massacres d'Europeens et de non
wins sêveres represailles.
(11)
Le Monde, 12/11/56, p. 5.
(12)
Le Monde, 20/12/56, pp. 1-7.
(13)
See also Chapter 6.
(16)
Monde, 13/5/55.
(..) a exagerer l'etendue du terrorisme et la
gravite de la situation. Maunoury in Le Monde, 15-
16/5/55.
(..)tous ceux qui emettent ou colportent de
fausses nouvelles se font involontairement les
complices des hors la loi. Je demande a chacun de
conserver la tete froide et de reagir avec vigueur
contre les campagnes de demoralisation injustifiee
et singulierement dangereuse.
This statement issued by Soustelle after he visited a few
places in Algeria was faithfully echoed by the paper. It also
tended to reassure public opinion. See Le Monde, 14/5/55.
(17)
See Le Monde, 22-23/5/55.
(18)
The contents of Chapters 11 & 12 are very are very relevant
for our consideration here.
(19)
The philosophy of the paper was indeed based on this princi-
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pie that the readers were assumed to be mature people who could
make up their own minds about what was being reported. The
Fechteler episode (see Chapter 2) serves to further dispell any
doubts the reader might have about caution when the paper
believes in a particular philosophy. (Ibid.)
(20)
See also Chapter 5.
(21)
It was an attempt to avoid panicking public opinion and to
reassure it that things were not as bad as they could be. The
them could clearly be identified in this series of articles
written at the end of 1956 by Eugene Mannoni (referrred to
earlier, footnote 7).
(22)
Le dernier quart d'heure in Le Monde, 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.
(23)
A mere glance at the 1956 map given p. 143 in Opperman,
Thomas, Le problême algêrien, Maspero, Paris, 1961, based on
Time Magazine and Deutsche Kommentare, gives a very different
picture with zones under total rebel control, zones under
partial control and zones exposed to rebel attacks.
(24)
See Le Monde, 15/12/56, pp. 1-7.
(25)
See also supra p. 107ff.
P. Herreman was trying to propagate the same ideas when he
reported from the area of Orleansville which at the beginning
of 1957 was one of the most "terrorist-infested areas" in the
country.
(..)une des plus infestde d'Algerie. On ne
circulait plus sans risques sur les routes, les
fermes brillaient toutes les nuits, les attentats se
multipliaient dans certaines rues, les fellagas se
promenaient en uniforme en plein jour.
This was a recognition and an accurate description of the
seriousness of events, not at the time but six months to a year
previously.
These events were now said to have been remedied by success-
ful "psychological action", through the big campaign of signs
requesting the population to rally the French and asserting
that France would never abandon them.
Quoting a colonel, Herreman reported:
if "we" convince the Algerian population that we are not
going to abandon them then it " d'un seul coup va basculer de
notre ceitê". See also Chapter 5.
When the paratroopers came in February, he wrote, for a
month and half, tils] firent du renseignement and now "the
people in charge state that the rebels' infrastructure had been
destroyed, that the rebels had been sent back to the grottos
from which they only came out every now and again to cut down a
few posts." Le Monde, 23/7/57, p. 3.
(26)
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And it was stated that the army was leading it, giving the
best of itself, once it understood that there could not be a
military solution to the problem and that the conquest of the
population was at stake. The journalist stated that he had met
a team of young officers who spent several years as prisoners
of the Viets, who learned their methods, and who had told him:
LA oz les Viets ont reussi nous ne pouvons pas êchouer.
(27)
Describing the methods used, and deliberately forgetting
other military means, Herreman stated that propaganda was the
main one ("even if some were reluctant to use it, everybody
recognised its efficacy"). This propaganda was said to be in
written form -in newspapers, leaflets, posters-, but since a
major obstacle was the illiteracy of the people, the best tool
remaining was to be oral propaganda through loudspeakers, films
and so forth, "telling the people the fellagas want only their
misery. In P. Herreman, Contre la propagande et les pressions
du FLN des off iciers livrent bataille pour la <<conquéte des
coeurs>>, Le Monde, 23/7/57, p. 3.
Similarly, over six months previously articles had drawn
much from the theory of revolutionary warfare. Postulating
along the lines of Clausewitz that war was but the continuation
of politics by other means (and vice versa), and using Lenine's
and Mao's thoughts and theories on the subject, Le Monde
(15/12/56, pp. 1-7) stated that the "rebels" had also learned
about revolutionary warfare, without providing any proof apart
from describing their activities as being similar (ambush,
strike, distribution of leaflets, attentats, forbidding smok-
ing and "diluting" themselves amongst the "Muslim" mass to
strike again when appropriate).
(28)
The most critical opinions stigmatising the colonial system
came from intellectuals like Henri Marrou, Andre Mandouze and
Francois Mauriac, and are dealt with in Chapters 10 and 13.
(29)
It is, however, worth noting that the opinions expressed in
the "Libres Opinions" column only carry the weight of the
person writing to the paper, and sometimes do not get enough
credibility as they do not benefit from the official backing of
the paper. If Le Monde published such opinions it did not
necessarilly give them its seal of approval, nor was the paper
answerable for the content of the articles.
(30)
Whereby:
Un candidat Si qualifió soit-il ne peut af-
fronter le combat dans des conditions aussi in-
6gales, Le Monde, 9/2/54.
(31)
. For A.Meharra the choice in the Second College was decided
in advance:
Ii n'est ni celui des electeurs, ni celui des
êlus locaux. Ii vient d'en haut, pas m6me d' Alger
qui est dêpasse, il part de Paris, dict6 par un
ministre ou un home politigue influent, le plus
souvent representant de l'Algêrie. L'electeur dit
"Amen". Ii obtempére. L'abstention reste dans ces
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conditions sa seule arme de defense.
Mais alors....il y a une masse faite souvent
de mecontents qui n'est pas representee. C'est une
infime minorite qui dispose de ce privilege et ses
representants, par le fait d'un manque de liberte de
l'electeur, se succedent toujours a eux-mêmes dans
le Premier come dans le Second College. See Le
Monde, Libres Opinions, 9/2/54.
(32)
Bien que minoritaire, le courant oppositionnel
au sein du parti socialiste rejoint /a tendance
qui, sans porter une condamnation sur le fond de la
politique gouvernementale, estime qu'un congres
extraordinaire doit etre appele a se prononcer en
particulier sur les raisons qui ont empeche le
gouvernement d'appliquer la motion du congres de
Lille.




In La France devant ses perils et ses chances by Pierre-
Henri Simon, Le Monde, 4/1/58, pp. 1-7.
(35)
In Le Monde, 3/11/54.
Needless to say, the official reaction echoed in Le Monde's
reports was to treat the uprising as a "terrorist" movement
started by "bandits", "fellaquas" (Chapter 5) who should be
punished "without mercy" but also, with time, given the state
of poverty and destitution of the country (Chapter 3), the
rapid population growth, by some measure of economic reform. To
start with, the economic reforms were not to be implemented
until order had been restored.
(36)
Even if it were thought conceivable that the instigators of
the uprising could be disciples of Messali, the only well known
radical nationalist supremo at the time, this was said to be
unlikely as the paper stated that the actions did not have the








Mocking the chiffres fantaisistes of Cairo, spurred on by an
"Arab conspiracy" led by Nasser.
(40)
Perhaps it is not quite so surprising from a French colonial
perspective. Algeria had been a colony for longer than Morocco
and Tunisia; Algeria, unlike Tunisia and Morocco had a more
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important French population; and many French people claimed
that Algeria was part of France and not a colony.
(41)
Henri Laugier, Droit des peuples et souverainetes abusives,
Le Monde, 31/3/57 & 1/4/57, p. 1.
(42) Qui ne sent l'absurdite, l'offense A l'esprit 
d'une telle doctrine, brandie par tous les chauvi-
nismes, par tous les nationalismes exasperes, par
toutes les reactions du monde, y compris par la 




It was argued that, though, the "perfectionnement explosif
des techniques des echanges materiels et spirituels" there has
been a development of solidarity and interdependence between
states and nations similar to that found in a single city. As a
consequence of that, "individual freedoms", equated with a
"discretionary and unconditional right to install in any house
a reserve of explosives, a depot for poisons, a factory for the
manufacture of asphyxiating gases, a centre for contagious
disease" (fabrique de gas asphyxiants, un centre contagieux de
maladies) could not be legitimised since universal opinion has
recognised nationally that:
Le maximum de liberte pour chacun n'est assure
que par le respect d'un nombre important de restric-
tions A la liberte de reglementations acceptees par
tous, et si necessaires imposees aux refractaires
par la loi de la cite..., Le Monde, 31/4/57, p. 1.
(44)
Exceptionally, for economic reasons a shorter delay was
accepted by the Cartierists (trend of thought inspired by J.
Cartier of Paris-Match).
(45)
France's record in Algeria, it could be argued, was no
better with an illiteracy rate of over 90% for 1954, with only
9% being able to write. See E.O'Ballance, The Algerian Insur-
rection 1954- 1962, London, Faber & Faber, 1967, p. 24.
(46)
Ces populations desheritees qui parviennent &
l'independance sont menacees de sombrer dans le
desordre et l'anarchie, et, de ce fait exposees 6
subir /a dictature d'un homme ou d'une minorite.
This he called a troublante et cruelle verite.
(47)
The moral order he called le sens des valeurs and this
pseudo-democracy was described as confusion demagogique ... par
une egalite aveugle des droits, sous pretexte de democratie.
(48)
(acquerir] la maturite et l'experience indis-
pensable A l'exercice de /a liberte, mais il faut
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qu'ils sentent que le chemin passe par la culture.
11 appartient aux peuples dvolues de les aider avec
passion et desinteressement a acqudrir cette cul-
ture, en meme temps qu'a ameliorer leurs conditions
de vie et A briller les etapes qu'eux-mémes ont mis
des siecles a parcourir. Ii appartient aux peuples
attardes dans leur developpement de comprendre que
cette aide exterieure n'a rien d'humiliant, qu'elle
n'est pas une aum6ne, mais un droit, et qu'elle
necessite de leur part un effort continu, reflechi
et tenace.
Paul Rivet, Indêpendance et liberte, in Le Monde, 1/2/57,
pp. 1-3.
(49)
Les deux styles by P-H Simon in Le Monde, 21/2/57, pp. 1-5.
(50)
He praised also the work and attitude of Pineau and Sous-
telle [qui] se sont montres courtois et persuasifs... pane
droit et morale; ils ont plaide, dans le passé, l'action civil-
isatrice de la France; pour l'avenir, ses intentions humaines
et liberales.
(51)
rodomontades du colonel egyptien dont le monde
se fatigue, exces rhetoriques et fantaisies histori-
ques des avocats du bloc Afrique-Asie, que le prurit
nationaliste egara a leur tour.
Ibid.
(52)
Against those other papers arguing that negotiation was a
betrayal, that talks with Bourguiba and the Sultan should be
broken, that the government should act in a virile way which,
in his view, would only lead to la guerre plus dure, l'impasse
plus evidente, to broken promises and the return of the Alger-
ian question back to the U.N. and the failure of France.
(53)
oil le decoupage d'un territoire en departements
a moms d'importance que son integration economique
et politique A son ensemble.
Ibid.
(54)
Une France qui pane de culture, de justice, de
liberte, d'h6pitaux, d'universites, de routes, de
canaux, de chemins de fer, le monde ne demande qu'A
le croire; et meme a une heure oz.) ii sait qu'elle
cache derriere ce haut prestige seculaire la realite
d'une guerre cruelle et horrible, il lui accorde un
delai de credit, ii lui fait confiance pour rentrer
le plus t6t et le mieux possible dans la ligne de sa
vocation de faiseuse d'ordre et de paix.
Simon's wish (Ibid.) was to see the "good style" triumph:
le bon style, le bon sens, le vral patriotisme,
le sentiment de la grandeur solide et durable de la
France! Une hypotheque redoutable est levee. Un
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delai nous est donne pour sortir d'une guerre qui
epuise notre substance et ne grandit pas notre
prestige.
(55)
Pierre-Henri Simon, Les deux styles, in Le Monde, 21/2/57,
p. 5.
(56)
Urging a peaceful effort with the idea of associating France
and its partners and colonies in a "Eurafrican idea", the paper
thought that would ease the difficulties of the Algerian pro-
blem since that was:
plus sensible encore A la necessite d'aboutir
vite a un nouvel equilibre Outre-mer et de debou-
cher sur les sentiers de la paix en Algórie
In Un point de depart, Le Monde, 22/2/57.
(57)
Le Monde included the views of the Independents who had
elaborated a project of satut octroye with four regions, some
decentralised powers, new elections on the basis of one French-
man for two Muslims and equality between the two communities.
See Le Monde, 7/3/57, p. 4.
(58)
This was seen earlier when dealing with the army (Chapter
5). Juin had suggested conquering the hearts but also a piti-
less repression. See Impitoyable dans la repression du terror-
isme, nous devons en Algerie retrouver le chemin des coeurs
(published in Revue de la Defense nationa/e). See Le Monde,
7/3/57, p. 4. On that occasion, outlining the means of restor-
ing peace in a " territory which could not be parted from
France", Le Monde recalled that the causes of the tragedy
were: URSS, fanatisme pan-arabe, xenophobie,... expose moyens
de ramener la paix dans un territoire qui ne peut etre separe
de la France.
(59)
Who suggested dual sovereignty. The paper echoed his desire
to see his proposal of two sovereignties superimposed on the
Algerian territory, outlining and defending his principle of
souverainetes superposees. In Le Monde, 16/7/57 and 24/7/57.
(60)
Mais ii ne suffit pas d'affirmer aujourd'hui
que ces nationalismes et leur corrollaire, l'inde-
pendance sont perimes pour y faire renoncer des
communautes subjuguees, ou qui se croient telles.
Refuser l'independance au nom de l'evolution revient
pratiquer la politique de l'autruche. C'est nager
contre-courant et s'exposer a de sanglantes desil-
lusions.
Because the problem of conciliating two contradictory aspi-
rations remained.
qu'on l'aborde le problême demeure: com-
ment accorder aux uns a liberte a laquelle us 
aspirent sans l'enlever a d'autres vivant sur le 
méme sol? (his italics).
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(61)
le principe des souverainetes superposees 
permet, au prix certes de quelques complications, la 
coexistence sur un meme sol de deux communautes, 
libres, regies chacune par ses lois propres, sans 
amputation pour aucun des droits essentie/s.(his
italics)
Trying to find support for his new technique of co-exis-
tence, he wrote that if the government had the courage to go
along that path when preparing the loi-cadre everything could
be saved in North Africa with (...) la coexistence assuree dans
la liberte, l'hostilite de la majorite des Nations unies evi-
tee.
If they did not, then, his fear was that if France remained
prisoner of outdated formulae, pacification would not progress
as fast as the pressures of other nations and free elections
mnad not be possible for for a long time and it would then be
too late.
In Une technique nouvelle de la coexistence: deux souverai-
mtes superposees sur le móme territoire. by Jules Moch in Le
Monde, 24/7/57, p. 1.
(62)
There was a conviction that if Algeria were to get out of
the French umbrella there would be no doubt on the Republican
form of government that the nationalists would adopt, which was
said to be nearer the Tunisian model than the Moroccan one. But
it was thought that this system would be populaire revolution-
mire, and not <bourgeois>.
(63)
Les Repercussions internationales, in Le Monde, 26/7/57, p.
1.
(64)
P. Minay in his series of articles at the end of November
1955. See Le Monde, 24/11/55 to 30/11/55.
(65)
In a series of articles Au sud rien de nouveau by Alfred
Sawy, the first of which was I. Quelques donnees realistes du
probleme algêrien. Le Monde, 11/5/57, pp. 1-4 ff.
(66)
Le Monde, 11/5/57, pp. 1-4.
(67)
For him, France was bound to make progress along those
lines. See his second article in the series Au sud Rien de
nouveau, by A.Sauvy II.La France condamnee au progres. Le
Monde, 14/5/57, p. 4.
(68)
If genuinely implemented, this was thought to lead in the
not so distant future, given the Muslim population growth, to
French institutions, and Parliament in particular, being




Pierre Albin Martel in Le Monde,
(70)
Le monde, 11/10/55, p. 1.
(71)
And that is clearly why Le Monde was for it.
(72)
J.Fauvet, in Le Monde, 11/10/55, p. 1.
(73)
Acknowledging finally that the Algerian had a wish to ex-
press.
(74)
Le Monde, 11/10/55, p. 1.
(75)
Le Monde, 12/10/55, pp. 1-2.
(76)
M.Duverger in Le Monde, 12/10/55. pp. 1 & 2.
(77)




Described as impossible: parce qu'il n'existe pas en Algerie
Pequiva/ent de S.M. le Sultan ou de M. H.Bourquiba [ et parce
que] la nation algerienne est moms differenciêe que la nation
marocaine et tunisienne.
(80)
In his view, if federalism were to be adopted it should not
entail separating Algeria progressively from France but giving
to Algeria an appropriate statute within the French framework:
[Le federalisme] ne doit pas consister a deta-
cher progressivement l'Algerie de /a France, mais
dormer a l'Algdrie, a l'interieur de l'ensemble
frangais, un statut propre qui corresponde
originalite de sa structure et de sa situation.
(81)
It was a mistake in his eyes (a flaw in Soustelle's argu-
ments) to believe that total integration was possible. He did
agree, though, with the removal of the two Colleges and with
an increased representation of Algerians through specific
measures to ensure freedom of elections. See Le Monde, 24/1/56.
(82)
Le fait gue ces derniers [les Europeens] sont concentres
dans certaines regions leur permettrait d'ailleurs de conserver
des representants en cas de scrutin d'arrondissement. That
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should be followed even in the case of parliamentary elections:
en lui conservant, peut-étre pendant une periode transitoire,
sancaractere paritaire, lequel permettrait d'attenuer le choc
provoque dans les milieux frangais par la reforme precedente
(by increasing in the number of Algerian representatives). In
Le Monde, 24/1/56.
(83)
See Le Monde, 23/2/56.
(84)




Examiner la situation ne suffit plus, il est
grand temps d'agir, de poser clairement les condi-
tions et de mettre en oeuvre les moyens de l'indis-
pensable reconciliation.
See Le Monde, 21/11/56, pp. 1-3.
(87)
He was advising a bizarre operation of bribery, from which
it was difficult to perceive how a set of presents for the
birthday of the Sultan's son could solve the Algerian problem.




J. Le Moyne in Le Monde, 20/12/56, pp. 1-7.
(90)
Julien Le Moyne in Le Monde, 20/12/56, pp. 1-7. Anticipating
government action the next day, Fauvet also expected the PM to
act within a French framework. See Le Monde, 21/12/56, p. 1.
(91)
Meeting of the Mouvement pour l'Union atlantique succintly
reported by Le Monde. See Le Monde, 18-19/11/56, p. 5.
(92)
Speaking in his own name and not in the name of the institu-
tion, Le Monde hastened to add. Ibid., see also Chapter 10.
(93)
Le Monde, 18-19/11/56, p. 5
Le Monde also reported that M. Allais had taken part and had
made statements to the effect that the cost of French involve-
ment overseas was too high and that the benefits withdrawn
could be compensated by the establishment of an Atlantic mar-
ket.
It is worth noting that General Weygand protested against Le
Monde (in a letter), writing that the statements did not pro-
voke a "public outcry" (toile). He mentioned the different
protests by various pesonalities and also the fact that a
statement prepared in advance, to be issued at the end of the
573
meeting, did not meet with the approval of everybody. Le Monde,
22/11/56, p. 5.
When it published the letter the paper stood by what it had
printed and denied that there was any inaccuracy.
(94)
The treaty referred to ended the Seven Years' War. France
lost to Britain Acadia, Canada, St. Vincent, Tobago, Dominica,
Grenada, Senegal and Minorca, and to Spain, Louisiana (France
in 1763 regained Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West Indes as
well as the French settlements in India).
(95)




Some decentralisation leading to one of three directions: a
federal system with France and its colonies, a de facto Fran-
co-African union or a recognition of the right of independence
in stages, which would lead to a solution of a confederal type.
Georges Chaffard, Le Monde, 30/1/57, p. 3.
(98)
Ibid.
From La revision du titre VIII de la constitution devrait
etre l'occasion de reexaminer l'ensemble des structures de
l'Union francaise.
(99)
Blanchet, Savoir perdre une colonie pour gagner un dominion
in Le Monde, 6/3/57, p. 5.
(100)
He thought that if they had accepted the offer of elections
and if those elections had been free, that would have led the
movement to victory in the political field, "giving it a far
superior weapon than those of the military field where it is
now outclassed by France (us)".
(101)
Duverger in Le Monde, 22/2/57.
(102)
Sans le dire, par peur des mots, on est en
train de transformer la Republique francaise d'Etat
unitaire en Etat federal; on est en train de faire
des territoires d'outre-mer de veritables Republi-
ques federees. Ii reste a savoir s'il n'y aurait pas
un interet capital a le dire; si ces mots qui font
peur ne sont pas charges de prestige et de signif-
ication; s'ils ne peuvent pas creer un choc psycho-
logique et developper cette confiance populaire sans
laquelle rien de durable ne peut etre construit.
In M.Duverger, La peur des mots, in Le Monde, 6/2/57, p. 1.
(103)
A distinction was clearly established between Soviet repres-
sion in Hungary and French repression in Algeria.
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(104)
It may be useful to point out that the reader would find out
by deduction only that the "Muslims" were not treated equally.
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that such a recommendation
would transform the atmosphere.
(105)
M. Duverger, Impasse en Algerie?, 22/2/57, pp. 1-5.
(106)
Ibid.
One stage, expressing the will of a people for emancipation
and freedom such as in Europe and 19th century America (qui
gagne aujourd'hui	 Asie et l'Afrique), which was seen as
liberateur and progressiste and which he approved, despite the
risk of a temporary regression, lowering standards of living
and even a reduction of civil liberties, as even generous
paternalism constituted an alienation. The negative side to
this damaging growth crisis (crise d'originalite juvenile
entraine de grands dommages ...) was, nevertheless, preferable
to the maintien dans l'enfance.
The other stage likely to follow betrayed, in his view, the
egoism of a nation which refuses to accept that the boundaries
of its independence are constituted by other countries' inde-
pendence. Its main expression was said to be xenophobia, racism
and imperialism, when one formerly oppressed country refuses to
submit to demands of collective international life, wants
others to respect reciprocal arrangements which it does not
itself. This was the other type of nationalism, which, he
thought, was regressive and reactionary.
This could be found even within one country, he argued, to
fight the aspirations of oppressed classes or groups and main-
tain the privileges of a particular category, the myth of
national unity establishes common interests between the
«exploiters>> and «exploited» benefiting the former (oppres-
sors). Instead of helping to suppress forms of alienation, this
nationalism, he argued, helps maintain them and usually this is
accompanied by a shift from the Left to the Right.
(107)
Le Monde, 16/3/57, p. 1.
(108)
Looking at the violence mechanism between Europeans and
"Muslims" in Algeria and the mainland, Duverger wrote that not
all the liberals of Algeria were in prison and that there were
a lot of "ultras" in the corridors of power.
(109)
In a shrewd analysis of the status quo against reform,
Duverger wrote that the paradoxical situation was such that the
mainland's help was used to impose a policy opposed by the
mainland. There was a mechanism whereby public opinion was
pulled in a direction contrary to its wishes with the confusion
of the idea of reforms (wanted by the mainland) with the idea




See La Guerre d'Algerie et les Intellectuels Francais,
Cahiers de l'IHTP, No 10, November 1988, and Vidal-Naquet,
P., Une fidèlite tétue: la resistance frangaise a la guerre
d'Algerie, 206me Siecle: Revue d'histoire, April-June 1986, pp.
3-18.
(2)
Even politicians on the Left like G.Mollet and F.Mitterrand




See also Chapter 12.
(5)
See Cahiers de l'IHTP, No 10, op. cit., pp.14 & 18.
Even when politicians mockingly refer to them as "chers
professeurs."
(7)
Mauriac t s article La Question in L'Express, 15/1/1955; see
Fouilloux, Etienne, Intellectuels catholiques et la guerre
d'Algdrie (1954-1962), p. 64, in Cahiers de l'IHTP, op. cit.,
pp. 53-78.
(8)
Winock, M., L'age d'or des intellectuels, in L'Histoire,
83, November 1985, pp. 20-34, quoted by J-P Rioux, La guerre
d'Algerie dans l'histoire des intellectuels frangais, Cahiers 
de l'IHTP op. cit., p.21; See also M. Crouzet, La bataille des
intellectuels frangais, in IA Nef, No 12-13, October 1962-
January 1963, p. 50 ff.
(9)
The exceptional stands taken by Mandouze and Marrou are
dealt with in Chapter 13.
(10)
See especially Domenach, J.M., Un souvenir triste in
Cahiers de l'IHTP, op. cit., No 10, p. 241.
(11)
See Mauriac's views as reported by Le Monde, 23/2/57, p. 5
and 2/3/57, p. 4 (from L'Express).
(12)
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The war was referred to in the official terminology and in
most of the media only as the "troubles". This is well illu-
strated by the title of John Talbott's book, A.A. Knopf (1980),
op. cit.
(13)
Mauriac wrote articles in L'Express including a regular
Bloc-notes (Flammarion, Paris, 1958).
(14)
See Le Monde, 2/3/57, P . 4.
(15)
See Le Monde, 11/1/58, p. 4. All relevant quotes below are
from the same article.
(16)
See Le Monde, 17/1/58, p. 4.
(17)
Le Monde's article (19/6/57, pp. 1-6) which bore the same
title as Aron's book (La tragedie algarienne, Plon, Paris,
1957) was surrounded by official and army statements on saving
Algeria and discouraging the rebels.
(18)
Devoted to the "Algerian impasse".
(19)
Trend of thought (referred to in Chapter 9) which owed its
name to J.Cartier of Paris Match, and which favoured granting
independence to the colonies, seen as a burden hampering the
growth and development of colonial powers.
(20)
Soustelle, J., Le Drame algêrien et la decadence frangaise:
Reponse a R.Aron, Plon, Paris, 1957.
(21)
(...) le Servan-Schreiber des riches, le Maur-
iac de la sidêrurgie et le Claude Bourdet de /a
finance, ni les hommes auxquels il a donnó l'occa-
sion d'une <<relance>>: adversaires de la France,
communistes, progressistes ou autres intellectuels
fiers de leur cerveau, mais qui ne pensent peut-étre
pas assez a leur crane (...).
In Le Monde, 28/8/57, p. 5.
(22)
Ibid. Here, R.Gauthier seems to follow Soustelle's advice





See for instance Le Monde, 17/9/57, p. 4.
(25)
M de Maisonseul; see for instance Gouverner, Le Monde, 3-
4/6/56.
(26)
Apart from a few lines written in L'Express, picked up by Le
Mmde, 18/10/57, p. 7, in which he stated his firm belief in
the "association of the free and equal peoples of Algeria and
France" but also his hesitations about the ways of achieving
it.
(27)
Le Monde called him a representative of the FLN, 14/12/57,
p. 6.
( 28 )
Une /ettre de M. Albert Camus, in Le Monde 19/12/57, p. 4.
(29)
L'Express, France-Observateur, and France-Nouvelle; see S.
de Beauvoir: La force des choses, Gallimard, Paris, 1963, p.
406.
(30)
Peau noire, Masques blancs, Seuil, Paris, 1952.
(31)
Le Monde, 30/1/57, p. 2.
(32)
Portrait du colonise, Buchet-Chastel, Paris, 1957. See
M.Vaussard in Le Monde, 2/8/57, p. 4.
(33)
Signed D.P. in Le Monde, 14/8/57, p. 7.
(34)
Le Monde, 19-20/5/57, p. 13.
(35)
Domenach was opposed to any active support of the FLN any-
ray. See E. Fouilloux, Intellectuels catholiques et la guerre
l'Algerie, in Cahiers de l'IHTP No 10, November 1988, pp. 53-
78, p. 68.
(36)
J'ose ici proclamer les voeux solennels que je
forme pour que les Arabes expulsent energiquement
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les Francais de l'Alg6rie Si ceux-ci ne savent pas
la leur restituer dignement.
In Le Monde, 19-20/5/57, p. 13.
(37) quelqu'un se lêve aussit6t pour mettre en doute
-plus qu'en doute- /a capacitê des Arabes dans les




Yves Florenne, Revue des Revues: Algerie et socialismes, Le
Monde, 19-20/5/57, p. 13.
(39)
See also Chapter 12.
(40)
See Simon, P.-H., Contre
and Le Monde, 13/3/57, p. 2.
was not pro-Fin (see Chapter
trcmpe in Le Monde, 19/4/57,
la Torture, Paris, Seuil, 1957,
It is worth pointing out that he
6 and his article °a le FLN se
p. 1).
(41)
Servan-Schreiber, J.-J., Lieutenant en Algerie, Julliard,
1957, published at the same time as P.-H.Simon's book and only
reviewed by Le Monde on 29/6/57, p. 9.
(42)
Le Monde gave considerably more attention to books by Army
chiefs of staff and publications praising the conduct of the
army. See Chapter 5.
(43)
At a time when it became obvious to many that the army and
the police were resorting to systematic use of torture and
severe, indiscriminate and collective reprisals very often on
innocent civilians.
(44)










See Le Monde, 7/6/57, p. 3. The author's declared objective
was to silence the intellectuals and the campaign against
torture. The book, Contrepoison ou la morale en Algerie, Grass-
et, Paris, 1957, had incidently been secretely subsidised and
annotated by G.Mollet. See Vidal-Naquet, P., Torture dans la
Republique, Maspero, 1972, p. 68. Selected pages were published
side by side with Mollet's statements in the the official Revue
Militaire d'Information.
(49)
See Le Monde, 8/6/57, p. 3.
(50)
Cahiers de Temoignage chretien, 1957.
(51)
Which preferred to give its own "balanced" views (through
Serge Adour , October-November 1957) and was not that critical
of "Ceux d'Algerie" debates and book in Plon, presenting the
war effort and the conduct of the war under an extremely good
light. Le Monde 25/2/57, p. 3. There was a brief reference sta-
ting that Temoignage Chrêtien had published, and was subsequ-
ently in trouble for publishing, the Dossier Jean Muller. See
Le Monde 23/2/57, p. 5.
(52)
Simonin, A., Les Editions de Minuit et les Editions du
Seuil(...), Cahiers de l'IHTP, No 10, op. cit., pp. 147-166.
(53)
When he reviewed the article, without mentioning Le Monde by
name, Y.Florenne stated that he was not without any knowledge
of the reasons behind this major daily's refusal to publish
Sartre's article but denied that it was because of the position
taken on the repression in Algeria.
(54)
Vous etes formidables, in Les Temps Modernes, No 135, May
1957, pp. 1641-1647 and Situations, V, Gallimard, Paris, 1964,
pp. 57-67.
(55)
Revue des revues by Yves Florenne : Nous ne sommes pas
formidables, in Le Monde, 1/7/57, p. 13. The delay since May is
worth noting. All quotes below are from the same article.
(56)
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Accepted by the late Beuve-Mery in his article on P-H.Simon
above.
(57)
One wonders how, if one of the major papers was not helping.
(58)
Sartre in that very article Temps Modernes, No 135, op.cit.,
admitted as legitimate the condemnation of the events of Hun-
gary (p. 1646) as he had done publicly in November 1956. It was
also over Hungary that he broke away from F. Jeanson. See Jean-
son, F., Sartre dans sa vie, Seuil, Paris, 1974, p. 213.
(59)
J.P. Sartre donc, de la Hongrie, remonte
Buchenwald: Alger serait notre Budapest; et nous
aurions déjà rejoint le peuple allemand dans la
complicitê et la culpabilitê collectives totales.
In Le Monde, 1/7/57, p. 13.
(60)
Regardons la vêrite, elle mettra chacun de nous
en demeure, ou de condamner publiguement les crimes
accomplis, ou de les endosser en pleine connaissance
de cause. C'est pour cela que j'ai cru nêcessaire
de signaler au public la brochure des rappelês.
Voila l'êvidence, voila l'horreur, la nótre: nous ne
pouvons pas la voir sans l'arracher de nous et
l'êcraser.
In Temps Modernes, op. cit., p. 1647.
(61)
See Le Monde, 1/7/57, p. 13.
(62)
See also Chapter 13.
(63)
Jean Planchais in his interviews with the author, for in-
stance, but he is by no means the only one.
64
H. Beuve-Mery (recalling his meeting 18/9/58 with de
Gaulle), revealed in his book, Onze ans de regne, Flammarion,
Paris, 1974, pp. 10-11, the extent to which he was prepared to
go to preserve the "interests of the nation."
(65)
Hostert G., tine campagne n6o-colonialiste du Monde: Indo-
chine 1945-1946, des du Monde, Paris, 1983.
(66)
It would be wrong to believe, as J.-P. Rioux did, in La
France de la Quatriême Rêpublique, Vol.2, 1952-1958, Seuil,
Paris, 1983, p. 137, relying on an unsubstantiated reference in
J.-N. Jeanneney and J. Julliard, Le Monde de Beuve-Mêry ou le
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métier d'Alceste, Seuil, Paris, 1979, pp. 232-3, that the paper
favoured a negotiated solution and independence.
(67)
Schalk's reference to J.Talbott, op. cit., is in D.L.Schalk,
Algerie et Vietnam, p. 247, in Cahiers de l'IHTP, No 10, op.
cit., pp. 245-252.
(68)
Chatelain, A., Le Monde et ses lecteurs sous la Quatrieme




In 1848, 1871 and recently during the Second World War.
(2)
The erosion of civil liberties has already been extensively
documented by Arlette Heyman, in Les libertês publiques et la




Le Monde prepared its readers for the introduction of the
measures proposed for this piece of legislation and the reasons
behind them. On 20-21/3/55 it was announced that the Government
was putting the final touches to a text instituting a "state
of emergency" in Algeria, to be discussed in the near future.
(5)
See Le Monde, 20-21/3/55.
Le Monde claimed that legal and administrative "studies"
were insufficient to deal with the criminal activities of the
outlaws and put forward a long list of motives. These included:
desordre...quelques bandes de hors la loi
numeriquement peu 	 importantes, zones pro-
pices... hors la loi soutenus par.. propagande et
Olêments en provenance de l'êtranger... assassi-
flats, insOcurite...agitateurs accrdditent ... notion
d'impuissance de la France, ...troubles sporadiques
risquent de se transformer en insurrection
genórale....
See Le Monde, 24/3/55.
(6)
The paper also put forward the positive aspects of the meas-
ures.
Le dispositif juridique et administratif
insuffisant A assurer la securite de la masse de la
population contre les exactions des rebelles .... La
population court de grands risques a ne pas se
plier aux exigences des hors la loi qui sóvissent
clans certaines regions difficiles de l'Algerie
deviendrait inêvitablement complice ou victime...
finirait par se dftourner de nous par peur de
rdpr6sailles.
See Le Monde, 20-21/3/55
But since the paper presented the measures as if devised to
slow down if not eradicate rebel activity in the Aures area, it
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seemed ironical that Le Monde expressed the hope that the job
might be completed by the month of Ramadhan instead. See Le
Monde, 10/4/55.
(7)
An article reported, for instance, the arrest of 70 people
including an area leader, R. Bitat, and stated that terrorism
in Algeria had received a "serious blow": l'operation declare




See Le Monde, 24/3/55.
(9)
See Le Monde, 20-21/3/55.
(10)
Andre Chenebenoit, shareholder, co-director and journalist,
gave his views in a leading article. He saw the law as an
intermediary solution between Le Droit commun and a legislation
de peril national, applicable to the entire French territory;
as an intermediate form of legislation between l'Etat de siege,
equivalent to giving full authority to the Military and which
would "hold back the economic development" on the one hand, and
a normal state of affairs on the other hand, which did not
enable the authorities to deal with the situation in Algeria.
See Le Monde, 24/3/55.
(11)
Some of which were reported by Le Monde (see below).
A.Chenebenoit had a leading article dealing, once more, with
the measures and their justification, and which still presented
them as a middle of the road solution.
Ii n'en reste pas moms que voici la Quatrieme
Republique qui s'etait tant revee plus humaine et
plus pure que sa devanciere dotee en un tournemain
d'un nouveau statut juridique qui n'est ni le re-
spect sacre des libertes convenant a une democratie
sure d'elle méme, ni la	 suspension des garan-
ties civiques necessaires a la discipline d'une
nation en peril de guerre.
Although this could have constituted a reasonably critical
introduction to a discussion of the measures, Chénebenoit did
not intend to take the analysis any further. Instead, he adop-
ted the official phraseology:
Bref, selon l'expression off icielle un &tat
intermediaire entre le Droit Commun et l'Etat de
siege repondant a une situation intermediaire entre
le calme et l'insurrection
See Le Monde, 2/4/55.
(12)
or dispositif juridique
(...) laissant aux autorites civiles l'exercice
des pouvoirs traditionnels... les renforce et les
concentre de facon a les rendre plus adaptes aux
evenements ayant caractere de calamite publique,
susceptibles de mettre en danger l'ordre public ou





Despite the various claims and the prominent titles that le
Parlement reste souverain, the provision ( as well as the
discussion thereof) that outside parliamentary session, the
Council of Ministers could decide on the application and
implementation of the law, was not commented on . See Le
Monde, 2/4/55.
(15)
(..)possibilite de soumettre dans certains cas... delfts et
crimes a la juridiction des tribunaux militaires, in Le Monde,
23/3/55.
(16)
It was clear that Chénebenoit suggested that these measures
should be taken seriously and that these texts were, in some
respects, "worrying" (des textes inquietants), in spite of the
"justifications" presented. He looked at Article 11 which
implemented the general "disposition" of "a nation at war" (la
nation en temps de guerre 11-6-1938), Article 13 about military
tribunals' competence and the suspension of rights of appeal
(recours en cassation) and commented in Le Monde, 24/3/55:
Voil& on l'avouera qui est bien gros s'il ne
s'agit que de reprimer les coups de main des fell-
aquas de l'Aurês. On reflechira en tout cas sur
l'usage que pourraient faire en temps de guerre de
pareils textes un gouvernement et une Assemblee
dans une situation actuellement hors de prevision.
His worries were twofold: these measures might be too
excessive (On peut precisêment se demander si l'on ne braque
pas le canon pour ecraser une mouche.), and they could be
"subject of reflection" in hitherto unforeseen circumstances.
The overall concern, however, was clearly not about the mea-
sures themselves but about their possible use by a government
and an assembly in some unforeseen circumstances. Chénebenoit
was satisfied by the way the legislation had been enacted and
thought that the new law did not seem to bring any restriction
to civil liberties (libertes individuelles). He was even proud
that democracies could take similar measures:
C'est une source louable que doivent avoir les
democraties de s'appuyer sur des textes legaux
d'autant plus que les garanties republicaines sont 
assurees  aux citoyens
(17)
See, for instance, text of the law and articles, 23/3/55, p.
5.
(18)
See Le Monde, 24/3/55.
Mais elles [les democraties] doivent aussi se
garder si elles veulent vraiment mêriter leur nom de




In this instance, Le Monde did not behave differently from
any other newspaper trying to sell and justify a government's
legislation to public opinion.
(20)
See Le Monde, 2/4/55:
Mais le citoyen a-t-il lieu de s'inquieter
puisque tout repose sur la sagesse et sur la foi de
l'Assemblee, des assemblees que l'on espere inombra-
bles dans la longue suite rêpublicaine.
(21)
L'hemisphére au trois quarts vide ...
(1']absenteisme sevissait particuliérement sur les
bancs des Radicaux et des Moderes... A la fin vingt-
cinq deputes restaient en séance et les huissiers
votaient pour certains groupes.
( 22)
Les communistes, relayes par quelques socia-
listes et un depute musulman de droite, M. Bend jel-
loul ont multipli6 les interventions mais en pure
perte. Tous les amendements se sont heurtes a un
bloc sans fissures, qui n'a jamais ete inferieur
360 voix qui les a rejetes sans mot dire, pas plus
d'ailleurs que le gouvernement. En realite ii n'y a
pas eu de debat.
In dark print in Le Monde, 2/4/55.
(23)
It gave it a favourable coverage as it included a number of
reassuring statements from prominent personalities such as: La
mesure ne sera pas etendue a tout le territoire algórien ... le
Parlement reste souverain (Bourges Maunoury), 	L'Etat d'Ur-
gence ne heurte ni ne gene l'immense majorite de la population
(Papillon, delegate to the Algerian Assembly from Kabylia) and
finally, from Soustelle: Seuls les criminels peuvent redouter
la loi sur /'<Etat d'Urgence >.
Le simple devoir de toute autoritê democratique
est de mettre fin aux meurtres, aux attentats, aux
actes de pillage et de vandalisme.
Personne n'a rien a craindre sinon ceux qui se
rendent coupables de ces crimes... C'est la pacifi-
cation et non une repression que le gouvernement de
la Rdpublique entend mener a bien. Tous les Algêri-
ens exigent que ces dêsordres cessent avec tous les
maux qui les accompagnent. (2/4/55)
No position was taken by the paper against the disorders,
the irregularities, the traumas (interdictions de sejour,
residence forcOe, contrOle de presse, competence des tribunaux
militaires) which could and did follow.
(24)
Chénebenoit in Le Monde, /3/55. But the only area where it
was subsequently applied was Algeria.
(25)
In so doing the paper maintained that Algeria was an "inte-
gral part of France" and that there was no question of rêgime
d'exception, claiming that the present situation was not the
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only justification as these new measures would operate at
times of grave circumstances - fire, flood, earthquakes - when
the judicial and administrative system had proved innefficient
in the past. See Le Monde, 24/3/55.
(26)
See Le Monde, 24/3/55, and the discussion of the Libre Opi-
nion article to follow.
(27)
(Limiter le champ d'application). P.A.Martel, summing up the
spirit of the legislation, did so in terms that Soustelle had
used:
L'Etat d'Urgence n'empecherait pas la consulta-
tion d'être absolument libre...pacifier les regions
sous administrees, implanter l'administration..
forces de protection plus proches de l'habitant
organisations sanitaires et sociales qui font
defaut...
In Le Monde 8/4/55.
(28)
As late as 8 April, as one could read that
Le Gouverneur General ne pouvait en effet
ignorer que, saluee avec faveur dans certains
milieux europeens et dans la presse algeroise (sauf
le journal communiste), la nouvelle legislation a
ete accueillie avec inquietude dans la population
musulmane... les elus du Deuxieme College eux-mêmes
ont ete nombreux a s'en emouvoir.
(29)
"May reassure the European community." See Le Monde, 20-
21/3/55.
Apart from the explicit justifications for the law, there
was also an implicit bias in the presentation and the discus-
sion of the law and the explanation of the circumstances which
had brought it to the fore. Most of the readers of the mainland
would identify with the European community favourable to their
introduction, as opposed to the predominantly "Muslim" commun-
ity opposed to these measures. See Le Monde, 23/5/55/, 24/3/55,
1/4/56.
(30)
(...) l'implantation des Tabors marocains, de
legionnaires, de meharistes, de tirailleurs, le
retour du 18eme regiment de chasseurs-parachutistes,
le renforcement des autorites locales par l'instal-
lation d'administrateurs detaches et d'officiers des
<affaires indigenes> ( vocation civile), la coordina-
tion plus rationnelle des forces de l'ordre, l'in-
tensification de l'effort militaire (...)
See Le Monde, 10-11/4/55.
(31)
Aussi l'action des rebelles a-t-elle marque un
net ralentissement.
See Le Monde, 10-11/4/55.
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(32)
Even Le Monde itself had to admit it by adding:
On n'en deplore pas moms dans la region
aurasienne /a recrudescence d'attentats individuels
contre notables, goumiers, gardes .... informateurs
musulmans dont on a retrouve les corps, la gorge
tranchee, forme rituelle d'assassinat ayant un sens
religieux affirment un grand nombre de gens du pays,
musulmans ou non.
In Le Monde, 10-11/4/55.
(33)
Papillon: Elections completement libres. C'est le seul moyen
d'êviter les abstentions massives souhaitees par les separa-
tistes.
Soustelle's statements to the radio*	  calme securite...
l'Etat d'Urgence, loin de constituer un obstacle ... permettra
de faire prevaloir partout le respect de la loi... Toutes les
dispositions seront prises, toutes les garanties seront donnees
pour assurer a la vo/ontó des electeurs sa libre expression. In
L'Etat d'Urgence permettra de faire prêvaloir le respect de la
loi (13/4/55, p. 3).
(34)
Encore que la population et certains musulmans
reclament avec impatience l'application de /'Etat
d'Urgence. On peut se demander si ces mesures suf-
firont A les rassurer.
In Le Monde, 22/4/55.
(35)
La situation en Algerie ne laisse pas d'être
preoccupante. L'am6lioration constatee dans l'Aurês
a la suite de l'installation d'un dispositif admin-
istratif et militaire semble malheureusement avoir
ete comme compensOe par une aggravation sur le
pourtour et par l'extension des activites des hors
la loi dans le Nord Constantinois. L'implantation
des dispositifs adequats est autrement plus lente
que les mouvements des rebelles, qui sans dêlaisser
le terrorisme, en reviennent, a la faveur des beaux
jours, a une action guerriere par groupes atteignant
la centaine.
In Le Monde, 16/5/55.
(36)
(..)fait appel a des off iciers d'active ou de
reserve dont la qualite humaine et la competence
politique ne le cédent en rien a leur valeur mili-
taire. Ii faut evidemment faire face. Mais ni l'ac-
tion ainsi conduite, ni la loi sur l'Etat d'ur-
gence...ne paraissent avoir abouti au moms a
l'êchelle suffisante A "l'apprivoisement" recherché.
After L'Etat d'Urgence above Le Monde added in brackets:
qui va 'etre etendu a tout le departement de Constantine. This
was a very laconic and subtle way of introducing, without
commenting in any way, an extension of restrictions and suspen-
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sion of civil liberties. Ibid.
(37)
It was illustrated earlier and seemed very important for the
paper: Les Europeens, surtout les colons ne sentent pas leur
securite assuree. Were the Europeans the only people whose
security was at risk? What about the others that might be
affected? What about the negative impact which was appearing
clearly? The paper asked no questions. It therefore sought no
replies. See Le Monde, 16/5/55.
(38)
There were even echoes of Ministers being proud of having
voted for the measure. When Le Monde reported that the "Con-
seil general" of the Haute-Garonne had asked for the abrogation
of the state of emergency, against the wishes of Mr Bourges-
Plaunoury, it stated that when the SFIO delegate asked for the
abrogation of the state of emergency in the Toulouse congress:
Le ministre s'est felicite d'avoir fait voter
cette loi ... se declare decide a renforcer l'ap-
plication	 "c'est mon devoir, bons anus ... re-
cours a la fermete jacobine Si la situation en
Garonne .. semblable	 Constantinois... Contre le
terrorisme destructeur... methodes militaires: pas
de manifestation de faiblesse vis a vis de la
population. Les Francais musulmans d'Algerie sont
d'accord avec moi... sollicitent une action vigour-
euse. Nous ne fallirons pas a cette tAche.
In Le Monde, 4/6/55.
(39)
When a "North African" student was arrested (mis en secret)
and transferred to Algeria, Le Monde stated that it questioned
the Interior Minister, who declared that he knew nothing of the
affair.
The paper did not fail to publish the event through the
communiqué of the Union des Etudiants Algeriens de Paris, parts
of which included
... On transfere ... camps d'hebergement...
extension loi sur l'Etat d'Urgence aux Algeriens
residant en France juridiquement en dehors de la
z6ne d'application	 quiconque pourrait etre
arréte en France, transfere en Algerie	 soumis
exactions.
See Le Monde, 15/6/55.
After some legal abuses had occurred and the expulsion of
26 people from the departement of Oran, Le Monde also echoed
the appeal by 120 teachers and lawyers to public opinion by
publishing some extracts:
font appel a l'opinion publique	 denoncer	 la
loi dont la gravite est dissimulee a l'opinion et
au Parlement	 considerent que l'expulsion des	 26
personnes resulte de l'interpretation excessive de
la	 dangereux precedent que constituent les
mesures d'expulsion fondees sur des intentions
presumees «d'entraves a l'action des pouvoirs 
publics  ».
It declared that they considered
gue l'ensemble des mesures prises A ce
jour ... expulsions, z6nes de residence forcee,
contr6le de la presse, par leur caractere rdpressif
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et nêgatif ne sont pas de nature A instaurer un
climat d'appaisement et de détente. us en deman-
dent l'annulation pure et simple.
See Le Monde, 15/6/55, p. 5.
(40)
Libres Opinions did not involve the responsibility of the
paper because they did not bear the signature of any of Le
Monde's personnel, but that of somebody writing to the paper.
(41)
In the article Dans l'avant port du fascisme (see Le Monde,
28/4/55), which is worth quoting at length.
For Di Borgo, the 361 deputies, without debate, rewrote the
words of Mussolini:
Nous avons piêtin6 le cadavre pourri de la
dêesse liberte	 etat de siege masque.. etat de
siege ... non-existence d'un recours, pouvoir de
l'autorite administrative sans contrOle ni recours:
c'est l'arbitraire lêgalise.
The author was not criticising the implementation of the
measures, but their very nature:
contre l'audace et l'habiletê des malfaiteurs,
une dêmocratie ne lutte pas en supprimant le droit
des citoyens mais en dêfinissant mieux les dêlits et
les crimes en y attachant des peines plus sóveres et
en appliquant implacablement les lois.
He dismissed the widespread rumours that only criminals
should fear the emergency measures (Soustelle: seuls les crimi-
nels peuvent redouter la loi sur l'êtat d'urgence.) as these
powers epitomised:
Le pouvoir royal tel que Louis XIV ou Bos-
suet l'ont dOpeint ... en th6orie le mêchant seul
tremble, en fait c'est aux opprimês, aux faibles
qu'on cherche des torts.
For him many Algerians thought that, as far as France was
concerned, "repression was always in the present and freedom in
the future." Identifying with the Algerians, he went on to
say:
La cause des AlgOriens est notre propre
cause(title)... Les Francais se consolent parce que
nous n'irons pas en Kabylie.
Quoting Lincoln: (La moitie d'une nation etant esclave
l'autre ne peut demeurer libre), he commented:
Pour atteindre 600-800 personnes ... on a mis
hors de droit 1,2 million d'habitants.
And even here it seems that there was concern for the Eur-
opean population only (slip of the pen?).
He attacked the Assembly which he saw as acting against the
principle of liberty :
L'avenement de la tyrannie sera toujours physi-
quement possible mais l'Assemblde par son vote la
rendu legal... aberration... c'est une folie.
La dêmocratie doit s'elever plus haut, ou
cedant au vertige du racisme et du fascisme des-
cendre aux abimes oü s'êvanouissent parlement,
dêputes et citoyens.
La cause de ceux que des gens <comme il faut> 
nomment <bicots> ou <ratons>, c'est notre propre
cause; le meme glas sonne pour eux et pour nous.
He finished by quoting Condorcet (1789)
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N'oubliez pas que Si vous tolerez a l'egard
d'autres hommes la violation des droits naturels,
vous vous soummettez a reconnaitre, comme justes,
les principes de politique par lesquels, on cherche
a justifier cette violence... vous legitimez
d'avance les attentats que is tyrannie peut un jour
jouer contre vous... .
L'interet de notre stiretê comme la voix de
l'humanite vous prescrit de demander l'abrogation de
toutes les lois qui dans le pays soumis a l'Empire
fran9ais violent le droit de l'êtranger, du negre,
du serf, de is glebe. (Lettre A Messieurs du Tiers
Etat)
He aptly wondered whether his words (from letters to the
Third-Estate, quoted above) could not be rewritten in an Alg-
iers newspaper in 1955. See Le Monde, 28/4/55.
(42)
See Le Monde, 12/3/56 & 13/3/56.
(43)
As it did in the case of the "Law of Emergency", a year
earlier, (see above in footnote), Le Monde hinted (17/2/56)
prior to their adoption, that the government would later re-
quest "Special Powers" to implement "social and economic mea-
sures." No reference was made then to police or repressive
measures.
(44)
For some newspapers and many political scientists (including
outside contributors to Le Monde like Maurice Duverger) who had
a clear view of the Arab world, especially on the other side of
the Mediterranean, there was an awareness of the negative
impact of most measures introduced by the special powers. See
Le Monde, 13/3/56.
(45)
(...) user des droits de contreile et de police
les plus etendus. Ces mémes pouvoirs pourront etre
remis, le cas echeant, a l'autorite militaire. In Le
Monde, 20/3/56.
(46)
As it did so in the form of official terminology and slo-
gans:
Aussi le Ministre Resident va-t-il disposer de
pouvoirs et moyens fortement accrus dont il ent end
se servir pour le retablissement de la securite et
pour la reconciliation des deux communautes.
Ibid.
(47)
Some went further. R.Barillon thought the new law left out
only what had a purely political aspect, all the rest ( social
economic, military and administrative) was covered.
But the examination of the content of articles covering
special powers revealed, however, that they were mainly related
to increasing the ability of the government to deal with the
Algerian situation, through legitimizing the use of military
measures and calling up reinforcements.
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(48)
The worst thing being for him a majority without a clearly
defined policy, a government with full powers unable to make a
decision (Le Monde, 9/3/56).
(49)
See Le Monde, 2/3/56, for the text of the project on Alger-
ia.
(50)
For Fauvet, it was beyond doubt that these measures were
needed to increase the powers of the government and the Resi-
dent Minister:
(...) mais nul ne contestera que ni les dê-
clarations du gouvernement ni celles de ses contra-
dicteurs n'ont d'intêrét que s'ils conferent une
autoritê accrue au gouvernement, spócialement au
Mini stre Resident.
See Le Monde, 10/3/56.
Despite the fact, however, that he knew that government
policy had been the same for the previous three governments
since 1 November 1954 (this was always claimed to be the re-
storation of security and the implementation of some sort of
economic and social reforms), he argued that these special
powers would give the government means that the previous gov-
ernment did not have:
donneront a l'actuel gouvernement des moyens
d'action que ses prêdêcesseurs n'avaient pas, notam-
ment dans le domaine de la sêcuritê, depuis la fin
de l'etat d'urgence
The state of emergency was linked to the life of the pre-
vious government and had legally ceased to exist, but it is
doubtful whether that made any difference to the activities of
the security forces.
(51)
Having admitted that "many of the measures announced could
no doubt have been implemented without the need for special
powers by the government", Fauvet argued that the vote of spe-
cial powers would "at least break the resistance encountered so
far in some quarters." The resistance referred to seemed to be
that of the Europeans. One could not believe that they had in
any way presented any opposition to the restoration of order
before. Perhaps the statement was used merely to back up the
argument in favour of these means, with the hope that the
successor of Lacoste would not have to say like him: ce qui est
depassê, c'est le temps des promesses, ce qui est arrivê c'est
le temps d'une action ferme et rapide en tous domaines. See
Fauvet in Le Monde, 10/3/56.
(52)
It was made clear by official sources through Lacoste that
military measures did not depend on special powers. See Le
Monde, 18-19/3/56. This had been illustrated by one of Le
Monde's headlines which read:"sans attendre les pouvoirs spe-
ciaux le gouvernement envoie de nouvelles troupes en Algerie".
11-12/3/56 (by Gilbert Mathieu).
(53)
A quick reading of the article reveals that the action
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consisted essentially in military-related practical decisions
and repressive measures being taken (including press censorship
-see Chapter 13).
(54)
Le Monde reported that the use of the powers conferred by
article 5 (which clearly destroyed the remaining figments of
civil liberties) was designed to prevent "irresponsible acts"
which could widen the gap between the communities. Nothing
about the reforms or the social and economic measures was said
in this article, but only matters relating to the constitution
of a "task force", characterised by statements such as rêsolu
un effort militaire important, the government will continue to
send re-inforcements which would increase the size of French
forces, or on ne s'etonnera donc pas de l'ampleur des mesures
annoncêes par M.Bourgês-Maunoury (to acquire, for instance,
amongst other equipments, helicopters from Sikorsky and West-
land. See Le Monde, 17/3/56, p. 1).
A day or two later the paper enumerated the measures that
the government had to approve. These included some dealing with
social security and nominations by the Minister Resident of a
number of "Muslims" to lower echelons of the civil service,
new requests made to Prefects to ensure that the administra-
tion (especially clerks [petits fonctionnaires] since les
humiliations dont se plaignent les Musulmans proviennent sou-
vent des petits fonctionnaires) should work towards reconcilia-
tion -all meaningless measures in social and economic terms.
Other measures involving the security forces were prominent
here as well. It was stated that there was no intention of
establishing a state of siege in the measures dealing with the
restoration of order but there were, however, references to the
increased means at the disposal of the military, to troops re-
inforcements, a statement that press censorship would not be
imposed if there were voluntary discipline. Other items, such
as judicial decisions dealing with speeding up judicial proce-
dures and the implementation of sentences (European pressure to
carry out death sentences pronounced on Algerians and Alger-
ians' appeals for clemency in the hands of the President) were
all put under the heading of situation gêndrale.
See Le Monde, 18-19/3/56.
The few items relating to social and economic reforms, which
were included later, constituted limited and inflated official
statements and slogans. See La Monde, 28/3/56.
(55)
Mais, outre que les meilleurs rêformes ris-
quent, dans le climat actuel de perdre de leurs
effets auprês des musulmans... ii faudra autant de
volont6 pour, une fois la securite retablie, faire
prêvaloir les rêformes politiques ou institution-
nelles amorcOes par le gouvernement.
The fact that there was nothing concrete on the political or
institutional front announced in order for the Prime Minister's
statement to be implemented was a further indication that these
articles could have little importance except for propaganda
purposes. See Le Monde, 18-19/3/56.
(56)
Such as removing some of the limitations imposed on "Mus-
lims" access to secondary positions and schools (assuming they
were in a position to benefit), and introducing training cen-
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tres for civil servants.
(57)
They emphatically did not lead to any sense of equality
within society, and would not, in any sense, produce immediate
results. Most powers were of a repressive or a military nature
and were accompanied by the resignation of the "Muslim" presi-
dent of the Assembly, amongst others, who had been involved
with government policy since 1923. This led the paper to wonder
quite justifiably whether more would follow. And more did later
on.
(58)
These powers of repression which were quite extensive inclu-
ded the authority to suspend local councillors, to delegate
powers to the military, to create military zones and to detain
people or assign them to particular areas restricting their
movements. With few exceptions, referred to above, all remain-
ing articles dealt with military and police measures increasing
the authority of the Governor-General's office and their justi-
fication. There was no answer provided to the question framed
by the large headlines (were the powers likely to resolve the
situation?), but perhaps it was simply a rhetorical one. See




Previously given as being 380,000. See Le Monde, 1/3/56, p.
2.
(61)
Le Monde, 10/3/56, p. 2.
(62)
Some were of the opinion that the increase was too much of
an effort and a better use of the "fire extinguisher" was
needed, while others favoured a better "disposition" of the
troops already in the field. Ibid.
(63)
He established the need to be around 200,000 men, when the
number of those available for recall, the disponibles ( up to
three years after the release of the draftee, recalled by
decree by opposition to the draft, which is done by act of
Parliament.) could be about 295,000.
The French armed forces were reportedly the third largest in
the non-Communist bloc at about 900,000 strong, with North
Africa absorbing 38,000 out of 150,000 in the Air force, 14,000
out of 70,000 in the Navy. The land forces had 207,000 men in
the mainland, 86,000 in Germany, 61,000 in the T.O.M. and Indo-
china, 334,000 in North Africa, with 190,000 in Algeria,






After the vote of special powers, there were almost daily
articles dealing with increases in the number of troops and
recall of reservists. They gave various figures (See Le Monde,
30/3/56, 3/4/56, 5/4/56, 6/4/56, 7/4/56, 12/4/56, 13/4/56,
14/4/56 etc.) estimating the number who would be in Algeria
before the end of May at over 150,000 men, suggesting the
recall would take place the following month on 5 May. See Le
Monde, 21/4/56.
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Le Monde, 18-19/3/56, P. 1.
(67)
See Le Monde, 24/3/56. Lacoste stated that there was "rela-
tive détente since the vote", as well as articles by Fauvet and
others such as Penchenier in la chaudiere algerienne n'a pas
sauté, Le Monde, 23/3/56, pp. 1-5.
The notion of success is only relative, and has to be seen
in the light of earlier comments as a morale boosting, patrio-
tic exercise which would undermine hopes of victory by the
other side (see also Chapters 4 and 5).
(68)
These included collective sanctions against groups of people
and communities to punishment for "crimes" committed by persons
unknown, or for a refusal, or sometimes even inability, to
"cooperate" with the security forces by giving the names of
guilty parties. The authorities also declared designated areas
to be prohibited zones, and moved numerous people from area to
area, establishing what amounted to detention and concentration
camps.
(69)
See below as well as publications such as C. Paillat, Deux-
ame Dossier Secret de l'Algêrie, Presses de la Cite, Paris,
1962, P. Vidal-Naquet, Torture dans la Rópublique, Minuit,
Paris, 1972, L'Affaire Audin, Minuit, Paris, 1989, La Raison
d'Etat, Minuit, Paris, 1962, and Arlette Heyman, Les libertes
publiques et la Guerre	 LGDJ, Paris, 1972.
(70)
Although very obvious at an early stage (see Emergency and
Special Powers above), this became manifest during the battle
of Algiers and generally throughout the country in 1957.
See, for instance, the article of Le Monde, 22/1/57, p. 4,
which stated that: Les mesures exceptionnelles ont ete mainte-
nues, et les Algerois se sont plies avec discipline it l'ordre
prefectoral de fermer les portes donnant sur la voie publique,
pour eviter gue des terroristes puissent se refugier a l'inter-
ieur des immeubles.
(71)
Reporting that the Journal Off iciel of 9 February 1957 con-
tained a ministerial decree relating to public transport
authorising exceptional measures "necessary for the restoration
of order and the safeguard of the territory." See Le Monde, 10-
11/2/57, p. 3.
(72)
When, for instance, two Algerians were kidnapped and another
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one killed in the company of a European (Pierre Chambon), Le
Monde had no comment to make except for simply reporting that:
A Tlemcen un militaire europeen a ete tue de 3
balles de pistolet. Les temoins n'ayant pas pu ou
voulu fournir les renseignements que leur deman-
daient les enqueteurs ont ete condamnes a une amende
collective de 1 million de francs, payables dans les
24 heures.
A pretty harsh measure, considering the circumstances, for
punishing silence, let alone sympathies towards the nationalist
cause. See Le Monde, 23/5/57, P. 6.
(73)
This was part of the policy of anti guerrilla struggle
designed to deprive the terrorist ("fish" in revolutionary
warfare terminology) from the physical, geographical and social
environment, as well as logistic support (the "water") in which
they thrive (see also Chapter 5).
(74)
When reporting a new extension of these measures, the paper
would explain that the decision taken "prohibits stay or circu-
lation of any person in the area and implies its evacuation
within eight days from all persons living therein", recalling
occasionally that "the setting up of such zones authorises the
forces of order and the air force, in particular, to shoot on
sight any person found in the area". See Le Monde, 23-24/6/57,
p. 6.
(75)
In this kind of reports Le Monde shied away from making any
assessment of the impact of these measures. In this particular
case it stated that:
Il est malaise de preciser la portee exacte de
l'interdiction de circuler dans l'arrondissement de
Sidi Bel Abbes.
See Le Monde, 23-24/6/57, p. 6.
(76)
It could even be argued at this juncture that Le Monde was
helping to echo official views and denials against different
versions propagated by other sources.
In an article based on "precisions" given by the General
Headquarters of General Salan, Le Monde stated that a spokes-
man.
(...) apporte certaines precisions sur les
zones interdites du Nord Constantinois en particul-
ier du massif de Collo (East of Algeria), A propos
desquels des informations considerees comme inex-
actes ont ete publiees.
The report obviously elaborated on the fact that some of the
area (Djebels south El Milia) had already been a zone inter-
dite, that it had been bombed ten days previously and that the
people had already been warned by leaflet.
This and other flimsy reports took no account of illiteracy
rates in Algeria and the lack of efficiency of such means in
advising and warning the population. They illustrate Le Monde's
lack of touch, not to say ignorance on the matter, or perhaps
complicity in justifying that warnings had been given.
The report further stated that most of the people affected
by the evacuation (about 10,000) had been rehoused in surround-
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ing villages and in a camp at Ain Kercha. Le Monde, 29/6/57, p.
4.
(77)
It commented in small print that it was "known" (On sait...,
whereas the readers could not possibly know from the paper as
there had only been one or two previous references, that of
Sidi Bel Abbes above being a case in point) that numerous areas
of the kind had been created here and there in Algeria (un peu
partout) but that, except near the borders, their size was
generally small and that:
...leur relief tourmente empeche de surveiller
efficacement, et qui sont pour les fellagas des
lieux de passage et de sejour.
As far as that particular area was concerned the paper ex-
plained that it was the theatre for several "more or less
important" operations, the last of which, conducted exclusively
by air, had a <certain retentissement>. For the paper, the
operations reported the last few days s'inscrivent donc dens un
plan d'ensemble s'echelonnant sur plusieurs mois et visant
l'assainissement de cette region difficile (my emphasis).
(78)
The displacement of about 10,000 people in Les deplacements
de population dans le massif de Collo touchent environ 10.000
personnes , was given well under half a column of coverage in a
report dated 28 June from Algiers. In Le Monde, 29/6/57, p. 4.
(79)
This did lead to many cases of human rights abuses by order
of the Prime Minister, the Resident-Minister (Lacoste), the
prefects and the most subordinate authorities, as well as the
military in the field, who were granted the authority to detain
suspects indefinitely or to send them to civilian or military
tribunals and to commit many other atrocities outlined in this
section.
(80)
In A l'intention des autorites civiles et militaires M.
R.Lacoste precise l'application des procedures exceptionnelles
en Algêrie. Le Monde, 18/4/57, p. 3.
(81)
See Le Monde, 23/5/57, p. 1
It must be pointed out that in the discussions that prece-
ded the voting of special powers, Le Monde's journalists en-
quired about the duration of their implementation. They had
then established that these powers would automatically lapse
eight days after the election of a new administration. See Le
Monde, 8/3/56. On that occasion the report implied that it was
not optional, but compulsory, to request the prolongation of
the powers.
For those who had assumed, perhaps on the basis of informa-
tion previously given in the paper, that these powers would be
terminated after the fall of Mollet, Le Monde had a surprise.
The paper was now stating that this was only a possibility, if
the government felt so inclined. But for Algeria, the paper
stated that (as far as the prerogatives pertaining to maintain-
ing law and order were concerned) there was no need for a vote
in the Assembly to have these powers renewed -a simple request
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from the new government, not necessarily followed by a vote, no
later than ten days after the investiture was enough. See Le
Monde, 13/6/57, p. 7.
Thereafter, the paper reported that Lacoste was returning to
Algeria (after a visit to the mainland) to ensure the contin-
uity of the task and echoed most of his statements.
(82)
A number of Frenchmen, aware that the methods used by the
forces of order frequently if not invariably led to torture of
nationalists involved in the struggle and sometimes of innocent
Algerians merely suspected of having nationalist links or
sympathies, intervened to help those under threat in the name
of religion and that of the teachings of Christ. See Chapters
12 and 13 and various works which have been devoted to the
subject: Cahiers de l'IHTP, No 9, October 1988, No 10, November
1988, and Hammon, Herve & Rotman, Patrick, Les Porteurs de
valises: la Resistance frangaise a la guerre d'Algerie, Albin
Michel, Paris, 1979.
(83)
See Hamon, Herve and Rotman, Patrick, (1979), op. cit.
(84)
Prosecutions were succesfully brought against civilians
under offences such as threats to the internal or external
security of France, demoralisation of the Army as well as
membership of banned organisations. Apart from the arsenal of
legal measures given to the security forces by the Emergency
Law and Special Powers outlined earlier, offences were also
dealt with by a law of 29/7/1939 which, with few exceptions,
put them under military jurisdiction. Previous to the imple-
mentation of those measures in Algeria, such offences were
dealt with by the military, as in the Dreyfus Affair (1894), or
by civilian authorities according to the 1928 code. See also
the State of Emergency and Special Powers already examined
above as well as Heymann, Arlette, Les libertes publigues et la
guerre d'Algerie, Paris, LGDJ, 1972, pp. 67-140.
(85)
Algerian "terrorists" were not the only ones to be tried by
the courts in Algeria. Europeans from both sides of the poli-
tical spectrum were involved as well. There was at least one
case of right-wing terrorism with Europeans involved in pushing
the army reprisals and position further to the right and even
extreme right of the political spectrum. They were known as the
ultras. The only legal or disciplinary actions taken against
them and worth mentionning here were those of the Kovacs group,
who tried to assassinate Massu and missed, and the so-called
plot by General Faure. See also Chapter 5.
More importantly, a number of left-wing politicians, a
number of groups on the left of the political spectrum, were
arrested, both in France and Algeria, for their political
positions. They were dealt with by the military authorities
under the charge of atteinte A /a sdrete exterieure de l'Etat.
(86)
When it was not dispensed with altogether in the process,
the books by military commanders and soldiers, such as Argoud,
A., La decadence, l'imposture et le tragedie, Fayard, 1974;
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Paul Henissart's Wolves in the City; the death of French Alger-
ia, Rupert Hart-Davis, 1970; Massu l s Ma bataille d'Alger....
Salan, R., Mêmoires d'Empire, Presses de la Cite, 1972; Hov-
ette, P., Capitaine en Algêrie, Presses de la Cite, 1978;
Larteguy, J., Les Centurions, and Les Prêtoriens, Presses de la
Cite, 1961, illustrate through recounting their experiences,
the reality of the war.
(87)
Professor at the University of Algiers accused of collabora-
ting with the terrorists after writing an article in the "Free
Opinion" column of Le Monde. See Le Monde, 11-12/11/56. He was
arrested on 26 November 1956.
(88)
The same thing happened to Marrou. See Chapters 10 and 13.
(89)
He asked those in the press who had an influence on public
opinion in Algiers to weigh their responsibilities and, like
him, not to interfere with the course of justice by developing
"their propaganda and hatred campaigns." He reminded people
that an essential condition of the solution of the Algerian
problem was a sincere effort of rapprochement between the
spiritual families that make up Algeria.
L'Archevdque d'Alger: une condition essentielle
de la solution est un effort sincere de rapproche-
ment entre les families spirituelles qui composent
l'Algerie, in Le Monde, 1/8/57, p. 4.
A programme of peace and cooperation, it was stated, had
been demonstrated by the various religious authorities in
September 1955, the Pope, on 13 February 1956 and 21 April
1957, and was more essential now than ever before. Le Monde did
not feel that it ought to take the defence of those being
tried, in the same way as the highest Church authority in
Algeria, because of his "respect for Justice" and for the
consciences of those standing trial before military tribunals
in Algeria, was refusing to commit himself as to whether
"errors or imprudences" had been committed. Ibid.
(90)
The comments of the editorial of L'Echo d'Alger on the
mandement of Monsignor Duval could be found in Le Monde,
3/8/57, P. 4.
The Algiers newspaper asked whether it was possible for some
"masters of thought" to serve God without working against the
motherland and the human ideal that it protects, and pointed
out that, as far as rebuilding the country, nobody had said
that it could be done without actually basing this reconstruc-
tion on the mutual friendship and respect of the communities
which "make up its soul". Sarcastically, L'Echo d'Alger commen-
ted that a "curious ideal" was being served and advised that in
order to rebuild the friendship between the two communities the
progressive Christians could chose better partners than the
"killers and executioners of the FLN."
In L'Echo d'Alger commente le mandement de Mgr Duval in Le
Monde, 3/8/57, p. 4.
(91)
When reproducing news of the arrest of Europeans, Le Monde
very often used AFP press releases, which invariably described
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those arrested as communists and/or terrorists ( One report of
Le Monde referred the readers back to the AFP release dated 27
March; 6 militants ou sympathisants communistes. In fact that
day the paper had headed the article, Arrestations A Alger pour
recel, malfaiteurs et atteinte sdretê Etat (sic.), 27/3/57, p.
2) and generally gave them labels which would not raise any
suspicion for the reader. It was only after receiving letters
of protest that the content of the protests was made known to
the readers, although the misrepresentation was not rectified.
For instance, a letter of RP Pierre de Bosville, protesting
against the use of the communist label applied to an "exemplary
Christian", the teacher, Robert Malan (Professor at the lycee
Ben Aknoun). Le Monde wrote that day that M. Jolivet (profes-
seur agrege de Philosophie) had requested the same correction
for Malan and another teacher arrested with him, Lucien Hergot.
See Le Monde, 28/3/57, p. 2.
Le Monde learned nothing from this and continued to repro-
duce the same kind of reports (in Des communistes ou sympathi-
sants et des trafiquants d'explosifs sont arrOtas en Algerie,
Le Monde, 14-15/4/57, p. 2.) when the paper wrote that about
twenty Europeans belonging to the communist or a progressive
milieu were accused of s'être consultês et organisês at in de
diffuser des brochures et des tracts portant atteinte au moral
de l'arm6e. As we see clearly here, Le Monde more readily took
the version given by the official authorities as a reliable
source, and was thus jumping the gun in being quick to judge by
writing in its reports that the author of such an incident had
been arrested. "The author of the attack" (attentat) of Mn
Temouchent arrested", in Le Monde, 14-15/4/57, p. 2.
(92)
The flimsy and flawed sources and terminology could easily
be illustrated. News of the arrests, when made public, were
given to the readers by Le Monde, using the official termino-
logy and versions through the publication of official state-
ments, AFP press releases and information given by military
sources.
Le Monde would, for instance, publish an AFP press release
stating that "twenty-nine Communists" and a soldier had been
arrested under the euphemism of: se sont vu notifier des
mesures d'ordre administratif, adding, however, that the commu-
nique stated that "they would be detained in the centres of
Lodi and Berrouaghia. See Le Monde, 28/11/56, p. 5.
It would not be until the next day, sometimes much later on,
that further information was given, revealing that amongst the
thirty people arrested there was only one communist, the dele-
gate to the Algerian Assembly, M. Justrabo, as well as two
journalists of Alger Republicain. See Le Monde, 29/11/56, p. 5.
(93)
This was illustrated by the fact that in its reports of
military activities, Le Monde lost no time in describing the
various people arrested as guilty of whatever they were accused
of. When the army declared that a network of terrorists had
been destroyed, the paper used the same register and words
without putting into question the veracity or the accuracy of
the incidents described. See, for instance, Le Monde 30/1/57,
p. 2.
Another example could be found at the time of the arrest by
the military authorities of Badeche for being the assassin of
A. Froger. i.e Monde referred to him as such when it reported
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that he was under interrogation lasting all night when he had
not even been charged. It continued to refer to him as such
well into his trial, when it was revealed that his confessions
were obtained under duress while in detention and were now
being retracted. See Le Monde 11/4/57, p. 4 and 29/5/57, P. 3.
A further example of those being convicted in the paper's
reports prior to their trial could be found in Le proces des 37
accuses d'Oran, in Le Monde 28-29/7/57, p. 2, which became that
of the 37 communistes, with the added information that the
accused women had praised Algerian resistance in the next day's
headline. Une inculpee fait l'apologie de la <<resistance
algerienne>> in Le Monde 30/7/57, p. 4.
The same applied in many trials in which Le Monde itself
wrote that the people concerned had actually committed what
they were accused of (the Gauthron couple for sheltering Ben
Khedda and Melle Nelly Forget for sheltering Raymonde Peschard)
in Le Monde, 4/4/57, p. 4 -before the people even appeared
before the courts and were charged. Le Monde 5/4/57, p. 2.
But when the accusation fell apart in the courts, Le Monde
readjusted its coverage. When reporting on the trial of Chre-
tiens progressistes (see Le Monde, 23/7/57, p. 2, 24/7/57, p.
2), the paper ended up by stating that the affair was reduced
to more modest proportions, occupying a reduced media coverage,
having been exaggerated from the start through a "clumsy jour-
nalistic montage" (not of its own making, of course). The paper
wrote that the accusations and suspicions against the young
Europeans and Muslims had evaporated. It expressed satisfaction
that the proceedings had been conducted in an orderly fashion,
in contrast with those of the trials of Bouhired and Bouazza.
The paper allowed itself to express concern about the fact that
des faits, des accusations, dont i'inconsistance est au-
jourd'hui off iciellement reconnue aient pu trouver credit. If
some had been cleared of the crimes they were accused of having
committed, uncertainty remained as to the fate of some Eur-
opeans and "Muslims" denounced as guilty, before any trial had
taken place.
(94)
Corrections often only came with 11 4.0.5*.es-	 /Z3k2-1113/54A,2-) 20M
WC+) e, avst) 213/52/19Z.
(95)
A different page arrangement "Faits divers", for instance,
for if these were really considered as criminals why shouldn't
they be there?
(96)
The combination of attentats and arrests could be found in
various articles of Le Monde, 23/3/57, P. 2, terrorism, death
sentences and further trials 30/3/57, p. 6, terrorist acts, ar-
rests and death sentences executions, 24/5/57, p. 3, 3/8/57, p.
4, 4-5/8/57, p. 3, 8/8/57, p. 4, 11-12/8/57, p. 3, 13/8/57, p.
7, 8/1/58, p. 5, 9/1/58, p. 4. Other combinations included high
rebel losses and arrests, Le Monde, 12-13/5/57, p. 3, and
higher rebel numbers and Moroccan help. Le Monde, 24/5/57, p.
1.
(97)
It was argued that if these had been available in France in
the past, they would have avoided "deplorable errors", that the
presence of three civilian judges was enough to safeguard the
freedom of the individuals and their liberties.
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In its article, signed M.O., Le Monde wondered with M Patin,
whether it would not be better if the trial of offenders guilty
of crimes against the state were dealt with entirely by mili-
tary tribunals. Agreeing with M Patin, the paper seemed to
think that the system was safe enough to protect the interests
of the individual, even though the opposite could be argued as
the neutrality of the military judges was taken for granted
when in fact they were trying their enemies.
The proposals to get civilian judges involved at the invest-
igative stage, put forward here, was only designed to fulfill
the military's expectations for their burden to be made lighter
and their desire not to become too involved as well as to
prevent inconsistencies. The arguments developed by Patin, in
Recueil de Droit Penal, arguing in favour of putting the mili-
tary in charge of the procedure relating to offences against
the security of the state, were shared by Le Monde. The paper
echoed his ideas and concluded that his comments would be
"attentively examined". In La repression des atteintes A la
sdrete exterieure de l'Etat doit-elle etre confide intdgrale-
ment aux tribunaux militaires?. See Le Monde, 25/10/56.
The paper never questioned in any way whether the action
fitted the crime, whether this was a criminal or a political
matter, the expression of a political opinion or an actual
crime committed against the state.
It was also obvious in the case discussed that, given the
court's composition, the system allowed for conviction and
sentencing which could be easily achieved by the six military
judges over the three civilian ones. All were valid arguments
which could be easily used to undermine the idea that the
system was safe enough to protect the interests of the individ-
ual.
(98)
Some of the trials reported involved some of the most
"faithful friends" of France and staunchest allies of the
system which ended in convictions that were very tenuous
indeed; the Bachagha Boutaleb was accused of hiding bombs
(hidden in the wall in his absence) and for having had contacts
with FLN leaders, which, he claimed, were made with the full
knowledge of the authorities. Although it did not seem contes-
ted at all, by the authorities in Algeria as well as several
personalities, that this was indeed the case, Le Monde did not
seem to think it worthwile offering a comment, let alone argu-
ing his case. See Le Monde, 28/6/57, p. 7.
But despite being cleared of "possession of explosives",
the bachagha was sent down for 10 years (Le Monde, 5/7/57, p.
4) for holding contacts with an "association of miscreants." Le
Monde's assessment was that this showed an "attempt to discour-
age even those who, under the cover of high authorities (La-
coste), would interpose themselves for negotiation". The only
comment the paper made was to ask whether the Minister-Resident
had indeed authorised the contact. Le Monde, 5/7/57, p. 4.
(99)
Le Monde never saw fit to ask questions about the number of
arrests concerning women (5/4/57, p. 2 & 27/4/57), doctors
(26/3/57, p. 6), intellectuals (24-25/3/57, p. 3), professors
(17/4/57, P. 4), lawyers (19/4/57 & 24/4/57), Communists
(19/4/57, p. 4), and even former army officers (19/4/57, p. 4 &
23/4/57, p. 2) which, perhaps, should have led the paper to
express concern for the measures being implemented. If the
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measures and the arrests were not being questioned, one would
have expected the paper to wonder at least about what was
leading to the arrest of so many people, who are usually not
associated with the criminal layer of society but more with
its most respectable few.
(100)
See the case outlined above, footnote 93.
(101)
Only one European, M.Coudre, was given a non-suspended
sentence of two years and all the others were acquitted or
received suspended sentences, while most of the Algerians
received between one and ten years'jail sentences. See below.
(102)
This was done despite the acknowledged violent criticism of
the lawyers and their pleas to the judges, describing the image
of solidarity between the members of two different communities
as "tomorrow's Algeria", being reported.
Discussing the trials and the subsequent sentences, Le Monde
wrote that the accused would have liked the serene atmosphere
of the proceedings and the efforts made to clear the Catholics
of the accusations against them to have benefitted their Muslim
friends, but the difference, the paper commented, was that:
Mais, alors gue les uns avaient seulement obei
a leur souci de preserver la fraternite scellee
dans les bidonvilles. Les autres avaient choisi
deliberement de porter atteinte a l'integrite du
territoire. us ont d'ailleurs, en fin d'audience,
fait de solonnelles professions de foi FLN.
Bernard Poirot-Delpech in Le Monde, 25/7/57, p. 2.
(103)
Le Monde, 25/7/57, p. 2. Many of the trials reported were
to end with very heavy sentences including many death penal-
ties. But they received far less significant coverage than, for
instance, the death sentences in Hungary which were highligh-
ted. When reporting the news of the death sentence of Mozeff
Petrus, rebellion leader in the Pecs uprising (South West of
Hungary) the previous March, Le Monde added that, according to
Dunantuli Nap/o, 21 accomplices were sentenced to up to 15
years. In Les condamnations a mort continuent en Hongrie, Le
Monde, 1/7/57, p. 6.
The latter article was in bold characters (dark ink) and
spread over two columns, while reports of "Algerian" executions
and death sentences were given a few lines. See, for instance,
news of the sentence to death of "five terrorists" in Le Monde,
20-21/1/57, p. 4, and news of two sentenced to death in Alg-
iers, Le Monde, 8/5/57, p. 4.
(104)
With very much a low profile (Le Monde, 27/4/57, p. 4).
Badeche's lawyer, Me Gisele Halimi, was not acceptable to the
court and not acknowledged as a registered lawyer by the presi-
ding magistrate despite being registered (it was pointed out in
a footnote that she had been registered). See Le Monde,
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27/4/57. The paper did publish, however, the subsequent com-
plaint by William Thorp against the procedure. See Le Monde,
9/5/57, p. 6.
(105)
Les droits de la defense en Algerie, in Le Monde, 28/6/57,
p. 7. There were also protests by a M.Thorp (Le batonnier Thorp
proteste aupres de M.Coty contre l'internement des avocats
d'Algrerie, stating that he was "against measures -l'internement
administratif- taken against lawyers practising in Algeria),
and by left-wing organisations (ainsi que la Nouvelle Gauche
contre ...inculpations de plus en plus nombreuses dont font
l'objet les democrates francais qui preconisent une solution
pacifique du probleme algerien par la negociation et la recon-
naissance du fait national algerien... proteste contre
multiples entraves apportees au droits de la defense en Algerie
et notamment contre l'arrestation systematique des avocats
deenseurs des militants algeriens). In Le Monde, 28/2/57.
More technical difficulties were also put in the way of
those being tried, and Le Monde reported complaints sent to it
about lawyers unable to see their clients (Trois avocats se
plaignent de ne pouvoir defendre leurs clients -including
J.Verges- in Le Monde, 8/8/57, p. 4) or irregularities of the
trials themselves. There were some complaints of irregularity
by defence lawyers dating from the previous year, 26/11/56.
The number of similar incidents reported was also high at
other times but there was hardly any comment. See Le Monde,
13/7/57, p. 5, 2/3/58, p. 2.
(106)
See Le Monde, 14/2/57 and 27/4/57, p. 4.
(107)
This was the time when people such as J.Verges became known
for standing up and criticising the judicial system. This no
doubt sowed the seeds to the most controversial career which
led to this lawyer's fame/notoriety. The paper reported that
J.Verges had written to Capitant to protest that his client,
Djemila Bouhired, had been kidnapped by the paratroopers and
neither he, nor her family, were able to contact her. This wa
reported by Le Monde (23/4/57, p. 2).
(108)
Except in statements of politicians or outsiders to the
paper.
(109)
See Le Monde, 8/2/57, p. 2 and also below (Chapter 13).
(110)
See Le Monde, 5/4/57, p. 2.
(111)
34 europeens et 12 musulmans devant le tribunal militaire
a Alger et A Oran, in Le Monde, 27/7/57, p. 2. But the paper
chose to headline on the themes or statement of the Prosecution
(Au proces des 37 accuses d'Oran il ne s'agit pas de savoir
s'il y a eu ou non des sevices mais Si les proces verbaux sont
vrais ou faux affirme le commissaire du gouvernment - report
from special correspondent) and not on the prosecutorsimethods,
such as his use of a photograph out of a newspaper showing a
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terrorists' victim (with no relation to the case). The paper
did not exhibit a strong interest in finding out whether detai-
nees had indeed been subjected to inhuman treatment. Le Monde,
28-29/7/57, P. 2.
In a similar case, on the basis of reports of trials from
its correspondent, Le Monde chose to headline items such as the
remarks made by the Substitut Bosquet Nous ne sommes pas ici
pour juger Sainte Evelyne, martyre, mais Evelyne Lavalette,
complice des rebelles. When the defendant maintained her accu-
sations of mistreatment against the police, the paper highligh-
ted the response of the President of the court to another
defendent's complaints of injustices she had always suffered
from, which was that the injustices that she seemed to have
suffered from did not prevent her from gaining her Baccalaureat
and access to the University. In Le Monde, 24-25/3/57, p. 3.
(112)
Le Monde, 22/2/57, p. 4.
(113)
There were even clear cases of miscarriages of justice when
death sentences were pronounced and carried out on people who
later appeared to be innocent. Le Monde reported, on the basis
of an AFP release, the trial and death sentence (11/4/57 and
13/4/57) of M.Amedee Froger's "assassin", stating that he had
claimed that he was innocent and that the statement of his
previous admission had been extracted under duress, adding that
no witness for the prosecution had recognised him but that two
witnesses presented for the defence had clearly identified him.
The paper reported later on the submission of his appeal and
its rejection in Le Monde, 13/4/57, 23/4/57, 27/4/57, p. 4.
(114)
Fernand Iveton believed in the struggle (with the "Muslims")
of Algeria to free the country from the colonialist domination.
He was arrested (13/11/56) for putting an explosive device in
the gas plant where he worked and he was tried by a military
tribunal, which sentenced him to death despite his repeated
claims that the device was not designed to maim anybody as it
was set to go off at a time when it could only result in damage
to the installations. Despite the defence's claim that it did
not have time to study the case properly and that the atmo-
sphere of that time could not be conducive to a fair trial, Le
Monde's comments was that the death verdict (25/11/56) had been
warmly applauded by the large audience (report cabled from
Algiers on 26 November 1956 by special correspondent, in Le
Monde 27/11/56). Further information was given about the
devices used in Le Monde, 30/1/57, p. 2.
When he was executed, with two other "terrorists", the paper
seemed to have forgotten it was an attempt to blow up an unin-
habited gas plant as it stated that he had been sentenced to
death for tentative de destruction, a l'aide d'explosifs,
d'ddifices servant a usage d'habitation. The report was dated 9
February and published by Le Monde, 12/2/57, p. 3.
See also Jean-Luc Einaudi, Pour l'Exemple: l'affaire Fernand
Iveton, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1986,
(115)
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However Le Monde did echo some protests and appeals by third
parties, such as the one made by the Comite pour l'amnistie des
condamnes politiques d'Outre-Mer. This was done through its
president, Louis Massignon, who addressed a letter to the
President of the Republic: adjurant devant la menace de la
recrudescence d'executions capitales en Algerie <<de ne prendre
conseil que des exemples de noblesse et de grandeur que la
France a donne au monde>>. This request was said to have been
then passed on by M. Coty to the Conseil Superieur de la Magi-
strature. See Le Monde, 21-22/7/57, p. 2. There was another
very small article of about 12 lines, including the title in
small print: Un appel contre les executions capitales.
(116)
For instance, Me Yves Dechezelles wrote to France-Observa-
teLIT wondering whether appeals for clemency had any point at
all when executions were being carried out despite a consider-
able element of doubt remaining with some of the convictions.
The lawyer also explained that executions were carried out even
if the intended victims of the "terrorists" were not killed.
Expressing the view that political motives were not at all
taken into consideration, he also wondered whether he should
not turn down requests for defence from clients because he was
notable to ensure that they would be properly defended.
Although Le Monde was not the paper in which these requests
were made, it has to be pointed out that the paper did include
them in its coverage, thereby informing its readers of their
existence. See Le recours en grace a-t-il encore une significa-
tion pour les condamnes a mort algeriens? demande un avocat
prisien dans France-Observateur (2/8/57, p. 4).
The paper reproduced leaflets from the FLN for the attention
of the same readers threatening reprisals if the French author-
ities went ahead with the executions. See Le Monde, 2/8/57, p.
4.
(117)
Changes in the justice system in Algeria giving powers to
Army officers were hardly commented upon. See Les pouvoirs de
justice militaire sont modifies en Algerie ( Modification of
22/12/53 decree). In Le Monde, 3/4/57/3, p. 3.
(118)
See Le Monde, 2/3/57.
(119)
Le Monde published a supportive article (2/4/57, p. 1) in
which Maurice Garcon (de l'Academie) concluded overall that: La
reforme proposee est heureuse. Ii faut souhaiter qu'elle inter-
viEmme vite.
But he insisted on the sanctity of individual civil liber-
ties.
Si la detention preventive se justifie parfois,
/a liberte d'un inculpe qui n'a pas ete condamne
dolt étre la régle. Jamais on ne doit avoir plus de
scrupules que lorsqu'il s'agit du respect de la
liberte individuelle. Ii faut, pour prendre une
decision aussi importante qu'une detention, avant
qu'une decision judiciaire alt prononce une condam-
nation, avoir lu les piêces du dossier, avoir estime
la valeur des presomptions ou des preuves, n'avoir
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rien neglige pour eviter l'arbitraire. Quand on sait
le nombre d'affaires qui sont souvent expediées en
une journee il est evident que l'examen ne peut etre
que superficiel. Du moms la presence d'un defenseur
portant contradiction au ministere public permet-
trait d'avoir la certitude que la cour n'aura pas
ignore l'essentiel des arguments.
When the deputies started debating the project, Le Monde
echoed the various arguments put forward which depicted the
proposals as a vast improvement of the system (in Les deputes
ont entrepris la reforme du code d'instruction penale, Le
Monde, 22/6/57, p. 7) and some (noticeably fewer though) even
opposing them and putting arguments against.
(120)
In an article, in which he contended that for seventy
years, the Third Republic resisted aux assauts conjugues de
ceux qui voulaient l'entrainer dans les chemins de l'arbitraire
et qui ont en! in reussi dans leur entreprise... cette nuit-la ,
on etait presse.
He also objected to the rush with which things were expedi-
ted:
La discussion portait sur un sujet de maigre
importance: ii ne s'agissait que de porter atteinte
a nos libertes publiques et privees, comme l'a
fort bien fait observer le president de
l'Assemblee.(JO. P2993)
The latter was quoted as saying:
<<Nous n'avons aucune raison de nous eterniser
sur eux [certains articles], sinon nous serons
encore la demain matin >>
Maurice Gargon then mocked the self-satisfied mood of the
deputies who made torture and arbitrary measures legal, putting
the clock back a hundred years.
On deblayait.. les congratulations de nos elus
se comprennent Si l'on peut tirer un sujet d'orgueil
d'avoir, en quelques heures, consacre l'arbitraire
et reglemente la torture. C'est plus d'un siècle de
recul....
See Une mauvaise loi by Maurice Garcon, de l'Academie, in
Le Monde, 4/7/57, pp. 1-4.
For him the text legalised a practice, hitherto irregular
and dangerous, as nobody could be arrested without a judges's
warrant. Now, he argued unjust presumptions sufficed, especi-
ally with the notion of flagrante delicto being loosely inter-
preted, and abuse of the law becoming a matter of fact, thus
legitimised (with the deformation of article 307 of the law of
20 May 1904, which enables detention to allow for appearance
before a judge within twenty-four hours when distance does not
allow a swift presentation to the judge).
He seemed quite upset by the fact that the deadline of 24
hours could then be extended and in fact the suspect, presumed
but not necessarily guilty, was then subject to arbitrary
rules, tacitly abrogating thereby the 1897 Law.
(121)
By important people like R. Schummann.
607
(122)
On croit rever...gouvernements font l'eloge de
la contrainte dans les interrogatoires des justici-
ables. On n'en est pas a la reconnaissance de la
question de /'eau ou des brodequins, mais on reta-
blit officiellement ce qu'au XVI siecle on appelait
la torture insomniae prOnee en particulier par
l'inquisiteur Boguet, qui prescrivait d'interroger
«sans discontinuation.>>
On pouvait esperer ne plus revoir ces horreurs
et voila qu'elles acquierent force de loi. A ceux
qui disent, pour excuser ce retour a une procedure
depuis longtemps abolie, que la gravite de certains
crimes justifie tous les moyens de coercition.
He found it hard and painful to go that far back to remind
the IV Republic of fundamental principles that the IIIrd had
respected. If what he was attempting to say had little chance
of changing the outcome on the text passed on to the Second
Member, he would have at least done his duty of reminding the
French of their principles which, in his view, they were not
intent on renouncing ( he could not accept that they were).
M.Garcon (Academie francaise) in Le Monde, 4/7/57.
(123)
See the case of Iveton above.
(124)
Equivalent to thought of the day, La balance et le couteau,
in Le Monde (7/2/58, p. 1), in which he stated:
Eh bien, non; si le jugement de Nancy a provo-
que un malaise salutaire, ce n'est pas parce qu'un
miserable a êchappe a la mort judiciaire, c'est
parce que d'autres misêrables, moms coupables peut-
etre, risquent toujours d'être legalement tues 	
His criticism was directed against French civilisation
itself but also the French nation's attachment to an idea of
justice equated with a "pint of bad blood", the "nauseating"
thought of which, he remarked, most of the other people of the
world had shied away from.
Sans doute ce peuple frangais dont le fameux
sens exige, parait-il, sa pinte de mauvais sang des
mains du bourreau, sans doute notre peuple est-11 un
des dermiers au monde a boire de cette justice-la.
La plupart des autres s'en sont detournes avec la
nausee.. [ parce que non tenu] par la rigueur de la
logique nationale, non moms fameuse de bon sens, et
dont la belle, noble et decisive formule de nous
etre donnee en plein prêtoire: «un cadavre contre
un autre: c'est la logique.».
(125)
Yves Florenne in Le Monde, 7/2/58, p. 1.
(126)
For instance, those sent to the Lodi and Berrouaghia camps.
See Le Monde, 22/1/57, p. 4.
(127)
Le Monde never stopped to think and ask the question of why
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so many people, including those of European origin, were being
arrested by the Army and these included lawyers as well as male
and female doctors. See Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 6, 30/3/57, p. 6,
and various arguments developed and cases cited throughout.
(128)
Pour la premiere fois dans l'histoire de la
Republique, un gouvernement a demande au Parlement,
hormis le temps de guerre êtrangere, le droit d'ouv-
rir des camps de concentration en France pour y
enfermer des Francais.
Les Camps by M.Duverger, Le Monde, 20/7/57, p. 1.
(129)
He thought at first glance that there was a justification
put before the Assembly when he evoked the precedents of the
decrees of August and October 1944, but pointed out that
France had not been liberated then.
(130)
The instigators and their accomplices were a job for the
police and the judges, he argued, and if they were too few, let
their number be increased; if the sanctions pronounced by
judges, bound by the penal code, were not sufficient then let
the code be changed.
(131)
The latter, without control or guarantees, would then lock
him up in a concentration camp where it would be very easy to
maintain an efficient repression, removed from under the super-
vision of the law, basis of democracy and civilised society.
On peut assez facilement imaginer une repres-
sion efficace qui maintienne le contrOle des magi-
strats, la garantie de la procedure judiciaire et
tout cet ensemble de regles qui sont a la base meme
de la democratie et de la civilisation de l'Occi-
dent.
(132)
Concluding that the average citizen would feel very strongly
the impact of that decision, and quite rightly so. "The vote of
Parliament might well seal its own fate" (Le vote de chaque
depute engage aussi le sien et celui de tous les Francais, in
Les Camps, Le Monde, 20/7/57, p. 1), Duverger stated:
Qu'on ne s'y trompe pas; les camps de concen-
tration ne sont pas seulement une institutionn
materielle. Comme la bombe, comme lea tortures, us
ont pris une signification symbolique. On ne peut
pas transiger avec eux. Accepter leur principe 'name
en l'entourant de restrictions aussi precises que
possible, induce en limitant son application, c'est,
en un certain sens, franchir la ligne de demarcation
qui separe la democratie de la dictature.
(133)
A year after the adoption of special powers in Algeria,
609
while the Governor-General remained in post, France had a new
Prime Minister, M.Bourges-Maunoury -yet nothing had been re-
solved in Algeria. On the contrary, "terrorism" had become
commonplace in the cities (the best example being the battle of
Algiers) and the countryside, and was spilling over onto the
mainland (where the targetted victims consisted only of secur-
ity forces and rival nationalist groups and their sympathi-
sers). Under the spread of the terrorist threat, there was talk
of extending special powers and many restrictions (previously
taken against Algerians in Algeria) to mainland France. See
also above.
(134)
The paper pointed out the "unusual character" of this
measure. While highlighting the contradiction with article 2
(no distinction of race, creed, religion, thought) and article
7 (equal protection under the law) of the Universal declara-
tion of the Rights of Man, the paper pointed out that discrimi-
nation based on the place of birth, even if one conceded the
need for repression of terrorist activities, would give rise to
serious difficulties as far as the Europeans were concerned. In
Algeria the "renewal" was done as a matter of course. In La
reconduction des pouvoirs speciaux de police en AlgOrie n'ex-
ige pas un nouveau vote du parlement, Le Monde, 13/6/57, p. 7.
It was obviously not a matter of wanting to extend these
measures to "Algerian" inhabitants of European origin. Even if
it were applicable, their number was negligible, as only a few
were involved if any at all (a few left-wingers and intellect-
uals). The modification was blatantly designed to get at Alger-
ians in France, who had the knowledge, the money or the friends
that could help them safely claim protection (under the law in
France) against breaches of human rights when possible and
escape French "emergency" justice. See Le Monde, 23-24/6/57, p.
1.
(135)
And it was very much people such as Leon Lyon-Caen, premier
president honoraire de la Cour de cassation, who hammered the
nail in when he saw the attempt of extending the powers to
France as an open door to abuse and arbitrary powers by the
administration. In L'extension des pouvoirs spêciaux: voie
ouverte a l'arbitraire administratif, Le Monde, 25/6/57, pp. 1-
3. See also below.
(136)
Which requested that the "assigned" persons should be able
to see their lawyer within five days. Le Monde, 15/5/57, p. 4.
This was followed by further protests by the League for
Human Rights against the extension of the powers to France,
violation of the citizens'constitutional right of equality
against a form of racism which might be different from Vichy's
but "as odious in its spirit", arguing that anybody voting for
the measure would accept to substitute /a regle du bon plaisir
policier to the Rights of Man and liberties proclaimed by the
Universal Declaration and to the republican regime. In La
Ligue des droits de l'homme proteste contre l'extension des
pouvoirs spáciaux, Le Monde, 28/6/57, p. 7.
The organisation also made a case against phone tapping, in
Le Monde, 25/6/57, pp. 1-3.
Other protests reported included some newspapers which did
not accept the introduction of the system to France:
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- Franc-Tireur which found the measure unjustifiable, con-
trary to the declaration of the Rights of Man and the preamble
to the 1946 Constitution and asked Parliamentarians to oppose
it (Le Monde, 25/6/57, pp. 1-3).
- La Croix expressed concern for Maunoury's policy of
"blancs-seings" (lettres de cachet), especially at times of
Parliamentary recess, which provided for the arrest of any
Algerians, be they a "Marechal de France", and concluded that
either a normal regime be introduced in Algeria or an abnormal
system be more and more implemented to the mass of Frenchmen
who would find, faute de mieux, equality in submission (Repor-
ted by Le Monde, 26/6/57, p. 6).
(137)
A lawyer, who argued against the measures the day before.
See Le Monde, 25/6/57, pp. 1-3.
(138)
For Leon Lyon-Caen, the measure was incompatible with the
principle of equality before the law for the Muslims, made
French citizens since the Statutes of 1947, contrary to article
3 (section 1) of the Civil Code and articles 2 and 7 of the
Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man. He also dealt
(pint 3) with different discriminations based on the place of
birth and their contradictions, adding (point 4) that the
consequences of the project should not be hidden as all the
measures taken in Algeria (assignations a residence, interne-
mmt administratif dans des camps de concentration, interdic-
tion de sejour prononcee par l'autorite prefectorale, perquisi-
tions A domicile de jour et de nuit, requisitions de personnes
en vue d'un travail force, interdiction de reunion), "denounced
for years" as being in breach of fundamental civil liberties,
justified by Parliament and government claiming exceptional
circumstances, would cause serious troubles if extented to
France.
(139)
Like the "comical" round-about way (detour) used in Septem-
ber 1955, when hundreds of Algerians who had jobs and families
in France were arrested under fictitious charges and trans-
ferred to Algiers where they were freed, only to be arrested
again and put in camps at Lodi and Berrouaghia.
NB. It is worth noting here that Le Monde's readers always
seemed to find out about events a long time after the event.
(140)
Ihon Lyon-Caen on L'Extension des pouvoirs speciaux, in Le
Monde, 25/6/57, pp. 1-3. The same day Duverger was giving the
government a hundred days to act.
(141)
A lawyer and member of the French Academie. in De L'Arbi-
traire article published by Le Monde, 15/3/57, pp. 1-6.
(142)
ifich then become relevant only for the purpose of critical
history to illustrate that:
il est rare qu'on ne constate pas que non
seulement elles n'ont ete que d'assez miserables
expedients, mais encore -ce qui est plus grave-
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qu'elles ont ete inefficaces et n'ont servi, en
faisant des martyrs, qu'A renforcer le developpement
des opinions ou des doctrines subversives qu'on
avait pour dessein d'êtouffer.
Drawing from examples in Roman history and accepting the
notion of "defence of the country in danger", he argued that
when coercive arbitrary measures were taken they were used to
deal with offences that had more to do with freedom of con-
science ( of someone) seen as subversive; they could lead to
abuse and constituted an easy way of getting rid of "contradic-
tors" by interning them without having to give a motive or
provide safeguards.
Garcon showed his dislike of the Ancien Regime's system of
"lettres de cachet", which, people thought, were only quite
"useful innocent vexations for maintaining good spirits and
often peace between families", which even Louis XVI, "who did
not know much about anything", thought needed changing. The
Constitution of September 1791 solved the probem by declaring
que nul homme ne pourrait etre arrete ou detenu
que dans les cas determines par la loi et dans les
formes qu'elles a prescrites. Un principe essentiel
etait pose, et le probléme etait te/ qu'on pouvait
penser la question definitivement liquidee. On ne
faisait d'ailleurs qu'imiter l'Angleterre,
depuis Charles II les citoyens etaient proteges par
l'habeas corpus.
He then looked at various other times of French history
when, despite the abolition of arbitrary measures, infringments
of civil liberties were committed until, 1st June 1946, after
the end of the War when this practice was abandonned.
Dwelling so much on the past was for Garcon only a way "to
sound the alarm against the present return pi viciuus practices




The nature of the repressive measures adopted could clearly
be seen through the reading of the article:
La loi du 3 avril 1955 instituant l'etat d'ur-
gence en Algerie a permis au gouvernement general
de prononcer <<l'assignation a residence>>, dans une
localite determinee, des personnes dont l'activite
s'av&re dangereuse pour la securite et l'ordre
publics, mais en precisant qu'en aucun cas l'as-
signation a residence ne pourrait avoir pour effet
la creation de camps de detention. Ii etait d'ail-
leurs institue en meme temps une commission de
contrede et la possibilite d'un recours pour excês
de pouvoir. Un an plus tard, le 16 mars 1956, une
loi complementaire a permis au gouverneur de prendre
toute mesure exceptionnelle en vue du retablissement
de l'ordre en precisant toutefois que, si les me-
sures envisagees devaient avoir pour effet de modif-
ier /a legislation, elles seraient prises par decret
en conseil des ministres. Ii est evident que les
detentions arbitraires modifient /a legislation.
C'est pourquoi un decret pris en conseil des mini-
stres le lendemain, 17 mars 1956, autorisa le gou-
verneur general A assigner A residence, surveillee
ou non, toute personne dont l'activite s'avére
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dangereuse, avec l'obligation pour le gouvernement
d'assurer sa subsistance et son hebergement. Un
dernier decret du 19 janvier 1957 a en! in permis de
suspendre le paiement des arrerages de toutes pen-
sions civiles ou militaires dues par l'Etat aux
individus reputes arbitrairement dangereux pour la
securite ou l'ordre public.
On remarquera que la formule <<assignation
residence>> veut dire qu'il s'agit d'une mesure
d'eloignement, mais comme le gouvernement doit
pourvoir a l'hebergement il a ete immediatement cree
des camps de concentration oil on a entasse de pre-
tendus suspects en leur imposant des conditions de
vie particuliérement rigoureuses. L'astreinte
residence surveillee s'est transformee en detention
sur simple arrete non motive. Ceux qui sont ainsi
frappes ne sont pas seulement privês de liberte mais
encore us ne peuvent recevoir les visites de leurs
families que trés parcimonieusement. La pension des
mutiles de guerre est supprimee et il ne leur est
permis, d'ailleurs rarement, de se confier a un
defenseur, qu'en presence d'un surveillant, ce qui
n'est pas imaginable, meme lorsqu'il s'agit des
pires criminels de droit commun.
(144)
See Le Monde, 15/3/57, pp. 1-6.
The various protest led to a major rethink by government
policy makers with considerable changes and modifications
brought to the policies.
Le gouvernement prepare une lettre rectificative des Pou-
Vai.r'S speciaux. In Le Monde, 7-8/7/57, p. 2.
(145)
In Le projet sur l'extension des pouvoirs speciaux re-
wontre une serieuse opposition a l'Assemblee. J. Fauvet, Le
Monde, 11/7/57, p. 1.
(146)
It seemed highly unlikely that anybody convicted on those
charges would be freed before their sentence had been served
and the measures on preventive detention would have given the
authorities unlimited powers. Yet, once again, we see legisla-
tion, which was very harsh and exceptional, which made a mock-
ery of civil liberty and individual freedom, disguised under
the cloak of necessity.
The measure also suspended section 2 of article 113 of the
Criminal Instruction Code limiting to 5 days i detention those
likely to be sentenced for less than two years, and allowing
for the possibility of searching the premises of people consid-
ered dangerous at any time of the day or night.
The measures being introduced were being put forward as
normal, legitimate and justified, even if the criticisms le-
velled by other personalities and political parties were repor-
ted. See Le Monde, 11/7/57, p. 4.
(147)
At the time of the renewal of the Special powers and their
extension, with modification to the mainland, Le Monde was
explaining the volonte de moderation was appreciated by depu-
ties and reporting that Maunoury was applauded when he promised
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to table the loi cadre project in the near future. One could
tell from the speeches reported on the "Muslims" side that the
discourse of Le Monde did not reflect the real story. It was
still giving an optimistic picture when there were dire nega-
tive signs. Almost every Algerian, even the least revolution-
ary, was in favour of independence.
From the other report of the speech by Ben Habyles (one of
the rare Muslims still seen at the Senate -Luxembourg-, who was
merely reported as having made a "curious" appeal to de Gaulle
and "provoked some emotion with his request for independence",
thus rejoining the line defended by F.Abbas), it can be clearly
stated that even the elected representatives, who were most
"helpful" to the French authorities and institutions, had, by
that time, given up on French politicians in power and were
condemning French policy and asking for independence. These
people, often promoted to office/"elected" with the help of the
authorities, who were the least revolutionary and who had
always collaborated, had seen fit by then to state that noth-
ing short of independence would do; and considered government
policy as an engrenage fatal.
Les baillons et les menottes, dit-il, ne peu-
vent rien donner sur cette terre de liberte qu'est
la France. Les mesures militaires les plus draconi-
ennes -méme assorties de promesses- sont incapables
de venir a bout d'une insurrection nationale. Pour
retablir la paix, ii faut d'autres methodes. "Si je
suis a cette tribune -et c'est peut -etre la der-
niere fois- ce n'est pas pour y semer la haine,
ajoute l'orateur,; mais comment croire qu'une solu-
tion de sagesse poura prevaloir tant que regnera cet
infernal colonialisme?"
The senator of Constantine continued, referring to the views
expressed by F.Abbas:
c'est de la France que l'Algerie voudrait
tenir son independance , bienfait supreme. Ii n'est
pas d'Algórien pour desirer l'abaissement de la
France... il n'est plus qu'un homme en France qui
puisse engager la negociation a laquelle je songe
c'est le general de Gaulle.
See Le Monde, 27/7/57, p. 2.
But his proposals were presented as not being accepted from
the replies given in the debate (for instance, "a priori inde-
pendence refused", "suggestion coming from abroad", "the man
had sat long enough on the Senate benches not to think serious-
ly that his reproaches had any basis", as well as various other
contributions indicating that these measures were the minimum,
and were quite legitimate (see report by Bernard Faucogney in
Le Monde, 27/7/57, p. 2). The measures he was opposing were
passed by a clear majority. Le Monde reported that the project
(Special powers) was adopted by 269 votes against 25.
It was obvious that even when echoing these views of the odd
remaining Algerian parliamentarian, Le Monde was also high-
lighting the views and responses of the French Premier Bourges-
Maunoury, and denying that any spirit of colonialism had
motivated government policy:
aucun esprit de colonialisme n'a jamais anime
les gouvernements frangais et la presence de
M.Benhabyles ici-méme fait justice de ses accusa-
tions de racisme.
See Le Monde, 27/7/57, p. 2.
Other politicians made declarations stating that anti-ter-
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rorist forces had been successful and would not be diverted
from their purpose, that the measures would only affect indi-
viduals previously convicted, explaining the government's
attachment to traditional liberties and that "our scruples"
did not prevent the task ahead, the promise of the "loi cadre"
and a "new Algeria". Ibid.
(148)
From the reports of the police in Paris, terrorist activi-
ties were not as serious as one might have expected. These
reports did not totally square with the requests for the exten-
sion of the special powers in France and made the official
claims here, like they had been in Algeria, rather dubious.
The activities of the police were defended by a Commissio-
ner, given the opportunity to have his letter printed in the
Correspondence section (there appeared an article under the
title of Un commissaire de la sdrete repond aux attaques dont
la police fait l'objet, in Le Monde, 20/7/57, p. 3.)
(149)
Le Monde published the statements of the Police prefect of
the Seine:
Faisant le bilan de l'action repressive de ses services: Ii
est excessif de parler de terrorisme nord africain a Paris
declare le prefet de police. Le Monde, 26/7/57, p. 2.
(150)
He listed 174 attacks in the first 6 months of 1957, in
which 173 "Francais musulmans" had been killed, and stated
that there were only 8 to 10 revolvers available. Some were
handed in to the authorities, some hidden in caches which had
been discovered.
Gênebrier also stated that the 8.000 Moroccans and 3.000
Tunisians were not involved in agitation and gave the number of
"Muslims" of Algeria as being 120.000, almost all men, making
Paris the highest male populated city, when Algiers had only
180,000 inhabitants, including women and children.
(151)
The prdfet, M. Genebrier, denied any Arab pogrom in police
activities which he said:
tend a faire, pour separer le bon grain de
l'ivraie, non pas la <<chasse aux facies», comme on
l'a affirme, mais a proteger les travailleurs hon-
netes contre des agitateurs politiques.
M. Genebrier also stated that night squads (called brigades
de nuit dite des agressions et violences), created in 1953 and
put in charge of repressing attacks on "French Muslims", had
seen their number increase. He added that there was a system of
surveillance criss-crossing (quadrillage) the capital with
important means at its disposal, over the whole of the Seine
department. These had given positive results: 14,894 people
taken to police stations for identity verifications, 4,600
arrests for crimes (delft droit commun), 574 for politically
motivated crimes (delft et crimes a motif politique) including
47 murders and attempted murders, 117 for atteinte a la sOrete
de l'etat et reconstitution de ligue dissoute, 410 for arms
offences. To that, he added, that hotels were systematically
visited and 48 cafés had been closed down.
He stated that the "brigades" were said to be doing a rea-
sonable job, that their numbers had been doubled but he did not
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reject the idea that the extension of special powers could be
helpful. See Le Monde, 26/7/57, p. 2.
A further question to be asked would be why were these
people still being called North Africans when most, if not all,
of them were Algerians, since Morocco and Tunisia had been




The uprising, which seemed to have been timed to coincide
with the second commemoration of the deposition of the Sultan
in Morocco, resulted in the deaths of European civilians and
subsequent reprisals, similar in their intensity only to those
of 1945, and to those previous attempts by the colonising
nation to subdue uprisings and revolts, that marked over a
hundred years'history of French occupation. See also Chapter 3.
(2)
123 people in total were killed amongst whom there were 71
Europeans. See Guerin, Daniel, Ci-git le colonialisme, Mouton,
Paris, 1973, pp. 69-70.
(3)
Several possible explanations could be ventured for the
delay. Most of the journalists could have been on holiday as it
was near the end of August and the paper could not cope with
the journalists at hand. Or, perhaps less inclined towards
sensationalism, the paper may have waited for a while, reserv-
ing its reports and judgements until it obtained a fuller
account (version of the facts) of the events. It could also be
that the paper was taking a very cautious approach in order not
to appear too alarmist.
(4)
There could have been a natural delay at the time as the
means of communication which, though significant, were not that
advanced in the mid-1950's. This seems a more plausible expla-
nation than the holiday theory, as most papers keep a skeleton
staff capable of dealing with emergencies, and could recall
journalists at very short notice. There may have been other
reasons; Le Monde could have been hesitant, if not reluctant,
to publish news that made French troops look bad or presented
them in a bad light. One cannot say with certainty.
(5)
Au moms 162 de nos compatriotes y ont trouvê
une mort horrible, quant aux Musulmans tombs vic-
times de leur fanatisme, il est encore impossible de
les dênombrer avec exactitude.
(6)
He felt it quite necessary, nevertheless, to think, in a
second phase, about implementing without delay "the 1947 Sta-
tutes to the French citizens of Algeria" and "to imagine" the
most suitable form of "French Union" (Union frangaise).
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(7)
En effet, dans la plupart des attaques les
vêritables hors la loi avaient enrole de force des
<occasionnels> qu'ils avaient places en rideau
devant eux et qui subirent les premiers les feux de
la riposte. Beaucoup furent tues alors qu'ils
n'avaient pas d'armes en main.
See Le Monde, 23/8/55, p. 1.
(8)
When it wrote:
Nos forces armees	 ont entrepris le ratis-
sage des zones oil la population paysanne apporte un
concours actif aux hors la loi; elles ont detruit en
particulier plusieurs hameaux < reconnus> ( my
emphasis) comme <foyers d'insurrection>.
In Le Monde, 23/8/55, p. 1, under the title: Nos troupes
pourchassent les rebelles au Maroc et dêtruisent en Algerie les
foyers d' insurrection.
In G. Penchenier's article, L'heure de la repression dans le
Constantinois, the reader finds a flowery style. If it had not
been for the soldiers accompanying the journalist, the reader
would have thought it was a Sunday excursion. But the reader
is quickly brought back to the reality of burning hamlets,
houses riddled with bullets, guns behind the rubble of a wall.
But also:
(...) automitrailleuses qui tout & l'heure vont
faire payer si rudement a certains villages les
exploits des fellaghas.
See Le Monde, 24/8/55, p. 1.
(8)
Describing the repression, Penchenier wrote :
considOrant que dix mechtas ont servi de
<foyers de rebellion>, les commandos ont ete charges
de les dêtruire... Le procêde est simple. Les femmes
et les enfants sont autorises a sortir des gourbis,
puis /a mechta est aneantie.
Does that mean that the men were not allowed to come out
before the hamlet was destroyed? Le Monde did not say, but
Penchenier stated that, in the villages that had been attacked,
no Arab could be found as they feared being held responsible
for the troubles (this perhaps suggests that they were not
responsible) and that most of them had joined the <maquis>.
Ibid, 24/8/55.
(10)
This time the paper stated that almost everybody participa-
ted or joined in:
Rares sont ceux qui n'ont pas suivi le mouvement.
See Le Monde, 24/8/55, p. 1.
(11)
Aprês les massacres du Constantinois une guerre impitoyable
de race et de religion, in Le Monde, 25/8/55, pp. 1 & 2.
(12)
The energetic declaration made by Soustelle was said to have
been appreciated by the Europeans, who saw the Government as
committed to arming farmers. ( p. 1) In this respect Penchen-
ier stated clearly that what was going on in Algeria, as a
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result of those events, was exactly the opposite of what was
going on in Morocco.
Ici l'heure a sonne et nul ne s'aviserait plus
de rappeller les promesses faites en 1932, 1936 ou
en 1947.
See Le Monde, 24/8/55.
The report (under the title of <la guerre impitoyable>)
intimated that militia groups had been constituted and were
engaged in a "frenetic hunt for the rebels". It evoked at least
one example of a rebel leader's cruel execution.
Je ne peux qu'evoquer car on ne saurait preci-
ser d'affreux details, l'execution a l'aerodrome de
Philippeville d'un chef fellaga qui resta mourant
pendant trois heures.
(13)
Je puis au moms porter temoignage de celle
qui a eu pour objectif la mechta de Carriere Ro-
maine A cinq kilometres de Philippeville. Une cin-
quantaine de vieillards, de femmes et d'enfants ont
ete tues a defaut des males qui s'etaient enfuis la
nuit precedente.
Je ne connais pas de spectacle plus tragique
que celui que j'ai vecu apres le depart des comman-
dos en circulant entre les murs calcines, salue par
les hurlements plaintifs des chiens enchaines, seuls
survivants du massacre.
(14)
La guerre passe par la
de race et de religion dont
pourrait l'arreter, Si tant
autres en aient seulement 1
G.Penchenier, Le Monde, 25/8/55, p.
(15)
An article the next day pointed out that, according to
officers on the ground, precautions had been taken to evacuate
women and children, unlike the "unique" case he had seen and
reported (this was designed obviously to diminish the serious-
ness of the repression and the kind of criminal activities and
massacres perpetrated by the security forces. The reliance on
officers on the ground does not seem justified since even what
he saw was being denied by the authorities).
(16)
This article was very significant and was echoed in the
international press and in Parliament. See below.
(17)
There was, thus, a contradiction between the official ver-
sion and that of the journalist. The paper itself tried to
keep itself out of the controversy by passing the content of
the denial onto Penchenier, who had a chance to give more
details and be more specific in his contradiction of the offi-
cial version. This was printed below the communiqué of the
Minister of the Interior.
So, having reported accurately what he had seen, Penchenier
seemed to have stepped back a little, and to have given cre-
dence to the official and military versions of the events, as
: une guerre impitoyable
on sait mal comment on




opposed to what he had actually seen, and what he thought
plausible.
(18)
He problably had no choice but to respond, in the absence of
a collective response by the paper.
(19)
He wrote that:
- 1) shots and the sound of automatic rifles were heard in
the late morning (matin6e) of Tuesday 23 August;
- 2) when he went at 14.30, he stopped before the fosse
commune when he saw the hamlet on the left-hand side of the
road;
-3) he had heard/seen dogs howling, several children under
the age of ten dead, that he had no recollection of seeing dead
adult men, that he "can/could still see" clearly enough to give
specific examples -a little girl on her knees (dead), an old
man and a group of three women with their babies still in their
arms all dead, not to mention all the other inhabitants scat-
tered all over the place;
- 4) he was struck by the fact that no smell could be no-
ticed, even if the little valley was in the shade. He wrote
that he would have been very surprised if the incident had
taken place on Saturday, since the coagulated blood was still
red, ( he implied, of course, that the official version was not
plausible);
-5) the hamlet had not been mowed down, the gourbis were
still intact and standing, but the scene showed signs of
visible general disorder, which had resulted from the event,
and which looked as though the inhabitants had been running in
all directions during the shooting;
-6) he could safely say that, if this operation had not
taken place on Tuesday morning, as what he had seen made him
believe, it certainly did not take place Saturday noon. See Le
Monde, 30/8/55, p. 2.
(20)
During the session of 12 October 1955, the Communist depu-
ties, Fayet and Duclos, evoked the events witnessed by Penchen-
ier, and sought an explanation from the government.
The government denied the statements of Penchenier, and
stated that the journalist had, himself, admitted not having
been there.
(21)
In a footnote and in very small print.
(22)
"I leave it up to the readers, he continued, to formulate
their own opinion on the consequences of such methods. The
newspaper gave, however, further coverage to more "official"
communiqués of reprisals in nine more hamlets where, it was
said, this time, that women and children had been evacuated".
See Le Monde, 13/10/55, P . 3.
(23)
From the rare indigenous person that he met, Penchenier
concluded that the Algerians saw no reward except indiscrimi-
nate (aveugle) repression for most Algerians. He thought that
the effect of the repression was not a <terreur salutaire>, but
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away of "only inciting the Arabs to flee and join the rebels
in the mountains". He also stated that, despite the claims of
Army HQ, the heads of the rebellion had not been eliminated,
that terrorism went on, and was even likely to spread". See Le
Monde, 24/8/55, p. 1.
(24)
The use of the "nous" in this context was very significant.
(25)
See Le Monde, 24/8/55, p. 1.
(26)
He thought, instead, that rumours of repression would result
in psychological gains for the rebels. Only a few rebels man-
aged to create havoc in the area and the forces of order were
In-letIle to do anything but take it out on the community by and
large. In his view, it was David and Goliath, where the commun-
ity suffers and nobody gains ("and that was no triumph").
Penchenier stated categorically that the leaders of the move-
ment had practically not been affected and that only "a few
thousand peasants" ("expendable by definition") had paid with
their lives.
(27)
He also saw the government in danger of being faced with a
permanent crisis because of the intransigent demands of the
proponents of outdated forms of colonialism. He saw two schools
of thought, repression a outrance and repression spectaculaire
avec une recherche du contact both being practised at the same
time. He still wondered, however, if it was not too late (si on
ne 'leg-lige pas l'implacable evolution du temps). See Le Monde,
30/8/55, pp. 1-2.
(28)
See Le Monde, 31/8/55, pp. 1-3.
(29)
The paper thought it hardly possible that a revolt in two
main areas should succeed, but quite likely that these areas
should be seen as a theatre of experimentation by rebels who
could be thinking of another coup de force in a "fertile
ground", where the "fanatics of Islam and the Arab world would
find the best elements of a Holy War or a War of Liberation".
(30)
If they were very interested in reading them, but only if
they looked in the right sections (see various groups and
organisations' declarations and appeals, outlined above and
below), and very often, only if echoed by other newspapers.
(31)
Sometimes this was done in the form of quotes, for example
when reporting Les elus musulmans protestent aupres de M.Faure
contre la repression dans la Constantinois.
See Le Monde, 3/9/55, p. 2.
In quotes we learn that collective repression followed the
events of 20 August, impitoyable, demesuree, in which not only
"the forces of order" but also elements civils irresponsables
took part. There were instances of events to which there had
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been witnesses, notamment l'execution d'un proprietaire musul-
man et six jeunes gens membres de sa famille. We also learn
about requests, asking for charges to be brought against the
mayor of Philippeville, Crevaux, and of protests against the
seizure of Le Monde, as well as censorship, which was pre-
venting repliesr  to appels a la haine de certains journaux
&Alger (see below).
There were also condemnations such as:
(..) tient a condamner formellement la
repression aveugle qui frappe un nombre considerable
d'innocents, appliquant le principe de la respon-
sabilite collective a des populations sans defense,
demande la cessation de cette repression et le
retour a une conception plus same et normale des
rêgies de la justice (Le Monde, 28/9/55, p. 3).
or
Le comite de coordination du groupe des 61,
conscient de la gravite de l'heure, denonce solon-
nellement a la conscience, tant metropolitaine
qu'algerienne, le caractére aveugle de la repression
qui continue de s'exercer (Le Monde, 17/12/55, p.
4).
But all were reported only in quotes.
(32)
Similarly, Le Monde reported their statements in quotes.
(...) exprime sa profonde emotion et son in-
dignation devant les recents massacres des musul-
mans, et notamment ceux de Philippevile, Mn
Abid .... et reclament l'arrét immediat de cette
odieuse repression sous toutes ses formes civiles
et militaires, l'arrestation des elements civils
europeens, instigateurs ou executeurs d'assassinats
sur des habitants desarmés et innocents.
See Le Monde, 4-5/9/55, p. 2.
One of the most vocal protestors against the means was the
Troup of 61 Algerian MPs, who listed a series of arbitrary
measures taken against Algerians:
1) Executions sommaires. 2) Arrestations arbitraires de
personnes dont les families ne peuvent avoir de nouvelles.
3)Perquisitions illegales suivies de violences de toutes
natures. 4)Destructions d'habitations et de leur contenu.
5)Vexations, humiliations repetees sur des populations pais-
ibles. 6)Appropriation par la violence de biens prives.
All were reported in quotes by the paper. The "61" Group was
also reported as stating:
Le Comite constate, une fois de plus, que ces
methodes indignes, employees par des agents de la
population, consideres comme agissant au nom de la
nation frangaise, aboutissent a developper de plus
en plus le mecontentement et a creer la haine.
In Le Comite des 61 denonce la repression aveugle qui s'ex-
erce en Algerie, Le Monde, 17/12/55, p. 4.
(33)
See Le Monde, 4-5/9/55, p. 2 and the previous section on
Penchenier.
(34)
See, for instance, Le Monde, 22/12/55, p. 7:
(...) portes a la connaissance du gou-
620
vernement....pour que des elements innocents du
mouvement insurrectionnel n'aient pas a supporter le
contrecoup de l'emotion provoquee par le caractere
atroce des crimes des hors-la-loi.
(35)
In other words, facts about these negative aspects of the
repression and the developments in Algeria were not being
reported as often as they should have been, and when they were
reported, they were put next to reports of rebel activity or
their capture. The effects of that seemed to mean that there
was a conscious or subconscious effort to tone down the exces-
ses of the repression, or that this repression, because of the
rebels'activity, seemed to be warranted (see also Chapters 4
and 5).
(36)
See Le Monde, 23/12/55.
(37)
As, for instance, when the paper reported news that a group
of "Muslims" (the Muslim community were reported as being
divided anyway) were condemning collective repression and the
killing of innocents:
(... ) Si l'on a d'autres procedes pour la
contenir que la repression collective et des sanc-
tions au hasard, telle qu'on les pratique ... donne
l'alarme, rupture desastreuse ... l'Algerie et la
France ... protestons de toutes nos forces contre la
cruautd d'une repression qui ne pouvait atteindre,
la plupart du temps, les auteurs veritables des
attaques... substitue aux rèsultats des statistiques
de cadavres, en frappant bien souvent des innocents.
( pl )
This kind of view was often balanced by somebody else's,
saying how unlikely this was, as in this declaration by Barto-
letti:
On a beaucoup parle a ce propos de repression
collective. Si elle etait pratiquee, je n'hesiterai
pas a /a condamner. Mais je ne peux pas supposer un
seul instant que l'armee ait commis des actes que
lui pretent ses accusateurs.
See Le Monde, 7/12/55, p. 4.
(38)
Despite admitting that the events had caused "embarrassment"
to the authorites and "emotion" among the Muslims, when Le
Monde reported a shooting which resulted in the death of up to
forty Algerians in Lamy market, the correspondent of the paper
claimed that it was still impossible to give perfectly "in-
contestable versions" of the causes.
To justify why the truth had not been established, when so
many people were involved and so much panic was caused by the
shooting, the journalist wrote that telephone and telegraph
lines were down for a few hours, that there was control of
information in Algeria and a deliberate delay imposed on broad-
casting news; all this made enquiries difficult. See Le Monde,
7/12/55, p. 6. In another incident reported (19-20/5/57), Le
Monde was able to state that the paratroopers had reacted
"violently", while at the same time claiming that it was having
difficulty establishing what exactly went on during a shoot-
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out, which lasted half an hour and left about thirty victims.
Reporting another incident, Le Monde had been imprecise
Mxmt the nature of the reprisals, when it announced that
security operations, curfews and searches were being undertaken
in Algiers, and that a similar operation in Medea (...)a donne
Lieu, dans des circonstances encore mal definies, a des inci-
dents qui semblent devoir comporter de graves repercussions.
Nothing was very clear as to what had happened, according to
the report of the correspondent dated the 18 December and
published in the paper of the following day. See Le Monde,
19/12/56, p. 5.
(39)
Le Monde ( 28/2/57, p. 1), and also Le Monde, 13/6/57, p. 1.
This lack of information, or slowness in providing complete
information, took place frequently. In this instance, it was
illustrated when the paper's correspondent gave the figure of
six dead, according to the official toll, but indicated that
there were higher estimates, without being able to give further
details. See Le Monde, 13/6/57, p. 1.
(40)
This, as argued earlier, could have been because some papers
were more ready to report immediately, while others preferred
to wait. It may be that some, which had the information, might
have thought (or been aware) that the information available
could be damaging nationally for the government of the day, or
internationally, for the nation as a whole, if it were reported
straight away. This could indeed provide an explanation as to
why they waited. See Le Monde, 28/2/57, p. 1 and 19-20/5/57,
p. 1, where the report indicated that:
Autant que l'on peut reconstituer les faits en 
l'absence d'informations precises, ii apparait qu'au
cours d'une fusillade qui se prolongea pendant une
demi-heure une trentaine de musulmans ont ete tues.
(41)
Reporting about a "certain effervescence" in several of the
streets of Marseille, after a gathering of a hundred people in
front of the Communist La Marseillaise, Le Monde indicated that
about twenty North Africans had received hospital treatment as
a result of injuries sustained, but Le Monde stated that it
did not know whether this was the result of a "punch up" with
the paratroopers.
En quelques quartiers, des bagarres ont eclate
et une vingtaine de nord africains ont regu des
soins a l'hOpital. Toutefois leur etat indique-t-on,
est sans gravite. On signalait ce matin qu'un nord
africain avait succombe a des blessures graves
qu'ils avaient regues, sans que l'on sache encore si
cette mort est la consequence d'une rixe avec des
parachutistes.
See Le Monde, 18/7/57, p. 5.
(42)
See Le Monde, 3/5/57, p. 6.
(43)
The proximity of news was a major feature. News of these
excesses by the army were often put near news of terrorist
attacks, which gave the impression that these excesses were, to
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a certain extent, less one-sided, and even perhaps justified.
See Le Monde, 19-20/5/57, p. 1.
Another article reported incidents qui semblent devoir
amporter de graves consequences, which was combined with other
reports announcing various terrorist attacks. See Le Monde,
19/12/56, p. 5.
There was a combination of news of excesses of repression
committed by the army with news of efficient work done by the
troops in terms of defeating the enemies and arresting them.
Under the front page headline of 3 chefs rebelles arrétes en
Algdrie et plusieurs membres du FLN apprehendes a Paris, impor-
tarts documents saisis, in Le Monde, 28/2/57, p. 1, the reader
would find in small print at the end of the summary-article:
Signalons en! in de regrettables incidents
survenus la nuit dans la Casbah d'Alger. Les cir-
constances sont encore mal connues, mais les pre-
mières depêches d'agences portent a croire que des
militaires exasperés par un attentat commis contre
un des leurs, ont ouvert le feu sans discernement
sur tous les musulmans qui s'enfuyaient.
(44)
There were also some reports with innacuracies.
Serious incidents took place a hundred metres from the
Ruisseau barracks, paratroopers came to help their colleagues
and disturbances spread to the neighbouring cafés where the
paratroopers got people out and shot them, the official toll
being put at 26 killed and 11 injured, all Muslims. A higher
toll was claimed by other sources.
If the front page article gave the impression that repres-
sive measures were taken after terrorist acts made three vic-
tims amongst the security forces, page six of the same paper
stated that only one of the paratroopers of the Second Regi-
ments of Chasseurs was affected, the second was only injured
and the third was unscathed. See Le Monde, 19-20/5/57, p. 6.
(45)
When there were reports of incidents, they seemed to have
been "deliberately provoked" by the "rebels" most of the time.
This was highlighted, for instance, in the official communiqué
of the Minister Resident, stating that sanctions were envisaged
against certain évenements profondement regrettables in which
six Muslim civilians were killed and twelve injured, which
happened after deux assassinats particuliérement odieux. See Le
Monde, 21/12/56, p. 6.
(46)
Like the one dated 19-20/5/57, p. 1.
(47)
This did not square with the article below stating that
flexibility was being urged by Bourguiba in discussions at-
tempting trying to break the deadlock about elections and
independence preconditions.
(48)
Commis A peu de distance de l'un de leurs campements, l'at-
tentat aurait eu pour but de susciter leur riposte.
Le Monde was, in my view, making too much of the proximity
of the barracks as being a provocation.
That was very much the official view when the troops or the
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Europeans committed such acts since it was in the interest of
the authorities that the incident be seen as a deliberate
provocation to get them to react in that way.
It would be difficult to argue that there was an easier
place (except in the barracks themselves) for the nationalists
to find soldiers to target, nor an easier way of identifying
them (because of the uniform worn by soldiers coming in and
out).
Further justifications were provided in the shape of a
reported directive, also said to explain why there had been a
recent increase in the violence and in the number of attacks:
De fait, le nombre des attentats et la violence des engagements
se sont accrus depuis quelque temps. In Violente reaction de
parachutistes a un attentat commis & Alger contre 3 de leurs
camarades. 26 musulmans tuês 11 blesses. See Le Monde, 19-
20/5/57, p. 1.
(49)
The next day, claiming that it had not yet obtained more
information about the event (indicating, though, that four of
the injured had died), Le Monde still put forward, according to
non official sources <informateur officieux> and a press
agency, the view that it was really the "Muslims"' fault and
that the soldiers could not have done much about it.
Dans la soirée du samedi un informateur off i-
cieux avancait l'hypothése selon laquelle le quart-
ier ayant ete °coupe par la troupe, les musulmans se
seraient precipites vers les barrages. Craignant
d'être debordes, les militaires auraient alors
ouvert le feu.
It was further stated:
Selon (...) Associated Press, de nombreux
suspects ayant ete rassembles un certain nombre
d'entre eux auraient tentes de s'enfuir avant que
soient arrives les camions qui allaient les amener
aux fins d'interrogatoire. Ce fut alors la fusil-
lade.
In L'enquéte se poursuit sur les incidents d'Alger, see Le
Monde, 21/5/57, p. 5 (small article). A further comment that
could be made here is the brevity of this kind of report, next
to which there was another article, twice as long, on La Fe-
deration des Anciens de la R6sistance salue "avec respect et
ferveur" les forces de l'ordre. Ibid., 21/5/57, p. 5.
(50)
As an illustration, the number of victims of incidents on
the army or civilian sides was given according to army sources,
despite indications that there might have been much higher
casualty figures.
See Le Monde, 19/12/56, p. 5, where the number of soldier
victims was given, and so was the statement of the Governor
General, which was the following:
Des incidents se sont produits hier soir
Medea, au cours d'une operation de contrOle montee
A /a suite de l'attentat perpótre contre deux mili-
taires, et qui avait fait un blesse et un tue.
Les forces de securite, qui suivaient la piste
des agresseurs, ont abattu six musulmans qui ne
rOpondaient pas aux sommations d'usage et s'en-
fuyaient dans les vignes aux abords de la ville.
A Medea même, une panique naquit au sein de la
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population musulmane. Ii s'en suivit une echauffour-
ee, au cours de laquelle douze musulmans furent plus
ou moms blesses.
The correspondant wrote that:
Selon d'autres bruits difficilement verifiables, l'echauf-
fouree aurait ete plus serieuse, le nombre de victimes -tues ou
blesses- serait plus eleve que ne l'indique le communiqué
off iciel.
Another killing of three Algerians by the paratroopers was
reported on the basis of an AFP press release, stating that two
',Muslim" brothers had been killed after an altercation with the
paratroopers and that another Muslim had been shot as he ig-
nored warnings to stop -interpele en vain (by a patrol) (...)
abattu... (and no papers were found on him). See Le Monde,
3/5/57, p. 6.
(51)
See Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and Dean Peyrega in Chap-
ter 13.
(52)
In the case of parliamentarians, an example of the paper's
indirect reports could also be found through the complaints of
deputies, when Le Monde reported that two former delegates to
the Algerian Assembly had addressed open letters to the Mini-
ster Resident about "des faits de repression " ( Le Monde's
terms). One stated that as a result of an ambush, in which
eight soldiers died and nine were injured, eight young Muslims
were shot in similar conditions to those in two areas of the
Tablat commune. The other letter stated that the town of Cher-
chell had been le thedtre d'exactions, that territorial guards
had executed eight Muslims, three of whom had been members of
the Sadoun family, a municipal employee, holder of the military
medal. The last letter asked for an enquiry to be opened, in
the same way as the one ordered by the Minister Resident, after
the incidents of Mouzaiaville on the 2/11/56. See Le Monde 16-
17/11/56, p. 6.
(53)
This was the case for a number of these incidents which were
first reported by other media before being echoed by Le Monde.
An incident which saw the shooting in cold blood of two Alger-
ian "suspects" received an international airing through news-
reels of Fox Movietone and L'Express, which published pictures
of the event, or other more vocal newspapers which had a more
objective approach, less respective of authority, and were more
informative vis-à-vis their readers.
(54)
In the incident at Lamy market, for instance (see Le Monde
7/12/55, p. 6) when different versions giving the number of
victims between 17 and 40 were put forward.
After the Movietone incident, Le Monde included reports from
both sides accusing each other ( some with pictures at hand) of
atrocities, issuing denials, and presenting respective argu-
ments in their defence (see Le Monde, 30, 31/12/55, pp. 1-2, 3,
and 5/1/56, for instance), even finding inconsistencies and
questioning the versions put forward by the authorities.
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(55)
One by one, it published the version of l'Express, called
the version incriminee (six cases of abuse), and the govern-
ment's counter-claim, termed denial (dementi), reponse offi-
cielle, against these allegations, which tended to discredit
the activities of the security forces.
Timzit, 29 November 1955, the French Foreign Legion which
opened fire on ten villagers, 7 of whom were war veterans
(anciens combattants) and of whom eight were killed and two
badly wounded.
1) Then more people came out to see, including a seven year
old girl, all of whom were shot down .
Official denial version
Rebels who had attacked security elements trying to flee had
some losses, no girl involved; "this denial stated that the
version of events above was pure invention".
2.) Four brothers, brought in for confrontation with Muslim
victims of the "attentat", were not recognized and were put
into internment camp.
official version: none of them interned .
3.) Shooting of twelve notables of Guendouz, considered as
suspects. Protest in the National Assembly, Official authori-
ties admit disappearance but cannot explain it .
Official version: enquiries revealed no execution.
4.)Bombing, three days before Christmas, hamlet bombed,
shelled and burned out.
Official version: two incidents of fighting against a convoy
of rebels in a grotto, no raid.
5.) Hamlet burned down, sixty-five houses burned down,
following assassination of a caid (local magistrate).
Official version: enquiries still going on, cannot give
precision, village far away, difficulty of communication .
6.) Further details (Precisions) "camp d'hdbergement" de
Djorf inspected by Wagner parliamentary commission: no observa-
tion on this place.
(56)
When reporting events, even if a special correspondent was
present, such as the shooting resulting in 40 dead counted in
Lamy market, it was very often a version of the facts that gave
the benefit of the doubt to the troops, when no official state-
ments had been made. See Le Monde, 7/12/55, pp. 1-p6.
Naturally, State official sources did not want to give the
impression that security forces were trigger-happy or that the
"rebels" could hit anywhere or any place, despite the protec-
tion provided by the army.
In the Lamy market incident, no matter what the difference
in the number of victims was (depending on various versions of
the incident), as far as the case in hand was concerned, one
fact could be easily established. There were no victims
amongst Europeans, no victims on the side of the security
forces (except, one Muslim "suppletif", who was hit by a revol-
ver shot).
From what one can judge, the incident in both versions
provided, the authorised official (officers') version and the
"Muslim" witnesses version, the injury of the "suppletif"
seemed to have sparked off the event. The first version stated
that the rebels positioned around the village started firing
into the crowd, while the witnesses said that a fight broke out
before the "suppletif" was slightly injured, and alleged that
the security forces surrounding the village started shooting at
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people in the market.
Apart from the fact that the suppletif was curiously not
considered as being part of the forces of order in this report,
one starts wondering if it was not the case, indeed, of trig-
ger-happy security forces, firing into the crowd, at the
slightest thing happening. Had that not been the case, it would
be difficult to see how, given the claimed number of "rebels"
positioned around the village, no members of the security
forces, nor Europeans, had been hit. And if, as the first
version leads one to believe, the security forces were only
reacting to something they were not expecting, and even conced-
ing that the assailants had missed their targets, how could the
security forces have killed so many "rebels", who would ob-
viously have tried to preempt any reaction?
(57)
See Le Monde, 7/12/55, pp. 1-6.
(58)
The article, Un gendarme convaincu d'avoir execute un rebel-
le algerien a ete traduit en Conseil de Guerre, stated that
L'Express, in an article by Jean Daniel, commented on how the
gendarme, who was in charge of watching over a group of sus-
pects, was seen shooting one of them in the back.
(59)
For this, Le Monde advanced the very authoritative "preci-
sions" (Nous avons obtenu a ce sujet , dans les milieux les
plus autorises les precisions suivantes sur cette affaire).
(60)
See also Chapter 7.
(61)
Aux abus de la repression on oppose les atro-
cites incontestables commises par les hors la loi,
See Le Monde, 30/12/55, p. 1.
In the Marseille incident, referred to above, Le Monde used
the term "punch-up" to describe typical beatings. If these had
really been punch-ups (rixes, bagarres), as the paper described
them, should there not have been victims on both sides or were
the Algerians inherently weaker and incapable of defending
themselves? And how could a poor immigrant fight with a uni-
formed French paratrooper in the mainland? It seems more plaus-
ible that this was yet another "ratonnade", or systematic
beating of Algerians, disguised by the paper to look like a
fight. Most of the content of the article suggested the latter,
even for a not very perceptive reader. It would then not be
exaggerated to suggest that, despite having a correspondent on
the spot, the paper was deliberatly trying to give a different
construction of the events, thereby encouraging the readers
into thinking something completely different from what they
ought to have thought. See Le Monde, 18/7/57, p. 5.
(62)
An event which seemed to have escaped the attention of the
paper until then. Even here, Le Monde stated that a European,
"mistaken for a Muslim", had been beaten up and saved only by
an officer firing in the air.
(63)
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It revealed that some Muslims had been molested in markets
and a few cars overturned ( some damaged) and a motorcycle set
alight, without mentioning who was driving them at the time.
The demonstrators were said to have belonged to several organi-
sations, but especially youngsters, aged between 16 and 22, who
were then said to have violently attacked Muslims in cars (with
one requiring hospital treatment).
Ambulances were said to have ferried the injured to hospital
while army helicopters were hovering overhead.
Le Monde, 12/6/57, pp. 1-2.
(64)
ii ressort des recits parvenus d'Alger que les
emeutiers etaient comme par le passé, de tout jeunes
gens, prompts A traduire leur legitime indignation A
la suite des recents attentats par des manifesta-
tions de violence aveugle qui ne desservent pas, au
contraire, la cause des terroristes.
Some part of the report saw this as no more than a group of
people losing "their cool".
On aurait pu penser que le maintien de M.La-
coste, le retour des parachutistes et en general
l'assurance que le nouveau gouvernement allait
poursuivre une politique de fermete a l'dgard de la
rebellion, étaient de nature A les inciter A garder
leur sang-froid. See Le Monde, 13/6/57, p. 1.
(65)
Between Le Monde and other reports.
After an incident involving four people in a car, Le Monde
wrote that an Algerian woman and a child had been taken out of
the vehicle and the occupants beaten up, one to death.
When the official toll by the authorities gave six deaths
(Le Monde, 13/6/57, p. 2), Le Monde wrote: promptement assomme
et tile a coups de pied et de poing (presumably implying that he
did not suffer because he was knocked out first). Then the car
was pushed over the ten metre-high stone parapet, with the
other Algerian still inside being picked up "half dead" from
the water under the "boos" of the crowd. Other Algerians were
lynched, but that gave a lower number of victims on the Alger-
ian side.
Reports of the French and international press revealed that
there was a discrepancy between the report in Le Monde and that
of France Soir, which indicated that the two individuals were
in the car when it was flattened on the rocks.
Le Monde's report had indicated that only one person had
remained in the car (13/6/57). Most of the other newspapers
reported versions of the events which were not dissimilar,
except for a more pronounced insistence from the right-wing
L'Aurore on the injustice of the violence and the plight of
innocent lives, paying the price of the law of the jungle (loi
du talion). In general more objective papers, except the Alger-
ian press run by pro-settlers interests, were more daring in
their condemnation of the deeds.
Here it would be worthwhile asking why reports of L'Humanite
were not included.
(66)
Foreign publications (Life Magazine published successively
photos of two summary executions), Newsreel, Hort and South
America and French publications such as L'Express (December)
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and Noir et Blanc (which also published a photo of a summary
execution), and even publications in Algeria, R6publique Al-
Oxienne (UDMA publication), reported news of repressive mea-
sures and summary executions, very often of innocent people,
illustrated with pictures. These were published in France in
1955.
(67)
In the concluding paragraph of a very small article (about
a quarter of a column) reporting some atrocities, Le Monde's
attitude seemed somewhat more understanding, since the source
of most incidents was considered to be provocation by Le Monde:
Les circonstances excusent parfois, Si elles ne
les justifient, des actes 6minemment douloureux. Les
services off iciels s'emploient A les limiter ou
les prevenir.
In Le Monde, 21/12/56, p. 6.
(68)
Lorsque malgr6 ces efforts, us se produisent,
ne vaut-il pas mieux, dans l'intêrét m6me des rela-
tions franco-musulmanes, les reconnaitre et les
sanctionner ouvertement?
See le Monde, 21/12/56, p. 6.
Le Monde even reported that the authorities themselves were
considering sanctions against the offenders (because they were
determined to stop anything from getting to extremes).
Ce sont ces circonstances qui ont dètermin6,
semble-t-il, les autoritês a rêagir avec d6termina-
tion. Alors que par le passé les forces de l'ordre
faisaient mdme a l'6gard des 61èments europ6ens
d'une certaine neutralitê, elles se sont opposees
cette fois au manifestants. Detail qui peut appar-
aitre symbolique, des parachutistes ont Otê mis en
ligne contre les 6meutiers.
Le Monde, 21/12/56, p. 6.
It can clearly be seen here, that Le Monde was making a
positive statement about the security forces doing their job
properly, this time. By implication one can guess that they had
not done so previously.
When, as in this instance, the fairness of the army was
reported by the paper, it was implicit in the statement that
this was not always the case. We can clearly conclude that the
fairness of the army was reported when it took place. But its
unfairness was kept unreported. Another sentence in the article
might even say it all. The paper stated that there was no
complicity: La bienveillance ou la complicit6 qui pr6valaient
jusqu'ici dans de pareils cas ont fait place a la reprobation
01261-ale. See Le Monde, 13/6/57, p. 1.
(69)
No comments were made (Le Monde, 7/5/57, p. 7) for instance,
when a group of Europeans and Jews (Europêens et Israelites
prennent a partie tous les musulmans qui se trouvaient aux
abords immOdiats) attacked Algerian "Muslims" on sight (with
about forty people needing hospital treatment) "after a grenade
[had] exploded".
(70)
Le Monde's weak challenge was manifest. Paratropers engaged
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in a frenzy of beatings in Algiers (according to the article
sent by the Algiers correspondent, these paratroopers wrecked
shops along the streets, battered "Algerian Muslims", stabbed
several times an Algerian officer who was trying to calm them
down, and assaulted Muslim workers in tramway works) were but
"recurrent incidents" and merely described by Le Monde as
"regrettable". A deliberate mass retaliation by paratroopers on
innocent by-standers was thought by the paper to be a mere
geste maladroit [qui] aggrave les malentendus et retarde les
solutions.
Writing about the incident proper, the paper commented in an
interrogative but understanding manner:
Que dire des excés commis & Alger, dans le
quartier Beclourt, par des parachutistes contre des
Arabes? Quel rapport avec la pacification, les
mesures de justice, la vraie mission de l'arm6e? Les
blessures regues par deux de leurs camarades, l'hu-
miliation que des hommes rêcemment ramenês d'Egypte
ont l'impression d'y avoir subie, peuvent servir
d'excuse, non de justification.
Le Monde, 6-7/1/57, p. 1.
(71)
Sometimes condemnations originated in the official sources
without any comment by Le Monde before the paper followed suit.
The Resident Minister's communiqué was calling the events,
in which six "Muslim" civilians were killed and twelve injured,
profondêment regrettables. See Le Monde, 19/12/56, p. 5.
The way in which the newspaper reported other scenes of
Algerians being lynched (some people being beaten up and shop
being damaged) above was very significant. But if the paper was
only showing slight unease, the official press agency itself
was calling the incidents "regrettable".
The events were said to have been over quickly and to have
been started by the attack on the forces of order. See Le Monde
3/5/57, p. 6.
(72)
Les incidents.... soulévent méme A Alger de
vives rêprobations...
C'est peut-étre qu'entre-temps ii y a eu Melou-
za. Le massacre de Melouza a revêle a ceux que des
attentats individuels ne suffisaient plus A con-
vaincre que les musulmans êtaient, comme les Eur-
opêens et davantage encore, victimes d'un terrorisme
aveugle. Comment alors admettre aujourd'hui qu'au
hasard d'une êmeute des musulmans, en tant que tels,
continuent A payer pour des crimes dont ils sont
plus souvent les victimes que les complices?
See P. Herreman, in le Monde, 13/6/57, p. 1.
. The plight of the innocent Algerian victims received an
airing:
des voix off icieuses ont fait observer que les
victimes musulmanes de la manifestation Otaient
aussi innocentes que celles du casino de la Cor-
niche. La presse metropolitaine et aussi /a presse
alOroise sont unanimes ce matin et dêsapprouvent
les excés.
(73)
Le Monde attacked the authorities' "unjustifiable silence"
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(for months) as "inexplicable" while it was, at the same time,
deploring the timing of the revelations (sur les faits qui ont
emu et scandalise l'opinion en Afrique du Nord et a l'êtranger)
and their use for electioneering purposes.
(74)
Le silence qui tend a couvrir des actes crimi-
nels ou arbitraires ne peut qu'alimenter les





Le Monde did not doubt that similar incidents had happened
before elsewhere and enquiries were opened, but the results of
those enquiries were never made public and the sanctions, if
any, were taken without public opinion being informed .
In La discipline de feu, "whatever the circumstances" (still
to be established, lack of precise information), Alain Jacob
could not see that the shooting of about thirty "Muslims" as
the result of a "lucid command."
Jacob blamed the "emotional and spontaneous reaction of
inexperienced soldiers freshly arrived from the mainland ... to
the murder of some of their comrades". So, in other words, the
benefit of the doubt was given immediately to the paratroopers,
even before any information had been made available. Le Monde
was putting the view forward that the most likely hypothesis
was that the soldiers could not help their reaction and that
the need for discipline must be backed by the high command.
The paper was hereby confirming that the "murder" which
"triggered the reaction" was a "provocation" and suggesting
that "uncontrolled reprisals would help serve the cause of the
adversaries who threaten dozens of innocents". To state it
more clearly, one action was murder, the other, reprisals and
merely calling for sanctions, not trial for murder. The life of
an Algerian must have been cheap for the paper.
The resolution of discipline or "command" (commandement)
problem was seen as the solution. La discipline de feu, Alain
Jacob, in Le Monde, 21/5/57, p. 5.
(77)
In an incident in Algiers, Le Monde reported:
Ce n'est pas la premiere Lois que des faits
semblables sont constates. Jamais les reactions
n'avaient atteint, a Alger du moms, ce degre de
violence. See Le Monde, 19-20/5/57, p. 1.
It would be legitimite to ask why Le Monde chose the "vio-
lence" aspect here instead of the "guilt" and "murder" aspect
of the event. Had these deeds been the act of Algerians, they




The themes and expressions used revealed a different kind of
perspective:
Bien d'autres illustrations ont scandalise les spectateurs
americains, wrote the correspondent, explaining how shocked
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American public opinion was after seeing those pictures (and
many more) and headlines with the caption: "shoot first, ask
questions later" in publications such as Life, The New York




See also footnote 77 above.
(82)
Moreover, Le Monde published on the same pages that day
declarations from France and Algiers. It is surprising to see
that these would have been more convincing. It seems to have
given them considerable importance as it devoted more than half
a page to them. Ibid.
(83)
As for Le Monde itself, the paper mentioned two statements
by C.Bourdet and F.Mauriac not involving the responsibility of
the paper. See Intellectuals (Chapter 10), Bourdet's article
was Votre gestapo algerienne (France-Observateur, January,
1955) and Mauriac's was La Question (L'Express, 15/1/1955)
Having quoted from these two articles giving names, examples
and types of torture, Le Monde published statements denying
them since it wrote, in this respect, that the Ministry of
Interior had replied to its enquiries:
Enquete ouverte, inspecteur specialement
chargé ... faits sur lesquels enquetes jusqu'A
present ... averes inexacts... quoiqu'il en soit...
ministre	 decide de sanctionner avec severite...
agents dont la culpabilite viendrait a etre eta-
blie.
See Le Monde,	 15/1/55.
(84)
Later on the word "torture" appeared only in Le Monde's
reports of speeches, such as those by the Communist deputy
Guyot:
En Algerie le sang coule journellement, de
veritables operations militaires se deroulent dans
l'Aures et la Kabylie. Les prisons regorgent de
"terroristes", les policiers torturent, les tribu-
naux condamnent, les militants communistes sont tra-
ques, les journaux progressistes sont saisis, le
peuple est dans la misere, mais les gros colons et
les grandes socidtes realisent des benefices en-
ormes. See Le Monde, 4/2/55.
Other examples are the reports of speeches by Algerian
representatives, such as Dr Bendjelloul or Benbahmed (SFIO),
giving details ... supplices ont cours en Algerie touchent...
innocents, the use of "bathtubs, funnels" on people who were
denounced by an unknown person, the use of "electricity,
bottlenecks...a 55-year-old man made to dance naked in front of
his family, his children and grand children". See Le Monde,
5/2/55.
(85)
The ill-treatment of Melle Lavalette was described by Le
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Monde in the following terms:
Or transfêree d'Alger A Oran par des inspec-
teurs de la P.J. d'Alger, Melle Lavalette a êtê
injuriee, malmen6e, violemment giflee, et brutale-
ment frapp6e a la tête. On lui a 6galement lie a
plusieurs reprises les pieds et les mains tandis
qu'un baillon lui êtait appliqué jusqu'a 6touffement
puis êvanouissement. Elle a êt6 laissee pendant
quatre jours sans nourriture et plus longtemps
encore sans soins.
The paper stated that traces of ill-treatment were said to
have faded and that she was still being refused bail on health
grounds. See Le Monde, 23/1/57, p. 5.
In the case of Evelyn Lavalette, the paper stated that it
had evidence that the person in question had been ill-treated
while in police custody. Le Monde wrote that it had received
information which it had cross-checked, evidence in other
words, that the young 28-year-old practising Catholic, Evelyne
Lavalette, had been ill-treated by the police because of ac-
tions she had admitted to them (acting as a letter box for the
rebels).
The paper categorically stated that, by informing about her
sèvice, it did not seek to justify in any way her attitude,
which Le Monde summed up in her reply, according to those who
knew her, to anybody questioning her attitude:
A qui lui demanderait les raisons de sa con-
duite, dêclarent ceux qui la connaissent bien, elle
rêpondrait sans doute qu'elle a etd dêtermin6e par
un sentiment de rOvolte devant les exactions corn-
raises en Alger-ie. ConsidOrant la France comme la
patrie de l'êgalite et de la justice, elle n'a pas
cru pouvoir tolêrer des excés commis en son nom.
Elle a donc rejoint ceux qu'elle tenait pour op-
primes. Ancienne chef tame du Mouvement <<Guide de
France>> en Algerie, elle avait d'ailleurs donnO sa
dêmission en termes assez vifs il y a deux ans.
See Le Monde, 23/1/57, p. 5.
But the paper could not accept her ill-treatment, especially
since this woman, having heard of her brother's arrest and
having learnt that she was wanted by the police, went to them
admitting what she was being accused of.
(86)
It published a note by Michel Gorlin, chargé de mission in
the cabinet of the Minister-Resident, denying of course the
alleged offences through various arguments that were included.
At the bottom of the note, Le Monde wrote that it was publish-
ing it at the request of its author, but that the information
that the paper itself had published was also from reputable
sources. Defending itself against the assertions of the note
and maintaining its story, Le Monde wrote:
Nous enregistrons 	  <la note> de Mr Gorlin,
sans pour autant qu'elle nous amane a tenir pour
inêxacts des renseignements dont nous nous sommes
faits l'Ocho, sur la foi de t6moignages emanants,
eux aussi, de personalitês fort honorables et dont
la sincêritd et méme l'absence de passions parti-
sanes sont indiscutables 	
Destinêe A jeter la suspicion sur les informa-
tions que nous avons publiees, la <note> qui nous
est communiquêe aurait gagne a ne pas demeurer, sur
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des points essentiels, dans le vague. Elle ne donne
ni la date a laquelle le Dr Barriere s'est rendu
auprés de Melle Lavalette ni A quelle periode se
rapportent les menus dont le detail nous est pro-
duit.
See Le Monde, 29/1/57, p. 3.
(87)
See Simon, P.-H., and Servan-Schreiber, J.J. (Chapter 13).
(88)
This debate was opened by a series of articles run by by the
paper around the theme "for or against torture". See below and
also Chapters 10 and 13.
1
bien-fonde, voire même la necessite, in some case to resort to10
torture. See Le Monde, 26-27 and 30/5/57.
(90)
The same line of argument as Le Pen's was defended and
justified in an "Information Bulletin of the Air force" (Le
Monde, 26-27, 30/5/1957) and in a note de service recommendinc
"a study" by an army priest of the parachute regiment to the
soldiers facing problems of conscience in Algeria, which was
circulating underground (sous le manteau), published by the
June issue of Alger-Universitê and reproduced in parts by
Temoignage chretien ( 21/7/57), which had commented:
(...) cette bonne parole, ecrit Alger-
Universite nous est aujourd'hui prechee par un
aumeinier catholique de la Xême region militaire
s'adressant aux soldats pacificateurs. Gageons que
ses reflexions profondes et humaines, solidement
etayees par des references a la Bible et aux textes
pontificaux, sauront nous conduire & une meditation
profitable....
Indicating that the news had been denied, Le Monde wrote
that it would be impossible to publish the long sermon in
question, but gave some extracts, and reported that there were
reactions and even reproaches made to Temoignage chretien which
had initially reproduced extracts. It also stated the arguments
presented by Temoignage chretien in its own defense. In Pour
ou contre la torture. Un prétre, aumonnier parachutiste, preco-
nise en certaines circonstances <<un interrogatoire sans sa-
disme mais efficace>>. Le Monde, 1/7/57, p. 4.
(91)
A further article first gave the impression that the RP
Delarue had been somewhat sanctioned, because of his own state-
ment and his support for torture as the title might have sug-
gested, but in reality, as close reading of the article re-
vealed, the sanction was for giving his views to a third party,
even in confidence.
The paper stated that some information according to which
R.P. Delarue des oblats de Marie might have been relieved of
his duties by Cardinal Feltin, as he "seemed" to justify in
(89)
The paper recalled that Le Pen had stated publicly le
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some case the recourse to torture in the interrogation of
rebels in Algeria in a "study" where he had written:
(...) Entre deux maux -faire souffrir passa-
gerement un bandit pris sur le fait et qui d'ail-
leurs merite la mort, et d'autre part laisser massa-
crer des innocents que l'on sauverait si, par les
revelations de ce criminel, on parvenait a aneantir
le gang- il faut sans hesiter choisir le moindre: un
interrogatoire sans sadisme mais efficace.
Le Monde wrote that, according to information it had gath-
ered, no administrative sanction had been taken against RF
Delarue (who remains at his post) by his superiors as they had
decided that he could not be held responsible for the diffusion
in the press of a document, destined exclusively for the inter-
nal consumption of a military group (and therefore it was ill-
advised/inopportune to take a disciplinary measure against him
which could be erroneously interpreted politically), but that
he had been reprimanded for making his thoughts on the moral
aspects of the operations in Algeria public without the prior
consent of his superiors. The paper pointed out that that had
taken place and that the file on the matter had been closed for
a long time before the document gained wider diffusion.
See Le Monde, 6-7/7/57 and 17/7/57, p. 12.
In Auteur d'une <<êtude>> sur les methodes d'interrogatoire
en Algerie le RP delarue a ete blame par ses superieurs eccle-
siastiques mais ii demeure aumeinier de la 10eme division de
parachutistes, Le Monde, 17/7/57, p. 12.
(92)
Le Monde reminded the readers that it was following its
sommation respectueuse that RF d'Ouince had discussed the topic
at length in the religious paper La Croix, and Le Monde echoed
the theme and content of the published article in its own
pages.
(93)
The article was said to have been written with the consent
of the hierarchical authorities.
(94)
Which had three simultaneous aims:
proteger les amis de la France, gagner la
confiance des neutres, maitriser des adversaires.
(95)
Ces hommes, clercs ou laics, sont imparfaits et
ii y a des bavures. Mais le sens de cette action
n'est pas douteux...[elle tend] incontestablement
humaniser cette guerre, que sa nature meme porte
degenerer en luttes inhumaines. Elle tend a empecher
que ne s'instaure une morale pratique qui serait une
demission des consciences.
In the remainder of the article, RF d'Ouince saw two groups:
some see the necessity to protect lives and of immediate effi-
cacy, others, more "lucides", think more of the dangers of
going down the road of violence and arbitrary measures and
towards the deformation of consciences and the psychological
repercussions of an injustice committed by an army fighting in
the name of a superior civilisation:
Si vraiment nous sommes capables d'un reflexe
moral que n'a pas l'adversaire, c'est la meilleure
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justification de notre cause et de notre victoire.
The Priest also argued that the campaigns against
"excesses", which were often exploited for "un-pure" motives,
had had a beneficial effect.
(96)
Some acts were said to be obviously inadmissible for a
Christian conscience and from the list given in the directives
issued by the religious authorities of the army. These were:
Certains actes sont, d'evidence,inadmissibles
pour une conscience chretienne, j'en reléve une
grande liste dans les directives donnees par l'aumo-
nerie militaire:les represailles collectives, les
executions d'Otages, la justice expeditive livree
l'arbitraire, les sevices exerces sur des suspects
au sujet desquels on ne sait rien de précis, l'in-
terrogatoire pousse jusqu'a la torture abolissant la
liberte..
On these points, the article continued, "excesses/abuses"
exist or, at least, the Church position is not ambiguous it
does not approve them. It does not have to do more, as an army
priest has no more power on the men in his unit than the curate
on the people in his parish.
(97)
Under its own paragraph heading (Les methodes les plus
humaines sont a la longue, les plus payantes).
(98)
La hierarchie qui impose une regle ne peut le
faire en matiere douteuse. Dans ce cas, le silence
est de sa part non pas une derobade mais un acte de
prudence et d'honnetetê...
(99)
As if providing the perfect answer for Le Monde's previous
request, the article ended on the following note:
La parole est a l'Eglise. Mais la parole de
l'Eglise n'est pas seulement une sentence arbitrale;
elle est un temoignage et un appel: <<Que celui qui
a des oreilles pour entendre entende!>>.
In Un article du RP D'ouince sur le con! lit algerien. L'ac-
tion de L'Eglise <<Va incontestablement a humaniser cette
guerre que sa nature meme porte a degenerer en luttes inhu-
maines>>, Le Monde, 1/8/57, p. 4.
(100)
The article concluded that the Christian was not a robot in
the hands of the Church; the initiative and the responsibility
was in the hands of each individual.
(101)
See Le Monde, 25/7/57, p. 1.
(102)
Like that of Mme Alleg. See, for instance, the letter to the
press from the wife of the former director of Alger-Republicain
with a complaint sent by her husband to the Public prosecutor,




That, for her, was a euphemism which meant that he was
dead) in See Le Monde, 3/8/57, P. 4 .
The lawyers also protested, especially Alleg's (as Audin was
never seen by anybody). Le Monde published statements by the
lawyers complaining that they had not managed to get in touch
with their client. Here, Le Monde explained the technical
reason for the visit's refusal and published a "statement to
the paper" itself by these lawyers, declaring that they were
still being refused a visit to their client because his deten-
tion was claimed to be under an administrative measure and,
therefore, he could not have a lawyer to represent him. See Le
Monde, 7/8/57, P. 4.
There were then rumours of a complaint Alleg had made
against the State through Serge Barret, prefet of Algiers,
transmitted to the Public Prosecutor, who had decided to start
an enquiry.
Then, the paper published the content of letters sent by the
two wives to the authorities (the letter of Alleg's wife was
sent to M. Beteille, member of the investigative commission
sent to Algeria. See relevant section on civil liberties) and
to the press.
See Le Monde, 7-8/7/57, for the letter relating to the
disappearance of both a month after the so-called escape of
Audin. See also 13/8/57 for the letter of Mme Audin sent to
the authorities and the press complaining about the arrest of
her husband on 11 June 1957 and the declaration by the authori-
ties that he had escaped on 21 June. Mme Audin also stated on
that occasion that she had absolute/incontrovertible proof that
her husband had been tortured and could not have escaped and
that, according to rumours,he was in a bad shape in one of the
camps.
(104)
See Le Monde, 11-12/8/57.
(105)
After the news of the "suicide", Rene Capitant, former law
lecturer of the victim, suspended his courses at the University
of Paris for a while.
(106)




The atrocities that took place in Algeria had to be repor-
ted. If the job was not done very well by Le Monde, were other
newspapers and journalists any different, and with what conse-
quences? When different and courageous positions were adopted
and sanctions taken, what defence were they afforded by the
paper?
(2)
His bold and conscientious approach to his job and his
knowledge of the realities of the war gave him a real under-
standing of the situation in Algeria, on which he came to hold
very strong views.
(3)
He also stated that the authorities were inflicting punish-
ment on communities, which were not really responsible for the
troubles, and forcibly moving these communities to areas con-
trolled by soldiers. Calling these places camps d'hebergement,
he declared, did not hide their "concentration camp aspects".
There were also in his article accusations of giving in to
supporters of collective repression against ten to twenty
thousand Muslims, only to get ten to twenty years of peace, as
the French authorities in Algeria had done so often in the
pest: for instance, the scorched earth policy of the period
1845-1850 under generals Cavaignac, Canrobert and Pdlissier;
the crushing of the Kabyle uprising of 1871; and in 1945, when
the riots of Sdtif were drowned in blood. He also stated that
this policy of repression carried the risk of producing oppo-
site results to those intended, and that the measures adopted
did not deal with the economic and political roots of the
problem, but only made the population more hostile. See Le
Monde, 15/9/55.
(4)
One wonders what the readers made of this opinion when more
or less at the same time, Le Monde was seeking the opinions of
people such as J.Servier and publishing them in a proper arti-
cle (for Servier, the real root of the problem was sheer fana-
ticism against France caused by Ulftas, amongst the Berbers in
the Aures area).
(5)
See Le Monde, 15/9/55 and Barrat's article Un journaliste




And the incident was reported in the most neutral way by Le
Monde, which gave the news of his arrest, the charges and a
brief biography. See Le Monde, 26-27/9/55, p. 4.
(7)
Captain Michel sent a telegram to Paris, cancelling the
warrant requesting transfer of Barrat to Algeria, stating that
the case could be heard in Paris (sur commission rogatoire) and
allowing his release on bail. No mention was made by Le Monde
on how exceptional this procedure was.
(8)
When explaining the delay in his release, Le Monde stated
that it was due to the problem of finding out who had the
authority to free him since the DST, which had issued the
warrant for his arrest, subsequently declared that it had no
authority to free him.
(9)
There were protests by journalists from various papers,
including some working for Le Monde itself, who published a
statement "communicated" to the paper with the list of its
signatories, which seems to indicate that the journalists as
individuals signed the protest note. It was signed by C.Sar-
raute, A.Fontaine, R.Barrillon, G.Meny, G.Penchenier, E.Sabl-
ier, C.Julien, C.Ezraty, A.Pierre, J.Planchais, A.Mercier,
G.Mathieu... amongst others.
This declaration stated what had happened and requested the
immediate release of R.Barrat. See Le Monde, 14/5/57, p. 4.
(10)
See Le Monde, 28/9/55, p. 1
(11)
He asked a series of questions:
Did he have the right ( in order to find out the truth about
the fellaguas) to go to those who declare themselves to be
"ennemis et non rêvoltds", to talk specifically with a deserter
who has become their leader and as such "responsable d'assassi-
nats"? The paper's answer was that he must have thought so
because he went beyond (passé outre) scruples that he himself
felt, as expressed by the editorial board of France-Observa-
teur, and which, in publishing the article, gave priority to
the right to inform: de ne pas laisser ignorer des aspects
d'une vèrite qui se manifestera tOt ou tard.
(12)
Although Chenebenoit accepted that after the Indochinese
nightmare (la pênible experience du drame indochinois), it
looked as though those who, "in despair of a policy they
thought stupid, entertained the idea and practicality of con-
tacts with Ho Chi Minh" (considered then as a criminal act),
could be justified afterwards.
(13)
Here, Le Monde denied any similarity between this article
and that written by any of its journalists. For instance Blan-
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chet, in Le Monde, 24/12/56.
(14)
For Chénebenoit, in the absence of a professionnal con-
science (code of conduct), the duties of which, as far as
individual conscience is concerned, had never been defined by
law, it was up to the individual to weigh up <peser> his re-
sponsibilities.
To each his freedom to decide and to act, but if they decide
"to go above the other citizens" and break the law, he thought,
they must be held responsible :
Et chacun, lorsque ses scrupules cedent & la
conception qu'il a de la liberte de la presse, doit
accepter les risques qui font la grandeur de cette
profession. Car, Si le journaliste doit etre totale-
ment assure de sa liberte d'opinion ou d'expression,
ii ne saurait etre tenu pour irresponsable de ses
actes de citoyen sans se mettre au dessus des
citoyens.
Having understood the position of Barrat, and accepted his
conception of the right to inform, the paper thought that he
had neglected to weigh up this right against what it saw as the
duty of every citizen: not to give the enemy grounds for hope
or victory.
(15)
Outlining why he got in touch with the "outlaws", he repor-
ted what he had said in a meeting of the Mouvement de liber-
ation du peuple:
Ii nous faudrait bien, tOt ou tard, (...)
prendre contact avec ceux qui sont actuellement les
adversaires de la politique francaise et represen-
tent l'opinion d'une large fraction de la popula-
tion algerienne. J'ai pense qu'il etait urgent de
connaitre et de faire connaitre leur point de vue .
Si nous avions dialogue plus teit avec le Vietminh,
il est vraisemblable que l'effusion de sang en
Indochine edt pu etre arretee avant Dien-Bien-Phu.
See Le Monde, 1/10/55, p. 2.
(16)
See Le Monde 1/10/55, p. 2 and 28/11/55, p. 3. Barrat's
article was a reportage from the Algerian maquis (see footnote
5 above). The position of the paper was expressed by A.Chénebe-
noit.
(17)
And outlining the duty of French people to respect the
necessities of public order, and that the measures taken
ont ete inspirees uniquement par le souci de
l'interét national et la necessite absolue de ne pas
laisser compromettre par une representation eronnee
ou exageree des faits en Afrique du Nord dont vous
connaissez la gravite.
Je suis convaincu qu'il vous apparaitra que le
gouvernement, en l'occurence, a use de son autorite
sans abuser aucunement de la confiance qu'il a recue
du pays et du Parlement.
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See Le Monde, 11/10/55, p. 5.
(18)
When it reported news of the interrogation of Barrat by the
authorities (military tribunal of Paris) a year later, over
the article( published in 31/8/56 in Temoignage Chretien and
Bilan de la Pacification in France Observateur), the paper
stated that he was accused of attempting to demoralise the
army, a criminal matter, and that he was rejecting the allega-
tions, claiming he only wanted to "relate true facts" which
they could not reproach him.
The reaction of Le Monde here was simply a statement of
fact. The paper did not commit itself in favour of the journal-
ist whose freedom of expression was being threatened, whose
duty was being restricted, even stifled; it simply stated:
On sait que M. Barrat, ancien secretaire du
Centre catholique des intellectuels francais, fut
déjà inculpe en septembre 1955 de non-denonciation
de faits constituant des crimes d'atteinte a la
sdrete exterieure et intdrieure de l'Etat, pour un
reportage au sein du maquis algerien, publie
l'epoque dans France-Observateur.
The problem is trying to identify what this last reminder is
there for. It does certainly inform the reader of what went on
before as it did state that Barrat had been charged (See Le
Monde, 7-8/10/56, p. 6.), but it could also give the impres-
sion that the person had already been up for that kind of
"offence" before, in which case, he was less likely to draw a
sympathetic response from the reader. See also Le Monde,
27/10/56.
(19)
Le Monde indicated to its readers that Servan-Schreiber had
participated in a debate on press freedom, organised by the
Radical Party, and that he was advising a long information
campaign about Algeria.
Quoting his comments about the first article in L'Express,
recounting his experience in Algeria, Le Monde observed:
Sa qualite de «rappele» a dit le directeur de
J'Express, lui a permis de voir pendant six mois
l'autre «ccite du decor» et de prendre conscience
du «decalage» entre les verites off icielles et la
realite.
The intention of his paper was said to reveal:
dans quel êtat de «mensonges generalises»
nous vivons et dans quel <<engrenage absurde » nous
nous sommes engages.
Le Monde explained that for Servan-Schreiber the Algerian
problem was not simply at the political level, which could be
solved by a change of government, as in the case of Indochina,
but that it was more serious and more deep than that, "it
affects the very fabric of the nation."
Le Monde's report, headlining on M.Jean-Jacques Servan-
Schreiber: Nous nous sommes engages dans un engrenage absurde,
was dated 9/3/57, p. 2.
With the publication of the article, Le Monde reported that
there were questions asked by M. Dides about the Servan-
Schreiber's article, wondering why his "odious" article in
L'Express had not been seized and asking why a former officer
had not been immediately prosecuted over accusing: ses anciens
camarades de combat encore mobilises et se trouvant dans l'im-
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possibilitd de lui repondre, de crimes graves et de tortures.
See Le Monde, 10-11/3/57.
Servan-Schreiber also wrote a book recounting his exper-
ience. See Chapter 11.
(20)
Mais il convient de distinguer l'accessoire de
l'essentiel. Or le ministre n'a pas conteste
jusqu'ici	 l'essentiel, c'est a dire la veracite
des faits.
See Le Monde, 15/3/57, p. 2.
(21)
The reporting of the protestations of Servan-Schreiber were
accompanied with his acceptance that it might be irritating
(genant) for the military authorities that, as a consccript
with the army in Algeria for six months and a first-hand wit-
ness, he should be allowed, after his return, to speak freely
about what he saw.
To be silent for him was to be an accomplice in the discre-
dit of the whole army over the use of "certain methods" which
would lead to the loss of Algeria. Servan-Schreiber stated that
he was firm about continuing his articles in L'Express for as
long as he was able to. Moreover, continued Servan-Schreiber,
"too many serving men had asked me to speak out for me to be
intimidated".
(22)
See Le Monde, 19/3/57, p. 4 and 20/3/57, p. 1.
(23)
Une nouvelle declaration du directeur de L'Express, in which
Servan-Schreiber declared that he was being sued for having
published photographs which he never stated were taken there,
that he never took a photo while in service , and that this
diversion indicated:
[la faiblesse] des arguments que la propagande
off icielle est en mesure d'opposer A un texte qui
traduit fidelement la realite algerienne.
(24)
The first group included the former Socialist Governor of
Algeria, Naegelen, the MLP, Nouvelle Gauche, the party of Jeune
Republique, as well as the League of Human Rights, which pro-
tested against the attempts to hide the truth from public
opinion, likening the attempt to the Dreyfus affair, an "un-
dignified attempt" made by a Republican government, which, as
in the Dreyfus affair, would be in vain anyway. See Le Monde,
24-25/3/57, p. 3 Une protestation de la ligue des droits de
l'homme.
There were also a group of fifty journalists from Nancy who
denounced this breach of freedom of the press, "best guarantee
of integrity of the democratic process" (Ibid.), and General
Bollardiere's letter of support sent to Servan-Schreiber.
The paper gave the text of the letter sent by the general to
Servan-Schreiber about his Lieutenant en Algerie story, pub-
lished in L'Express 29 mars, approving Servan-Schreiber's
publication.
Je pense qu i ll etait hautement souhaitable
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qu'aprós avoir v6cu notre action et partag6 nos
efforts, vous fassiez votre métier de journaliste en
soulignant & l'opinion publique les aspects dramati-
ques de la guerre revolutionnaire & laquelle nous
faisons face, et A l'effroyable danger qu'il y
aurait pour nous A perdre de vue, sous le prêtexte
fallacieux de l'efficacitO immediate, les valeurs
morales qui, seules, ont fait jusqu'á maintenant la
grandeur de note civilisation et de notre armee.
Je vous envoie l'assurance de mon estime et mes
souvenirs amicaux.
Signed Gênêral Paris de Bollardi&re, grand chevalier de la
Legion d'honneur, compagnon de la Liberation, in Le Monde,
30/3/57, p. 6.
The letter had initially been published in L'Express on 29
March and reproduced by Le Monde the same day (dated 30 March).
With a seemingly supportive current in favour of Servan-
Schreiber, there was also in a second group, a host of denials
and official or governmental pronoucements arguing the opposite
point of view. Most of these official statements tended to run
against the support of Servan-Schreiber. See also Le Monde,
21/3/57, p. 2.
The reports showed the Defence and Resident Ministers at-
tacking his articles and putting the blame on him for not
having spoken previously when he was serving on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, Servan-Schreiber remarking that the
measures taken against him and other serving officers were
"unfair and inelegant", stating that he was speaking of his own
free will and denying that he was trying to score political
points. He was also reported as asserting that his main con-
cern was that if public opinion did not take stock of the
situation in Algeria, his generation would have to pay a cruel
price and that his belief, shared by many of his comrades, led
him to start his rêcit which he stated would continue.
See Le Monde, 23/3/57, p. 2 and 30/3/57, p. 6 which con-
tained a further declaration by the Defence Minister
(25)
Le Monde reported that Servan-Schreiber had been charged
with demoralisation of the army, that he had chosen Me Georges
Izard for his defence, and that he left the court on bail,
making a declaration to the effect that the Ministry of Defence
knew the veracity of the statements, claiming that Servan-
Schreiber received daily testimonies confirming his own, and
outlining his intention to publish five more articles on the
subject. See Le Monde, 22/3/57, p. 2.
A further appearance of Servan-Schreiber before the judge
was reported, together with protest of the Press Federation
against further seizures of L'Express. See Le Monde, 5/4/57, p.
2.
The paper laconically reported later that copies of L'Ex-
press sent to Algeria did not contain the articles of Servan-
Schreiber and that, eventually, he had interrupted the publica-
tion of his articles because of "health reasons", without
going into any details, promising, though, that publication
would resume the following month. See Le Monde, 6/4/57, p. 4.
Thereafter, Le Monde continued to channel the replies given
by the military in Algeria in defence of their action. See Le
Monde, 13/4/57, p. 4.
(26)
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Lieutenant en AlOrie, Julliard, Paris, 1957.
(27)
For France-Observateur, see Le Monde, 14-15/10/56, p. 3, and
26/4/57, p. 5, for further charges brought against him.
(28)
Le Monde, 18/1/57, p. 5.
Le Monde also reported charges against C.Bourdet (Le Monde,
26/4/57, p. 5.), against L'Humanite's editorialist, M.Courtade,
who was reported to have appeared in a criminal court for
atteinte a l'int&grite du territoire, to have manifested a
"secessionist opinion" while the defence was reported as having
stated that numerous "personalities" were aware of existence of
an "Algerian national identity". See Le Monde, 16/3/57, p. 2.
Ten days later, in about fourteen lines, came the conviction
of L'Humanitê for defamation by the president of Batna's Tribu-
nal over the article Halte aux forfaits colonialistes, 4/7/55.
On this occasion both the director, Firmin Pelissier, and
the author of the article were each fined 100,000 francs by
the tribunal of the Seine presided over by judge Peyronie. See
Le Monde, 24-25/3/57, p. 3.
A few days after the event Georges Montaron, director of
Temoignage chrêtien, was charged with the offence of defamation
of the army after a complaint by M.Bourg6s-Maunoury, the De-
fence Minister. Montaron was reported as having come out of the
Tribunal stating that he thought the action was over Jean
Muller's publication [Le blonde's footnote simply stated the
Notebook (Cahier d'êcriture) of the time spent by a reservist
in Algeria], but in reality it was the name of the reader's
letter, which he would not reveal to the court, that was being
sought of him.
Le Monde, on this occassion, while reporting Montaron's
statement to the press in quotes, gave the sentences applic-
able, explaining that the sentences for defamation were eight
days to a year in jail or a fine of between 20,000 to 20 mil-
lion francs, or both according to article 30 of the Law of 29
July 1881. See Le Monde, 30/3/57, p. 6.
(29)
Firmin Pelissier, Director, and Lyzow Mittelbeg, cartoonist
both were fined 100,000 francs. See Le Monde, 14/5/57, p. 4.
(30)
See Le Monde, 25/5/57, p. 3
(31)
See Le Monde, 20/6/57, p. 6, 5/7/57, p. 4 and 7-8/7/57, p.
3.
(32)
Le Monde, 5/4/56, p. 5.
(33)
Dean of the Law Faculty, Algiers University.
(34)
Le Monde 10/4/57, p. 3.
(35)
A.Frossard, Ce Mandouze dont nous vient tout le mal, Le
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Monde, 28/11/55, p. 5 and G.Suffert, Un recidiviste, Le Monde,
5/12/55, p. 5.
(36)
La Question, Minuit, Lausanne, 1958 & 1961.
The book, banned in France, clearly exposed for the first
time detailed use of torture at the hand of the French security
forces by somebody giving a first hand account of it.
(37)
Le Monde, 20/2/58, p. 9 and 14/5/58, p. 3.
(38)
If some of the international press warned of North Africa
going back to the dark ages (Morgen Post) if France were to
withdraw, some others accepted the aims of freedom which anima-
ted the masses in that area, but found it too soon to liberate
the colonies (Philadelphia Enquirer). Others went further; the
<General Anzeiger>, probably with fresh memories of the plight
of Germany during the last war, issued a strong condemnation
of the reprisals, and likened the destruction of Algerian
villages to the Czech village of Lidice and the massacres of
Oradour, arguing that, if only one innocent can be found
amongst the thousand victims, the instigators of the reprisals
should be charged with crimes against humanity.
The New York Daily Mirror likened the North African struggle
to the American War of Independance and wrote that the Moors
were not French in history, religion, or customs, and that the
revolution taking place over there, taking advantage of French
weakness, had the same characteristics as that which had resul-
ted in the creation of the US. The fact that American colonists
were mostly British by history, religion, customs, etc. and
they, unlike the Algerian FLN, received massive foreign aid,
suggests that the parallel was not close; it helps illustrate,
however, that there was even less common ground between the
French and the Moors, and therefore the links between Algeria
and France were even less justified historically. This paper
saw no interest in backing French colonialism in the area,
which it saw as destined to perish.
There were echoes of all these positions in Le Monde's press
review.
(39)
A shrewd Liberation found that a disguised war was taking
place: Une guerre qui n'ose pas dire son nom. For this paper,
the terminology used (such as: general assault, cleaning up
operations, villages mowed down to the ground) was reminiscent
of a previously troubled period, oil /a France se glissa insen-
siblement dans la guerre d'Indochine against the wishes of the
people who would have to face a fait accompli".
Even Le Figaro was a hint critical. For this paper punish-
ment did not solve anything at all: Le chAtiment ne reg/e rien.
This paper, however, similarly to Le Monde, did not agree with
L'Humanites characterisation of the rebels as patriots. Le
Monde's reaction (as seen above) was a confused and unclear
statement of what had happened, justifying some actions and not
others, and condemning the odious assassination of Europeans.
Very few newspapers printed strong condemnations of the
reprisals by the troops. The reaction of the government was
simple when they did: the authorities resorted to legal mea-
sures or administrative procedures which resulted in blatant
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seizures of these newspapers. As a result of this policy, the
article, Faites cesser la terreur, by Pierre Courtade was to
make L'Humanitê suffer. It was seized (from the presses, de-
pots, transport vehicles, stations and mailbags).
Le Monde was no exception, it was seized for reprinting what
the others had printed.
(40)
There has not been an in-depth study of the seizures except
for Harrisson M., Government and the Press during the Algerian
war, The American Political Science Review, June 1964, pp. 273-
285.
(41)
Or, put another way, how did Le Monde react to this in-
fringement of press freedom and attack on the freedom of ex-
pression? What characteristics do we find in articles and
reports dealing with that particular aspect of Le Monde's
coverage?
(42)
Sometimes playing down the importance (as when Le Monde gave
the number of seizures since a particular date). The impact of
giving the total number of seizures would have been far great-
er.
Le Monde, for instance, pointed out that it was the third
time in a short period that the Catholic paper, La Croix (3 and
4 February 1957) had fallen victim to such a measure. On this
occasion Le Monde also gave the article incriminated as being:
Algerie, la greve s'êtend.
A number of other examples can be given relating to: Esprit
(third seizure over Maladies infantiles de l'Indêpendance in Le
Monde, 29/6/57, p. 4, 1/8/57/and 8/8/57, p. 4, and over Captain
Louis Fournier's article commenting on the battle of Melouza.
See Le Monde, 10/8/57, p. 4.
Exceptionally, the account was complete in the case of
L'Economie Algêrienne, mouthpiece of the Union of Traders UGCA
(it was the second time). See Le Monde 22/12/56.
When Le Monde reported that L'Espoir was about to be wound
up, it quoted the statements of the paper, outlining the total
number of publications and seizures. See Le Monde, 23/2/57, p.
5.
(43)
Le Monde (30/1/57) indicating that: La Croix saisi a Alger
en raison d'information relatives au mot d'ordre de greve.
(44)
The seizure of L'Esprit over the maladies infantiles arti-
cle in Le Monde, 29/6/57, p. 4 (seven lines).
(45)
Le Monde headlined that five other weeklies had been seized
(5 autres hebdomadaires saisis) when an actual reading of the
article revealed that, besides those five weeklies, two more
dailies were also seized, making the total seven publications
altogether. See Le Monde, 23/1/57, p. 5.
Another instance could be found when the contents of another
article of Le Monde, headlining that three weeklies had been
seized, revealed that many more publications had suffered the




The sort of neutral way of reporting applied through Septem-
ber 1955, for instance, despite the paper's knowledge of its
own journalist's first-hand experience (Penchenier), and de-
spite other papers'publication of cases of vivid description of
torture.
Je rencontre un Algérien, citoyen frangais
comme vous et moi, de par notre volonte. Ii fut
arrete en novembre, conduit a Alger, interroge sur
ses activites politiques. N'en ayant pas, ses re-
ponses degurent ceux qui croyaient la prise bonne.
On le devétit, on lui ha aussi les mains sur une
barre passant derriere les genoux, on he jeta
terre. A chaque denegation un tuyeau etait place sur
sa bouche et sur son nez jusqu'a suffocation. Ii
s'evanouit plusieurs fois pendant ce supplice com-
plete de coups de baton dans les reins. Le regime
changea: eclairage violent dans les yeux pendant des
heures, coups de poing a la nuque, au creux de
l'estomac, l'electrocution. Cela dura trois jours
comme la descente aux enfers. Un tel traitement
n'est pas habituel bien stir, ni en Algerie, ni
ailleurs. Mais on le pratique parfois dans tous les
pays du monde. Vraiment ii ne faudrait pas gratter
beaucoup pour liberer dans l'homme la bestialite la
plus avilissante! -enfin la justice!- 	 fut ac-
cuse] d'atteinte a la sdrete de l'Etat, et fut con-
duit pour trois mois en prison. I1 ne fut pas juge,
pour la seule raison qu'il beneficia d'un non-lieu:
bênóficia, la formule est d'une ironie cruelle. Sans
reparation, sans excuses ou regrets, il rentra dans
la vie. Ii aurait quelques raisons d'être revolte,
de nous hair. Il a domine sa rancoeur, car il a
appris que la haine ne rapporte qu'une haine plus
grande...
This letter, printed by Claudius Petit in his St-Etienne
weekly and echoed in Le Monde, 21/9/55, p. 5, gave detailed
"excesses" and crimes committed against the civilian Algerian
population.
(47)
This simple way of reporting the event was carried out
through most of the paper's reports throughout.
Similarly when, for instance, as a result of various sei-
zures of their publications, the presses used by Ferhat Abbas (
A nationalist liberal who collaborated with the French authori-
ties until the mid 1950's) were being auctioned off, Le Monde
made no comments and simply carried the news. See Le Monde,
3/1/58.
(48)
See Le Monde, 19/11/56, p. 7, about L'Espoir,
When the fortnightly publication, L'Espoir (see also below)
distributed by the Federation des Liberaux d'Algerie was
seized, Le Monde stated that the newspaper had been seized in
the kiosks and the Post Office in Algiers by prefectoral decree
of 10 November. See Le Monde, 19/11/56, p. 7.
(49)
Les Nouvelles de Bordeaux et du Sud Quest a ete saisi en
vertu de l'article 10 du Code d'Instruction Criminelle. This
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seizure related to police operations against Algerians belong-
ing to banned organisations and included reports of interroga-
tion and summary executions. 22/1/57, P. 4.
(50)
Le Monde resorted to using statements made by official state
sources or news agencies. As in the case of the UDMA's Republi-
que Algerienne. See Le Monde, 15/9/55, p. 5.
... Publication de nouvelles de nature A trou-
bler l'ordre public. Au sommaire de ce numero, qui
devait etre mis en vente le vendredi 16 septembre
figurait un document photographique sur les exec-
utions sommaires au stade de Philippeville, document
déjà publie en France, notamment par le magazine
Noir et Blanc; une etude de synthese sur la situa-
tion en Algerie et la responsabilite du colo-
nialisme, et surtout un article accusant le contre-
terrorisme d'avoir fait assassiner le pharmacien
Abbas Alaoua, neveu de Ferhat Abbas, le 20 aodt
Constantine.
Most of the articles referring to seizure were based on
official sources, especially the Governor General and the
governmental press agency, AFP. See Le Monde,23-24/12/56. See
also, for instance, the report referring to the seizure by the
Prefet of the Garonne 20-12-56, on his Interior Minister's
instruction, of the Bulletin of Black African students, ex-
pressing disagreement with their elders over the way to solve
the problem of the day.
(51)
This was the case of many articles by Socialists opposed to
government policy such as Andre Philip. When reporting the
seizure of L'Espoir, Le Monde indicated that the article which
had motivated the seizure was the article of Andre Philip,
former minister and socialist deputy, taking up ideas expressed
in Le Monde ( in reply to the Prime Minister's declaration out-
lining the programme to be followed in Algeria -cease-fire,
elections-negotiations), and stating that a cease-fire could
not be achieved without a political agreement. See Le Monde,
22/1/57, p. 4.
Andre Philip's other article (Le Monde, 7/3/58, p. 3) criti-
cising the suicidal policy of France, given the officially
accepted view that victory was impossible, arguing that the
conflict was internationalised, was given by Le Monde as the
motive for the seizure of France Observateur.
Motives were also given for the seizure of many left-wing
publications.
(52)
See Le Monde, 30-31/4/57, p. 4. It is worth noting that de-
spite self-censorhip, L'Express and a few others were under
heavy pressure throughout the period in question.
(53)
On pense que c'est la fagon dont le journal
L'Espoir relatait la greve des 8 jours, declenchee
par le FLN qui a provoque cette mesure.
Le Monde, 12/2/57, p. 3.
It must be pointed out, especially on this occasion, that Le
Monde reported this seizure without contrasting it to its own
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innocuous articles on the topic (See Chapter 12 on this sub-
ject).
Sometimes, the reports were based on other papers' guesses.
Comments indicating that, despite the voluntary self-imposed
censure prealable, L'Express's editorial team:
est reduite a supposer que seul le Bloc-Notes
de M Francois Mauriac peut etre la cause de cette
mesure discretionnaire.
Le Monde, 1/3/58, p. 1.
(54)
Comments referring to the repeated seizures of the Algerian
liberals' newspaper, L'Espoir, "which showed independence from
political power and financial groups", Le Monde stated that
with the threat of this paper's disappearance:
disparaitrait en Algerie l'une des rares
tribunes oa Europeens et musulmans peuvent encore
s'exprimer en faveur de la cohabitation des deux
communautes et d'une solution pacifique du probleme
algerien.
Le Monde, 22/12/56.
With a later seizure, Le Monde (23-24/12/56) wrote that this
further seizure could increase the financial difficulties and
speed up the decision to liquidate the paper.
Le Monde also reported that the contributors to the paper
had stated that they had kept quiet for six months to enable
Lacoste to implement his policies but that, since nothing had
been done, they had decided to speak out. It reported also that
they did so with moderation, in order not to increase tension
between the two communities. It was also revealed that they had
kept some information, received from their correspondents in
the countryside, quiet, that they had doctored (edulcorer) some
articles and delayed the publication of information until
verifications were made. It was also stated that they reaf-
firmed that they did not encourage Algerian rebellion, but that
the truth about it could not be silenced.
Nous ne pouvons pas ne pas condamner les me-
thodes dangereuses pour la France, pour l'Algerie et
pour cette amitie franco-maghrebine sans laquelle /a
France ne serait plus la France, sans laquelle le
Maghreb s'engagerait dans une aventure dont on ne
peut prevoir les consequences ...
Le pays creve de mensonges et de faux sem-
blants. Si l'on veut que les choses ne soient pas
dites, ii taut qu'elles ne soient pas faites. Si
l'on pretend defendre la democratie et la liberte,
ii faut laisser librement parler ceux qui ne pensent
pas come nous. Si l'on est si sensible qu'on ne
supporte pas la contradiction, eh bien! Qu'on prenne
des mesures dictatoriales. La censure en est une.
Elle aurait au moms le merite de la franchise.
'Le Monde, 23-24/12/56. All this defense of the paper was in
quotes. Although it is informing its readers about the issue,
Le Monde, in a sense, is only reporting what the others are
saying and not really getting involved itself.
(55)
Reporting the seizure of the Catholic paper, La Croix (3-4
February 1957), over the article, La greve s'etend, le terror-
isme se rallume, and stating that L'Echo d'Alger's last page
had been devoted to the same event, Le Monde pointedly commen-
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ted (but in very small print):
(...) la saisie du journal parisien constitue
une mesure a la fois inutile et arbitraire. Elle
n'empechera personne a l'êtranger comme en France
de connaitre la verite sur l'Algerie en dehors des
versions et declarations off icielles trop souvent
dementies par les faits depuis un an.
Le Monde, 7/2/57, p. 10.
(56)
This can even be seen as duplicitous when we know that the
paper at the same time was witholding information from its
readers about the very strike itself (See Chapter 7).
(57)
When we know that Le Monde's journalists and director were
so quick off the mark to see the Melouza incidents and "fell-
agas atrocities" as crimes against humanity. See Melouza refer-
ence in Chapter 6.
(58)
Stating that France-Observateur had been seized for the
second time in three weeks, Le Monde reproduced excerpts from
another article written in France-Observateur outlining the
seized paper's insistence on the danger of financial threats,
the freedom of journalists and their intention to refuse to be
silenced, as well as the right of the public to be informed,
and reported that a later edition of France Observateur was
published without the incriminating article. See Le Monde,
3/5/57, pp. 5-6 Nouvelle saisie de France-Observateur
The few comments ventured by Le Monde in small print inclu-
ded assertions such as: the press had to inform public opinion
of facts that the authorities "preferred to ignore", and that
"random seizures" (a tout bout de champ) would only lead to a
further degradation of our institutions and a perpetuation of
excesses".
(59)
Le Monde was now urging that the Commission de Sauvegarde
(see below) be quickly set up to "fulfil conscientiously and
courageously its task" (see Nouvelle saisie de France-Observa-
teur, in Le Monde, 3/5/57, p. 6) so that:
La presse, au moms dans un premier stade,
n'aura plus alors qu'a lui adresser temoins et
temoignages.
So the role of the press, in this field, was to inform the
Commission. There clearly appears a difference of attitude and
conception of the role of the newspaper between Le Monde and
France-Observateur as seen above.
(60)
Referred to as early as 1955 in independent reports.
The seizure of France Observateur in May 1957 (discussed
above) was based specifically on a reference to torture in a
soldier's letter to his father (Jeunes soldats devant la tor-
ture). See Le Monde, 3/5/57, p. 6.
(61)
However, the the paper did report third-party protests over
his treatment. Le Monde reported, for instance, occasionally
(in quotes) that L'Humanite had been seized for publishing
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Alleg's complaint, that M. Still had pointed out that the
commission of former deportees (See Commission de sauvegarde
below) had, after enquiry, recognised the existence of tor-
ture, and that the government had agreed to send a commission
of enquiry.
(62)
Le Monde reported its position in its review of the press
column. The report of Franc-Tireur on this occasion read as
follows: Franc-Tireur publie de son ceite le commentaire sui-
vant:
«Nous n'avons pas les moyens de verifier
l'exactitude des assertions de M.Alleg, dont le
parti a trop souvent couvert les tortures et les
crimes perpetres a l'Est. Mais Si une partie seule-
ment de ces faits sont exacts, une enquete et des
sanctions s'imposent, non contre le journal, fdt-il
communiste, qui les a publies, mais contre les
tortionnaires, fussent-ils des off iciers.
Dans ses conclusions, publiees la semaine
derniere, la delegation de la commission interna-
tionale contre le regime concentrationnaire avait
déjà releve en Algerie des cas de veritables tor-
tures par l'electricite, le tuyau d'eau, la baig-
noire, la pendaison pour extorquer declarations ou
aveux.
Ces cas sont sans doute exceptionnels et ne
sauraient donc porter atteinte a l'honneur de la
France, pas plus que des off iciers isoles ne saurai-
ent attenter a l'honneur de l'armee, surtout s'il
est exact, comme l'affirme M.Alleg, qu'ils ont
couvert d'injures la Republique qu'ils ont mission
de servir.
Mais ce devrait etre une raison de plus pour
etablir la verite et faire triompher la justice.»
Le Monde, 1/8/57, p. 4.
In small print Le Monde commented that the government could
not afford to do nothing, but that it had to establish whether
the statements were correct and act accordingly:
Les precisions sur les noms, les dates et les
lieux et, helas! les procedes de tortures donnees
M.Alleg dans sa plainte ne permettent pas en effet
de considerer que la saisie du journal communiste
constitue pour la conscience une reponse suffisante.
Ou ces faits sont inexacts et des poursuites doivent
etre engagees, ou us sont vrais et des sanctions
doivent etre prises. L'Humanite a d'ailleurs cite
saisi trop tard pour que la presse êtrangere n'ait
pas eu connaissance d'une affaire qui, parmi d'au-
tres, risque, si elle est simplement dtouffee, de
porter un grave prejudice a /a cause francaise.
See Le Monde, 1/8/57, p. 4.
(63)
Very often these protests emanated from sources other than
Le Monde, but as a rule, the paper included them in its cover-
age.
It reported the protests by Camille Val, general-secretary
of Jeune Republique, about the seizure of Espoir-Algerie
drawing a parallel between the attitude adopted by the govern-
ment towards the "proponents of a real pacification and dialo-
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gue" and those "responsible for the dramatic situation in
Algeria, for promoting colonialism and racism" (Le Monde,
27/12/56.), before stating that the paper had interrupted its
publication.
In Aprés une nouvelle saisie <<L'Espoir>> organe des
liberaux d'Algerie interrompt sa partition. Le Monde, 23/2/57,
p. 5.
The paper reported that the paper had sent a circular to its
suscribers after this fifth seizure explaining that readers and
friends understood that it could not take the futile risk of
printing a newspaper which was immediately taken away by the
police. The paper was also reported as criticising:
(...) la propagande off icielle qui masque la
verite et declare qu'il a <<denonce les erreurs et
les injustices de la politique de pacification quand
ii était temps encore de redresser une action mal-
heureuse...
Nous sommes ... au terme d'un enchainement
fatal oil le recours a la force conduit au regne de
la force seule.
It hoped that it would be able to appear in the future
without the need to be in the opposition.
Le Monde recalled that that paper [which was at its 16th
publication, authorised to publish by Lacoste in June 56] was
the only paper of the opposition in Algeria to be tolerated by
the Governor-General and that this tolerance had become more
and more fictitious as the number of seizures increased:
Les dirigeants du bimensuel avaient même demande clue la
censure leur soit appliquee plutOt Tie des methodes indirectes
qui avaient pour effet de leur imposer le silence. 23/2/57, p.
5.
(64)
When the same L'Espoir stopped publication, Le Monde's
reports dealt with that (23/2/57, p. 5, and above). Later Jean
Gannet, director, was given the opportunity to argue the case
for his paper in two half-colums of the "free opinion" rubric.
See Un journal qui disparait, Le Monde, 14/3/57, p. 2.
He also stressed the need for a coherence between the ends
and the means:
N'importe quels moyens ne conduisent pas A
n'importe quelle fin. Des moyens injustes perpetuent
l'injustice. Des solutions emportees par la force ne
tiennent qu'autant que la force est suffisemment
forte pour les imposer.
Ibid.
(65)
One could find in Le Monde the protests of Andrd Still,
editor of L'Ilumanite ( Le Monde, 18/1/57, p. 5); that of Fran-
coise Giroud, co-editor (with Servan-Schreiber) of L'Express,
complaining that France Soir, Paris Presse, Le Monde, L'Ex-
press, La Croix, Temoignage Chretien and others all had been
seized during that year in Algeria, arguing that there were
"lies" by omission and requesting, either, that these measures
be stopped, or for censorship to be clearly envisaged like in
Spain Hungary and Egypt. See Le Monde, 4/5/57, p. 3.
There were also protests by Claude Bourdet in the paper,
complaining against the seizure of France-Observateur over Le
silence est de sang, article dealing with repression in Algeria
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(this was a play with word mocking the well-known expression le
silence est d'or) in the communiqué of France-Observateur,
published in Le Monde, 12/4/57, which also reported on this
occasion the frustration of the editorial team for not having
been informed of the reasons of the seizure and their defiant
statement (in quotes) that information will eventually get out
to public opinion. It was also pointed out that M. Bourges-
Maunoury had declared (on 4 April) that there was no question
of censorship a week (8days) before and indicated that there
were financial implications for the paper, which had asserted
its will to fight on to inform public opinion.
Other examples of protests included the Federation of the
Press (in a communiqué issued by its president Albert Bayet)
against the seizure of L'Express in Algeria (despite the arti-
cles concerning Algeria being edited from copies of the papers
sent there). All these protests were given room in the paper
and could clearly be seen. But the paper was not orchestrating
a campaign against the state, it was simply reproducing these
protests in quotes; it was merely reporting them factually. le
Monde, 5/4/57, p. 2.
Organisations'protests were also reported when Le Monde
published the complaint of the Bureau of the radical Party
against procede arbitraire, anti-democratique et plus hypocrite
que la censure avouee [qui] porte un prejudice intolerable A
la liberte de la presse.
See Le Monde, 4/5/57, p. 3, Le Bureau du parti radical pro-
teste contre la saisie de France Observateur.
Le Monde reported that personalities and groups protested
against censorship measures. The paper gave news of thirty-five
personalities writing to the president of the Republic, M Coty,
to complain against the seizure of France Observateur, the
breach of the French people's right to be informed of what was
going on in Algeria, and requesting information on whether "the
action demanded of the sons of France was in conformity with
the honour of the flag".
Le Monde gave the names of some of the signatories; Jean
Cassou, R.Capitant, J.Kayser, Pierre Le Brun, Henry Marrou,
Louis Martin-Chauffier, Louis Massignon, Francois Mauriac,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Leon Pierre-Quint, Claude Roy, JP
Sartre, Alfred Sauvy, Jean Wahl, Mmes Clara Malraux, Andree
Viennot, in 35 personalites protestent aupres de M.Coty contre
la saisie de France-Observateur. Le Monde, 7/5/57, p. 7.
The same day the paper reported a protest by the print union
against the "second seizure in two weeks". 7/5/57, p. 7.
(66)
On the seizure of France-Observateur and Alleg's book, see
Le Monde, 28/2/58, when occasionally Le Monde gave a fuller
explanation as to what actually was involved, but only much
later.
(67)
When the article of Jean Daniel was omitted from L'Express,
Le Monde reported the event and the comments made by the cen-
sored paper in its following issue. In Le Monde, 26/1/57.
L'Express parait A Alger avec une page blanche.
"Qu'une censure soit instituee Si la situation
est telle qu'elle l'exige, soit. Mais la saisie
n'est pas la censure. Mentionnons pour memoire
l'hemorragie financiére qu'elle entraine et qui
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suffirait a conseiller aux directeurs de journaux la
prudence , la timidite, la lAchetê...
Nous refusons, pour notre part, de nous suicid-
er en subissant, pour chaque numêro saisi, des
pertes qui sont lourdes pour nous. C'est un luxe
que nous ne pouvons pas nous offrir toutes les
semaines. Mais nous ne cederons pas davantage a la
tentative de <<l'information 6masculee>>.
Le Monde concluded:
L'article de Jean Daniel, que contient ce
numêro et qui pourrait donner pretexte a /a sollici-
tude du gouvernement gêndral, sera donc purement et
simplement remplace par une page blanche, dans les
exemplaires expediês en Algerie.
L'Express was particularly hit and seizures took place even
when it had censored its articles. This also occurred in August
1957. See Le Monde, 10/8/57, p. 4 and 14/8/57, p. 4. The latter
edition edition announced that Le Monde had also been seized
for reporting the content of the censored version of L'Express.
(68)
Le Monde, for instance, reported that it had been requested
to publish the protest of Temps Modernes.
On nous prie d'inserer le communiqué suivant; and in quotes
one finds the editorial communiqué stating that the seizure of
Temps Modernes had been motivated by an editorial of J.P.
Sartre on torture in Algeria and Jean Rous i article on the last
chances for negotiation. See Le Monde, 5/6/57, p. 3. Many of
the articles mentioned above were also published in communiqué
form.
(69)
Attention to legal requirements, as far as freedom of the
press was concerned, though reported (second hand) by Le Monde,
was usually put forward by other organisations. It was France
Observateur, for instance, which pointed out (to the Public
Prosecutor) that article 51 of the law of 21 July 1881 stated
that seizure could only be decided by a judge (d'instruction)
and should only relate to 4 copies of the item in question
while all other copies should be restituted. Le Monde, 7/5/57,
p. 7.
Similarly, it was L'Bumanite's Andre Still (reported by Le
Monde) who pointed out that the charges brought against him
were in violation of the same law, which excluded the editor of
a newspaper from criminal charges (responsabilite juridique)
and responsibility over articles not written by him.
See Le Monde, 18/1/57, p. 5.
(70)
In its comments, the paper wrote: Comme ii etait a próvoir,
les autoritós font usage des droits que leur confére la loi sur
l'Etat d'Urgence. See Le Monde, 24-25/4/55.
Since most of its previous reports indicated that press
censorship would not be adopted. Then, when it occurred, the
first measure should have led to a strong protest from any
paper committed to freedom of the press. Instead, the article
simply read:
L'arréte publie au Journal Official... importanteg
mesures dans le cadre de la loi d'urgence. Le pre-
mier êtablit la censure sur la presse et stipule gue
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les directeurs et responsables de journaux et de
publications doivent soumettre avant tirage au
prófets du d6partement dans lequel us sont publies
des morasses ou preuves des numêros a paraitre la
dur6e de cette mesure est limit6e A la dui-6e d'ap-
plication de l'Etat d'Urgence.
Instead of strongly criticising special powers and their
consequences, in anticipation of what might later happen, the
paper commented in a small note and in a small print:
(..) C'est aujourd'hui la libertê d'informationet
de commentaire qui se voit restreindre en AlOrie
alors que les dispositions 16gales antêrieures
mettaient dêja une arme redoutable, on a pu le
constater en France, aux mains des pouvoirs publics.
See Le Monde, 24-25/4/55.
(71)
The paper was seized in Algeria over the Penchenier story.
See Chapter 10 (footnotes) and Chapter 12.
(72)
Very similar to those referred to in Chapter 12.
(73)
Vraisemblablement par des balles perdues. See Le Monde, 6-
7/1/57, ff.
(74)
Hubert Beuve-Mery (HBM), wanting to be judged by what his
paper had actually printed rather than by what the government
was accusing it of having printed, tried to put the record
straight by republishing the description of the incident (See
Piêces en main in Le Monde, 8/1/57, p. 1), stating that steps
had been taken to contact the Ministry of Defence to check the
details of the story; and he maintained that the paper did
refer to the "fatal injury" of the girl as an "accident" and
that it was not accusing anybody of murder. He also asked what
the "exigences de l'heure", on which the seizure was motivated,
were and what they meant.
(75)
Quand ii n'y a plus de libertê digne de ce nom,
l'êtablissement de la censure prêalable devient une
question de stricte honnétete. Elle seule peut
degager devant le public les journaux et les jour-
nalistes de responsabilitês qui ne leur appartien-
nent plus.
See Beuve-Mêry, in Le Monde, 8/1/57, p. 1.
(76)
The story published by Le Monde did not contradict the
Ministry of Defence sources in any case.
(77)
The next day, see Le Monde, 9/1/57, p. 2.
(78)
The indirect emergence of the Federation's agreement in the
protestations of the Federation, was quite revealing in the
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sense that it was not used to provide a caution to the readers
to help in their assessment of the nature of what was being
printed under the cover of objective reporting, but as a miti-
gating circumstance to strengthen and help defend the paper in
its position.
(79)
See Le Monde, 11/1/57, p. 7.
(80)
In small print the paper pointed out that it was not only in
the Lodi camp, but in all internment camps, that the paper had
been banned. See Le Monde, 26/3/57, p. 6.
(81)




Outside contributor to the paper, see Le Monde, 22/3/57,
mainly written to criticise the report of the Hovnanian Commis-
sion (see below).
(84)
(...) constatation en quelque sorte clinique d'un des
grands phenomenes sociaux du XX ieme siecle.
In the article, Beuve-Mery reiterated that the patriotism
and the efficacy of the paratroopers were never in question and
that, indeed, his paper had on countless occasions praised
them. He stated the "game" of a few politicians was to give the
army responsibilities alien to it, so that it could be better
used as a shield to prevent any attempt to discuss or draw the
consequences of this role, and thereby, interpret any political
discussion on the subject as a crime. See Le Proces, leader
signed by Hubert Beuve-Mery in Le Monde, 20/7/57, p. 1.
(85)
Ii fallait s'y attendre. Les assauts spectacu-
laires A coups de centaines de millions et les
savantes machinations ourdies dans l'ombre n'ayant
pas abouti a quoi que ce fat, sinon a renforcer le




By declaring that other papers had showed the "same degree
of temerity" when they clearly used to do much more in this
field, Beuve-Mèry continued:
Mais c'est Le Monde qu'il taut A tout prix trapper
et mettre, si possible, hors de combat.
La preuve est ainsi faite, une fois de plus du
bien fondd des avertissements prodigues ici ... de
ce qui attend le pays au terme de la route dans





For Tribune de Lausanne, see La Tribune de Lausanne consacre
un editorial au proces intente au Monde, in Le Monde, 23/7/57,
p. 2; for The Economist, see "Squeezing the Press: L'Economiste
se preoccupe des atteintes a la liberte de la presse francaise
et du proces intente au Monde, in Le Monde, 30/7/57, p. 5 and
for The Washington Post, see Ze Washington Post (1/8) s'in-
quiête A son tour des poursuites engagees contre Le Monde, see
Le Monde, 2/8/57, p. 4.
(88)
It would be useful to recall that Le Monde was also seized
for reproducing stories published in other papers such as the
article published by Captain Luis Fournier (seized itself) in
L'Express, extracts of which were reproduced in Le Monde,
without the paper showing the slightest signs of having been
annoyed. There was no protest in this case, but information
outlining that both its Saturday editions for 10 August had
been seized for reproducing extracts of the article in ques-
tion.
See Le Monde, 11-12/8/57, p. 3 and 14/8/57, p. 4.
(89)
See Chapter 2 or one of its articles Quand la France est
gouvernee.
(90)
See section relating to press censorship above and the
persecution of journalists in the earlier part of this chap-
ter.
(91)
Harrisson, M., op. cit.
(92)
See Le Monde, 26/1/57, p. 3, reporting publication of L'Ex-
press with blank pages.
(93)
Penchenier's articles at the end of August 1955 (24 to
30/8/55) were examined in Chapter 12.
(94)
Which only implied that potentially those Algerians, dissa-
tisfied with government policy, might be the future leaders of
the nationalists. See Le Monde, 24/12/56.
(95)
Jean Planchais told me that this did not mean that the
positions of the paper pleased everybody as he, and his own
appartment, were a bomb target after 1958.
(96)
From the start, in spite of the fact that a number of Com-
munists were allegedly and actually victims of ill-treatment by
the security forces, parliament voted to exclude them from
taking part in the seven-man expedition.
This was reported by Le Monde, 28-29/10/56, without any
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objections being raised by the paper as to why this group,
whose associated members were the main victims besides intel-
lectuals and the Algerians themselves, could not take part.
(97)
The dissenter was a member of the Radical party, M. Hovna-
nian. The six other members were Mr Provo and Mr Merigonde
(both Socialists), M.Isorni (Independent), M Bricout (from the
Republicains Sociaux), M.Cayeux (MRP) and Quinson (GRG).
(98)
The paper covered both the content of the conclusions and
the objections of Hovnanian.
(99)
Which, the paper admitted, was the only case which it had
directly reported. See earlier report of Lavallete, January
1957, in Chapter 12.
(100)
See Le Monde, 17-18/3/57, p. 1.
(101)
Though surprised by the use of the conditional (l'imposture
serait 6vidente), the paper concluded along the lines of the
report that a propos du pal, des ongles arrachês, l'imposture
serait 6vidente m	cas de sevices aussi graves doivent lais-
ser longtemps des stigmates evidents.
(102)
See Le Monde, 17-18/3/57, p. 1.
(103)
Which consisted in summarising, quoting, mainly going
through the main points of the report without being in any
sense critical. Ibid p. 2.
(104)
With the conclusion that nothing in the completed enquiry
enabled it to conclude that torture had been practised:
aprês un examen approfondi du dossier, la
delêgation a estimê, a l'unanimitê moms une voix,
que rien dans l'enquête qu'elle a effectuee ne




Also the last two headings (and the contents of the para-
graphs) indicated respectively that the implementation of
justice under normal conditions would make it impossible to
effect any arrest, and that doubt and suspicion regarding the
security forces had to be avoided (l'êcueil a 6viter). Ibid.
(106)
Who thought that, although it would be difficult to check
for traces of torture three months afterwards, the traces that
he found were inconsistent with illness. He also stated that he
did not share the conclusion that "doubt had to be avoided".
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He, nevertheless, appreciated the difficulty of police work and
put the blame on the politicians in charge, in the first in-
stance, "who justify or even encourage by their silence the
continuation of these methods".
(107)
By not doing so, it made the report look more plausible and
likely to be given more credibility. See Le Monde, 17-18/3/57,
p. 2.
(108)
This was reported by Le Monde in quotes, 23/3/57, p. 2. The
seven lawyers involved in the case were Michel Bruguier, Roger
Cavaer, Henri Douzon, Jerome Ferruci, Leon Mataraso, Paul
Viennay and Maurice Zavao.
(109)
See Le Monde, 23/3/57, p. 2.
(110)
First, the contibutor to the paper, M.Duverger, found the
report accablant, not for the policemen involved but for the
authors of the report themsevles.
Ii y a des textes qui respirent la sinceritê;
celui-la eclate de mauvaise foi. Ancun des Jesuites
stigmatises par Pascal n'avait pousse si loin l'em-
ploi du conditionnel, le maniement de la restriction
mentale, l'usage de la preterition inconsciente.
Aucun non plus n'ecrivait un frangais aussi approxi-
matif od l'impropriete des termes et les fautes de
syntaxe epousent Si bien la mediocrite et le flou de
la pensee. La phrase terminale est un morceau d'an-
thologie...
Maurice Duverger in, Absence Francaise, Le Monde, 22/3/57,
pp. 1-2.
(111)
Turning to one of the statements in the report with which he
disapproved ("Dans la recherche de la verite, on se heurte
souvent aux arguments des parties en cause. L'ecueil a eviter,
c'est de ne pas se laisser envahir par le doute faute de quoi
on ne peut pas conclure.") and quoting extensively, he stated
that the only merit he found was that it posed the problem of
France in Algeria squarely:
"II pose clairement le probleme de la France en
A1gerie dans ses termes actuels: <<I1 est impossi-
ble, par des moyens consideres habituellement comme
normaux, de detecter les organisations clandestines
et paramilitaires, de pourchasser les agitateurs,
les meneurs de jeu, les conspirateurs contre la
Ibid. 
presence francaise en Alger-ie.
(112)
Si les droits de la defense sont imprescript-
ibles, ceux de la nation ne le sont pas moms.
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Mieux, on ne saurait affaiblir ceux-ci sans que, par
repercussion, ceux-la diminuent progressivement. Or
personne n'a reclame ni demande au Parlement le
depart de la France de l'Algerie. Le gouvernement a
donc le devoir de prendre toutes les mesures neces-
saires et appropriees pour ramener le calme, assurer
la protection des vies et preserver nos droits.
Ibid.
(113)
A report which, he thought, by-passed the problem of tor-
ture, which became a single element of a vaste ensemble, which
consisted of finding out whether a totalitarian system was
being established in Algeria.
(114)
He argued that only a proper investigation by people whose
independence and loyalty could not be questioned would enable
one to know whether there had been an exaggeration in the
temoignages souvent bouleversants qu'on commence a recueillir
sur ces methodes de la part d'hommes ponder& et serieux.
Although he was not sure that some of the suicides (that of
Boumendjel, for instance,) described were in fact similar to
that of Brossolette, he was certain that the enlevement pour
interrogatoire from internment camp, the conditions of deporta-
tion, the lack of knowledge of people's whereabouts after their
arrest by "this super-police", were only too reminiscent of
Hitler's Germany.
Though he found it difficult from Paris to put these facts
into perspective, and to know whether these were isolated cases
or examples of widespread practices, he thought excesses
possible, but his conclusion was that Algeria had not really
become a totalitarian regime. One thing was sure however "if
things carried on we would be forced to go to the bitter end
(jusqu'au bout)".
(115)
He considered his thoughts more realistic and concrete than
they seemed, and measuring the path followed during the pre-
vious fourteen months, he concluded that the threat of fascism
was serious since France was halfway down the road to a totali-
tarian state.
Ces reflexions sont plus concretes ', plus rea-
listes, plus proches de nous qu'elles n'en ont
l'air. Pour la premiere fois depuis dix ans le
danger de fascisme devient reellement serieux.
Mesurez le chemin parcouru depuis quatorze mois;
nous sommes a peu pres a la moitie de la route qui
merle a l'Etat totalitaire... Et la marche s'accelere
depuis quelques semaines.
See M.Duverger in Le Monde, 22/3/57, p. 2. This is the
article which landed the paper in a law suit (examined above).
(116)
It was, in his view, possible to subdue the rebellion in
Algeria by force (as was proved by the results of army activ-
ity) in the same way as the Russians did in Hungary. This would
be for a long time, but not forever. And the logic of it would
be to impose, in his view, similar measures in France which
would spell the end of civil liberties.
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(117)
In a pertinent but moderate attack against those, including
"self-professed socialists and republicans", calling them-
selves "enemies of fascism", who developed ultra-nationalist
and totalitarian views (argument), who consider reason of state
as the the supreme value in the defence of the French presence
in Algeria, he asked them to examine the meaning of that pre-
sence, and whether it was advisable for it to consist of "sold-
iers, policemen, militiamen, judges and civil servants who
implemented methods that were evidently contrary to civilised
principles which France has considered as being hers throughout
history."
Une AlOrie juridiquement incorporee au terri-
toire frangais serait-elle encore <<frangaise>> Si
rien n'y subsistait plus de ces principes en quoi
tant de Francais ont vu et continuent de voir
l'essence méme de leur pays? Ne voit-on pas en! in
que pour maintenir cette apparence d'AlOrie fran-
gaise on risque d'aneantir sun notre hêxagone meme
tout ce qui fait la nature propre de la France, de




He stated that public opinion had been alerted by some
report of "sevices" on some people arrested, and that on 6
October the Minister-Resident sent a telegramme to the Interior
Commission of the Assembly, requesting the sending of a parliai
mentary commission, to which investigative powers were given or
26 October. The deputies were so overworked, he added, that
they could not free themselves for the task before 27 December
by which date they had arrived, and had been very active there
from 27/12 at 16.30h to 30/12/ at 12.30, heard 52 people,
tabled and annexed their report to the papers of the 6 March
session, concluding "unanimously less one voice" that nothing
could lead to the conclusion that people had been tortured.
In De la legalite, by Maurice Garcon, Le Monde, 26/3/57, pp.
1-6.
(119)
Without explaining the position of Hovnanian. Referring to
separate revelations, he thought it exaggerated to sue, or to
commit to trial, those who had made them as "nobody had wanted
to insult the army as a whole, and that everybody knew its
courage, bravery and devotion (...), shown in the field against
cruel and pitiless insurgents." The spirit of sacrifice of the
army was admired by the whole country, he added, and if
"excesses" had been committed, these would be isolated ( he had
never even been there to see) and, if true, would be condemned
by the army as a whole.
Ibid.
(120)
One of which being that the Law was above all other consid-
erations since it ensures punishment of the guilty and its
strict rules protect the innocent,
S'il [le Droit] assure le chatiment du coupable, ses rêgles
strictes protêgent l'innocent. Ibid.
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(121)
Since Right and emergency legislation had never been compat-
ible in exceptional circumstances, of which Algeria was an
example (Or jamais le droit et les lois d'exception n'ont
cheminè de concert).
(122)
He was aware of the need for powers of search and arrest at
short notice around the clock before the suspects "harden", but
also of where, despite the best intentions, a "keen" search
for information could lead. He urged that these powers be used
for finding evidence and not extracting confessions. Since, he
pointed out, those arrested spent months before seeing a
judge/being tried, he suggested that from the time of publica-
tion of the communiqué of arrest, there should not be arbitrary
sequestration and non-involvement of the courts.
His conclusion was that:
C'est en revenant tres vite a legalitê qu'on
justifie des mesures arbitraires auxquelles ii faut
peut étre se resoudre a regret et dont la dur6e et
la clandestinite inquiéte l'opinion qui les juge de
mauvais aloi.
In De la Lêgalitó by Maurice Garcon, Le Monde, 26/3/57,
pp. 1-6.
(123)
In L'inadmissible equivoque, Le Monde, 26/3/57.
(124)
This difference was said to diminish, however, if the au-
thorities were to continue condoning such inhuman practices or
if, had they known about them, they were to hesitate in taking
sanctions against them. He concluded that:
Si la loi du talion doit devenir la loi des
nations, la civilisation est frapp6e de mort et la
France ne serait plus la France si elle acceptait de
hurler avec les loups et de contribuer, Si peu que




See Le Monde, 4/4/57.
The article was slightly misleading in the sense that it
absolved the civilian authorities of torture on a massive
scale, which was quite possible since it was the military who
were in charge (decree 17 March 1956).
Even when the government was admitting that atrocities had
taken place in Algeria, headlines on the number of acknowledged
cases of ill-treatment at the hands of the security forces in
general would have seemed more appropriate if the desire of the
paper had not been, like that of the government, to reassure
public opinion that things had not got out of hand. The publi-
cation (and a headline on the figure) of the number of those
ill-treated in their hands would have been very significant.
Conversely, the effect of the actual statements and headline
would have had the immediate impact of denying or contradicting
the awareness campaign being led by other media in France about
widespread incidents of torture.
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(126)
About exactions by the army.
A fortnight before, Le Monde published a communiqué by the
Minister of Defence, which only incidentally revealed that
there had been a few cases of exactions and which insisted more
on the fact that they had been punished by the authorities.
It insisted on the "peace-keeping" aspect and the "tightly
controlled activity" of the army which "never tolerated exac-
tions". It also emphasised that the Ministry had ordered an
investigation every time an incident was directly or indirectly
reported, and that the enquiries had revealed that these inci-
dents were non-existent or highly exaggerated. Thus conscious
of its duty to defend the army against any "odious defamation",
which "repulsed" those serving in Algeria, the Minister's
communiqué also stated that those associating themselves with
this campaign, especially amongst those who had served in
Algeria (reference to Bollardi6re and others), would be consid-
ered to be, and were in actual fact, accomplices because they
did not inform their superiors. See Le Monde, 15/3/57, p. 2.
Two days after Mitterrand's statement (4/4/57) came a simi-
lar declaration by M. Bourges-Maunoury himself (at a Republican
circle in front of other personalities), covered by Le Monde in
a similar fashion. The headline was that cases of "exactions"
were exceptional. In the same statement the Defence Minister
declared that war was bound to be dirty, that it was impossible
to guarantee that there would not be excesses. He also insis-
ted on how unjust it was to bring about the dishonour of those
fighting for France. See Le Monde, 6/4/57.
(127)
See Le Monde, 6/4/57.
The reasons put forward for the creation of the Commission
(over the setting of which, Jacques Fauvet thought the govern-
ment had no choice with new testimonies -Le Monde, 6/4/57, p.
1) were the "attachment of France to the rights of the individ-
ual" and the "sincere emotion of all democrats". Its aims were
to deal with press reports, complaints and rumours of excesses
in order to establish the truth about the facts "real or al-
leged", but also to take position on the "calumnious nature
or systematic exaggeration of some information".
(128)
Three types were outlined in Fauvet'article, Le Monde,
6/4/57, p. 1. The article was nevertheless surrounded with a
host of reservations and statements qualifying denunciation of
excesses, by stating that those denouncing the use of "some
methods were in no way seeking to undermine the army or the
government". Though the journalist argued that the best way of
preserving the honour of the army, and guaranteeing the effi-
ciency of the policy followed, was through putting an end to
the admitted excesses and not by denying them or keeping quiet
about them, he believed it to be only fair to allow the prose-
cution of journalists, while stating at the same time that
there was not going to be press censorship, nor seizure of any
newspaper.
(129)
Threat of resignation by Salan and others.
(130)
The headline read as follows: "the role of the Commission
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will depend on its composition."
This was despite the criticism of the Radical Ministers,
amongst others, stating that "it would not even meet because
the witnesses would never materialise in such circumstances",
that of the extreme Left, stating that it will "fail to reveal
everything".
In spite of its belief that it was possible to create, in
the middle ground between a "ghost commission" (fantome) and a
whitewash commission (êteignoir), a commission which, by its
competence and composition, would fulfil its objectives, Le
Monde showed more than an understanding attitude towards the
complex problems of legality of such a Commission.
(131)
In a pleading tone, Le blonde's argument did not seem to be
too incongruous in relation to that of the government when it
argued that all the voices:
qui se sont elevees, au moms en France, ont
simplement exprime devant tant de temoignages une
emotion que le gouvernement declare lui-même com-
prendre et partager. Si cette emotion ne s'etait
pas exprimee publiquement, la Commission de sauve-
garde des droits et des libertes n'aurait jamais vu
le jour.
See Le Monde, 7-8/4/57, p. 1.
(132)
See Le Monde, 15/3/57, p. 2.
(133)
If we looked at the statements made by people like Pierre
Mendes-France, for instance, one would find that they revealed
a very strong position indeed.
For Mendes-France, hitting at those who were trying to give
evidence made matters worse. In his speech to the Comite Radi-
cal of the Arrondissement of Pont-Audemer (reported by Le
Monde, 9/4/57, p. 5), he argued in favour of creating the
conditions for a solution. He stated that, while being ignored
by the authorities, the evidence was overwhelming. Quoting the
Fèdóration protestante de France (les temoignages regus sont
trop nombreux et de trop sure qualite, les sevices exerces trop
attestds et trop graves, l'emotion de beaucoup de soldats et
d'officiers trop douloureuse), he described the reality of
Algeria as being
(...) des brutalites et des exces qui nous
blessent dans notre conception méme du reile de la
France outre-mer, et qui ne peuvent qu'opposer
haineusement les deux communautes raciales et ruiner
les dernieres chances de l'Afrique frangaise que
nous voulons sauver.
For him the real culprits were not mediocre "agents d'execu-
tion" but those responsible, those who authorised, those who
"for a long time hid deeds that were prejudicial to the French
cause in Africa."
He denounced the policy being implemented as being on the
wrong track when spectacular measures could change the outlook
on things and reverse the process before it was too late.
On pretend parfois gagner les populations
musulmanes en ameliorant leurs conditions economi-
ques et sociales, en relevant leur niveau de vie,
oeuvre indispensable dont les interesses ne recon-
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naitront toutefois les rêsultats qu'& lointaine
èchaance. Mais mettre fin au mauvais traitement, aux
injustices, aux humiliations, comme je n'ai cessê de
demander, cela pouvait se faire dans l'immêdiat de
fagon spectaculaire, par quelques mesures retentis-
santes. Ainsi on ramenerait a nous les sympathies et
la confiance de la masse des indócis qu'on a mainte-
nant rejetês de l'autre ceitê ...
(..) Ii faut renverser la vapeur. Ii est tard.
Mais il n'est jamais trop tard.
In A propos de la Commission de Sauvegarde: P. Mendes-
France: frapper ceux qui têmoignent ne peut qu'agraver le mal,
Le Monde, 9/4/57, p. 5.
(134)
Le Monde, 20/3/57, P. 5.
He was more concerned with taking the defence of the morale
of the army, as he tried to explain the "vives reactions"
created in the ranks of army officers by certain testimonies,
as well as the revelations in the Pierre-Henri Simon book (see
Chapter 10) and in part of the press, on some methods prac-
tised by some soldiers.
(135)
He put the trouble down to young "cadres" having taken
initiatives very much because everybody else could not do their
job (basse besogne). Ibid.
(136)
Which the FLN had "forced" it to take, against revolutionary
warfare, a role which it had assumed, against its will.
(137)
No matter where the blame came from.
Quant & faire griefs aux temoins qui se devoi-
lent aujourd'hui de n'avoir pas fait connaitre par
la voie hiórarchique, puisqu'il n'en est pas d'au-
tres, les faits regrettables auxquels us ont as-
siste, le reproche, de Si haut qu'il vienne, n'en
est pas moms dêrisoire. On ne saurait demander a
des militaires qui n'ont pas participe & une action
qu'ils rêprouvent de dOnoncer leurs camarades et de
renier leur solidaritê. En cas contraire, il fau-
drait une candeur rare ou un courage plus rare
encore pour faire transmettre par les homes mis




On salt d'autre part combien il est facile,
lorsqu'une enquéte est effectivement ouverte, de
camoufler les faits et de noyer les responsabi-
litês. C'est au manque d'autorite et de prestige du
gouvernement et du commandement qu'il faut s'en
prendre. Le marechal de Lattre avait fait nettement
connaitre en Indochine comment il concevait la
pacification. Ii avait convaincu; il y avait aussi
dans un petit nombre de cas fait de severes exem-
pies. Au moment oil il quitte l'Extréme-Orient pour
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n'y plus revenir, le climat avait change dans ce
domaine comme dans bien d'autres....
(139)
La simple efficacite dans l'oeuvre quo Von
veut pacificatrice n'est pas seule a exiger qu'on en
finisse rapidement avec des pratiques condamnables.
Ii en va aussi de l'unite du pays. Entre les
«intellectuels», ceux que M. Bourges-Maunoury
appelle «les chers professeurs>>, accuses de
trancher des cas de conscience <<au nom des grands
principes>>, et les chefs qui doivent lea resoudre
auprés des cadavres des Francais egorges ou des
camarades tombes sous les balles, un fosse se
creuse. Mais sans les «grands principes>>, quel




He argued that "morale" should not be confused with "moral-
ity" within the army in its educational role, and that the
former was not conceivable without the latter.
S'il ne faut pas confondre «le moral>> avec
«la morale», il n'en reste pas moms que, dans une
armee digne de sa tradition et chargee, qu'elle le
veuille ou non, de parachever l'education de con-
tames de milliers de jeunes homes, le premier no
peut se concevoir sans le respect total de la se-
conde.
He concluded that:
Les veritables «atteintes au moral de
l'armee» no sont pas le fait des hommes qui denon-
cent les erreurs commises, mais de ceux qui lea
tolerent ou sont incapables de les empecher.
Jean Planchais in Le Monde, 20/3/57, p. 5.
(141)
See Le Monde, 28-29/4/57, p. 2.
(142)
That is to say establishing the truth and the need for
enquiries to be held soon after the event to prevent the remo-
val of evidence, and so forth (see above).
(143)
The membership (most of the members had a Resistance back-
ground) included 2 military men, 3 lawyers, 2 doctors, one
teacher, one former Governor-General, a former ambassador and a
former prefet as given in Le Monde, 4/5/57, p. 3 with a state-
ment that it would set its own powers the following week, in
Le Monde, 7/5/57, p. 1. Its departure for Algeria was an-
nounced for the week after in Le Monde, 11/5/57, p. 3. Reports
of subsequent changes are to be found in Le Monde, 12-13/5/57,
p. 3.
(144)
See Le Monde, 12-13/5/57, p. 3.
(145)
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Transferring the arena of debate back to public opinion and
the courts, see Le Monde, 25/5/57, p. 3. See also an article by
William Thorp expressing his thoughts on the Commission. Ibid.
(146)
Which was given to the paper by a former Governor of Alger-
ia, Robert de la Vignette, member of the commission who re-
signed in despair at the governments refusal to act.
(147)
There were eight rapports annexes beaucoup plus accablants,
especially those of Delavignette and Me Garcon. See Jean Noel
Jeaneney and J.Julliard, op cit., p. 231. Informed of Le Mon-
de's intention to publish, the government was said to have pre-
empted the move by publishing itself the same day while, at the
same time, planning to seize Le Monde. See Planchais, Jean,
L'Empire embrase, Denodl, Paris, 1990, p. 270.
(148)
Thibau, J., op cit, p. 334.
(149)
Thibau, J., op cit, p. 334 and author's interview with J.
Planchais.
(150)
It is clear that Le Monde was a bit reluctant when it came
to denouncing these methods. Beuve-Mêry, in a reply to a reader
who complained to the paper, wrote that he had waited six
months et multiplie les demarches avant d'entrouvrir une
premiere fois le dossier des detenus en Alger-ie. Letter to
General Reboul, 28 January 1959, in Jeanneney, J.-N. and Jul-
hard, J., op. cit., p. 232.
(151)
The appointment of its president came about a month after
the idea was first floated. See Le Monde, 15/5/57, p. 4.
(152)
Le Monde reported that the vice-president of the organisa-
tion, David Rousset, had made his feelings known to the au-
thorities (President of the Republic, Prime Minister and Mini-
ster Resident) and that formal authorisation was being sought
from the government. He also declared that the Commission was
willing to intervene on behalf of four non-communist French
organisations of deportees or internees, who requested an
investigation of human rights, of conditions of arrest and
detention of Algerians, and of the handling of cases by the
Police and the authorities.
See Le Monde, 12/4/57, p. 2.
(153)
In a plenary seession on 18 May in Brussels, see Le Monde,
26-27/5/57, P. 11.
(154)
From the vice-president of the Commission, Georges Andr6 and
the Norwegian delegate, Mrs Lise Borsum.
(155)





He declared having interviewed 92 detainees, having found
that 33 complained of torture, and that 12 effectively bore
marks. In 3 of the cases, the marks were very likely as a
result of the use of electrodes.
(158)
Stating instead, that the Algerian rebels numbered 100.000
and were terrorising 9 million people. Ibid.
(159)
See Le Monde, 12/4/57, p. 2.
(160)
See above, but also further criticism found in Le Monde,
20/4/57, P. 4.
(161)
At the same time as Peyrega protests (see earlier part of
this Chapter). Other groups protesting included the Grenoble
congress of the Syndicat de l'enseignement secondaire.
(162)
Even a few months later, at the time of the CICR, there had
been no tangible results. See Le Monde, 10/8/57, p. 4.
(163)
Said to be opposed to it. Later, Le Monde reported that he
was not opposed to its creation. See Le Monde, 20/4/57, p. 4.
(164)
See Le Monde, 12/4/57, p. 2.
(165)
The paper also reported Charles Hernu f s intention (having
made a proposal of resolution on this subject the previous
October) to put before it the cases of several serving offi-
cers whose command had been withdrawn. See Le Monde, 13/4/57.
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Le Monde, 21-22/4/57, p. 2
(169)
As a result of the opposition met. See Le Monde, 23/4/57.
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When it evoked the "Algerian tradition of eating a kind of
Easter bread (manger la Mouna sur l'herbe), Le Monde displayed
here a very European-centered point of view as most of the
Algerian population, being Muslims, were fasting for Ramadhan.
Le Monde, 24/4/57, p. 5.
(173)
The Resident-Minister had stated, amongst other things, that
the protection of the Commission would involve the withdrawal
from essential duties of thousands of troops to ensure the
safety of its members. The reply by the Commission clearly
indicated that, by declaring himself unable to ensure their 	 mr77,
protection, and by refusing them any means (and even refusing
to see them), the Resident-Minister was putting the members of
the Commission in the impossibility of carrying out their task.
The Commission's telegramme also reminded the Resident-Mini-
ster of the objectives of the mission and that no one could,
in good faith, declare this to be against the interests of
France. Ibid.
(174)
By C. Fuzier in Le Populaire, Robert Bony of L'Aurore and
Gabriel Robinet of Le Figaro. Echoes of G.Altman's incomprehen-
sion in Franc-Tireur, of Marcel Fourrier's disappointment in
Liberation, could also be found in Le Monde. Both Yves Morreau
of L'Humanite and the Radical MP for the Loire, Michel Soulie,
were said to be wondering who was in charge. Only Jeune Repu-
blique was reported to be indignant and to have denounced the
"conspiracy of silence and tragic impasse in which France finds
herself." See Le Monde, 24/4/57, p. 5.
(175)
Despite the precedent of Boutbien's Mission in Indochina in
1950, which went ahead despite Boutbien's known support for a
cease-fire and Vietnamese independence.
(176)
For instance the paper asked whether the truth of December
(as far as Lacoste was concerned) was no longer valid in April;
other pertinent questions referred to the potential blackmail-
ing power of the street and were: how many amongst those gath-
ered in the grass of the Airport would demand a say in the
future composition of any commision, including a Commission de
Sauvegarde? whether the kind of reception planned for the
Commission would not lead to the reservation or refusal of
participation (through deterrence) of future participants to
any such commission?
(177)
See Le Monde, 24/4/57, p. 1.
(178)
Le temps press° pourtant encore plus depuis les
evenements (...).
(179)
Line large fraction de l'opinion francaise
soubaiterait avoir d'autres elements d'information
que ceux rapportes 12 y a clnq semaines par la
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vait: <<l'êcueil a Oviter c'est de ne pas se laisser
envahir par le doute, faute de quoi on ne peut pas
conclure».
R.Barrillon in Le Monde, 24/4/57, p. 11.
(180)
The letter of resignation from the SFIO in protest against
Lacoste's policy by A. Doumenc, former Senator for Algeria, was
published in Le Monde, 25/4/57, p. 5.
(181)
See L'affaire de la commision d'information Le bureau du
Parti radical condamne sdv6rement l'attitude de Mr Lacoste, in
Le Monde, 26/4/57, p. 4.
(182)
See Le Monde, 26/4/57, P. 4.
(183)
See Le Monde, 27/4/57, P. 5.
(184)
See the section on Penchenier's controversy (August 1955) in
Chapter 12.
(185)
The paper reported the denial of his story by the authori-
ties and gave him a chance to restate his evidence, which he
did. However, in that article, he appeared not as a direct
witness of the events themselves, but as somebody who arrived
on the scene afterwards. Moreover, when he was restating the
evidence, it was clear that he was doing so on his own steam.
Ibid.
(186)
In other words, as a journalist given a chance to comment on
his version, which the government was denying without the
paper's responsibility being at stake.
(187)
It was clear that, in most cases, it was not so much the ex-
pression of an opinion, a point of view, as the simple report-
ing of facts (itself or those reported by other papers) that
led to the seizures referred to.
Le Monde had no reply to give as a reaction to its seizures
in Algeria for reporting exactly what had been stated in L'Ex-
pres. After seizure, the paper simply mentioned the fact that
it had been seized.
(188)
Le Bled, No 11, May 1957, which estimated that from October
1956 to March 1957, there had been 36 legal suits, 28 decisions
taken over previous complaints (dêlit en cause ... fausse
information, information diffamatoire, injures envers l'armee,
provocation A la desobeissance). See Le Monde, 18/5/57, p. 5.
(189)
Claiming that it was thought desirable that, by and large,
the public should have been informed of the aims and neutrality
of the report, Le Monde was not "surprised by the discretion of




See various quotes in Chapter 1 especially
See Debats op. cit. and RPP and chap 1?
(2)
Freund, A., op. cit., p. 30.
(3)




Freund, A., op. cit., pp. 179-180, refers to this reflex in
the study of the BBC journalists reporting on the miners shown
by Glasgow University Media group. This reflex may also be due
to institutional reasons tenant au recrutement des collabora-
teurs et de leurs <<reflexes de classe».
(6)
Especially when victims are killed in cold blood and it is
simply reported that they had been running away as though they
were guilty, or had something to hide. The use of the word
"suspects" also clearly casts some suspicion on these group, on
people killed by the armed forces who might have been just too
frightened to remain when bullets were flying around. To these
one must add the numerous cases of corvee de bois revealed
during and after the war.
(7)
As it does not evoke all the significance of the actions
that the term encompasses, as it only summarises the reality of
moral torture, the conditions of detention etc... See Freund,
op. cit., p. 172.
(8)
The aim of the authorities being to reverse the tide, which
could not have been achieved without the tacit support of
public opinion. The role of the press, in this respect, would
have been crucial, as it would have constituted the main in-
strument in this strategy.
(9)
Jean Planchais in his interviews with the author, for in-
stance, but he is by no means the only one.
(10)
Beuve-Mery H., (recalling his meeting 18/9/58 with de
Gaulle), revealed in his book, Onze ans de rêgne, Flammarion,
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preserve the "interests of the nation."
(11)
See Le Monde, 8/8/89, p. 8.
(12)
The circulation of L'Express went up from 60,000 copies in
1953 to 500,000 copies in 1967. For France-Observateur (renamed
Le Nouvel-Observateur in 1964) the figures were 20,000 in 1950
to 100,000 in 1960. See Ory, P., & Sirinelli, J.-F., Les
Intellectuels frangais de l'Affaire Dreyfus & nos jours, Armand
Colin, Paris, 1986, pp. 206-207.
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Author of Winners and Loosers, Harcourt Brace Janovich, New
York, 1976.
(14)
See further examples of journalists who were supported by
their paper. (eg. Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator 
Timesbooks, New York, 1984) referred to by Freund, A., op.
cit., pp. 47-48.
(15)
This was penned by outsiders to the paper, usually in the
form of a Libre Opinion or "Letter to the Editor".
(16)
Except perhaps Andre Mandouze who "religiously" had lunch
with Hubert Beuve-Mery every Tuesday.
(17)
If one included Le Monde's reports, Libres Opinions, the
various declarations made by various political groups and
quoted verbatim.
(18)
Paris Colloquium on "memories of the Algerian War" (13-15
March, 1992) organised by the Institut du Monde Arabe and the
Ligue de l'Enseignement en France. This colloquium led to the
following publications:
* Actes du Collogue, Memoire et Enseignement de la Guerre
d'Algerie, La Ligue/IMA, Paris, 1993, 2 Volumes.
* Gilles Manceron et al., Documents, Actes et Rapports pour
I'Education, La Guerre d'Algerie dans l'Enseignements en France
et en Algerie, La Ligue/IMA/CNDP, Paris, 1993, Volumes.
* Gilles Manceron & Hassan Remaoun, D'une rive A l'autre, la
guerre d'Algerie de la memoire a l'histoire, Syros, Paris,
1993.
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the Institut d'Histoire du Temps Present, 1988, 1989, and by
the Ligue and IMA -above), which may be a painful but the only
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- French expeditionary forces landed in Sidi
- Algiers taken by the French under General de
1832
* Abdel Kader regrouped the tribes around
Mascara and organised the province along national lines into a
national entity, recognised at first by the French.
1834
July
* Algeria proclaimed a French possession.
1837
30 May
- Tafna Treaty signed by General Bugeaud and
Abdel Kader. The latter was recognised as being sovereign over
two-thirds of the territory by France.
24 October
- Capture of Constantine by the French.
1845
* Bou Maa'za's uprising in the Dahra, Cheliff
and Ouarsenis.
1846
* Introduction of a system of Expropriation of
non-cultivated land.
1847
* Surrender of Emir Abdelkader to the French,
who exiled him to Damascus until his death. His remains were
brought back to Algeria in the 1970s.
1848
* Nothern Algeria subdivided into three dêpar-
tements.
1848




* Policy of cantonnement imposed on tribes.
* Introduction of Customs and Duty system which
ruined traditional crafts.
1852
* Following Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's coup
d'etat and dissolution of French National Assembly, representa-
tion of French settlers in Algeria in French Parliament abo-
lished.
1863
* Senatus Consulta: introduction of French
legal principles in Algerian land transactions.
1870
24 October 1870
- Cremieux decree grants French citizenship to
all Algerian Jews.
1871
* France loses Alsace Lorraine: colonisation of
Algeria intensified.
1873
* Loi Warnier complementing the Senatus Consul-
ta of 1863 subjected Algerians to French law and increased the
dislocation of lands and tribes.
1881
* Algerian affairs attached to relevant French
ministries.
* Bardot Treaty: Tunisia a French Protectorate.
* Code de l'Indigênat: discriminatory legisla-
tion imposed on the Algerians.
1881-1883
* Insurrection south of the Oran departement.
1889
20 June
- Decree allowing French citizenship to be
given to children born in Algeria of foreign parents.
16 May
1898
- Birth of Messali Hadj.
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1899
* Birth of Ferhat Abbas.
1900
* Financial Autonomy of Algerian departements
1912
* Morocco proclaimed a French Protectorate.
1914-1918
* 173.000 Algerians fight in the Great War, of
whom 25.000 killed.
1916
* Massive revolt in the Aures Mountains.
1926
* The Etoile Nord Africaine (ENA) founded in
France.
1930
* Celebration of the centenary of the French
colonisation od Algeria.
1931
* The "Ulêmas Association" founded.
1934
* The Fêddration des Elus of the Constantine
departement established.
1936
* The Blum-Violette Bill offering French citi-





- The Parti du Peuple Algèrien founded.
1940




in alliance with Italy.
1939-1945
* 134.000 Algerians fight in the Second World
War of whom 12.000 killed.
8 November
1942
- Allied landings in North Africa
1943
- Les Anis du Manifeste founded by Ferhat
1944
* Exceptional measures applicable to "Muslims
only" abolished by Ordinance (7 March).
* Speech by de Gaulle in Brazzaville promises




- Insurrection in the Constantine departement
(Setif): thousands of victims of French Repression .
1946
* The Union Democratigue du Manifeste Algerien
(UDMA) founded by Ferhat Abbas and the Mouvement pour le Triom-
phe des Libertês dèmocratigues (MTLD) by Messali Hadj.
1947
February
* The Organisation Spêciale formed within the
MTLD and entrusted with preparing the insurrection.
20 September
- Algerian Statute adopted.
1948
11 & 14 April
- Election rigging on a massive scale.
1950





* Edmond Naegelen replaced as Governor General
by Roger Leonard.
1952
* Formation of Pinay government.
1953
* Rene Coty elected President.










* Comite Révolutionnaire pour l'Unite et l'Ac-
tion (CRUA) formed.
- French surrender Dien Bien Phu (Indochina).
- Pierre Mend6s-France comes to power.
* Indochinese settlement
- Proclamation of Internal Autonomy for Tuni-
* Hornu Congress MTLD.
October
* The Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN)
founded together with the Arm6e de Liberation Nationale (ALN).
1 November
- All Saints' day: a series of "terrorist"
attacks mark the beginning of the insurrection. The FLN publish
a statement demanding independence.
5 November
- The MTLD dissolved by the French Government.
December
* Messali Hadj founded the Mouvement National





- Articles by Claude Bourdet (France-
Observateur) and Francois Mauriac (L'Express) denounced the
use of torture in Algeria.
25-6 January
- Jacques Soustelle appointed Governor General
of Algeria.
1 February




- Fall of Mendes-France Government.
- Death of Didouche Mourad.
23-25 February





- Rapport Wuillaume on torture submitted to
- First Rapport Mairey on the behaviour of the
security forces in Algeria.
25 March
- Arrest of Rabah Bitat.
31 March
- Emergency Powers Bill immediately implemented
in Algeria (especially in the Kabylie region).
3 April
- Emergency Law promulgated.
18-24 April
- FLN attended the Bandung Conference.
26 April
- General Parlange arrived in the Constanti-
nois.
20 August
- Riot in the Constantine dêpartement resulted
in 123 deaths (of whom 71 were Europeans). Repression led to
the deaths of 1273 Muslims.
24-28th August
- Decrees recalling demobilised draftees.
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30 August
- Emergency powers extended to the whole of
Algeria.
6 September
- Claude Bourdet's article Ne jetez pas le
contingent dans la guerre published in France-Observateur
11 September
- Draftees demonstrated against their posting
to North Africa in the Gare de Lyon.
12 September
- Algerian Communist Party banned.
15 September
- Robert Barrat's reportage on the Algerian




Saint Severin Church (Paris) organised Mass




- Algerian Question put before the United
* Autumn reinforcements sent to Algeria.
* A Comite Contre l'envoi du contingent en
Afrique du Nord set up.
7 October
- Draftees' demonstration in Rouen caused
serious incidents.
November
* A Comitê d'Action des Intellectuels contre la
poursuite de la guerre en Afrique du Nord formed.




- Dissolution of the Assembly.
- General Elections adjourned in Algeria.




- Victory of the Popular Front in French par-
liamentary elections.
22 January
- In Algiers, Albert Camus called for a truce
in Algeria.
26 january
- Monet succeeded Edgard Faure as Prime Mini-
ster.
27 January
- Secret meeting between Pierre Mend6s-France
and Andrd Mandouze (mandated by the FLN).
31 January
- Formation of Guy Mallet government.




- Investiture of G.Mollet and his government.
- Soustelle replaced by Lacoste.
- National Day of Action against the War
(Montreuil).
6 February









- Robert Lacoste appointed Minister Resident.
- Oil strike in the Sahara
- Independence of Morocco.
- French Assembly grants Mallet special powers.
- Independence of Tunisia .
- Claude Bourdet arrested for <demoralising the
5 April
- Professor Henri Marrou published his Libres





- Police search of Henri Marrou's house as a
result of his Libres Opinion in Le Monde.
11 April
- Length of military service extended to 27
months.
12 April
- Dissolution of the Algerian Assembly and
recall of Reservists (Disponibles).
12-20 April







- Ferhat ABBAS joins the FLN in Cairo.
- Demonstrations against Draftees's departure
- Violent demonstrations in Grenoble.
- 18 French soldiers massacred in an ambush
- Resignation of Pierre Mendes-France.
- PCF abstains on the vote of confidence on the





- First execution in Algiers of Muslim members
* Contacts between French and Algerians in
2 July
- A conscientious objector, Alban Liechti
(Communist), refused to serve in Algeria.
18 July
- 14th Congress of the PCF in Le Havre.
August
* Contacts between French and Algerians in
Rome.
10 August
- French terrorist (ORAF) bomb exploded Rue de
Thebes in the Casbah (Algiers), killing 15 people according to
the police and 70 according to the FLN.
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20 August
- Soummam conference: FLN policy defined.
- Formation of CNRA and CCE.
1 September
- Contacts between French and Algerians in
Belgrade with the participation of Pierre Comin, Mohammed
Khider and Mhamed Yazid.
30 September
- Bombs in cafeteria and milk bar in Algiers.




- Interception of Athos, loaded with arms for
- Hijacking of the Moroccan plane carrying
Ahmed Ben Bella and other leaders, who are arrested in Algiers.
1 November
- Beginning of Suez operations.
5 November
- Anglo-French Landings in Suez.
9 November
- Andre Mandouze, Cecile de Verdurand and Anne-
Marie Chaulet arrested.
15 November
- Salan appointed Commander-in-Chief in Alger-
ia.
14 december
- Salan takes over command of Algiers.
19 December
- Andre Mandouze, Cecile de Verdurand and Anne-
Marie Chaulet freed.
27 December







- Third Rapport Mairey.
- Tenth D.P. entrusted with maintaining order
7 January
- All Police powers delegated to Massu in
Algiers. Paratroopers take over the city.
16 january
- Bazooka attempt to kill Salan.
26 January
- Bombs in the Otomatik and Coq Hardi Brasser-
ies in Algiers.
28 January





- Bombs in Algiers Stadia: Ruisseau and El
- FLN chiefs in France arrested.
February
- Dossier Jean Muller published by Cahiers de
Temoignage Chretien.
23 March
- Ali Boumendjel's "Suicide".
28 March
- General de Bollardiere asked to be relieved
of his command.
* Publication of the brochure Des rappeles
temoignent.
* Publication of Contre la Torture by Pierre-
Henri Simon.
* Secondary School teachers set up a Comite de
defense des libertes et pour la paix en Algórie.
5 April
- Commission de sauve garde des droits et des
libertes individuelles established.
* Esprit published La Paix des Nementchas by
Robert Bonnaud.
21 May




- Massacres of Melouza. The FLN massacred all







- Maurice Audin arrested.
- Henri Alleg arrested.
- Bourges-Maunoury becomes Prime Minister.
- Death of Maurice Audin.
* Georges Mattel published Jours Kabyles in
Temps Modernes.
2 July
- Senator Kennedy's speech in support of Alger-
ian independence.
11-15 July
- Trial of Djamila Bouhired.
13 August
- Louis Martin-Chauffier published the Rapport
de la Commission internationale d'enguête in Le Figaro 
12 September
- Paul Teitgen, General Secretary of the Police
in Algiers, resigned in protest against the methods used by
General Massu.
24 September
- Arrest of Yacef Saadi, head of the FLN squads
in Algiers. The Battle of Algiers won by Massu and his troops.
30 September
- Fall of the BourOs-Maunoury government over
the Loi-cadre.
October
* The Centre d'Information et de Coordination
pour la Defense des Libertes et de la Paix by Robert Barrat and
Maurice Pagat.
8 October




	 - Gaillard succeeded Bourges-Maunoury as Prime
November
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* Pour Djamila Bouhired published by J. Verges
and Georges Arnaud.
* Comit6 Maurice Audin formed.
29 November
- The Loi-Cadre adopted.
Throughout December 1957
* Violent battles in the Constantinois.
2 December
- Maurice Audin's thesis submitted in absentia.
14 December
- Le Monde published Le Rapport de synthèse de
la Commission de Sauvegarde.
26 December




* Battle of the barrage in the East Constantine
areas.
7 January




- The Loi -Cadre defining "Algerian personal-
ity" adopted by the French Parliament.
8 February
- Sakiet Sidi Youssef (Tunisia) bombed by
French aircraft in response to "terrorist" attacks. 69 dead,
130 injured, including women and children.
17 February
- Offer of Anglo-American "good offices".
25 February
- Robert Murphy arrived in Paris for his "good
offices" mission.
27 March
- La Question seized.
15 April
- Fall of Gaillard's government. France remains
without government for 37 days.
26 April
frangaise.
- Demonstration in Algiers in favour of Algerie
29 April-1 May
* Battle of Souk Ahras (south).
12 May
- L'Affaire Audin published
13 May
- Algiers rebels against Paris. Settlers take
over the Governor General's Office.
- Massu forms the Comite de Salut Public.





- Pflimlin's investiture. Massu appeals to de
- Vive de Gaq4Je shouted by Salan. General de
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- First press conference by de Gaulle.
- Demonstration by the Left (Republique).
- Resignation of Pflimlin.
- De Gaulle becomes Prime Minister.
APPENDIX B
INDEX OF LE MONDE'S JOURNALISTS UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
BALLET Andre
Born in 1903, worked for the newspaper Le Temps as assistant
-head of the political section (Parliamentary reports). Joined
Le Monde in December 1944, in charge of the section dealing
with Parliamentary reports. Became Assistant to the Head of the
political Section. Reported on the major post-Liberation
trials, including those of Petain and Laval. He worked for Le
Monde until his retirement in 1972. He died in 1982.
BARRILLON Raymond
Born in 1921, joined Le Monde in 1950 as editor (redacteur)
in the politics section. Became head of the section from 1969
to 1983. He died on 8 July 1983.
BEUVE-MERY Hubert
Former correspondent of Le Temps from 1935 till 12 April
1938, when he offered his resignation. Founder and Director of
Le Monde from 19 December 1944 to 29 December 1969. The major
force behind the paper. He died on 6 August 1989.
BIRMANN Dominik
French correspondent of Le Monde from 1957 to 1964. He wrote
many articles on the Scandinavian countries.
* BLANCHET Andre
External contributor to Le Monde from 1946 to 1965. Was also
special correspondent. Specialist on Africa and also a Profes-
sor at the IEP, Paris.
BONIS_CHARANCLE Martial
Born in 1892, former General-Secretary of Le Temps, he
became Secretary General of Le Monde. He left the paper in
1949. He died in 1963.
CATRICE Andre
Associate-founder of SARL/Le Monde in 1944. Appointed co-
Manager in 1951. He assumed the functions of Administrative
Director until his retirement in 1969. He died in 1972.
CHAFFARD Georges
Editor in the Overseas service of Le Monde, responsible for
the Indochinese and African questions from 1956 to 1958.
Worked for Le Monde again between 1963 and 1965. Regular con-
tributor to Le Monde Diplomatigue subsequently. He died in
1969.
CHENEBENOIT Andre
Born in 1895, joined Le Temps as secretaire de redaction,
became secretaire general de la redaction until the paper's
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disappearance in November 1942. He helped H. Beuve-Mery in the
setting up of Le Monde. Editor-in-Chief of Le Monde from its
inception until his retirement in 1966. He played an important
role in the 1951 crisis of Le Monde when he refused to replace
Beuve-Mery, who had submitted his resignation. He died in 1974.
COURTIN Rene
Born in 1900, member of Board of Directors of Le Monde from
1946 to 1950, played a major role in the 1951 crisis.
Le Monde recorded him as having opposed H.Beuve-Mery in the
crisis of the paper between 1949 and 1951 and as resigning from
the board in December 1949. He died in 1964.
COUVREUR Jean
Born in 1903. He joined Le Monde in 1947 as "Grand reporter"
attached to the service informations generales. Target of a
corruption attempt, he was encouraged by Roger Lutignaux to
organise a coup d'etat against H.Beuve-Mery. He left but re-
turned in 1952. He retired at the end of 1968.
DELAGE Edmond
Head of the National Defence section. He left the paper in
1953.
DOMENACH Jean-Marie
Writer, Director of the review Esprit for 20 years from 1957
to 1977. Listed as outside contributor to Le Monde, writer of
various articles and Libre Opinions in the paper.
* DRIAND Jaques
Wrote two articles in Le Monde as an outside contributor.
DUPRAZ Joannes
Born 1907, journalist, a Secretary of the Ministry of Infor-
mation during the founding of Le Monde in 1944. He was appoin-
ted Chairman of the Board of Le Monde from July to December
1951, during the 1951 crisis and the resignation of H.Beuve-
Mery.
DUVERGER Maurice
Born in 1917. A Professor of Law in Bordeaux and then Paris.
Director of Study and Research in the FNSP. An important acade-
mic contributor who had frequent articles in Le Monde since
1946 as outside contributor, taking a stance/position regularly
on the major questions (politics/constitution) of the day.
EMMANUEL Pierre
Born in 1916, member of the Acadêmie, journalist, writer,
and poet, he wrote many articles in many reviews and newspa-
pers, including Le Monde. He died in 1984.
ESCARPIT Robert
Born in 1918, Agrege in English, Professor of literature. A
contributor to Le Monde, he wrote a daily column (billet quoti-
dien) Au Jour le Jour from 1949 to 1974.
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EZRATY Claude
Born in 1925, wrote under the name of Claude Estier in
France-Observateur and Liberation. He joined the editorial
team in 1955 and left the paper during the 1958 crisis.
FABRE-LUCE Andre
Essayist, outside contributor, he wrote a few Libres Opi-
nions (Letter to the Editor) on the major problems of the day
(politics, history). He died in 1983.
FAUVET Jacques
Born in 1914, studied Law and joined Le Monde in 1945 as
editor. He became head of the political section from 1948 to
1958, then Assistant Editor-In-Chief from 1958 to 1963. From
1963 to 1969 he was Editor-in-Chief. He succeeded H. Beuve-Mery
as Director in December 1989 where he remained until he left
the paper in 1982. From 1968 to 1982 he was also joint-manager
of the paper (co-gerant).
FAVREL Charles
Special envoy in Asia from 1950 to 1954, especially during
the Korean War. He is also allegec to have strongly opposed the
war in Indochina.
FLORENNE Yves
Writer, contributor to Le Monde's cultural section. After
the Liberation he contributed to the Au jour le jour column
(billet) and was put in charge of drating the serial (feuille-
ton) Revue des Revues from September 1949. He died in 1992.
FONTAINE Andre
Born in 1921, head of the foreign section and secretaire de
redaction of Temps Present in 1946-1947. He studied Law, joined
Le Monde in 1947 as Editor and then assistant head of general
news. From 1951 to 1959 he was head of the foreign desk. From
January 1985 to Februry 1991 he was Director of the paper.
FRANCOIS Jean
Wrote one article in 1947 on Algeria.
* FREDERIX Pierre
Contributed to Le Monde, especially articles about the
French Union in 1951. Le Monde records also state that he wrote
articles on Latin America from 1945 to 1953.
FROMENT Pierre
Born in 1896, an associate of the Sarl/Le Monde, a Professor
in various Institutes and a specialist on questions of Agricul-
ture. He wrote in Le Monde from its first appearance in Decem-
ber 1944 to 1947. He died in 1959.
FROSSARD Andre
Author of a Libre Opinion in Le Monde in defense of Man-
douze: Ce Mandouze dont nous vient tout le mal, 28/11/55/p5.
FUNCK-BRENTANO Christian-Charles
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Born in 1894, son of the well known historian Franz Funck-
Brentano, associate of the company SARL/Le Monde from its
foundation in December 1944. He left it in December 1949 in
disagreement with the external/foreign policy of the paper. He
died in 1966.
GAUTHIER Robert
Born in 1901, former contributor to Le Temps, where he was
Assistant to the Head of the general section from 1928 until
the War. A philosophy Graduate, he joined Le Monde where he was
put in charge of the general section. In 1951 he became Assis-
tant editor-in- chief, which he remained until 1963. He died in
1966.
GILSON Etienne
Born in 1884, Professor at the College de France, then a
teacher in Toronto, Canada. Member of the Academie, specialist
in mediaeval Philosophy. He was an outside contributor to the
paper from 1945 to 1950. He played a major role in the elabora-
tion of the newspaper's policy and led the campaign of armed
neutralism for Europe, 1949-1951. His articles were said to
have caused des remous d'une incroyable violence.
GRIGNON-DUMOULIN Jacques
Born in 1929, joined the paper in 1956, Editor of the for-
eign section, specialist on Iberia and Latin America. In the
foreign section until 1964. He wrote the articles dealing with
the Spanish strike.
* GUERIF Jacques
Editor in the foreign section from 1945 to 1952, a special-
ist on Asia and the French Union.
HERREMAN Philippe
Born in 1928, joined the paper in 1956 as overseas editor,
became Editor-in-Chief from 1990 to June 1993, when he retired.
HOURDIN Georges
Born in 1899, Doctor in Law, journalist from 1928 (Vie
Catholigue), he wrote a number of articles from 1945 onwards.
JACOB Alain,
Born in 1932, joined the paper in 1957 (overseas service
especially, North Africa), then Then foreign correspondent in
London, Moscow and Peking. Assitant Head to the foreign section
from 1984 to 1991. Assistant head in the Literary section since
1991.
JULIEN Claude
Born in 1925, studied political science in the USA, author
of a number of books on America, joined the paper in 1951 in
the foreign section, worked in the redaction: service etranger,
then Assistant-head of the service, especially problems of
North and Central America. Editor-in-chief of Le Monde Diploma-




Born in 1900, a long term member of the Radical Party,
Assistant Director of the IFP, wrote many articles on the
press, Editor for Le Monde between 1951 and 1956, specialist of
the Cold War. He died in 1963.
KNECHT Jean
Born in 1912, a graduate in Literature, joined the paper in
1951, Editor foreign section, then Le Monde's permanent corre-
spondent in Washington. He left the paper in 1972.
* LACOUTURE Jean
Born in 1921, graduate in Literature, Law and Political
Science, joined the paper in 1951, in charge of overseas ques-
tions. In 1953, he left the paper to become Cairo Correspondent
for France Soir. He came back to Le Monde between 1957 and
1962, when he was in charge of the overseas service, especially
North Africa. He was a Grand reporter from 1962 to 1972.
LEGRIS Michel
Born in 1931, joined the paper in 1956 as Editor, working in
the general news section, left the paper in 1972.
LE MOYNE Julien
Editor in the overseas service from 1956 to 1967. Author of
many articles on North Africa and Turkey. Le Monde's correspon-
dent in Istambul. He died in 1967.
LEVEUF Andre
Editor of Le Monde from 1951 to 1955 in the general news
section. He died in a terrorist ambush in Morocco in 1955.
MANN Georges
Born in 1921, joined the paper in 1951, editor in the poli-
tics section then assistant head of the section. Specialist in
Parliamentary affairs (transactions de couloirs), he remained
with the paper until 1961.
MANDOUZE Andrd
A Lecturer at the University of Algiers. He made a speech at
an International congress , Algeria in a state of War. A sympa-
thiser of the Algerian cause, he contributed occasional arti-
cles to the paper. One led to his arrest on 26/11/56/ and to
his house being searched.
MANNONI Eugene
Born in 1921, worked for Le Monde from 1954 to 1961 as
editor in the general news section, then as chief reporter
(Grands reportages) on the Algerian War and Trials.
MARROU Henri
Born in 1904, a Professor at the Sorbonne, a specialist in
the History of Christianity, wrote occasional articles for Le
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Monde and Esprit, under the pseudonym of Henri Davenson.
MARTEL Pierre-Albin
Overseas Departement editor from 1953 to 1956.
MATHIEU Gilbert
Born in 1928, joined Le Monde in 1952, worked in the econo-
mics section (specialist on housing), then second in command
and finally head of the section, which he directed until his
death in 1980.
* MESSUD Gaston
Outside contributor to Le Monde from 1946 to 1950. He wrote
many articles on Algeria.
MINAY Philippe
Wrote articles on Algeria from 1955 to 1958.
PENCHENIER Georges
Born in 1919, joined Le Monde in 1945 in the foreign sec-
tion. He became successively special correspondent of the paper
in Prague, then Vienna until 1953. From 1953 to 1956 he was
Grand Reporter of the paper. He left the paper in 1956 in the
Temps de Paris affair and joined French Radio and Television.
PIERRE Andrd
Born in 1887, graduate in Literature (agre0), author of
numerous books, Secretary of Le Temps from 1933 to 1943, he
joined Le Monde at its inception in December 1944. Worked in
the foreign section, then second in command of the section, a
specialist in Slav and Sovietic affairs. He retired in 1957 and
died in 1966.
PIERRE Henri
Son of Andrd PIERRE (above), born in 1918, joined the paper
in December 1944 as editor in the foreign section. From 1950
to 1953 he was second in command of the foreign section. Var-
ious posts thereafter, Washington's Permanent Correspondent
1953 to 1960, then London and Moscow. He retired in 1981.
* PIERRON R.
Outside contributor of Le Monde, wrote a series of three
articles on Algeria in 1945.
PIGNEAU Charles
Le Monde's reporter on Algeria and Morocco between 1955 and
1956.
PLANCHAIS Jean
Son of doctor and member of the Resistance, who died in a
concentration camp. Joined the paper on 1 November 1945, as
trainee editor in charge of the Defence section, then editor-
in-chief of that section, then head of the general news section
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( 1979-to 1987). When he retired in 1987 he was Assistant
Editor-in-chief of Le Monde.
POIROT-DELPECH Bertrand
Born in 1929, Philosophy graduate, joined the paper in 1951
as editor in general news section, worked in the Judiciary
section, became theatre critic after the death of R. KEMP.
* ROURE Remy
Born 1885, former journalist of Le Temps, a deportee to
Auschwitz and Buchenwald. Joined the paper upon his return to
France in 1945, when H.Beuve-Mery asked him to manage the
paper. Wrote articles on domestic policy. Left the paper in
1952 because of his disagreement with the policy orientation of
the paper (Atlantic Pact and Fechteler report). Author of a
number of books under the name of Pierre Fervacque, he also
contributed to Le Figaro.
* SABLIER Edouard,
Born 1920 in Baghdad, son of a Consular Attaché, a Law and
Oriental Languages graduate, joined the paper in 1945 as editor
in the foreign section, then Grand repoprter and editorialist
on the Middle East/Orient, also chroniqueur BBC RTF. He wrote a
number of books on the Middle East under the pseudonym Chamard.
SCHWOEBEL Jean
Born 1912, Literature graduate with a doctorate in Law,
began his journalistic career in 1932. Joined Le Monde in 1945
as editor in the service êtranger, then became head of the
diplomatic section.
President and founder of the Societe des Redacteurs of Le
Monde in 1952. He also wrote for Têmoignage Chrftien. He
retired in 1977.
SERVAN-SCHREIBER Jean-Jacques
Born in 1924, a graduate of the Polytechnique, Editor in the
foreign policy section of Le Monde from 1948 to 1953. He later
joined L'Express as co-Director with Frangoise Giroud in 1953.
SIMON Pierre-Henri
Born in 1903, a graduate of ENS, with a degree in Literature
(Agr60), Dean of the Fribourg Faculty of Letters
(Switzerland), a Professor since 1949, wrote important articles
(raflexions philosophiques et literature). After the death of
E. Herriot in 1961, he succeeded him as head of La Vie litter-
aire in the paper. He died in 1972.
* TAILLEMAGRE Jean,
Born 1907, Farmer and prize-winning author. Wrote from 1947
a monthly article/column, La vie au champs, until 1981. Used
the pseudonym Comte Arnaud de Pesquidoux.
THEOLLEYRE Jean-Marc,
Born in 1924, member of the Resistance, deported to Buchen-
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wald, where he met Remy Roure. Joined the paper's redaction in
the general news section. Left the paper in 1957 to work for
Paris Journal, came back to Le Monde in 1959 where he dealt
with the judiciary section (trials and reports).
VAUSSARD Maurice,
Born in 1888, degree in Italian, a former Director of the
French Institute in Milan. He wrote a number of articles on
Italian history, civilisation and political life from 1945 to
1964.
VIANSSON-PONTE Pierre
Born in 1920, doctorate in Law, first worked for AFP, then
head of the political section from 1948 to 1952. Editor-in-
Chief of L'Express from 1953 to 1958. He joined Le Monde
(again) in 1958 as head of the politics section. Succeeded
Jacques Fauvet in Le Monde.
From 1974 he wrote a regular article/column "Au fil de la
Semaine". He died in 1979.
VIGNAL Jean
Professor, then Director, of Studies at the Polytechnique,
One of the associate founders of Le Monde since December 1944.
WETZ Jean Joined Le Monde in 1949 in the foreign section. He
was special correspondent in London until 1969, then Belgrade,
Warsaw, New Delhi and Brussels. He retired in 1982.
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APPENDIX C
GOVERNMENTS OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
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Kent CT2 - 7 N X
Mons ieur, 
J'ai bien regu votre lettre du 6 fevrier. A ma connaissance
ii n'existe pas d'ouvrage pablie sur le Monde et l'Algerie.
Ii me perait difficile d'entreprendre une these sat ce sujet
sans u.n sejour a Paris. Nous vous faciliterions la consultation de nos
collections et de nos archives classees. Votre bibliographie me yarait
un peu. courte. Ii eat vra.i que des centaines d'cuvrages ont eté publies
en France Bur le conflit.
Pau' en revenir a notre journal, son attitude a evolue au
curs des longues arirees de gu c,rre . Ii a Ellr le plan politique preconise
devu.is 1947 et scn atatut non applipue, les solutions lea plus liber-iles
et a mene un dur combat pour lee droits de l'hornme et contre la repression,
qui lu.i a valu de nomtmeuses attaques des gouvernements et des partisans
de 1 1 Algerie Prangaise : saisies continuelles en Algerie et, a la fin,
attentats contre lea journalists . Ii a pris ensu.itP nettement parti
pour 1' indepencThnce
Veuillez agi4er, Monsieur, 1' assurance de mes sentiments lea
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Costa Green. Birmingham 84 7ET/Tel. 021.359 3611 Ex 280
Department of Modern Languages
P • otessJr ot	 .•	 D E Ago , BA P.,0
Professor of Language F Knowles MA. MSc
Reader in General Linguistics J 0 Ellis, BA PhD
Reader in the Histor y of European Universities J M Fletcher MA. DPhil
nimp/Lin4
Dear Mohammed Khane
Following your letter of 19th February, I would first advise you that the most
useful books on the history of the newspaper "Le Monde" are:
Jacques THIBAU - Le Monde; histoire elan journal; un journal dans lthistoire
(Paris, Grasset, 1978)
J-N JEANNENNEY + JZULLIARD - Le Monde de Beuve-Mery
(Le Seuil, Paris, 1979)
On Algeria as such I hope you have seen the work of Charles-Robert AGERON of
Tours University. Last year he published a history of the Maghreb and he has
produced many other works on the three North African francophone countries
which complement the works of Charles-Andre GULLIEN.
Your letter suggests that you do not have any specific angles that you Irish
to pursue at this stage. I think the best thing is for you to start the
reading: use also Claude BELLANGER et ALII - Histoire generale de la presse
frangaise (P.U.F., Paris, 1976), Tomes iv, v. Then write to me indicating
angles you particularly want to follow. One of the persons whom it would be
advisable to consult as early as possible is Charles GULLIEN, Editor of
Le Monde Diplomatique, but it is not wise tb approach him until you have made
some may with your initial research.
Yours sincerely







I am afraid I have not been working on French politics
for 10 years, so I am not really the right person to ask. But I
have asked my colleagues who are working on it and they think the
subject is quite a good one, and that no one is working on it as
far as they know. If you really want to make sure, you could write
to M. Alfred Grosser, Fondation nationale des sciences politiques,
27 rue St Guillaume, 75007 Paris; or, I ulderstand there is a professor
called Miege at the university at Aix-en-Provence where he runs a
Centre d'Etudes Nord Africaing iand he would certainly know.
Your list of books includes most of those which I would
have suggested, but you might add the following:
The Memoirs of Soustelle, Michelet and Buron
J. Kraft, The Struggle for Algeria
E. Behr, The Algerian Problem 
C.H. Favrod, La Revolution Algerienne
Joan Gillespie, Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution 
P.M. de la Gorce, La R4Publique et Son Arnie 
T. Oppermann, Le Probleme AlOrien 
These are good books on Algeria, but I am not sure that they are any
use to you on Le Monde. Clark should be M.K. Clark, Algeria in Turmoil. r
Paillat's initial is C. and he wrote another book called Dossieree 	 "xe
l'Algeriejt-Sexre, two volumes, which may or may not overlap the one you 	 A
have given. There is rather more about Algeria in my collection of essays
Wars, Plots and Scandals in Post-war France, than in Crisis and Compromise.














31st May 1984Mr. M. Khane,







Thank you for your letter of March 27 which has only just been
forwarded to me from Macmillans.
I do just remember the letter you wrote to me about Le Monde 
some two years ago. I am afraid I am very much out of touch with
matters concerning the Algerian war, as you will appreciate I have
not been back to Algeria since 1973 and my book was published already
some six years ago. Therefore I do not really feel that I can offer
anything new, or helpful at this stage, but obviously I wish you well
with your thesis.
Yours sincerely,
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